
Muslim
Democracy
Politics, religion and society in
Indonesia, Turkey and the Islamic world
Edward Schneier
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This is a ground-breaking comparative study of the Muslim world's struggle for democracy that transcends the simple cliches and polemics of an oft-asserted 'incompatibility' between the two. The book applies democratization theories to highlight events, factors and solutions explaining 'crucial' cases of Muslim democracy—Turkey and Indonesia—but also broader trends in the nexus between Islam, modernization, and democracy in the Muslim world. Written in an accessible language, the book will provide a valuable guide for students and researchers working in the areas of comparative democratization, Islamic politics, and twilights of democracy, secularism, religion and politics, and human rights in Muslim societies.

Arolda Elbasani, *European University Institute, Florence*

Sometimes it seems like we have shifted seamlessly from ignoring religion's role in politics to overstating it when it comes to explaining the relative dearth of democracy in Muslim-majority societies. In his challenging and provocative new book, Schneier persuasively insists on the re-emphasis of political factors in accounting for the complex relationship between Islam and democracy across the globe.

Timothy A. Byrnes, *Colgate University*

Muslim Democracy

Muslim Democracy explores the relationship between politics and religion in forty-seven Muslim-majority countries, especially those with democratic experience, such as Indonesia and Turkey, and drawing comparisons with their regional, non-Islamic counterparts. Unlike most studies of political Islam, this is a politically focused book, more concerned with governing realities than ideology. By changing the terms of the debate from theology to politics, and including the full complement of Islamic countries, Schneier shows that the boundaries between church and state in the Islamic world are more variable and diverse than is commonly assumed.

Through case studies and statistical comparisons between Muslim-majority countries and their regional counterparts, *Muslim Democracy* shows that countries with different religions but similar histories are not markedly different in their levels of democratization. What many Islamists and Western observers call "Islamic law," moreover, is more a political than a religious construct, with religion more the tool than the engine of politics. "Women who drive in Saudi Arabia," says the author, "are not warned that they will go to hell, but that they will go to jail." With the political salience of religion rising in many countries, this book is essential reading for students of comparative politics, religion and democratization interested in exploring the shifting boundaries between faith and politics.

Edward Schneier is professor emeritus of political science at the City College of the City University of New York, USA.

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Introduction

Indonesia, Turkey and the Islamic world

There are forty-seven countries in the world in which people of the Muslim faith are in the majority. In the 2013 Freedom House survey of global governance, only one is rated "free." Twenty-one achieve the ranking of "partly free," and twenty-five are listed as "not free."[1] It is not surprising that some observers consider the phrase "Muslim democracy" an oxymoron.

The so-called Arab Spring of 2011, a series of spontaneous uprisings in some of the world's most authoritarian polities, has intensified interest in the questions of whether, how or when a new wave of democratization, this one centered in the Middle East and North Africa, might be underway. The struggles to replace the fallen dictators in Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia and Libya have rekindled interest in those Islamic countries—Indonesia and Turkey in particular—whose steps toward democratization have been relatively successful. They have also raised the intensity of a more philosophical debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Long the domain of theologians and a handful of area studies specialists, the question literally flew into academic and political prominence in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 (also known as 9/11) and the subsequent Western responses in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Few areas of political or scholarly dialogue are more polarized. Even before 9/11 a substantial body of literature asserted that the values of Islam were utterly incompatible with those of Western democracy and predicted an inevitable, and probably violent, "clash of civilizations." The phrase "clash of civilizations" was popularized by the late Samuel Huntington, who used it to describe the displacement of rivalries between nation-states with an emerging conflict between cultures, Islam and a modernized West in particular.[2] The term seems actually to have been coined in a lecture by Princeton professor Bernard Lewis who describes the conflict in less stark terms than did Huntington. In *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East,* Lewis raises the more subtle and deceptively simple question of why a region that pioneered freedom, economic development and science fell so far behind. To "blame Islam as such," Lewis argues, is not "very plausible"; yet attempts to blame colonialism, Israel, the West in general or the "corruption" of Islam via Western concepts of modernization are equally

misguided.[3] While Lewis's own answer is murky, his short, readable history of the forces that led to the underdevelopment of a civil society conducive to democracy casts a long shadow over the ongoing debate. Lewis himself confines his discussion to the Middle East, an area he knows well. Many reviewers, however, including those quoted on the back cover of the paperback edition, cite the book as a study of the "Muslim world." The largest Muslim-majority countries—Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh (none of which is even adjacent to the Middle East)—are in fact home to nearly two-thirds of the world's followers of Islam; the Middle East is home to less than one-tenth. Yet the metonymical depiction of the Middle East as characteristic of all Islamic countries is common in the literature. "Islamic society" thus "becomes a generality constructed by others to describe Muslims and their cultures. It tells how others imagine what Muslims are and even how they should be. This world view has been perpetuated in part by some Muslim groups (mainly Islamists) who themselves construct a unitary Islamic landscape."[4] Yet even as a growing scholarly literature grinds away at this perspective, surprisingly little research attention has been given to a rich variety of Muslim-majority countries, especially those outside of the Middle East, regarding their struggles to establish the institutions of democracy.[5]

Since I am neither by training nor inclination a theologian, I approach these questions from the perspective of politics rather than religion. The issue, thus defined, is not about what the Koran and other religious sources tell us about the relationship between faith and politics, but rather what political actors in the world's Muslim countries do. Focusing especially on nearly a decade and a half of developments in Indonesia and nearly a century of developments in Turkey, the purpose of this study is to explore the compatibility of Islam and democracy through the lens of those Islamic countries which have been relatively more successful in consolidating democratic reforms. The secondary source literature on Turkey is substantial, and although scholarly studies on Indonesia have proliferated in both quantity and quality, much of the best work is too new to have been assimilated into the democratization literature. Indonesia's road to democracy, moreover, stands in interesting contrast with less successful efforts in Malaysia and other Islam-majority countries in the region. As a former colony rather than an empire, and as a democracy that has eschewed an explicitly secular constitution, it stands as a useful foil for Turkey in an attempt to develop a map of the roads to democracy in the Islamic world.

How typical of the Islamic world are Turkey and Indonesia? With one foot, so to speak, in Europe, one in Asia and a border with the Middle East, Turkey is often described as unique. There is a strong implication in Hefner's now-classic *Civil Islam*[6] that Indonesia stands apart as well; that it is, as one frequently hears, "Islam with a smile," or "disco Islam." Clearly, there is no typical Islamic country. The rigid, socially conservative authoritarianism of Saudi Arabia and some of its Middle Eastern and North African neighbors, which is sometimes depicted as typical, actually has few parallels outside of

the region. Iran's quasi-democratic theocracy is both historically and politically unique. And the Muslim-majority countries of the former Soviet Union (some of which are still rigidly secular) are surely special cases. Is it legitimate then, to study comparative politics in a construct known as the Muslim world? What makes this question particularly cogent is the argument by analogy which suggests that in the absence of studies of the Catholic, Jewish or Hindu world, references to a Muslim world must clearly signal an agenda of hostility, or a form of orientalist stereotyping that inevitably distorts reality.

The most pertinent answer to this question is that the long-standing erasure of religion as a key variable in studies of politics, society and culture has missed a vital dimension of reality. What Hurd argues for students of international relations has broader applicability:

> I argue, first, that the secularist division between religion and politics is not fixed but rather socially and historically constructed; second, that the failure to recognize this explains why students of contemporary international relations theory and practice have been unable to properly recognize the power of religion in world politics; and finally, that overcoming this problem allows a better understanding of crucial empirical puzzles in international relations, including the conflict between the United States and Iran, controversy over the enlargement of the European Union to include Turkey, the rise of political Islam, and the broader religious resurgence both in the United States and elsewhere.[7]

It is more than a little ironic that many of the same social scientists who give scant credence to broad generalizations regarding the role of religion in contemporary society continue to cite Max Weber's classic linkage of the Protestant ethic to the rise of capitalism.

A second rationale for focusing on the "Muslim world" is one of comparative methods. The editor of a film journal, reacting to charges that his proposed discussion about Muslim movies was in some sense perpetuating a stereotype, said simply that "to compare is not to conflate."[8] If Indonesia is not India, and Turkey is not Argentina, the problems of assessing the relationships between faith and politics are more manageable within denominational boundaries, on the one hand, and regional patterns, on the other. To compare a Muslim-majority country in the Middle East with a Catholic country in, say, Latin America, and thereby attribute the differences solely to religion makes little sense. Thus in Chapter 3 I look at what we might call the worst case scenario, the Middle East and North Africa, at once the birthplace of Islam and the worst case in terms of democratization. In Chapter 4 we move on to the other major regions of historic Muslim settlement—sub-Saharan Africa, South Central Europe and Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia—and compare countries with similar histories but disparate religions. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the processes,

prospects and problems of democratization in the Islamic world, and I examine also the divergent but relatively successful transitions achieved in Indonesia and Turkey.

Finally, I don't think it unfair to argue that by and large Islam today plays a bigger role in politics than most other religions do, and that it thus provides a useful focus for a broader discussion of the more general relationship between politics and the trans-denominational rise of faith-based political movements. The rise of a Hindu party in India, of militant Buddhism in Burma, even of fundamentalist Christians in the United States, is suggestive of the growing visibility and importance of religion in politics. Muslims throughout the world are more likely than most contemporary believers to report that religion plays a significant role in their everyday lives. A Gallup survey, whose findings were reprinted in John Esposito's *The Future of Islam*, ascertained that even in the USA Mormons were more likely (85 percent) than Muslims (80 percent) to emphasize the importance of religion. Moreover, according to Kamrava, "beginning in the 1970s, and lasting up to the present day, levels of religiosity have risen in depth and intensity among the Muslim masses all over the world."[9] Whether these pious proclivities carry over into politics, and what it means if they do, are different questions, but Islamic teachings arguably do reach further into the lives of their followers, or—to put it more succinctly—are more likely to overlap with politics, than are those of other faiths:

> Unlike a Christian church, which is separated from mundane activities and devoted only to worship, no activity was excluded from the mosque. In the Quranic vision there is no dichotomy between the sacred and the profane, the religious and the political, sexuality and worship. The whole of life was potentially holy and had to be brought into the ambit of the divine.[10]

Many would argue that this paints too bold a picture; that, on the one hand, followers of many religions profess to be guided by their faith in all aspects of their lives, while on the other hand, many Muslims can distinguish clear demarcations between matters of faith and politics. The point is that these distinctions are researchable rather than ordained; Islamic piety is a variable not an axiom.

The term "Islamist" has become almost standard usage to describe those Muslims who are most likely to subordinate aspects of their lives, politics specifically, to their religious beliefs.[11] Moataz Fattah's *Democratic Values in the Muslim World* attempts to determine the extent of Islamism in the Muslim world and includes a survey of more than 30,000 literate Muslims globally that provides a useful starting point. Though it does not draw upon a statistically valid sample, the survey, follow-up interviews, and focus groups provide a helpful snapshot of elite opinions. Those who Fattah labels "traditionalists" are close to a majority (46 percent) only in Saudi Arabia, and

average 17.6 percent of the overall survey. Those he counts as secularists, modernists and pluralists, conversely, together form clear majorities in most Muslim-majority countries as well as in the diaspora. The cautionary tale that lurks in Fattah's data is found in the extraordinary range of country-by-country responses that makes generalization difficult.[12] A more recent set of surveys conducted in thirty-nine countries by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public life found similar diversities. The percentage of Muslims who want to make Islamic law the law of the nation, for example, varies from a low of just 8 percent in Azerbaijan to 99 percent in Afghanistan.[13]

Implicit in the present study's focus on governance in general, and democracy in particular, is the notion that Islamic political thought—to the extent that there is a single coherent body of such thought—is filtered through diverse cultural and political contexts that shape its political implications. The question of whether or to what extent Muslims in these varied settings are willing to embrace the institutions of democracy, or, more importantly, the values of a democratic polity are, as Salwa Ismail puts it, "historically and materially grounded." While there may be a core of shared beliefs, "Muslims occupy differing and multiple positions in various social and national formations that shape how they relate to each other and to their government."[14] The relevant questions are about the ability of Islamic ideals, culturally and politically refined, to sustain democracies. Decades ago, Clifford Geertz argued that to develop the kind of civic culture congenial to democracy it was not essential to displace the "primordial sentiments" of religion and ethnicity but only to produce "an adjustment between them."[15] These "adjustments" are at the core of this book. To explore the relationship between Islam and democracy, at the same time, requires some reflection on the cultural lenses through which the question is being examined. One of Geertz's main contributions to the study of anthropology is the notion that the key to understanding the real meaning of many rituals comes through studying not the rituals themselves but how their audiences use and interpret them. In the same spirit, it is worth exploring not just the relationship between Islam and democracy, but also the ways in which European and American observers of this relationship have used and interpreted it; and, more importantly perhaps, how it has been used and interpreted in the Muslim world. Elizabeth Hurd makes this point with regard to the question of Turkish admission to the European Union (EU):

> The Turkish case is ... controversial in cultural and religious terms not only because it involves the potential accession of a Muslim-majority country in an arguably, at least historically, Christian Europe, though this is important, but also and more fundamentally because it brings up long-dormant dilemmas *internal* to Europe regarding how religion and politics relate to each other. Turkey's candidacy destabilizes the European secular social imaginary. It involves unfinished business in the social fabric of the core EU members, including what it means to be secular (both in Europe

> and in Turkey) and how religion, including but not limited to Islam, should relate to European life.[16]

If this book is about Islam and democracy in Muslim-majority countries, it is thus by implication at least about religion and politics more generally; and, to be somewhat more specific, about various concepts and practices of secularization. It is also, and this more directly, about the process of democratization in general; and, more specifically, about how religious variables figure into that process.

My primary focus, as noted, is on the more successful cases of democratization in the Islamic world, Indonesia and Turkey, in particular, with passing references to such interesting cases as Mali and Senegal. Setting these roads to democracy as paradigmatic, the test of the models is in those countries where democratization has, in one sense or another, foundered or failed. Brutal repression aside—as in Iran and Algeria at the height of the Cold War, or Syria and Bahrain more recently—the question of particular interest in countries like Albania, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Sudan is whether there is something in Islam itself that stands as an impediment to democratization. Here the answers clearly involve the issues of secularization already described, but they also wind through another very important theme in the literature of democratization: the relationship between modernization and democracy. To oversimplify a more nuanced debate, the argument is that a certain degree of modernization, defined largely in economic terms, is a prerequisite to democratization, and that there are aspects of Islamic beliefs and practices that inhibit modernization. However, while there is an intuitive logic to the argument that modernization is difficult in a society that seeks answers to twenty-first-century problems in the teachings of a sixth-century prophet, it begs the question of what it might be in Islam itself that distinguishes it in this regard from, say, Christianity, which has its own ancient texts. A growing body of literature suggests that the conceptual linkages between various definitions of "modernity" and "democracy," if they are not pre-packaged to fit a Western European or American model, are not as clear as they once appeared. Not only have some societies leapt the stages of development, there are a number of countries—the oil-rich rentier states of the Middle East in particular—in which the primary effect of modernization has been to give more tools to authoritarians. Many of the supposedly less "modern" movements in the Islamic world, moreover, most notably Al Qaeda, have shown themselves quite comfortable with a broad variety of sophisticated new technologies:

> "Islam," "democracy," and "modernity" are all contested terms. In many discussions, it is assumed that there is a fixed and single definition of each term. ... In the old standard format of the debates about the relations between Islam and democracy, the answers were simple and depended on the definitions rather than the analysis. However, the more recent conceptualizations of the issue can recognize that while Islam as defined by

> radical reactionaries may not be compatible with democracy, Islam and democracy are compatible in the faith and aspirations of most Muslims in the contemporary world.[17]

Fifteen years ago a doctoral candidate studying political Islam could reasonably have been expected to have read everything of significance written on the topic. In 2010, when I was asked to write a review essay on "Islam and Democracy," it was difficult to narrow the selection of general books to the sixty most pertinent titles.[18] Since then dozens of books on Turkey and Indonesia alone have been published, and there are specialists doing research in every one of the world's Muslim-majority countries. At a conservative estimate, the number of peer-reviewed, scholarly journals on topics related to Islam has doubled. The emphasis in most of this growing literature is theoretical and focused less on the politics of democracy than its sociology, more on political theory than practice. Prior to my brief residence in Jakarta, Indonesia, as a Fulbright fellow in 2001–02, my research interests were confined largely to political institutions in the United States. Working with Walter Murphy at a National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar in 1996 helped push me in a more comparative direction and resulted ultimately in my 2006 book on constitution making.[19] However, the real roots of both that book and this present one can be traced to my experience of working with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance as a consultant to the Indonesian parliament's Commission on Constitutional Reform where the focus was what kinds of institutions and processes work best in what kinds of environments.[20] Throughout the many conference discussions and formal hearings on the constitution of a new democracy, Islam was ever present and probably informing much of the dialogue, but the dialogue was about governance not faith. So is this book.

What I would like to think most distinguishes this book from others on the general topic of Islam and democracy derives from a subtle but important shift in the way the question is phrased. Instead of asking what there is in Islam that makes it compatible (or incompatible) with democracy, the question here is what features of democratic institutions and processes work in specific Muslim-majority countries? It is perhaps an exercise in what Euben calls "comparative political theory" that:

> entails the attempt to ask questions about the nature and value of politics in a variety of cultural and historical contexts. This presumes an understanding of political theory as defined by certain questions rather than particular answers. ... This approach builds on the possibility that disparate cultures are not worlds apart, morally and cognitively incommensurable, but exist in conversation with one another, even if they have serious moral and political disagreements.[21]

To professional political scientists it will be clear that my approach is largely institutionalist. What this means in less esoteric terms is that, "Different patterns of institutions today are deeply rooted in the past because once society gets organized in a particular way, this tends to persist."[22] Cultural forces, including religion, while not trivial are not determinative: they are filtered through political institutions that strongly influence both the nature and extent of their impact.

The organization of the book is straightforward. Chapter 1 provides a brief history of governance in the Islamic world from the days of the Prophet to the Arab Spring. Chapter 2 attempts to examine the general determinants of democratization, with particular reference to the role of religion in the process. Chapter 3 reexamines these basic issues with special regard to the actual politics and institutions of the Middle East and North Africa, with particular reference to what became known as the Arab Spring and the long, hot summer that it seems to have presaged. Chapter 4 covers the rest of the Muslim world, briefly comparing and contrasting problems of democracy in countries which are largely Islamic but not in the three major regions. Chapters 5 and 6 present case studies of Indonesia and Turkey and the countries' endeavors to build and sustain democratic polities. We conclude in Chapter 7 with an attempt to tease what lessons we can from these experiences as they relate to the ongoing relationships between faith and politics in the Islamic world and beyond. Each country's road to democracy must follow its own terrain, but implicit in this approach is that there are discernible patterns that determine democratization. Religion is part of this terrain. And I cannot help but acknowledge the persistent ringing in my head of my friend and former colleague Tim Byrnes's insistence that social scientists who think that religion has been rendered irrelevant in our secular world are, quite simply, wrong.

Notes

1 For the percentages of Muslims in independent countries here and throughout the book, we use the figures compiled by the Pew Research Foundation, available at www.pewresearch.org. The Freedom House ratings for 2013 are available from Freedom House at www.freedomhouse.org; and Arch Puddington, "The Democratic Gap," *Journal of Democracy* 25 (April 2014), 82–83.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
3 Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 156–57.
4 Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 2.
5 Interestingly, the term "Muslim democracy" does not seem to have appeared in the literature before a 2005 article by Vali Nasr introduced it as useful in describing a growing group of pragmatic leaders seeking to implement Islamic values through democratic elections. Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy,'" *Journal of Democracy* 16 (April 2005), 13–27.
6 Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

7 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1.
8 Ali Nobil Ahmad, "Is There a Muslim World?" *Third Text* 24 (January 2010), 8.
9 Mehran Kamrava, ed., *The New Voices of Islam: Rethinking Politics and Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
10 Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 14–15.
11 It is interesting how difficult it is to find meaningful yet neutral terms for describing the belief systems of people who derive their political priorities directly from their religious convictions. If an "Islamist" is a Muslim whose political ideology is shaped by his or her faith, there should be—but interestingly there aren't—comparable terms such as "Christianist" or "Hinduist." "Islamic radical" or "Jewish radical" doesn't help very much since many of the most fervent religious ideologues are more conservative than radical. Moreover, terms such as "fundamentalist" and "Zionist" are so specific to particular sects of particular faiths that they transfer poorly. Hence, the term "Islamist," with the suggestion that maybe we should start talking about "Christianists" and "Hinduists" as well.
12 Moataz A. Fattah, *Democratic Values in the Muslim World* (Boulder, CO; Lynne Reinner, 2006).
13 Pew Research Center, *The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society* (Washington, DC: Pew Center, 2013). Available at www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society/exec.aspx.
14 Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (New York: I. B. Taurus, 2003), 5.
15 As cited in Robert B. Hefner, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 49.
16 Hurd, 8. Emphasis in the original.
17 John O. Voll, "Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier?" in Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, eds, *Modernization, Democracy, and Islam* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 94–95.
18 Edward V. Schneier, "Islam and Democracy," *Choice* 49 (September 2011), 27–37.
19 Edward Schneier, *Crafting Constitutional Democracies: The Politics of Institutional Design* (New York: Routledge, 2006)
20 Edward Schneier, ed., *Continuing Dialogues towards Constitutional Reform in Indonesia: Report of a Conference held in Jakarta, Indonesia, October 2001* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002).
21 Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9–10.
22 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* (London: Profile Books, 2013), 44.

1 A brief history of the Islamic world

In 612 AD, two years after first hearing the voice of God, an Arab businessman, Muhammad ibn Abdallah, decided to devote his life to the articulation of an Arab monotheism based on the Abrahamic traditions of Judaism and Christianity. His worldwide following is now second only to that of Christianity. Expelled from Mecca in 616, Muhammad was welcomed as a prophet in nearby Medina, and was soon able to form a religious and political community that, for the first time in the Arab world, transcended tribal loyalties. In less than a decade, Muhammad and his followers had retaken Mecca and spread the faith throughout much of the Arab peninsula. The Prophet, however, left no instructions for his succession, resulting in multiple claimants and conflicting interpretations of his will that divide Islam to this day. In 632, Abu Bakr, Muhammad's friend and father-in-law, was chosen by most of the Prophet's close followers to be the head of the Muslim community. Bakr overcame the argument—advanced by the faction now known as Shi'ites—that Muhammad's mantle should pass through a direct line of descent to his cousin and son-in-law, Ali. Although Abu Bakr ruled for only two years before being assassinated, his successors—later known as Sunnis—extended Muslim rule across the Arab world and into North Africa. They established the caliphate system which soon became the paradigmatic pattern of Muslim political rule.

The caliphate

The traditional caliph, from an Arabic word, variously translated as "successor" or "representative," combined temporal and spiritual authority. Though never a prophet, because divine revelation ended with Muhammad, the caliph was expected to observe and defend the faith. Most of the early caliphs were generous in funding religious schools and building mosques, but their primary interests were more profane than sacred. Under their rule the Islamic world expanded rapidly and gave rise to a sophisticated civilization, culturally and scientifically the most advanced of its day. It superimposed on a society of nomads a growing network of cosmopolitan urban centers:

> In the government offices, private salons, and marketplaces of such towns, as well as of the imperial capitals of Damascus and Baghdad, a new Islamic literary culture in Arabic began to crystallize—all the more remarkable because before the rise of Islam, Arabic had no tradition of written literature. Poetry, grammar, Quranic studies, history, biography, law, theology, philosophy, geography, the natural sciences—all were elaborated in Arabic and in a form that was distinctively Islamic.[1]

The caliphs were not religious proselytizers and Islam has no missionary tradition. Their conquests were only inadvertently Islamic; their exploitation of the tribal wars and conflicts between the Persian and Byzantine Empires was "entirely pragmatic: they wanted the plunder and a common activity that would preserve" their emerging community.[2] Largely through the establishment of schools, the conversion of previously polytheist tribes, and the sense among the conquered that there were advantages in being on the winning side, the spread of the Islamic faith followed on the heels of both conquest and trade. And it was incredibly swift:

> By the mid-650s the Believers ruling from Medina had loose control over a vast area stretching from Yemen to Armenia and from Egypt to eastern Iran. And from various staging centers in this vast area, the Believers were organizing raids into areas yet further afield: from Egypt into Libya, North Africa, and Sudan; from Syria and northern Mesopotamia into Anatolia; from Armenia into the Caucasus region; from lower Mesopotamia into many unconsolidated districts in Iran and eastward toward Afghanistan and the fringes of Central Asia.[3]

The most extensive and long-lived caliphate, the Abbasid Empire—in power from roughly 750 to 1250—developed an elaborate bureaucracy and a professional army, but remained relatively removed from religious activism. Followers of other monotheistic religions—Zoroastrian, Christian and Jewish—were often taxed at higher rates, but tolerated. With the caliph and governing bureaucracy in Baghdad and the center of religious scholarship in Mecca, an implicit separation of powers was developed. So long as its members did not challenge state authority, each religious community was allowed to enforce its own civic code. Non-Islamic traditions of marriage, family and property law were generally applied within their communities as Islamic law applied to Muslims. Although the caliphs claimed the authority to make religious rulings, in practice:

> the tendency to separate political and religious authority seemed unavoidable. As conquerors and emperors, the caliphs increasingly became political leaders with only a symbolic form of religious authority; the authority to promulgate or discover law, to make judgments on matters of belief, and to instruct ordinary Muslims devolved on the ulama and

> the holy men. By the time of the Abbasid Empire's collapse, political and religious authority thus belonged in practice to different people, although this was not yet recognized in theory.[4]

The early caliphates ruled almost exclusively in lands dominated by Sunnis. In Sunni Islam, the caliph "functions as the political and military leader of the community, but not as their prophet. In Shia Islam, the Imam (leader) ... is not only the political but also the religious leader of the community. Though not a prophet, he is considered the divinely inspired, sinless, infallible, authoritative interpreter of God's will as formulated in Islamic law."[5] If the Sunni caliphs claimed no such role, and seldom interceded in the interpretation of sharia law, neither were they entirely neutral in their relations with the ulama. The leading ulama, from the Arabic word for scholarly wise men (sometimes written in English as ulema), though not an institutional clergy, as in Catholicism, nevertheless presided over substantial agglomerations of mosques, schools and other institutions. Their trained expertise in interpreting the Koran and applying its wisdom to contemporary problems gave them an especially important role, particularly in setting the standards of orthodoxy in schools, courts and mosques which were often coterminous. Financial support for these complexes generally came from private donors and communicants, but elaborate patronage systems also emerged, which favored Sunnis over Shias and particular sects, movements and individuals within Sunni groups.

As the caliphate expanded, both the bureaucracy and the professional army were stretched too thinly to govern a huge and diverse empire and at the same time protect its flanks from Christian crusaders from the north and Mongol invaders from the east. The growing complexity of the empire as well as its increasing reliance on paid mercenaries and slaves/soldiers simultaneously weakened it from within. The great Islamic scholar, Ibn Khaldun, acknowledged by many as the father of modern sociology, described North African and Middle Eastern society as an arena for ongoing conflict between the sophisticated urban centers of the caliphates on the one hand, and the more war-like, less sophisticated, tribes of the nomads on the other. As the former became larger, more complex and diverse, they lost their social cohesion and became increasingly vulnerable to the more compact, unified cultures of tribal nomads. Power founded in military might and royal authority would slowly lose out to the more intense loyalties of regional tribes. As the new leaders were assimilated in turn into the civilizations they had vanquished, they too would lose their solidarity and appetite for war. Other forces were at work, as Khaldun acknowledges, but the basic cyclical pattern of rise and fall which he described held at least until the advent of European colonialism, and in some cases even beyond that.[5]

Even as the caliphate succumbed to centrifugal forces, the cosmopolitanism of the region persisted, if only at times through the transmission of religious knowledge, and in the institutional structures of religious life. Although Islamic law pervaded the region with increasing uniformity and sophistication,

held together in no small part by scholars like Khaldun, who was born in Spain, migrated to Tunisia, studied in Fez, moved to Algeria, and passed his last days in Egypt, the emergence of a distinctive Islamic religion took centuries to evolve. While the early caliphs facilitated the spread of Islam, they also became the targets of an emerging religious piety that both absorbed and transcended tribal divisions.[6] Even as the decline and eventual disintegration of the Abbasid Empire decimated the number of Muslims living *dar al Islam* (in territories governed by Muslims), the Islamic world community continued to spread, particularly along the trade routes opening and expanding into Africa and Asia. Increasing contact with this wider world stretched and divided the empire and left it vulnerable to conquest.

Unlike Christianity, which is heavy on doctrine, Islam—like Judaism—lays emphasis on law. The idea "that to be a Muslim is to accept Islamic law" applies both to those living in Muslim-majority countries and to those outside of its formal jurisdiction.[7] The Koran is the foundation of that law, but just as the Prophet was called upon to interpret and apply it to everyday problems, so there is a continuing need to interpret it. Thus, as the Islamic world grew and diversified and while the coherence provided by the caliphates declined, the gap between Shi'ites and Sunnis widened, minor sects proliferated and the importance of those defining and applying the details of Islamic law, the ulama, increased as well. There were both centrifugal and centripetal forces at work that tended to decentralize the faith as it accommodated new cultures, yet making it more uniform as the scholars interacted with one another. A system of connected schools, or madrasas, increasingly standardized training. Freed from the commercial and personal ambitions of state actors, the mosques turned in upon themselves providing a coherent set of doctrines and laws on the one hand, and insularity on the other: learned in the language of Koran, they were often unfamiliar with the native tongues of the citizenry or—to an increasing degree—with other cultures.

While there is no widely accepted theory as to why Islam lost its dynamism, there is a general consensus that the golden age, during which the Islamic world was at the center of science, learning and culture, began to turn in upon itself some three to five centuries after the death of the Prophet. What had been the foremost economic, military and scientific force in the world lost much of its edge. Medieval Europe, which had been "a pupil and in a sense a dependent of the Islamic world"[8] became the engine of economic, military and intellectual change. In the Middle East, a new cadre of "traditionalist" ulama claiming that "Islam is the solution," and suspicious of ideas not founded in the scriptures, came to the fore. Revelation displaced reason as the medium of inquiry.

Turning inward

There was, arguably, too much diversity in the Islamic world to label the period after the demise of the caliphates a dark age. As with a comparable

period in Europe, scholars continue to disagree as to how much really changed (or failed to) from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries. On the one hand, Muslim scientists continued their research through much of what some scholars call "the Middle Period"; vigorous religious and philosophical discourses continued, particularly in fields tied to religious issues. On the other hand, a growing number of ulama harbored deep suspicions about intellectual traditions whose roots were pre-Islamic. Lacking access to the material resources of the caliphs, the ulama and the madrasas in which they studied and taught increasingly focused on those issues cutting most closely to the bone of theology. A growing number of hadiths—sayings attributed to the Prophet—were issued that limited rational inquiry in favor of religious injunctions. Many of these hadiths hardened Islamic law, but were less about real tradition than "the projection of the customs and values of the medieval Orient back to the Prophet."[9] Contemporary reformers argue that these hadiths, rather than the true teachings of Muhammad, are at the core of many of contemporary Islam's more conservative injunctions. Mustafa Akyol argues, for example, that in the Koran's retelling of the story of Adam and Eve it is Adam rather than Eve who is the deceiver:

> But in the Qur'anic commentaries written in the third century of Islam, Eve started to receive the blame. This occurred at the same time that dozens of new Hadiths appeared, defining women as cunning, insidious, and immoral creatures. No wonder that Islamic feminists of our times often uphold the Qur'an in order to challenge misogynistic Hadiths, which they see as products of the male-dominant ideology.[10]

Mongol conquerors, and other increasingly secular caliphs, were generally content to leave the interpretation and enforcement of the civil code to the ulama, provided that—like the caliphs—they did not challenge central authority. Thus, although Islam has no formal religious hierarchy:

> by the end of the fourteenth century the *ulama* had transformed the pluralism of the Quran into a hard communalism, which saw other traditions as irrelevant relics of the past. ... The trauma of the invasions had, not surprisingly, made Muslims feel insecure. Foreigners were not only suspect; they could be as lethal as the Mongols.[11]

In a pattern that recurs, reformers, usually calling for a "return" to lost values, blamed the incursions of the Mongols and the Europeans for the failure of Muslims to follow the "true" faith. In a broad sense:

> intellectual concerns shifted from innovation to preservation. Philosophy in particular was forced to give way to conservative theology. In the narrowing field of political freedoms, illuminative rationalist movements, especially Sufism, emerged as alternative forms of social inquiry without

explicitly declaring a political intent. In short, social and historic uncertainties and threats created a defensive intellectual aura.[12]

None of the Islamic reform movements produced splits comparable to those of the Reformation in Europe. At the same time as Aquinas and Christian rationalists in Europe were challenging the view that enquiry beyond the Gospel was superfluous, the opposite trend manifested itself in Islam. External threats from crusading Christians and Mongols provoked a turning inward that would last five centuries. The schisms in Europe that "almost compelled Christians to secularize their states and societies in order to escape from the vicious circle of persecution and conflict" never challenged the Muslim world.[13] This at least partially explains why the Islamic world was slower to develop strong nation-states. Thus as the Islamic world was fragmenting into shifting alliances of military kingdoms, and major migrations were disrupting cultural patterns throughout North Africa and the Middle East, Turkish warrior clans were expanding out of Anatolia and consolidating control of what were to become more potent Islamic empires. For nearly five centuries, the Muslim world would be dominated by the Moghul Empire of Delhi in the east, the Safavid Persian Empire centered in what is now Iran, and the Ottomans in the west.

The age of empire

At its peak in the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire extended over all of the old Byzantine Empire in what is now Turkey and Greece; the Balkan peninsula and even north of the Danube into much of what is now Romania, Moldavia and Hungary; the Middle East, including the holy cities of Mecca and Jerusalem; and most of North Africa. Its capital, İstanbul, was the largest city west of India, and its army was the largest in the world. For over 400 years it governed the Balkans, whose indigenous population was Christian, the core Islamic areas of the Arabian peninsula, and mixed provinces and peoples ranging across North Africa. Although the sultans were Muslim, and defined themselves as protectors of the faith, they were remarkably tolerant of religious minorities, serving as protectors of the Orthodox Church and providing a haven for Jews fleeing the Inquisition in Spain. Under its "millet" system, various religious communities were granted substantial power to set and enforce their own laws, collect taxes and—in varying degrees—to govern themselves. The empire's very size and diversity were emblematic of both its greatest strength and weakness. Paradoxically it was imperiled both internally by separatist forces of rising nationalism and externally by the rising imperialism of its European neighbors.[14]

To the east of the Ottomans, the Safavid Empire was less diverse but no less troubled by separatists, imperialists and hostile neighbors. Bordered on the north by tsarist Russia, the Ottomans to the west, Moghuls to the east and growing British and Portuguese interest in the port cities of the Persian Gulf

and Arabian Sea, the boundaries of the empire were in near-constant flux. Its Shi'ite rulers tended to be less tolerant than the Ottomans, and sectarian rebellions were more frequent. East of Persia, the Moghul Empire ruled most of what is now India, Pakistan and the surrounding mountain areas that together contained nearly a quarter of the world's population. Muslims, the ruling minority, were sometimes more, sometimes less, tolerant of their largely Hindu subjects. Indeed the Moghul rulers themselves, especially Akbar (1557–1605) and his immediate heirs, considered themselves "above the parochial prejudice of narrow sectarianism."[15] As Hinduism was not among the religions in the Abrahamic tradition protected by Islamic law, the "rulers of India faced the insoluble problem of either embracing India's non-Muslim majority and thereby offending their strict Muslim followers, or else offending the non-Muslim majority in order to satisfy strict Muslims."[16] For roughly two centuries Akbar and his successors played this balancing act rather well, until the later emperors sought to enforce Islamic rules more strictly and to expand the empire to the south. The Moghul Empire collapsed under the weight of these efforts.

At their peak in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the three great Muslim empires between them ruled over nearly half the peoples of Europe and Asia, controlled the Silk Road and other overland trade routes between Europe and Asia, and, as in the courts of the great European monarchies, amassed enormous riches. The magnificence of the palaces and mosques in İstanbul and India's Taj Mahal remain as monuments to both their high culture and their excesses. Ibn Khaldun's theory of cycles, can, with certain caveats, be applied to them as well as to the early caliphates. The very ethnic and religious diversity that made these regimes beacons of affluence, culture and the arts contained the seeds of conflict between the sophisticated and cosmopolitan centers of society and the more cohesive and violent cultures of the periphery. The new forces of decentralization were nationalistic and ethnic rather than tribal, exacerbated by a growing willingness of outside powers to side with internal dissidents, Russia with fellow Serbs in the Balkans and Iran, Britain and France in Egypt, for example, and of course Britain in India. It was a long time, however, before the Ottoman Empire became known as "the sick man of Europe," the Moghul Empire faded into the sunset of the British Empire or the shahs of Iran lost effective control. Ironically, it was, in part, their growth as world powers and involvement with Europe that, in an increasingly globalized world of finance, precipitated their downfall. In order to maintain their armies, bureaucracies and lavish lifestyles, the sultans and shahs became increasingly dependent upon the European money markets. Empires proved expensive to maintain; their histories, moreover, as with the Ottomans, were "of almost unbroken warfare, first as the Turks fought to capture territory in Europe and then as they fought to keep from losing it. In the more than six centuries between the coronation of the first Ottoman sultan around 1300 and the fall of the last one in 1922, the longest period of peace lasted just twenty-four years."[17] In the throes of its decline, as much as

40 percent of the Ottoman Empire's budget was allocated to supporting its army, navy and internal police. "Seven years of almost uninterrupted hostilities (with Italy, 1911–12; in the Balkans, 1912–13; and in the First World War) brought the Ottoman Empire closer to being a garrison state than it had perhaps been at any time since its infancy."[18] Moreover, despite the sophistication of their urban centers the three great Muslim empires remained, in a sense, economic backwaters. The overland trade routes they controlled were bypassed and superseded by the more efficient naval routes to the Orient that were increasingly dominated by corporatist Europeans.

The most durable of these empires was the Ottoman. Despite periods of significant reform, the empire kept one foot firmly planted in the past. The rise of the nation-state and what Anderson calls the "imagined communities" of nationalism left the core of the empire neither Turkish nor Ottoman.[19] The idea of the nation-state presupposed a collective memory that the empire's decentralized system could not provide. For the old empire to become a modern state it needed either to bring Islam into the equation or bypass it entirely, as Atatürk was later to do. The sultans, however, were never entirely able to do either. The elaborate, quasi-patrimonial system they had constructed left large pockets of independent power, such as that which lay with the ulama, whose relations with the sultans were both pillars of their claim to rule and challenges to their authority. In effect, by leaving the educational system entirely in the hands of the parochial madrasas, no Turkish, Serbo-Croat or other vernacular language was taught in the schools, which were almost entirely devoted to Arabic-language studies of religion. Children who spoke no Arabic memorized passages from the Koran, a few prayers and perhaps some math, but gained few practical skills or training in their own language. The mosque and their ulama were the cultural glue of the empire, providing cultural links to its otherwise diverse community. Its largely uniform role in education, the judiciary and the civil service gave the clergy a key, albeit unofficial, role in the state.[20] Particularly in the Arab parts of the empire, these ties gave the empire legitimacy even as they impeded modernization and discouraged training in the mundane skills of running an increasingly complex society.

Recognizing the poor skills of its officer corps, the military established as early as 1773 special training academies in what became a wider top-down effort to reorganize the system of education. Military reforms became the opening wedge for a series of often Western-modeled changes in everything from the civil service to land laws and the courts that collectively became known as the Tanzimet (reforms) implemented largely between 1839 and 1877.[21] Those aspects of the Tanzimet that limited the arbitrary powers of the Sultan and adopted the principles of legal equality and proportionality between crime and punishment were well received. More controversial were those that tended to undermine the status of the ulama. Although their schools and other institutions remained untouched, the parallel tracks of civil schools and courts gradually eroded the power and prestige of the religious

establishment. The ulama were not without their own resources, but the recurring cycles of reform that began with the Tanzimet combined with a rising middle class to produce, and, at the same time, reflect a growing wave of secularism.

The Tanzimet came too late and with too little impact to stem the forces of decentralization or solve the empire's growing financial problems. Deeply in debt to the British and the French, "the leaders did not realize, or realized too late, that economic and financial subjection to the great powers was no less a threat to political independence than defeat on the battle front."[22] And things had not gone too well on that front either. Napoleon's occupation of Egypt in 1798 displayed the weaknesses of the Ottoman armies and brought European balance of power politics into the region. Saved by the British from a disastrous defeat in the Crimean War, the empire lost no territory and, for better or worse, gained admission to the European diplomatic system. However, it was forced to concede control over the Balkans and the Black Sea. By the turn of the century, the British and the French had carved out spheres of influence in North Africa that left much of it under only nominal Ottoman control, and the Italians completed a sweep of the region with their invasion of Tripoli and Libya in 1911. The Balkan wars that followed were devastating in military terms and transformed the region. Hundreds of thousands of Christians and Muslims were deported, massacred or displaced between the two Balkan wars and World War I, which was to deliver the final blows. By the time of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the once massive empire had been reduced to the core of the country we now know as Turkey, a country without a solid identity of its own.

The shortcomings of reform

In 1877 the sultans had been forced to share power with an elected parliament. Dissolved a year later, it was soon "gone but not forgotten."[23] The Ottoman parliament would meet sporadically over the next half century when first the "young Ottomans" and later the "young Turks" used it as both a forum for and a target of their reform agenda, neatly summarized in the title of a popular book by Ziya Gökalp as "Turkicization, Islamization, Modernization."[24] Thus, "Although the parliamentarian phase lasted only for a short period, the fifteen months of constitutional rule marked a turning point. ... The genuinely modern forces of the bureaucracy, the army and the intelligentsia were breaking away from the traditional claim to power of the Ottoman dynasty."[25] Of particular importance was how the military emerged as a prime mover in the process of modernization. Together with elements of the bureaucracy and a rising urban middle class it was the social force that had struck the modern world before the arrival of imperialist Europeans. The collapse of the empire—not just in the Ottoman world but across North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia—left the emerging new nations of the region politically fragmented and divided within themselves between the

secularly trained elites and the traditional pre-modern cultures of the countryside.

The Tanzimet reforms had clearly extended the life of the empire. If nothing else, they created a new class of Muslim intellectuals, educators, bureaucrats and career military officers who were at once comfortable with European ideas and an evolving Islamic nationalism. The social networks thus created were in a parallel universe to the ideological world of the ulama with their continued control over large parts of the educational system, particularly in more rural areas:

> As a result, no broadly held notions of citizenship comparable to those of Europe could be institutionalized. ... [T]heir highly centralized and militarized bureaucracy proved neither capable of fully eradicating provincial state-subverting nationalism nor of institutionalizing a "national" civil society. In contrast to the European dialectic of militarism versus representation within a delimited nation-state, the Turkish state continued the Ottoman tradition of despotic autonomy with decentralizing opposition still largely centered around peripheral religiosity.[26]

As the Tanzimet reforms took hold, the Ottoman Empire in fact became more rational and capable of effective governance. Faced with European encroachment—in North Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East—it was fighting a rearguard action, but did not disintegrate, as did its counterparts in Iran and India. Yet as much as the reforms required "a determined attack on traditional power-sharing arrangements" and a "radical rethinking of the relationship between ruler and ruled," the Ottoman "solution" was more symbolic than substantive. "Its response was very similar to that of other modernizing empires, such as Austria, Russia, and Japan, in the pressure cooker of the nineteenth century. The 'invention of tradition' dramatically increased the pomp and circumstance surrounding the sultan and all activities of state" without fully becoming a viable nation.[27] And thus, just as the major industrial powers were creating powerful democratic states, the sultans were circling the wagons in defense of the relics of absolute monarchy.

The two other great Muslim empires, the Moghuls in India and the Safavids in what is now Iran went through cycles of rise and decline which roughly coincided with those of the Ottomans. The Safavids had a more tenuous grip on power and were forced to negotiate their authority with local nobles, foreign influences, wealthy merchants and the ulama, who Azimi describes as "the most politically consequential and the least vulnerable subjects of the state."[28] From its peak in the 1700s, by 1850 the empire had lost its grip on Georgia, Armenia and the North Caucuses to Russia, and been forced to accept British control over much of Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. More interestingly, in retrospect, its nineteenth-century monarchs also lost control of their own base and became the Islamic world's second (albeit short-lived) representative democracy in 1906.

The history of modern Iran is largely one of "autocracy, foreign interventions, and revolutions."[29] Yet no country in the Islamic world has had a longer, more variegated or, one might say, bizarre experience with democracy. As the Safavid dynasty and its successor (the Qajars) disintegrated, a series of self-anointed shahs (from the Persian word for king) took control. They were able to do so largely by playing off against each other an increasingly diverse group of internal and external rivals: the British and the Russians, on the one hand; the ulama, bureaucrats, soldiers and an increasingly sophisticated urban middle class on the other. Iran's parliament was lively, fractious and virtually incapable of reaching consensus or exerting its potential powers. In the twenty years between the adoption of the constitution and the takeover by Reza Shah, nineteen prime ministers, largely drawn from the old families of the nobility, went through thirty-four cabinets and numerous reshuffles of the governing coalitions.[30]

The reformers, who probably did represent the majority, were never able to overcome the entrenched interests of the ulama, the nobility and a deeply imbedded system of patronage in which an official who lost office would lose his income and property as well. The ulama, who might have joined the reformers in opposing a system based on avarice and patronage, were too suspicious of possible secularization to do so. Unlike the Ottoman ulama, those in Iran were financially independent and wielded control over the schools, courts and many rural communities. The Iranian ulama, moreover, had developed a form of Shi'ism that made such cooperation unlikely. Believing that a messianic prophet would return in the future to restore a perfect society, the Iranian ulama had developed a hierarchy of religious leaders who had sole authority to interpret Islam. It was the role of these most learned imams (known as ayatollahs) to interpret the Koran and promulgate laws:

> The doctrine was a powerful one, powerful enough, for example, to enable the community to inscribe in its law principles and practices which seem to violate express Koranic statements. So, for example, the doctrine ... enabled the jurists to respond to the prevailing sexual standards of late antique and early medieval Near Eastern societies and accept a punishment for adultery—death by stoning, at least under certain conditions—in direct violation of an explicit Koranic verse, which called for a more lenient penalty.[31]

Under the prevailing Shi'ite doctrine, once the jurists had reached a consensus on a ruling such as this, it was accepted as having binding legal status, equivalent in effect to a Koranic principle or hadith. It was not a coincidence that it reinforced the role and authority of the ulama vis-à-vis the state.

The failure of the empire's constitutional government, made worse by foreign intrigues and the disaster of World War I, helped to pave the way for the advent of a new set of authoritarian rulers who used the civilian and military

elites to transform the ramshackle empire into a nation-state.[32] Many reformers, weary of the failure of constitutional government to provide order or economic modernization, actually welcomed the reemergence of strong shahs. And that is what they got. Putting Cossacks and the traditional army under a single command, the shahs created a modern state with a powerful and intrusive domestic police force. They secularized the schools and sent thousands of students to Western colleges; developed oil fields, built refineries, a railroad and a modern port; abolished the veil; and, not coincidentally, made themselves very wealthy. Sometimes referred to as "quasi-modernizers" they created the outward trappings of a modern state without reflecting on (or caring):

> how the erosion of legitimatizing institutions and the elimination of credible statesmen could mire the country in the calamity of ungovernability and political disorder. Proponents of autocracy, unwittingly or otherwise, ensured that its political alternative would involve collision, collusion, and shifting alliances among competing political clans and power fiefdoms that would inevitably mar the country's political future.[33]

The growing forces of nationalism, globalization and imperialism combined to render the three great Islamic empires obsolete. Lacking the nationalistic fervor (not to mention the material resources) of the expanding European empires, they became secondary players in a new game of global outreach that gradually painted the map of the world in European colors. Even as its political role declined, however, religious Islam continued to expand.

The growing world of Islam

Under the caliphs, and in the later empires, conversion followed conquest. In Southeast Asia and southern Africa, Islamization followed trade and usually preceded governance. Although the precise number of Muslims in each country is very much in dispute, the approximate pattern in Africa shows a marked tapering of the Islamic percentage of the population as one traverses from north to south and west to east. The northern rim of the continent, from Mauritania and Morocco, to Egypt and Sudan, is almost entirely Islamic. Countries on the overland trade routes across the Sahara and along the littoral routes of the Indian Ocean also have significant Muslim communities, particularly in seaport areas. Most of these communities can trace their origins as far back as the thirteenth century.

In both southern Africa and Southeast Asia, the gradual blending of Islam into the dominant sociopolitical culture tended to produce a rich array of variations on basic doctrine. Clifford Geertz's classic distinction between "syncretic" Muslims who combined Hindu and polytheist traditions with Islam, and their more orthodox neighbors has been questioned, modified and revised; but its rich description of a wide range of Islamic experiences is

essential to understanding the further reaches of the Islamic world.[34] In many parts of Africa, as in Hefner's description of Southeast Asia, "Muslim politics ... was varied from the start. At a few times and in a few places, there were pluralist tendencies not just in politics but in literature and religious practices as well."[35]

As a general tendency in Africa and Asia, when there were Muslim rulers, Islamic law was tempered with respect for traditional rites; where rulers were not Muslim, Islamic laws and rituals were, for the most part, bent toward local customs. Esposito relates the story of Mansa Musa, a fourteenth-century emperor of Saharan Mali, who was described as a pious Muslim. While on a visit to Mecca he was told "that his treatment of free women as if they were slave concubines was forbidden by Islamic law. 'Not even to kings?' Mansa Musa asked. 'Not even to kings,' replied the official, 'Ask the learned scholars.' Mansa Musa responded, 'By Allah. I did not know that. Now I will renounce it completely.'"[36] Although this story illustrates the blending of local traditions with orthodox Islamism, it also reveals an increasingly important counter-dynamic as globalization made the world more mobile. Rulers and ordinary citizens on hadj, scholars holding conferences and sharing papers, and merchants and tourists visiting other countries and their mosques increasingly encountered more mainstream practices which—in common with King Musa—they brought home. More recently, conservative Islamic doctrines have been spread throughout Asia and Africa through mosques, madrasas, the Internet and universities funded by oil-rich governments, Saudi Arabia in particular, or in Shi'ite areas, Iran.[37]

While the overwhelming majority of Muslims in southern Africa and Asia are Sunni, many adhere to the mystical Sufi branch which blends more easily with traditional rituals and practices. As urbanization, mass communication and population mobility increase, syncretic traditions are breaking down. In rural areas especially, beliefs are not necessarily monolithic, but the village imam "is the only local leader who has a regular, continuing, captive audience for his political views and his interpretations of Islam."[38] Where this once meant that there could be variations from one village to the next, travel, television and migration to urban centers have opened areas of choice and eroded syncretic traditions. There is still incredible diversity within the Islamic world—particularly at its geographic peripheries—but orthodoxies are emerging with greater clarity.

In the twentieth century the Islamic diaspora spread neither through conquest nor trade but as a by-product of globalization and—ironically perhaps—of colonization. The French, for example, having conquered much of northern and western Africa brought millions of Muslims under their flag and, when needed for cheap labor or military service, on to French soil itself:

> Eventually, many of these new residents presented themselves in the public eye as Muslims: not as workers or North Africans or post-colonials but as practitioners of a new *French* religion. The idea that Islam would

> take its place alongside Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism as a recognized religion, with services in public places, and schools, and special ways of marrying and burying—all this was very new for those French men and women ... who had thought that religion was on its way out of public life altogether.[39]

European domination

Despite often fierce opposition, every Muslim-majority country in the world, with the exception of Albania, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Yemen, was under overt European domination at the end of World War I. Few of the non-colonies, moreover, were truly independent. The Ottomans, beyond their internal problems, had chosen the wrong side in the war and were forced to give up both land and sovereignty. The neighboring Safavid Empire was similarly fragmented and assimilated into spheres of British and Russian influence. The "countries" of Africa and much of southern Asia, as products of European bargaining, were seldom founded in traditional communities. Beyond the economic and geopolitical motivations underlying imperialism, all of the colonizing powers to a greater or lesser extent justified their seizures of authority in terms of a civilizing mission that would bring modernity to backward societies and elevate rationalism over superstition. The tensions resulting from these lines of demarcation were intensified in Muslim-majority countries where Christian/Muslim distinctions were superimposed upon the wide cultural, economic and social divisions found in colonial systems. "The very deep-rootedness and coherence of Islamic civilizations before the advent of modern times gave added severity to the multiform challenges brought by Western domination. Islam and the West, it can be argued, is a special case."[40]

Muslim traders who had long dominated the Silk Road and other overland trade routes to Asia were increasingly challenged by aggressive, state-backed European commercial traders who quickly outpaced the Islamic world's long-standing domination of the key sea routes to the East. New sail technologies were a factor, but of perhaps greater importance was the ability of the Europeans to finance ever more sophisticated military and commercial fleets through a system of commercial banks—forbidden by Islamic usury laws—limited liability corporations that spread the cost of risky ventures to investors, and the invention of insurance as a method of spreading the burden of risk yet further. As the Europeans consolidated their trade monopolies, Muslim traders and sailors drew back into increasingly isolated ports, moved inland or resorted to smuggling and piracy. In the remaining port areas, such as Aceh, Brunei and Bantam in Southeast Asia, Islam provided the locus of resistance to European rule. "The grievances of Muslim traders were translated into an intense commitment to Islam—a commitment that has persisted in these areas to the present day."[41] Unlike Latin America where colonial governments and the Catholic Church simultaneously achieved dominance, or

southern Africa, where colonial rule was imposed on highly fragmented, largely tribal communities, colonial regimes in the Islamic world were overlaid upon sophisticated communities of believers with long histories of relations with the European world. Especially in Islam's historic centers of power and learning—from Baghdad and Cairo to the old empires—there was a true clash of civilizations as the Europeans tightened their hegemony.

The line of protected European port cities expanded rapidly along the coasts of Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands, then inland to the surrounding countryside. With some important variations, the process of colonization went through the same basic cycle. Beginning as purely commercial ventures seeking valuable commodities such as spices, precious metals and—particularly in Africa—human slaves, the colonies began to develop more permanent sources of revenue. Single crop plantations displaced sustainable small farms, and extractive industries such as mining and later oil became increasingly important, serving both to change the demography of the colonies and add a new constituency of wealthy investors to domestic support for the colonial enterprise. In some of the colonies—particularly those endowed with good land, water and favorable climate—permanent European settlements were established. In the early years of the colonial project, Spain was particularly "determined to establish a colonial system with complete control over native populations and lands supported by an active state-sponsored program of conversion to Christianity."[42]

Colonial policies differed from one country and one colony to another, and shifted over time according to political exigencies and deeper ideologies. The British tended to favor indirect rule in the Muslim areas of divided countries such as India, Nigeria and Malaysia. Although commercial and criminal matters were dealt with primarily by British-run common law courts, sharia courts handled family law issues in Islamic areas and traditional sultans and tribal leaders continued to administer local governments. Britain's shifting approaches to Islam in terms of working through or simply avoiding existing institutions, containing Islamic regions and sometimes actively repressing them left a mixed legacy. Similarly to the British, the Spanish and the Portuguese were motivated primarily by commercial concerns. Having experienced centuries of Muslim rule, both countries were considerably more eager than the British to challenge Islam on commercial and religious grounds. Beyond the coastal enclaves in India and southern Africa, in East Timor and the Philippines, their missionary efforts were far less successful in Muslim colonies than in Latin America and southern Africa. The Portuguese, with limited resources, went so far as to prohibit officers from bringing their wives over from Europe, but this had the paradoxical effect of creating significant Catholic Eurasian enclaves.[43] The Portuguese, like the French, also favored a gradual assimilation of colonies into the larger nation; indeed the French tended to give them representation in the National Assembly and granted some segments of the colonial population full citizenship.

Scholars are paying greater attention to what has been labeled "settler colonialism."[44] Where the native populations were relatively small and dispersed, the new settlers rather quickly came to dominate large areas. Unlike many Muslims, the natives of countries like Australia, Canada and the United States had no firearms and—not having had any commercial contact with the Europeans—were highly susceptible to diseases to which exposure had brought only partial immunity. As a result the native populations were overpowered through conquest and disease. Decolonization in settler colonies in these areas came rather quickly with the "new" settlers generally leading the charge. Attempts to settle in much of the Islamic world proved far more contentious as did the process of decolonization. Decolonization became an especially brutal process particularly in the African settler colonies of Algeria, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique. In some Muslim colonies, Indonesia, for example, the ulama led the opposition. In this conflict, often called the Java War of 1825–30, the Dutch tended to identify Islam as the basis for opposition, and the war took on the tone of being an anti-imperialist jihad. Dutch military superiority, and eventually divisions among the resistance, brought an end to the war after much loss of life and property. One important consequence of the war was that "renewalist, ulama-defined Islam became identified with opposition to foreign rule ... giving added strength to the processes of Islamization of social life among the peasantry."[45]

With the exception of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, where Catholic missionaries were part and parcel of the colonial incursion, religious institutions and practices were left pretty much intact. But lacking the patronage of the caliphs, or even the lukewarm support of the Ottoman sultans, the ulama continued to slide into a more narrowly focused religious role. What Nevzat Soguk calls "the triumph of theology over philosophy" had begun long before the European conquests. "Islamic knowledge ... meant not the science of medicine, engineering, chemistry, or astronomy anymore, but more and more the dense interpretive exercises that steadily grew into Sharia streams."[46] Nor were the colonial powers willing to encourage or allow the mosques to extend their functions beyond a focus on the spiritual concerns of their communities. However, their general tolerance of the mosques as religious institutions, combined with a tendency to restrict or ban all other forms of civil association, left the ulama as the only possible alternative to colonial rule, the focus for indigenous organizing of any kind and one of the few remaining viable institutions once liberation was achieved.

Anti-colonialism

For the settlers, colonial life was generally comfortable. Financially backed by their home governments, protected by their military and frequently encouraged simply to appropriate large tracts of land, many settlers led the kind of aristocratic lives often associated with plantations in the antebellum American south. Particularly as reformers began to gain traction in Europe, the

colonists became increasingly resentful of "governmental interference directed by distant strangers, with, it was felt, no direct knowledge of" life in the colonies.[47] Attempts by Europeans to liberalize their colonial regimes were thus frustrated on the ground by entrenched civil servants and settlers who had come to perceive the land as theirs. Second- and third-generation Algerian, Kenyan, Indonesian and Angolan settlers felt betrayed by fumbling attempts to confer varying degrees of sovereignty on the native populations. Worse, a new indigenous class of "troublemakers," educated in Amsterdam, London and Paris, was bringing the ideals of liberal democracy back to the homelands. A new elite of young natives, "well aware of their second class status in their own lands," was being trained in:

> Western ideas about freedom, democracy, and self-determination—even to revolutionary thought and Marxist ideology. The leadership of every major anticolonial nationalist movement in Southeast Asia during the first half of the twentieth century was dominated by men who had attained the benefit of a Western education, and who managed to turn the ideas of the rulers against them.[48]

Fluctuating domestic politics were enormously important in changing relations with the colonies as new leftist parties in Europe became increasingly sympathetic to the cause of colonial workers. The Dutch and the British had also been heavily involved in the slave trade, and as abolitionist sentiments took hold the case against slavery was increasingly linked to arguments against colonialism in general. The ending of European involvement in the slave trade, marked by agreements signed by the British and the Dutch in 1818, seems ironically to have reinforced rather than weakened support for the colonial system. With the slavery issue off the reform agenda:

> Radicals no longer could—or needed to—point to slavery as evidence of the barbarousness or injustice of the European political order. On the contrary, after the abolition of slavery in British colonies in 1838 and French colonies in 1848, the persistence of slave-trading in Africa, rather than indicting European imperial activities, seemed to vindicate them, as both religious and secular reformers called for Britain to penetrate areas of West Africa where the slave trade persisted and abolish it there as well.[49]

Increasingly, however, tensions between liberal values and colonial realities became troublesome to those colonial regimes purporting to be democracies. In the United States and the European democracies in particular, strong anticolonial movements became increasingly important forces in domestic politics. An Atlantic Charter, agreed by the United States and Great Britain in 1941, and later incorporated into a broader agreement among the major powers opposing Hitler in World War II, included provisions calling for the right of all people to choose their own form of government. By this point, the

issue was moot for many of the European colonizers as they were themselves under German rule with many of their colonies occupied by German or Japanese troops. At the height of the Axis powers' strength in 1942, they occupied a large part of the Muslim world, stretching (for the Germans and Italians) across North Africa into the Middle East, and (for the Japanese) through Burma, the Malay peninsula, Indonesia and the Philippines. The idea of post-war self-determination—not just from the Axis powers, but from the former colonizers as well—became a key point in the rhetoric of victory and the founding of the United Nations.

The colonial powers' willingness to agree to self-determination has generally been interpreted as both a sop to domestic do-gooders and a ploy to placate the Americans. With few exceptions, the colonial system was expected to endure. "France, Great Britain, and Holland," as one historian puts it, "regarded the loss of empires, humiliating as it was, as a temporary phenomenon."[50] Only in retrospect can we say with confidence that the genie of independence was out of the bottle. "We do know," says John Springhall, "the end of the story. Whether self-government is seen as either the result of deliberate preparation/abrupt withdrawal by a colonial state ('decolonization') or as a triumph wrested from the colonizers by nationalist movements ('liberation struggle'), the struggle allows itself to be read backwards."[51] The process was sometimes bloody and protracted, as in Vietnam, Kenya and Algeria; sometimes abrupt (as in Guinea, which the French quit virtually overnight, taking, it is said, even the light bulbs from their sockets); and sometimes even ceremonial (as when the Duke of Edinburgh delivered the Queen's independence message to Malta). Authoritarian governments in Spain and Portugal were able to keep their empires alive into the 1970s, but generally the game was up:

> Colonial forms of rule, through the 1950s, became prescriptively illegitimate through the emergence of a Third World voice in the international arena. The futility of military repression and its enormous costs became evident in the Dutch failure to reestablish postwar authority in Indonesia and the French disaster in Indochina; these instances eclipsed the British ability to crush Mau Mau in Kenya 1952–56 and the Communist insurgency in Malaya. In Africa, the failure of the French military deployment of 500,000 to crush the Algerian liberation movement, and a comparable failed Portuguese effort in its African territories, clearly established the inevitability of African independence.[52]

As a result, "when the Second World War broke out in 1939, roughly a third of the world's entire population lived under imperial or colonial rule; today less than 0.1 percent of the global population lives in dependent territories."[53]

One area that deserves special attention is Central Asia where, prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, such states as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and

Azerbaijan—historically on the periphery of the Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul Empires—essentially had become colonies of the Soviet Union. What set them apart were the deliberate attempts to give them at least a patina of nationhood. Under Stalin's nationalities policy, territorially distinct federal units—though frequently subjected to Russification—were at least nominally autonomous. Thus, "unlike most of Black Africa, where state boundaries had minimal ethnic or historical legitimacy... . Soviet ethnographers who attempted to create homogeneous nations out of the tribes and statelets of Central Asia made a real effort to follow ethnic logic and at least had only a single political master."[54]

If these former Soviet states bypassed the need for national consolidation faced by most of the Islamic world's other new nations, arguably they were even less ready for democracy:

> The manner in which independence was achieved deprives the new regimes of some legitimacy but it also means that, with the exception of Tajikistan, their societies have avoided the trauma and upheaval of revolution and war. Their rulers are political bureaucrats, not generals, revolutionaries or demagogues. They do not yet need to fear military coups since, in the absence of either national liberation struggles or separate colonial armies inherited from empire, the armed forces of these new states are still very weak. On the other hand, very obviously, these former communist top officials have none of the experience of democratic politics possessed, for example, by the cadres of India's Congress Party in 1947. Nor do they have the historical and pre-colonial legitimacy of the traditional monarchies which survived European domination in parts of the Muslim world and in South-East Asia.[55]

Compounding these problems, each of the former Soviet republics contains at least one significant minority ethnic enclave, deliberately inserted it is sometimes suggested, that weaken overall national identities and strengthen the case for authoritarian repression.[56]

Legacies

A popular defense of colonialism is that in one sense its subjects were not yet "ready" for self-government. Although this argument has been appropriately derided—especially in the third world, on the left, and among many scholars—as a vague if not racist obfuscation, it contains an important grain of truth. While most of the colonies had either trained armies or effective anti-colonial guerilla forces, bureaucracies that included at least some (usually lower-level) administrators, and functioning local court systems, the institutions of higher-level governance were simply not there. Adult literacy rates were below 50 percent in every African country with the exception of Mauritius, in all but three colonies (the Maldives, the Philippines and Sri Lanka) in Asia, in seven

Latin American countries and none in the Middle East.[57] Civil society had been rather rigidly suppressed. Apart from some religious institutions and underground opposition groups, almost every institution of economic or political importance—from factories, mines and plantations to police forces and postal services—was run by settlers or the Home Office in London, Madrid or wherever. In the newly independent states that emerged after World War II there was virtually no one with on-the-ground experience with democracy; and even in the former colonies governed by democratic Britain, France, Belgium and Holland, many national liberation movement leaders were inclined to view democracy as part of the problem, not the solution. The colonists, having created what Acemoglu and Robinson call "extractive" political and economic institutions, left a legacy of plunder:

> Because whoever controls the state becomes the beneficiary of this excessive power and the wealth that it generates, extractive institutions create incentives for infighting in order to control power and its benefits. ... These struggles ... would not be fought to change political institutions, introduce constraints on the exercise of power, or create pluralism, but to capture power and to enrich one group at the expense of the rest.[58]

In the wake of World War II and the subsequent dismemberment of the colonial system, European and US support for democracy in the former colonies increasingly was overshadowed by concerns about issues of resources and security. As the Cold War intensified, the key issues became "how to ensure that the newly independent countries of the third world became integrated into a capitalist network of market relations, and conversely, how to protect these desperately poor countries from becoming communist."[59] In the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, in particular, concerns about continuing access to key resources also helped to shape Western policies and those of the Soviet Union as well. Add to these factors the failure of many newly independent countries to establish stable governments it is not surprising that many scholars and policy-makers began to wonder whether independence had not come at too high a price. In arguing that "colonialism is likely to be the lesser of two evils in a predatory world," for example, the distinguished Harvard political scientist Rupert Emerson pointed out that the condition of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Liberia and other less developed countries that had escaped colonialism "leads to no optimistic conclusion that all would have been well if colonialism had never been invented."[60] Although a more nuanced perspective has begun to emerge from more recent scholarship, this perspective was widely shared. It had its roots partly, as we shall argue in Chapter 2, in an incomplete or misleading concept of modernization; partly in Cold War concerns about national security; and, perhaps most importantly, as a reaction to the unrealistically high expectations of many scholars and practitioners with regard to the capacity for the newly independent states to become instant democracies.

The same European reformers, particularly in Great Britain, who pushed for their governments to liberate the colonies also favored policies that would help these newly independent countries to become democracies in the tradition of the homeland. Democratic constitutions were drafted, advisors despatched and Westminster-type parliaments or presidential republics established in countries as diverse as India, Ghana, Nigeria, Malta and Barbados. Some took hold, most did not. The French gave their colonies three options: become overseas districts of the French republic; become independent members of a French union similar to the British Commonwealth; or become totally independent. The United States, less formally or specifically, embraced similar alternatives for Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Whatever their choice in relationship to France and the United States, most of them adopted democratic constitutions. Spain and Portugal, themselves authoritarian countries, were slower to yield independence or promote democracy. The Dutch record was similarly slow, losing Indonesia only after a bitter fight, and maintaining strong ties with Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles.

One of the key variables explaining degrees of European reluctance to abandon the colonial enterprise, as we have noted, was the size and intransigence of settler populations. The intensity of conflict in countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Rhodesia and Algeria was directly fueled by the determination of the settlers to maintain their ruling status. Of perhaps equal significance was the geopolitical importance of the colony in question. Given the commercial and strategic importance of the Suez Canal, for example, there was no way that either a Conservative or a Labour government in Great Britain would tolerate an Egyptian government that was hostile to British control of the Canal, or governments that were not protective of Western access to oil. Throughout the Middle East, in particular, "monarchies were installed, retained and refurbished because to a greater or lesser degree they served European political purposes."[61] Previously obscure royal families were propped up, often representing minority tribes or religious factions, and given instant recognition as sovereigns. In Asia, outside of oil-rich Brunei and the tiny mountain kingdom of Bhutan, these royal families have largely been relegated to symbolic status. Only in the Middle East, with its oil and other key resources, has their hold on power endured. The Middle East as a region did not become authoritarian because it was lacking in democratic capacity. As Eva Bellin puts it:

> what distinguishes the Middle East was not the absence of democratic prerequisites but rather the presence of conditions that fostered robust authoritarianism, specifically, the presence of an exceptionally muscular coercive apparatus endowed with both the capacity and will to repress democratic institutions.[62]

Table 1.1 rather crudely traces the time lines of post-independence regimes in Muslim-majority countries. It should be noted that almost every entry in this table is subject to debate. It includes Indonesia, for example, as a Dutch colony, which it clearly was for more than a century. However, at the time when Sukarno and Hatta first declared it an independent country it was actually emerging from five years of Japanese occupation. Should the year of independence be the year in which independence was proclaimed, the year in which it was conceded or the year in which an independent government was actually established? Similarly, although the British formally granted independence to Egypt in 1922, the year commonly cited for independence, they specifically retained control over the Suez Canal, relations with the Sudan and control over major military and security issues. The constitution was ostensibly democratic, though no parliament survived long enough to pass any laws, leaving effective power in the hands of the king and the British. Table 1.1 also further oversimplifies complex realities by attaching labels such as "democracy" and "dictatorship" to systems that are usually somewhat mixed. But despite such flaws, some patterns emerge so clearly as to make the exercise worthwhile.

Most strikingly, almost all of the former colonies in the Islamic world, outside of North Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, came into being as democracies. Even the small island chain of the Comoros, which is listed in Table 1.1 as a dictatorship from its inception, was a democracy during its first week of existence. Eighteen others had democratic constitutions and institutions, and, at their inception, held relatively free and competitive elections, and only six classified as one-party states. Within just ten years, however, only six could be labelled as even loosely democratic, with Indonesia and Malaysia soon to fall off the list. Clearly, in terms of the language of the times, they were not yet "ready for democracy."

Second, there were three major exceptions to the pattern of post-colonial democratization. Ten new states came into being as hereditary monarchies, with seven of them still under royal rule. Of the ten, all but Brunei are located in the Middle East or North Africa, and all but Jordan are endowed with significant reserves of petroleum. Of the newly independent former provinces of the Soviet Union only Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan began as democracies, and only Kyrgyzstan has remained relatively free. Its 2011 presidential election marked the first peaceful turnover from one leader to another in the post-Soviet history of Central Asia.

Third, military interventions in politics are common, sometimes resulting in direct military rule as has been the case in much of the recent history of Egypt, more frequently as key supporting players in ostensibly civilian regimes such as those of Suharto in Indonesia, Col. Muammar al-Qadaffi in Libya, and in most of the post-Soviet regimes. There are also countries in which the military pretty much stays in its barracks, emerging only to act as guardians of regimes that stray too far from established norms, or serving as power brokers in resolving civilian conflicts. The strength and political role of

Table 1.1 Sovereignty and governance: end of colonialism, governing systems and degrees of democratization in post-colonial Muslim-majority countries

New country and year of independence	*Colonial power*	*Governing system*		*Freedom House 2013*
		Original	*Ten years later*	
Algeria (1965)	France	Democracy	Military	Not free
Azerbaijan (1991)	Soviet Union	Democracy	One party	Not free
Bahrain (1971)	Great Britain	Monarchy	Monarchy	Not free
Brunei (1984)	Great Britain	Monarchy	Monarchy	Not free
Burkina Faso (1960)	France	One party	Military	Partly free
Chad (1960)	France	Democracy	One party	Not free
Comoros (1974)	France	Dictatorship	Dictatorship	Partly free
Côte d'Ivoire (1960)	France	Democracy	One party	Partly free
Djibouti (1977)	France	Democracy	One party	Not free
Egypt (1922)	Great Britain	Monarchy	Monarchy	Not free
The Gambia (1965)	Great Britain	Democracy	Democracy	Not free
Guinea (1958)	France	One party	One party	Partly free
Indonesia (1949)	Holland	Democracy	Democracy	Partly free
Iraq (1932)	Great Britain	Monarchy	Monarchy	Not free
Jordan (1946)	Great Britain	Monarchy	Monarchy	Not free
Kazakhstan (1991)	Soviet Union	Dictatorship	One party	Not free
Kuwait (1961)	Great Britain	Monarchy	Monarchy	Partly free
Kyrgyzstan (1991)	Soviet Union	Democracy	Democracy	Partly free
Lebanon (1943)	France	Democracy	Democracy	Partly free
Libya (1951)	Italy	Monarchy	Monarchy	Partly free
Malaysia (1957)	Great Britain	Democracy	Democracy	Partly free
Maldives (1965)	Great Britain	Democracy	Dictatorship	Partly free
Mali (1960)	France	Democracy	Military	Partly free
Mauritania (1960)	France	Democracy	One party	Not free
Morocco (1957)	France	Monarchy	Monarchy	Partly free
Niger (1960)	France	One party	One party	Partly free
Pakistan (1947)	Great Britain	One party	Military	Partly free
Qatar (1971)	Great Britain	Monarchy	Monarchy	Not free

New country and year of independence	*Colonial power*	*Governing system*		*Freedom House 2013*
		Original	*Ten years later*	
Senegal (1960)	France	Democracy	One party	Free
Sierra Leone (1961)	Great Britain	Democracy	One party	Partly free
Somalia (1960)	Italy/Great Britain	Democracy	Military	Not free
Sudan (1956)	Great Britain	Democracy	Democracy	Not free
Syria (1946)	France	Democracy	Military	Not free
Tajikistan (1991)	Soviet Union	Dictatorship	Dictatorship	Not free
Tunisia (1956)	France	One party	One party	Partly free
Turkmenistan (1991)	Soviet Union	One party	Dictatorship	Not free
United Arab Emirates (1971)	Great Britain	Monarchies	Monarchies	Not free
Uzbekistan (1991)	Soviet Union	One party	One party	Not free

Sources: Barry Turner, ed., *The Statesman's Yearbook: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and Arch Puddington, "The Democratic Leadership Gap: The Freedom House Survey for 2013," *Journal of Democracy* 25 (April 2014), 82–83.

the military often has its roots in the colonial past. In the worst case scenarios, colonial administrators recruited local troops according to ethnic and clan criteria, especially in favoring supposedly "warrior" ethnic groups, religious minorities or those from certain favored regions, thus making the military less the guardian of the nation than of a particular segment of it.[63] One could argue, for example, that Punjabi domination of the British colonial army in India is at the root of the strength of the army's role in contemporary Pakistan compared with its relatively secondary role in post-independence India. Where independence was fought for rather than granted, the military—whether formally in power or not—often enjoys high esteem as a symbol of independence and national unity, and, as a legacy from its days of sustaining itself as a guerilla movement, financial independence. These often combine to give the military the capacity and the motivation to intervene in politics, because, as Koonings and Kruit put it:

> There is the notion that the military institution is exceptionally well placed not only to defend but also to define the essence of the nation by birthright and competence. … [T]he military "knows" that "civilians," that is to say civilian politicians, the institutional framework of civic

> governance, the actions of societal interest groups, and the overall political culture tend to be inadequate to address the needs of the nation.[64]

Finally, the most common pattern was the emergence of a single party that took control. During their first decade of freedom, sixteen of these thirty-eight countries went through a period of one-party government. In many cases the single party evolved out of the nationalist force that had led the anti-colonial struggle. Inheriting highly centralized states from the colonial regimes, they:

> used the apparatus of the state to reinforce their hold on power and to restrict or eliminate opposition parties that they claimed undermined national unity. The party's claim to be the supreme embodiment of the popular will justified its claim to control the machinery of the state and to use it to strengthen the power of the new regime against its enemies. As a result, boundaries between party and state structures became blurred. The party-state became the norm in regimes headed by a dominant single party regardless of ideology or attitudes toward the former colonizer.[65]

In this sense, the new single-party regimes more accurately reflected their colonial roots than their ostensibly democratic constitutions: whatever the formal structure of their legal systems, "control and coercion, not management and persuasion, were the hallmarks of the colonial legal order. ... Without exception, independence instruments preserved that order intact as the foundation of administration in the postcolonial state."[66] It is also worth noting:

> that the ease with which these constitutions were changed and/or discarded was also due to the fact that constitution making at independence was an elite-controlled, top-down process in which a few indigenous elites met in conference (and assisted by their colonial benefactors) designed the rules and handed them down to the people with virtually no effective participation by the relevant stakeholder groups.[67]

Moreover, the newly elected leaders were not by and large "new" at all, and their first task was to sustain the established state structures within which many of them had worked. They generally consolidated their control by first extending to all significant offices the chief executive's authority to employ and dismiss, by establishing their party as the key agent of recruitment for elective office, by diminishing civil liberties and the parliament's powers of oversight, and finally by amending the constitution to bring it into conformity with the "inherited legal order."[68] These changes, usually justified in terms of adapting European forms to local conditions, led almost inevitably to one-person rule. If some parties continued to play a significant organizational role,

and the military, the church or the mosques retained some scraps of independence and leverage, "skillful manipulation of the Party machinery" more frequently shifted "its entire mandate to the presidency."[69] The reshaping of the independence constitutions was in part a pure power play, based on a strongly perceived need to establish truly national (as opposed to European) principles, and on a perception that the checks and balances built into these systems inhibited attempts to deal with the severe economic and social problems that afflicted the countries in question.

Thus the third stage in the political maturation of the many former colonies was one-person rule. Of course there is no such thing as a truly *absolute* dictator. Even the strongest of the strong, as Hobbes noted long ago, has to sleep. But from Suharto's "New Order" in Indonesia to Gamal Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and on down a long list, a majority of Europe's former colonies have endured at least one sustained period of authoritarian government. Kingships and varied forms of authoritarian dictatorships have been the norm for most of human history; but these post-colonial dictatorships were rather unique in the sense that they were based neither on hereditary claims nor divine right. Nor were they regularly established by military coup. Instead they might almost be called constitutional monarchies, not in the sense that they were monarchies checked by constitutions, but that they were monarchies constituted and consecrated through constitutions.

As the history of decolonization unfolds, its political ramifications remain controversial. One recent study concluded, for example, that comparisons of former colonies and the handful of third world nations that were never colonized support a conclusion that colonialism had "no systematic effects."[70] At the same time, others suggest that "colonial legacies have deleterious effects upon democratic survival."[71] The seeming contradiction between these studies probably arises from the tendency of most never colonized states—and only a handful exist—to be either an oddball group of poor, isolated nations like Afghanistan and Tibet, or else kingdoms like those of Saudi Arabia and Iran that—while never actually colonies—were under strong external influences. On a case-by-case basis, the negative effects of colonialism on democracy actually seem quite clear. Highly centralized administrative entities with socially meaningless boundaries, which most colonies were, could logically be expected to evolve into highly centralized authoritarian states. Poor, and poorly educated, often ethnically divided citizens, long denied the right to form the civic associations—from business organizations to labor unions, sports clubs to political parties—that sustain democracy at the grassroots, could hardly be expected to provide meaningful checks on the government. And in the absence of trained judges, bureaucrats, legislators and business leaders, few former colonies were ready either for democracy or even for self-government itself. Moreover, just as many of new nations were reaching the point at which they might have been able to move toward more open, democratic societies, they were caught in a Cold War dynamic that emphasized

security, discouraged change and often turned to active or covert intervention to support, sustain and reinstate authoritarian governments. What types of states might have emerged had colonialism been absent no one can say. In retrospect, however, it seems clear that the cycle of democratic decline through military coup or devolution from one-party state to dictatorship was sown into the very fabric of decolonization.

Decolonization and Islam

These patterns, in a broad sense, have nothing to do with Islam. Aside from the oil-rich monarchies of the Middle East, there is little to differentiate the post-independence political histories of Muslim-majority countries from those of other former colonies. The religious variable, however, was not without lingering political significance in the colonial world. Colonialism, overall, strengthened Islam, if not always in absolute terms, quite decidedly vis-à-vis other groups in society. The colonists' toleration of religion combined with a generally repressive attitude to other native institutions meant that the prospects for association lay only in the mosques. As independence movements coalesced, it was the mosques and related Islamic associations that served as both meeting places and rallying points. In the Dutch East Indies, for example, the first organized national movement against colonial rule was the Islamic Union, which, interestingly, took the boundaries established by the Dutch as the parameters of their imagined community of Indonesia.[72] This dynamic has sometimes carried over into post-colonial authoritarian regimes where groups like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the most viable alternatives to dictatorship.

What is perhaps particularly significant in the colonial heritage is the system of nation-states it created. Whatever state system might have devolved out of the ruins of the great Islamic empires or coalesced among various tribal and ethnic groups, the new states that the European colonists created dramatically changed the role of the mosque and the ulama. While some radical groups remain united in their opposition to nationalism and the nation-state, and continue to insist, as Fuller puts it, that "the *umma* is blessed by God, the nation-state is not,"[73] their position is all but untenable in the contemporary world. Except for a handful of fringe groups, few contemporary Islamists talk seriously about a universal Islamic community (or *umma*) as a politically relevant institution in a world of nation-states.[74] To be sure, the boundaries of these nations have yet to be firmly defined. Iraq seems increasingly likely to fragment into at least three regions or states—Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish—at best in some sort of loose confederation. Various transnational regional groups—most recently purporting to unite Iraq and Syria in a new caliphate—preclude any inclusion of Shi'ites, much less other religious groups. The renewal of the caliphate, its leaders proclaim, is thus finite in its reach. Southeast Asia's radical Islamists limit their vision to the region. In contrast with the early caliphates or later empires:

> A return to the ideal of a united *umma*, even as a hypothetical scenario, no longer remains a feasible proposition. The sovereign state is here to stay, and most Muslims, including most Islamists, have internalized the values of the sovereign state system and are perfectly at ease working within the parameters of the nation-state.[75]

If and when democracy comes to one of these states, at the same time it is often the ulama and their organizations who set its original direction. In Egypt's first meaningful elections in 2012, for example, only the candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical Al-Nur had effective organizational bases.

At a symbolic level, Islam has been used by authoritarian leaders to enhance their images and justify their rule. By promoting Islamism as the official state ideology, they were able both to co-opt religious opposition and bring it under state control.[76] Substantively, most Islamic countries, even the more democratic ones, such as Indonesia and Turkey, have ministries of education and religious affairs that to a greater or lesser extent regulate religious practices if only by controlling their finances. "Bringing religious endowments under state control drastically reduces the financial and, therefore, the intellectual and political autonomy of the religious classes, many of whom have become salaried functionaries of the state, often ruled in the post-colonial period by unrepresentative and authoritarian regimes."[77] The Iranian revolution, as Hayes says, "reversed the pattern with religious figures embracing politics"[78] through an unusual interpretation of Shi'ite doctrine. However, even in contemporary Iran there is a quasi-autonomous state structure with its own nationalistic identity.

The emergence of independent states from colonial domination had a profound effect on the umma. Although the imams, or learned scholars of the faith, continue to communicate globally in debating the correct interpretations of the Koran and related traditions, Islamic law—though never truly universal—is now truly national. No two of the twenty-five countries that proclaim that they are guided by Islamic law actually have identical legal codes. "European colonial domination reopened the whole question of the nature of authority in Islam by decimating existing political structures and undercutting the legitimacy of the religious authorities."[79]

Perhaps the most important legacy of the colonial and Cold War eras is founded, whatever the realities, in perceptions of them. Radical Islamist movements in particular justify extreme methods by assuming a persecution complex in which democracy in particular is seen as part of an ongoing plot against true religion. "For them, the spread of democratic values in Muslim countries is closely linked to colonialism, marking it indelibly with the notion of constraint and constituting by its nature a non-native political culture."[80] The argument that Islam has lost its way by abandoning its own traditions in order to imitate the West, though it does not necessarily translate into violence or politics, has proven a powerful political tool in some contexts. For

many of the more radical Islamic groups, the fall of the great empires and the concurrent Western occupation of the Muslim world helped to produce a significant change in thinking about Islamic politics. Basim Tibi locates this shift in the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928.[81] While many scholars would disagree with such a precise schedule, most would agree that it produced what Tibi calls the "invented tradition" of the sharia state. Under the caliphates, as we have noted, the sharia and politics were separated into something very similar to what Catholic philosophers defined as the swords of Christ and Caesar, the religious and the profane. Sharia law, governing family law, in particular, and varying parts of civil law such as inheritance, were defined by the ulama and in many cases enforced by special sharia courts; but there is really nowhere in the Koran, nowhere in Islamic traditions—until the twentieth century—when sharia law became conflated with state law. And in fact, even when sharia law was enforced, it varied in meaning and content from one country and even one village to another.

Ethically the Koran prescribes piety, ethics and general rules of conduct that are updated and interpreted by the ulama, but the idea that these same holy men should decide whether the speed limit on highways should be 65 or 75 miles per hour, that the state budget should include funding for nuclear weapons, or that the rich should pay taxes at a higher rate than the poor—while these decisions might well be informed by religious values—they were never, in traditional Islam, to be left to the ulama. Islamic law defines some acts as forbidden (*haram*), and some as obligatory (*fardh*), but there is a whole range of issues that are religiously permissible (*mubah*) and essentially beyond its scope. "To be sure," as Tibi puts it, "One can employ a new understanding of sharia law for ethical guidance in politics, but no more than that. Sharia is not itself constitutional law... . This claim abuses the text of the Qur'an to legitimate a new variety of Oriental despotism wearing the religious garb of either Wahhabi or Islamist Islam in the name of constitutionalism."[82]

Colonialism and Cold War politics left a residue of a mistrust of outsiders in general and the United States and Europe in particular. US and Western European support for Israel has compounded the sense, throughout Islam, that there is a real "we/they" division, if not a clash of civilizations, dividing the globe between imperialists and their victims. One recent study found that anti-Americanism is most widespread, paradoxically, in the more secular Islamic countries, and is largely a function of "the intensity of political competition along religious-secular lines."[83] What Bernard Lewis calls "the blame game" is not played only at the extremes:

> For the governments, at once oppressive and ineffectual, that rule much of the Middle East, the game serves a useful, indeed and essential purpose—to explain that the poverty they have failed to alleviate and to justify the tyranny that they have intensified...

> But for a growing number of Middle Easterners it is giving way to a more self-critical approach. The question "Who did this to us?" has led only to neurotic fantasies and conspiracy theories. The other question—"What did we do wrong?"—has led naturally to a second question: "How do we put it right?"[84]

Lewis may be too fast to exonerate the role of outside forces. Globalization, in one form or another, has been with us for a very long time, and even as we can see the light of democratic change at the end of some tunnels, the international community will play an important role in muddling through. And the question of how we put it right—the central question informing this book—is not unrelated to the question of what went wrong. It is not trivial, in the context of today's struggle for democracy, that the modern history of Muslim experiences with supposedly democractic European and US influences were actually supportive of oppression and dictatorship. "The very deep-rootedness and coherence of Islamic civilizations before the advent of modern times," moreover, "gave added severity to the multiform challenge brought by western domination." Hence Brown's conclusion that, "Islam and the West ... is a special case."[85]

Notes

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2 Religion, development and democratization

The victory of the Allied powers in World War II was widely expected to usher in a new era of peace and democracy. Instead, democracies established in newly independent countries in the third world, the Eastern European countries falling into the Soviet orbit and many former democracies in both Latin America and southern Europe were anything but democratic a quarter century after the War. By some calculations there were at best thirty world democracies in 1970, a handful more than in 1920. Thus the 1974 collapse of the seemingly stable Salazar dictatorship in Portugal was not widely predicted; Portugal's subsequent emergence as a relatively stable democracy even less so. But in fact the success of democracy in Portugal heralded a series of transitions that has become known, in a term coined by Samuel Huntington, as the "third wave" of global democratic expansion:

> The democratizing trend began in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, spread to the military regimes of South America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and reached East, Southeast, and South Asia by the mid to late 1980s. The end of the 1980s saw a surge of transitions from authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and a trend toward democracy in Central America as well. Finally, the democratic trend spread to Africa in 1990 ... By 1998 there were between nine and seventeen democracies on the continent—again depending on how one counts.[1]

By the end of the twentieth century the total worldwide number of democracies, by even the most conservative estimates, had reached more than eighty when the wave apparently crested.[2] The 2012 military coup and subsequent turbulence in Mali, the erosion of democratic institutions in Belarus and repeated shifts toward and away from democracy in such diverse countries as Haiti, Pakistan, Thailand and Zimbabwe continue to complicate the picture. At the same time, the Arab Spring, the turn toward liberalization in Myanmar (formerly Burma) and the general strengthening of democratic institutions in many other countries combine to suggest—if not a fourth wave—at least a resurgence of the third. In actual fact, the overall levels of values

associated with democracy have been rising quite steadily since the 1970s. Using a combination of the most commonly used indicators, Jan Teorell has shown that the mean level of democracy went from just over 4 points (on a scale of 0 to 10) in 1975 to almost 7 in 2005. The increase was steepest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and actually shows no sustained periods of decline and reversal.[3] A slightly more complex set of indicators shows similar trends extending into 2010, and also indicates an interesting tendency for the more purely authoritarian states to create quasi-democratic institutions such as elected legislatures with advisory powers, independent courts, and elected local governments.[4] The third wave, in short, is still building.

What is also noteworthy in the past four decades is the emergence of a whole new subfield in political science and a related industry centered on democratization. Along with a growing library of books and monographs, two relatively new journals are devoted to democratization,[5] and a rich array of both public and private organizations that specialize in the process have grown into a significant industry.[6] If there is one point upon which both practitioners and scholars increasingly agree, it is that there is no single path to democracy, no single pattern of what makes a country more or less democratic. The diverse experiences of the third-wave democracies—many of them now in their third and fourth decades—have stirred interest in a rich variety of questions about how to categorize regimes which are at once partly free and partly not; democratic in some senses and authoritarian in others; "hybrid regimes" as they are called that "share elements of both democracy and dictatorship" in ways that confound simple schemes of classification. This empirical reality has become a characteristic of so many modern states that it has "forced academics to rethink their understanding of the democratization process, standard conceptions of regime types, and definitions of regime types."[7]

In many ways, the term "democracy" has itself become a contested one. It starts, of course, with free elections, free enough to satisfy Przeworski's pithy definition of democracy as "a system in which parties lose elections."[8] But if it is generally agreed that democracy involves more than elections, there are varying interpretations of just what that "something more" is. Particularly with the emergence of political parties committed both to free elections and faith-based governance, new questions are being raised about how and under what conditions this "something more" is tied to concepts of secularism. The relationship between democracy and Islam is meaningful only in the context of these evolving concepts of democracy.

What is democracy?

Charles Tilly suggests that definitions of democracy either explicitly or implicitly involve a choice from four main themes. *Constitutional* approaches look at the formal rules that structure political activities and distinguish such systems as presidential and parliamentary from each other. The democracy assistance literature shows quite clearly that different ways of constructing

these arrangements have significant consequences: constitutions, in short, matter. At the very least "a well-designed constitution might help democratic institutions to survive, whereas a badly designed constitution might contribute to the breakdown of democratic institutions."[9] But as numerous real-life cases show, "large discrepancies between announced principles and daily practices often make constitutions misleading."[10] *Substantive* approaches to democracy avoid this pitfall by focusing not on how governments are constituted but on what they do. Larry Diamond, for example, lists equal justice, political liberty, free association and equal rights for women as core values.[11] Others might add some form or level of economic justice. One problem with this approach, as Tilly notes, lies in deciding which values to assign to what kinds of outcomes.[12] Even more troubling is the sense that this approach leaves out something important. In his famous Gettysburg address, Abraham Lincoln spoke of government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." The problem with the substantive approach is that it omits the first two parts of this equation. The most benevolent dictatorship, no matter how well it governs *for* the people, does not make the cut.

And so we move to *procedural* definitions that focus on the first two of Lincoln's criteria: government "of" and "by" the people, usually defined in terms of free elections. Fair elections are a necessary but insufficient indicator of democracy if only because they only work when accompanied by freedom of expression, the right to organize politically, inclusive citizenship and some sense of civic equality. Freedom House, whose annual ratings we use here, evaluates these in two indices, one based on voter choice, the other on civil liberties and human rights. These two scales are combined in what Tilly calls *process-oriented approaches* that start from a substantive value of personal autonomy to outline the processes necessary to maximize the ability of citizens to govern their own lives. Free elections, as Robert Dahl puts it, only have real meaning when the:

> process endows citizens with an extensive array of rights, liberties, and resources sufficient to permit them to participate fully, as equal citizens, in the making of all the collective decisions by which they are bound. ... Seen in this light, the democratic process is not only essential to one of the most important of all political goods—the right of people to govern themselves—but is itself a rich bundle of substantive goods.[13]

Tilly notes that Dahl's approach is more useful in describing a minimal set of standards than in telling us *how* democratic a given country is: "whether Canada," for example, "is more democratic than the United States, or whether the United States became less democratic last year."[14] Focusing on process, moreover, can result in a tendency to overlook substance. The particular problem here is with states that go through all the right motions (or processes) but cannot deliver. In order to have a functioning democracy, in other words, one must first have a functioning government.

Tilly and others have tried to devise working definitions of democracy that combine all four approaches. The minimal condition, free elections with a real opposition, is thus augmented with considerations of civil liberty, the rule of law and the delivery of substantive benefits. This broadened definition—which parallels the classic distinction between "liberal" and "electoral democracy"—asks too much, it can be argued, and reflects a bias toward Western values which, in a historical sense, it possibly does. But when we talk about sustainable democracy, about a system in which elections remain free, it is this broader, more "liberal" sense that sets the standard. "Democracy," as Diamond puts it, "is significantly more likely to become consolidated if it is liberal, and there is no third world democracy in the world today that is both illiberal ... and consolidated."[15] The reality, even in the developed world, is that democratization is a process of adjustment, renewal and decline; it does not come in neat packages, and, in fact, its arrival—look at the sudden overthrow of Indonesia's Suharto or the more recent developments in Tunisia and Egypt—seems haphazard at best. Rather than trying to distinguish "liberal" from "electoral" democracy, it seems more fruitful to look for scales of more or less democratic tendencies; "countries are more or less democratic across a variety of dimensions."[16] There are patterns, to be sure, but what Volpi argues with regard to Algeria applies with equal force around the world:

> From a theoretical perspective it is perfectly possible that the question, "what are effective means of democratization of a polity at the beginning of the twenty-first century?" requires a significantly different answer from the question "what are effective means of democratization in Algeria today?"[17]

We will look at particular countries in later chapters. We return here to the larger patterns, focusing broadly on the general "pre-conditions" of democracy, or the variables most closely associated with democratization, with particular reference to those most applicable to our later consideration of specific Muslim-majority countries. Rather than placing countries in such neatly labeled boxes as "electoral democracies," "liberal democracies," "semi-authoritarian governments" and so on, we will look at the different mixes of institutional arrangements and political practices that best characterize particular governments and the ways in which they measure up to the high standards set by theorists like Tilly and Dahl. Are institutions sufficiently strong to enforce law and order, provide basic services and regulate economic activity, yet sufficiently pluralistic to avoid the concentration of both political and economic power in the hands of a narrow elite? The role of religion, both in institutional terms and as a motivating political force, is also at issue, largely with respect to the process of democratic consolidation, but also in the larger sense in which new dimensions of church–state relations are evolving in the long-established democracies of the West.

Transitions and nation-building

The seeds of new democracies are sown in the fields of the old order. Transitions from authoritarian rule—whether violent or peaceful, sudden or gradual—are rooted in the institutions, cultures and individual personalities of the preceding regime. Not surprisingly, there is a long history of attempts to explain democratization in terms of history, economics, demographics and other variables that seem to be preconditions for change. At the top of the list, in most studies, is the existence of a definable state. For people to govern themselves there must be some implicit or well-defined definition of who the people are. It helps, and may be necessary to some degree that the community be relatively cohesive, and that there is, in Benedict Anderson's felicitous phrase, an "imagined community":

> It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion ...
>
> The community is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, perhaps encompassing a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations ...
>
> Finally, it is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always perceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.[18]

Such communities need not have a common culture in any profound sense. Citizens can "have a sense of belonging to their polity without thinking there is any real sense in which they belong *together.*"[19] Almost no one in Switzerland can speak all four of its official languages, most speak only one comfortably, yet there is most emphatically a Swiss national identity. However, there are many national entities that lack such a sense. The tendency of many Central Europeans, particularly in the Balkan mountains, to identify themselves primarily as Croatian, Bosnian or Serbian—when these countries were unstable parts of the declining Ottoman, Austrian and Russian Empires during the World War I era—led to use of the term "Balkanization" to describe a process of fragmentation that repeated itself in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Similar long-standing splits have persisted in such diverse countries as Pakistan and Bangladesh, North and South Sudan, Singapore and Malaysia. Where cultural conflicts—over dress codes or language; slavery; real or perceived acts of discrimination; attempts to regulate sexual or gender-based conduct; and even such issues as animal rights, smoking, diet, pornography and music—become entrenched, there is a challenge to the state. "Issues like these," as Dahl writes:

> pose a special problem for democracy. Adherents of a particular culture often view their political demands as matters of principle, deep religious

> or quasi-religious conviction, cultural preservation, or group survival. As a consequence, they consider their demands too crucial to allow for compromise. They are nonnegotiable. Yet under a peaceful democratic process, settling political conflicts generally requires negotiation, conciliation, compromise.[20]

Ethnic and religious differences, especially when exploited for political purposes, can create divided societies and "the growth of zero-sum, winner-takes-all politics in which some groups are permanently included and some permanently excluded," and where rivalries often escalate to the point of violence.[21] The resulting retreat from moderation undermines, if not destroys, the prospect of democracy; and although there are constitutional devices, such as federalism, that can be deployed to reduce the severity of ethnic and regional tensions, conflicts, sometimes extremely violent, can emerge with startling speed. "Whether party leaders terminate elections, military leaders reverse election results, or separatist leaders attempt to constrict the area in which those results will prevail, it is clear that ethnic divisions strain, contort, and often transform democratic institutions."[22] As the recovery from the Civil War in the United States has shown, however, and the more contemporary emergence of viable, generally democratic governments in the Balkans also illustrates, these divisions are not always fatal. State-building and democratization can occur simultaneously.[23]

The process of becoming a nation, at the same time, is not automatic. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, in their brilliant 1787 and 1788 essays in defense of the proposed US Constitution, began and ended their case by stressing the importance of union. Union is necessary, they argued, "for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well against the dangers from *foreign arms and influence,* as from dangers of the *like kind* arising from domestic causes."[24] Beyond safety, they argued, "the vigor of government is essential to the survival of liberty." Weak states are more likely to become tyrannical than strong: "a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government."[25]

These basic arguments, divided into three overlapping streams, are a continuing theme in studies of democratization. First, it is important to have a government that is able to resist the "dangers of foreign arms and influence," an issue of obvious concern to the newly independent United States in an age of colonial rivalries as well as to modern countries in an age of globalization. It is particularly important for divided societies to have sufficient internal cohesion to resist foreign intervention. One of the American founders' most profound fears was that the European powers would exacerbate and exploit differences between the thirteen former colonies to gain economic and political control over them. In the context of the shifting alliances and recurring wars between and among the great powers of Europe, a divided United States

would be "gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all."[26] Second, a government must be able to provide a basic level of what the American founders called "domestic tranquillity," the ability, at a minimum, to protect its citizens from each other. And finally, it should be strong enough to make a difference in everyday life, to be able to provide roads and schools, water and other basics that inoculate the system against widespread alienation and mistrust. "One good national government," as John Jay put it in *Federalist* No. 3, "affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter."[27]

How to craft a nation out of diverse or divided societies remains a challenge. There are nations so uniform and contained that the question has never had to be asked: Iceland springs to mind. Of its 320,000 residents, more than 90 percent are native-born Icelanders of Scandinavian and Celtic descent, 85 percent are at least nominally Lutheran, and all speak a common language. There are few such countries. However, many very large nations, some with very significant ethnic, regional and religious divisions have become coherent polities. James Madison's argument in *Federalist* No. 10 that a large nation, if sufficiently diverse, can produce what social scientists later called multiple "cross-cutting cleavages" does make intellectual sense despite the inconvenient fact that the United States he was describing was later to go through one of the world's most bloody and bitter civil wars. Institutional arrangements can also play an important role. Federalism—a system giving limited autonomy to subgovernment states or provinces as is the case in Canada—can defuse some conflicts. Bills of rights backed by legal institutions that protect religious and other minorities, or various government institutions promoting "consociationalism," such as reserving certain offices for particular groups or giving them veto powers, have also worked.[28] However, the history of democracy in divided societies is marked more by failure than success.

As theories of modernization and democratization began to develop during the Cold War, many theorists argued that a period of dictatorship might be needed to develop sufficient state authority to allow an emerging democracy to sustain such protections. Only with a strong military, they argued, can a nation sustain its autonomy and protect its people; only with the discipline of fiscal austerity and support for capitalist investment can it reach a takeoff point in its economic development to allow people to govern themselves; and only by suppressing dissent can it remain strong enough to accomplish these goals. Clearly states can provide these guarantees of security and stability only in the absence of violent internal conflicts and the possession of fairly substantial economic resources. The long-range success of new democracies depends in very large part on their ability to strengthen state capacity to collect revenue, provide social services, stimulate investment and maintain the rule of law; but the evidence that only a dictatorship—whether a dictatorship

of the proletariat in Leninist terms, or of the military or some other elite can do these things—is sketchy at best. There is, more likely, a self-reinforcing dynamic built into the process in which increases in state capacity facilitate democracy, and democratization promotes both greater affluence and more demands for expansions of the state's governing capacity.[29] Weak states tend to be poor states in which instability and lawlessness inhibit development, and poor states tend to be weak. This is one of the reasons that no variable is more closely associated with democratization than economic development.

Transitions and preconditions: economic development

Even if we use a very loose definition of democracy, its relationship to national wealth is consistent and strong. To use one a simple indicator: of the twenty-five richest countries in the world, Freedom House listed twenty as "mostly democratic," two as mixed and only Singapore, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates as mostly authoritarian. Among the twenty-five poorest nations, conversely, only Tanzania was "mostly democratic."[30] In the classic arguments of Barrington Moore[31] and Seymour Martin Lipset[32] a nation is unlikely to sustain democracy without a level of economic development that can sustain a middle class large enough effectively to challenge the ruling oligarchy. Although the basic argument has been repeatedly "supported and contested, revised and extended, buried and resuscitated" there is no question that in statistical terms "the relationship between the level of economic development and the incidence of democratic regimes is strong and tight."[33] Economic development, in a nutshell, "both spurs democratic transitions and stabilizes democracies."[34] In its crudest form, early modernization theory simply assumed that since economic development was strongly correlated with democracy the relationship was also causal; that through each or all of these processes the surest road to democracy traveled through a landscape of growing prosperity. The question is why and how?

Three explanations dominated the early literature, and continue to have considerable credence. The first is the notion that economic development affects the class structure, particularly in creating a large middle class, and/or a relatively prosperous working class that tempers conflicts between rich and poor. A changing balance of economic power "increases the organizational power of subordinate classes generally. At the same time, it erodes the size and power of the most anti-democratic force—the large landowning classes; especially those that rely on coercive state power for the control of their labor force."[35] The second is the tendency of a growing economy to expand education and the more rational and tolerant politics that supposedly flow therefrom. And the third is that it leads to a more complex civil society, a rich associational life that both channels citizen inputs into the political system and "instills in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness."[36] The more we look at the data, however, the murkier these relationships appear. Modernization and economic development may create

the "prerequisites" for democracy, but it is impossible to discern any particular level of progress at which a transition will occur. There are, on the one hand, too many countries with high levels of overall prosperity and education and large middle classes—such as Kuwait and Singapore—that have remained persistently authoritarian, and too many poor countries, like Tanzania, that have to some extent become democratic. While there are cases in which democracy has welled up from below to either seize power directly—as in the classic case of the French Revolution—it is not at all clear under what conditions which classes support democracy and under what conditions they are most likely to succeed. In the 1980s a classic uprising of students, workers and previously compliant middle-class groups, academics and religious leaders in South Korea forced democratic change on a previously unchallenged authoritarian regime.[37] Yet similar coalitions in South Africa went through decades of repression. The most promising theory of this process derives from economics.[38] As described in formal economic theory, it begins with the premise that "the fundamental struggle over democracy occurs between the rich and the poor." In most authoritarian regimes, policies are determined, not by voters "but by the rich themselves, who choose a zero tax rate and no redistribution [of resources]. Thus, the poor generally prefer democracy whereas the rich prefer (right-wing) dictatorship."[39] If the gap between rich and poor grows, it can lead to a downward cycle of repression in which increasingly desperate acts of rebellion are met with accelerating government crackdowns. These can be particularly violent when the income gap is reinforced by coincident ethnic divisions, as in Northern Ireland where the Protestants tended to enjoy both political and economic hegemony, or contemporary Bahrain where the ruling minority of Sunnis enjoy both political and economic advantages over the Shi'ite majority. Repression works, but it tends to be both morally and economically expensive. It requires, moreover, a large military and police force which can itself become a powerful, even autonomous, group in its own right.

The regime may choose to buy off dissent by voluntarily redistributing some of its income instead of its political power as in so-called rentier states (in the sense that they pay "rent" for their political offices rather than share power). Though this option can ultimately prove quite expensive, politicians who have no need to bargain for their revenues (as they do when they own the oil wells or control the diamond trade) are more likely to resist democratization. In less affluent societies, the actual transfer of political power, if it is not the product of violent revolution or outside intervention, comes about when the reigning oligarchs recognize that they are better off ceding some of their powers in exchange for peace and stability. And this is where the importance of a large middle class comes in as a buffer between elites and citizens:

> The presence of a large and relatively affluent middle class ensures that they play an important role in democratic politics and, because they are

> more prosperous than the citizens, they will typically support policies much closer to those that the elites prefer. Therefore by limiting the amount of policy change induced by democracy, a large and affluent middle class may act like a buffer between elites and the citizens in a democracy. It does this by simultaneously making democratization more attractive for the elites than repression and changing policy enough that the citizens are content enough not to revolt.[40]

This is a powerful line of argument that does have some predictive power: "development has a causal effect on democratization," and it works, in many ways, as the economic model predicts, by showing how it lowers the cost of democratization.[41] Clearly, however, other forces are also at work.

Most obviously, the economic model largely ignores the role of other kinds of interests and political forces. As we shall see in the case of Suharto's fall in Indonesia, for example, whatever latent divisions in the elite had kept the aging dictator in power, it was not until mass unrest and demonstrations against the regime threatened to destabilize the country that they became manifest. The middle class played an important role, and the economic elite, as the model predicts, was willing to cede some of its political power; but the core of the demonstrations and demands that tipped the scales against the authoritarian state was a loose student-centered social movement that was more political than economic. During the so-called Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, it was a diverse coalition of secular and religious groups, middle and lower class, that led the way to regime change. The basic problem with modernization theory in this regard is that it is apolitical. It presents the skeletal structure of a relationship between affluence and democracy and fits it into the overall shape of the body politic without reference to the tendons and muscles that make it work. Early studies by; Almond and Verba Rustow and others pointed out how the strategic choices of a small elite (such as the American founding fathers) led to the gradual development of a civic culture and to the gradual inclusion of more and more people and an expanding culture of bounded conflict.[42] If these studies lacked the explanatory rigor of the economic model, they underscored the importance of some softer variables that continue to play an important role in developing democracy. There are times when even a single individual can either facilitate, block or dramatically alter the transition from authoritarian rule; the importance of such figures as Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, Mandela and de Klerk in South Africa, or Khomeini in Iran can neither be quantified nor ignored. Still another "factor present in most successful transitions and missing in most failures is the role of indigenous civil society organizations."[43] Softer variables such as these also explain its nondevelopment, why, in particular, some countries that economic theory suggests should be democracies are not. Thus, while economic development variables set important statistical parameters for democratization, they are by no means determinative.

The "civic culture" of democracy

The colonial system was founded in greed, but also in a widespread belief that it was normatively good. By bringing Western religion, particularly Christianity, to the heathens; economic development to those with poor work ethics; and modern concepts of science and technology to those steeped in superstition and primitive lifestyles, the colonial powers were, many believed, bringing people better lives. The notion that there was what was openly called a "white man's burden" to bring European enlightenment to "primitive" people was once widely shared. In its academic guise, various cultural theories of economic development and democratization have been similarly advanced to explain different levels of progress. The energy level of those in temperate climates were said to be higher than those of people in the tropics. Confucian ethics would prevent China from ever sustaining serious economic growth. Catholic countries, because their church was hierarchically governed, could never be true democracies. Perhaps the most sophisticated and captivating theory linking "culture" and democracy was Max Weber's 1905 essay on *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which noted the links between the individualism of Protestant thinking, particularly Calvinism, and economic development, an important prerequisite to democracy. Each of these theories had just enough rough correlation with historical realities to be plausible and add to the moral justification for colonialism, and later to the popularity of various, more sophisticated, cultural theories of democracy.

One of the earliest empirical studies of this kind linked patterns of behavior in social settings with political behavior. In the 1960s Almond and Verba found important parallels between the patterns of social relations in similar settings in different societies; in participatory cultures (democracies), for example, schools encouraged active student participation in the classroom as opposed to the rote learning characteristic of authoritarian cultures.[44] Other studies suggested significant connections between religion and democracy. Countries with "hierarchical" religions were found to encourage corruption and inefficiency and to make citizen challenges to authority less likely.[45] Or because they make no distinction between the spiritual and the political, Islamic countries were said to be less hospitable to democracy.[46] As the causal links were difficult to trace, and as economic and structural theories began to have greater predictive power, these rather simple cultural theories of economic and political development lost currency. Acemoglu and Robinson, for example, cite the case of Korea to argue against a purely cultural approach. Before the Cold War division of the country into north and south, it had an absolutely common language, religion and culture; a little more than a half century later there could hardly be a greater contrast than that between the impoverished, authoritarian north and the prosperous, democratic south.[47] Similarly, the authors compare the two halves of Nogales, a town on the United States/Mexico border that was arbitrarily divided between the two countries in 1853. One community, one religion, one language, but today

Nogales USA has a per capita income nearly three times that of Nogales Mexico.[48] From a methodological perspective the problem with most cultural theories is that they were either tautological (France is what it is owing to its French culture) or lacking in explanatory power: was it a Protestant ethic that spawned capitalism or capitalists who latched on to Protestantism to justify their lifestyles?

An increasingly important way of looking at political cultures is through examination of a nation's associational life. The idea that there is a civic culture of democracy has a long history, most famously seen in de Tocqueville's celebrated *Democracy in America*, first published in 1835. Although the term "civic culture" has been used to describe a variety of general public attitudes, such as toleration, moderation and civic engagement, the focus of most recent research has been on the more empirically measurable value of associational life and the role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play in strengthening democracy. The idea that voluntary associations enhance democracy by providing experiences in working with others, cultivating public deliberation and providing outlets for expressions of feeling and dissent has become a basic component of contemporary thinking about democracy and democratization. Standing between the state and politics on the one hand, and individuals and economic enterprises on the other, civic organizations involve citizens in acting collectively. Tocqueville was particularly impressed with the New England town meeting, but admired the associational life of Americans in general for providing channels of representation and communication between citizens and the state. Civic organizations, in their modern form as organized interest groups, tend to be viewed less sympathetically, but play important roles.[49] Indeed if "special interests" and "fat cat lobbyists" have become almost standard terms of opprobrium in domestic politics, their proliferation as institutions of "civil society ... has become a, or perhaps *the*, cornerstone of America's democracy initiatives in other countries."[50]

The primary function of these associations in a democracy is to organize citizens for participation in the process of governing. Robert Putnam's comparison of northern and southern Italy suggests that when people have the capacity for collective action they acquire "social capital," or the potential to monitor and hold their governments accountable in ways that isolated individuals cannot. As opposed to "bowling alone"—the provocative title of Putnam's book on the United States—those who must work with others, even in so simple an association as a bowling league, develop social networks and habits of interacting with others that spill over into a general disposition to work with others and support a more general culture of tolerance.[51] A rich associational life contributes to democracy in three ways. First, it has the direct effect of mobilizing interests for political action and establishing links of representation between citizens and public officials that are issue specific and far less ambiguous than elections. The more such groups there are in society—or to use a fancier term—the more "pluralistic" the system, the more it will require bargaining and compromise to get things done. "Extend

the sphere," as Madison wrote in the oft-cited *Federalist* No. 10, "and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens." Pluralism—competitive, free enterprise—in the economic sphere has a similar impact.

The second way in which associational life helps to create a democratic civil culture is through the socialization of group members and the learning of democratic rules. "The thought is that the sense of cooperation and shared responsibility generated by associations produce 'social networks' and 'virtuous cycles' of trust on an ever-expanding scale."[52] Interpersonal trust, moreover, lubricates both economic and political transactions, serving as a foundation of cooperation that facilitates the kind of bargains, possibilities for agreement, and mutual restraints that underlie successful compromise. In more mundane terms, when civil associations are run democratically they provide "large free schools" (to use de Tocqueville's term) and experience such skills as running for office, debating and voting on alternative policies, and understanding rules of order.

Finally, a vibrant associational life is said to contribute to a civic culture of participation. If they can organize, the subjects of authoritarian regimes "can sometimes push the costs of control over certain matters to a point where rulers no longer find it worthwhile to try to dominate their subjects on these particular questions. Subjects thus acquire a degree of political autonomy."[53] And such limited victories are often contagious. "The social thrust toward organization intensifies as consciousness grows of the advantages to be gained from cooperation and from pooling resources."[54] In Putnam's description, societies develop horizontal rather than vertical flows of information that lead to norms of reciprocity and trust rather than hierarchical dependency.[55] As these associations develop, moreover, they become more established, mature and predictable in ways that facilitate the growth of cooperative networks. This emphasis on the importance of association life in "cultivating the ethic of reciprocity" has become, as Mark Warren puts it, "a staple in the literature on the democratic effects of association."[56]

Clearly not all civic associations contribute to democratization. Not only are some groups manifestly authoritarian (it is difficult to see membership of the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist group, or a messianic cult contributing to the civic culture), and many are what is generally described as corporatist, "in which the state controls, limits, sometimes monopolizes, even creates the interest-group life or 'civil society' that swirls about it."[57] Here associations can be as much artifacts of authoritarianism as checks on its control. And even where private associations are autonomous, there are forms of group conflict and patterns of group relations that are so sharply competitive that they endanger rather than support a civic culture that is conducive to democracy. Religious organizations have often been (and continue to be) sources of sharp, even violent, conflicts, though they have also played profoundly important roles in moderating conflicts and reducing violence. In

many authoritarian regimes, moreover, religious groups are the only institutions of civil society allowed to operate. It is interesting, in this regard, how little attention has been accorded to religious organizations in studies of civil society. Indeed there is some tendency not to include them at all on the grounds that (a) that they are not truly "voluntary" organizations in that one's commitment to, say, the Roman Catholic Church is of a different nature and magnitude than is one's membership in the Rotary Club; that (b) there is a tendency in most religions to develop what one student of Jewish groups calls a "Torah society" that, by placing the authority of the scriptures above that of the state, "is potentially detrimental to the development of a civic spirit with respect to the state or to fellow citizens";[58] and (c) that religious organizations are inherently authoritarian and anti-democratic. Even in Islam, where adult Muslims are allowed to make their own interpretations about the judgments of the scholars, the teaching of the ulama in practical terms carries a kind of "'certification' from one of several persons or institutions whose standing is undisputed."[59]

Wiarda suggests that "the growth of civil society in ethnically divided (Indonesia) or fragmented (Argentina) societies may lead not to democracy but to divisions, ungovernability and breakdown."[60] Religiously divided societies (Nigeria, for example), or those in which religious differences coincide with ethnic divides, are often subject to recurring outbreaks of violence and the breakdown of democratic institutions. A strong civil society in a state that cannot deliver may also breed mistrust rather than support for democratic governments, or it can badly prejudice public policy by forcing the government to confer special advantages upon those who can best afford to organize.

The correlation between the extent of a nation's civil society and its potential for robust democracy is obviously related to democracy's relationship to economic development: the more complex the economy the more likely it is to have a more complex associational life. Moreover, rather than serving as an agent of democratization it is equally plausible to argue that it is an effect of that democratization. The more open the political system, the greater the freedom that associations have to assemble, make their case and grow. As with the economic development model, moreover, if civil society is a necessary precondition of democracy, it is not sufficient. What the concept of civil society has done to the study of democratization is to return the concept of political culture to the discussion.[61] In the final analysis, the predictive values of all variables associated with democratization are contingent upon the decisions of real people in a world that is not abstract. The core problem with the early literature on the preconditions of democracy was that it was as apolitical as the real world is not.

Transitions and consolidation

Since the transition to democracy is generally from some form of authoritarian regime, recent research has focused on divisions within the ruling group and the relative willingness of various elites to cede power. Starting from this

perspective, during the past decade or so research has shifted the focus from purely structural factors to the political process associated with regime change.[62] In these transitional processes, the roles of nondemocratic elites—departing dictators and their supporters, the military and representatives of the larger economic enterprises—are crucial in deciding when and how the transition will take place. And even when it has taken place, the old order frequently lurks behind the curtains of the new regime setting the parameters of permissible democracy. The early years of new democracies tend to be unusually sensitive to the actions and personalities of individual leaders. Indian democracy, for example, is almost unimaginable without Gandhi, who made the link between independence and democratization inseparable. Two centuries later George Washington in the United States and Nelson Mandela in South Africa could each have been reelected as often as they chose; their respective choices to step aside played a major role in the consolidation of their young nations' democracies. At the other end of the equation, an extraordinary willingness to use violence and repression as an instrument of authoritarian rule—as in Augusto Pinochet's Chile or Qadaffi's Libya—may delay democratization for a long time after the economic and social preconditions discussed earlier in this chapter have been met. The main reason that economic and social models of democratization do not work as well as they should in theory is simply that they cannot take into account such largely random personal and institutional forces. No matter how "ready for democracy" a country might seem by all the indicators, it is real people not abstract indicators that are the engines of change.

Prediction of democratic success is made even more problematic by the key role played by international actors. The third wave of democratization was delayed for at least a generation by the Cold War, and the core interests of the great powers continue to influence—though not so consistently in a negative direction—the outcomes of many domestic tendencies.[63] My former colleague at the City College of New York, the late Ivo Duchacek, held the post of Minister of Education in the post-World War II Republic of Czechoslovakia. Once, at a seminar on parliamentary elections, the speaker suggested that the switch of three or four seats in a parliamentary democracy seldom has a major impact on the direction of the government. "I beg to differ with you," Ivo said, "if it wasn't for such a switch in Czechoslovakia [when the Communists took over the government and essentially ended the democratization process], I would not be here at City College." "I beg to differ with you," said another of my Eastern European émigré colleagues, "the election didn't matter. You and I are here because of the [Russian] Red Army." Whoever was correct with regard to Czechoslovakia in 1947, it is clear that the long-range timing of democratization in Eastern Europe had far less to do with economic development, national unity and the civic culture than with the Red Army. Especially in the context of the Cold War, the immediate national interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States superseded whatever interest there might have been in promoting democracy.

Direct Soviet military intervention to suppress the democracy movements in Hungary[64] and Czechoslovakia[65] has been well documented. Less frequently acknowledged are Western interventions to sustain authoritarian governments or overthrow newly elected leaders who were viewed as being on the "wrong" side during the Cold War. European countries' attempts to reestablish control over their former colonies in the wake of World War II had little to do with democracy; however, in their continuing efforts to retain influence if not hegemony, democracy was often lost in the shuffle. These interventions, unlike those of the Soviet Union, seldom involved the use of direct military force, but could be accomplished with hired mercenaries, as in Guatemala (1954); by assassination, as in Iran (1954); by supporting internal coups, as in Indonesia (1965); or through a combination of economic and political pressures. In many cases, overt action was unnecessary because many countries had already been subjected to such high levels of external control that they could appropriately be described as "penetrated" states in which major institutions, usually the army, were essentially under foreign control.[66] Sometimes the motive for these interventions was economic, as in Nigeria in the 1990s where, as Larry Diamond describes it, the Clinton administration went along with military coups for fear that democracy might result in the loss of concessions to US oil companies. More frequently, the interests competing with support for democratization were strategic. "For most of the Cold War, the United States readily supported right-wing, anti-Communist dictatorships as part of its containment of the Soviet power bloc."[67]

The end of the Cold War has seen a partial reversal of these policies with an increasing emphasis in both Europe and the United States on the promotion of democracy:

> With the demise of the Soviet bloc communist states, the power of the United States and its wealthy democratic allies has increased significantly. Acting partly out of principle, but also from a growing belief that more constitutional and accountable political systems will generally produce better governance and more legitimate and stable regimes, these powerful democracies have pressed the formal model of electoral democracy on the weaker states over which they hold sway.[68]

It is, unfortunately, easier to prevent democratization than to nurture it, but in overall terms this changing emphasis has been a key factor in the third-wave surge in democratization. It may also play an important role in democratic consolidation, that is, in the ability of newly emerging democracies to avoid sliding back into authoritarian patterns. That these efforts have not always succeeded is beyond question: "External pressures can quite easily topple a democracy through economic sanctions, support for subversion, or even invasion, but their ability to create a democracy is more limited. By its nature, democracy cannot be imposed in the way that authoritarianism can."[69] No matter how much it craves autonomy, however, no nation in the

modern world has the ability fully to control its own political destiny. International conflicts, as Dahl puts it, have always put sharp limits on national autonomy. "Not just conflict but also trade, commerce and finance have always spilled over state boundaries. Democratic states, therefore, have never been able to act autonomously, in disregard of outside forces over which they had little or no control."[70]

There are four ways in particular in which developed democracies can be of positive significance in the democratization process. First, there is an important sense in which democratic governance is a learned skill. Basic rules of parliamentary procedure, methods of conducting elections and ways of independently gathering and reporting news often need to be learned in transforming societies. Some semi-authoritarian systems are far better than others in at least providing the mechanisms and training for such activities. Crooked and rigged elections, for example, still require systems for casting, counting and recording votes, and even rubber-stamp parliaments follow rules of order; but in societies without such experiences the basic mechanics of conducting elections, counting votes and establishing democratic institutions can pose significant challenges. The United Nations, various governments and a number of nongovernmental agencies have played a very important part in helping to set up and monitor fair and free election systems and other democratic procedures.[71]

At another level, experts in democratization are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their ability to anticipate the effects of various kinds of institutional arrangements and their likely impact on the locus of political power. Thus a second path from established democracies to emerging ones is through what are sometimes called "demonstration effects." By looking at what has worked (and what hasn't) in other systems, it may be possible to structure the institutions of new democracies in ways that make them more likely to succeed. The design of an electoral system, an executive structure or a legislature—indeed of an entire constitutional system—"involves trade-offs between competing values, which suit different countries (and different intellectuals and constitution makers) differently."[72] It is true of course that the better we become at predicting the effects of different electoral systems and institutional structures the better various ruling elites will become at protecting their perquisites. "Across the world," as Giovanni Sartori notes, "drafters of electoral systems ... scantily ask for expert advice from self-styled experts, and end up adopting the system that they perceive to their own immediate advantage—with many hurrays to history, social determinants and noble traditions."[73] Yet despite often appropriate justifications for Sartori's cynicism, imported institutions can "create incentives to shape the behavior of political elites to be inclusive in their politics." In many cases, "there is enormous potential for constructive institutional design, policy choice, and changes in the culture of politics, which can make democracy more responsive."[74]

It helps if these institutional designs are backed by substantive incentives, as in the European Union (EU)'s carrot-and-stick preconditions that were

imposed on candidates for membership following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Indeed the third key way in which established democracies can facilitate democratization and the consolidation of democracy in new systems is through economic and trade incentives. Economic development, as we have seen, is strongly associated with democratization, but "the effect of income is strongly mediated by the structure of the international order and the ways in which the great powers shape the resources of political factions in small countries."[75] Many of the oil-rich countries of the Middle East have become rentier states in large part because the superpowers' thirst for oil has exceeded their appetite for promoting a redistribution of political power. Yet the economic backing given to new democracies in such diverse countries as the Philippines, Greece and Angola has played an important role in whatever success democratization has had.

Finally, and perhaps fundamentally, international actors promote democracy by promoting peace. Nothing is more subversive of democratic institutions than war. Sometimes democracies are created in the wake of war, as when the Allies, led by the United States, successfully wrote and imposed new democratic constitutions on Germany and Japan, but these appear to be exceptional cases. Whether similar success can be achieved in Afghanistan or Iraq is much less likely. Even consolidated democracies tend to backslide when the firing begins, with the need for secrecy challenging open government; security concerns trumping civil liberties; and the values of efficiency, hierarchy and decisiveness eroding deliberation and compromise.[76] The logic of state security:

> erodes democracy within nation-states by legitimatizing institutions which are hierarchical, which thrive on secrecy and which, in an age of weapons of mass destruction, give a tiny group of people power over the future of life itself. While the end of the Cold War has changed the immediate security equation for Europe, the United States and many other countries, the underlying structure of self-perpetuating insecurity remains intact.[77]

Even in this area, however, the trends are encouraging. Marshall and Cole's statistics on armed conflicts show that "the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2010 to its lowest level since 1961."[78] With the exception of the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Europe has never enjoyed a more prolonged period of peace.

The faith factor

Although a number of first- and second-wave democracies were—and in a technical sense still are—religious states with a single established church, virtually all of them are today essentially secular. The Lutheran Church in

Sweden, the Church of England, and the Catholic Church in Spain have a few ceremonial connections with the government but play at best a nominal role in government. In actual practice they differ little from countries such as France, Turkey and the United States whose constitutions specifically prohibit the government from favoring any particular church. These, and virtually all of the world's older democracies, are characterized by a rather sharp separation of church and state to the extent that such a separation is sometimes treated as a prerequisite to democracy. Indeed in early modernization theory, a growing separation of church and state was often cited as an important indicator of development. "The secular public sphere," as Hurd has summarized this position, "is constructed as the domain of reason, objectivity, deliberation, and justice. The religious private sphere is construed as the domain of subjectivity, transcendency, effeminacy, and affect. ... Religious presence is perceived as unnatural, undemocratic, and even theocratic."[79] Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*[80] is part of a long tradition of scholarship that contrasts the modern scientific orientation and liberal democracy of the West with the traditionalist, irrational beliefs of those whose orientations to the world are shaped largely by religion. It is a tradition that tends particularly to point to Islam as exemplifying the latter.

The leaders of many emerging democracies were similarly convinced that the triumph of secular nationalism over old ethnic and religious loyalties was sign of development:

> For many of them, embracing a secular form of nationalism was a way of promoting its major premise—freedom from the parochial identities of the past—and thereby avoiding the obstacles that religious loyalties create for a country's political goals. By implication, political power based on religious values and traditional communities held no authority.[81]

These attempts to inculcate nationalism as a counter to religious and ethnic diversity were more or less successful, though often at considerable cost. One irony of this association of secularism with modernity, particularly under the rigid rule of dictators such as the Shah of Iran, is that some Islamists came to associate secularism not with freedom and democracy but with dictatorship and repression.

A major challenge to conventional liberal democratic theories of church/state relations comes from both a worldwide religious revival and its penetration into the political arena. "Most of the world," as one of secularization theory's major voices concedes, "is bubbling with religious passions":[82]

> Since the early 1980s, religious parties have established themselves as pivotal actors in one country after another, ranging from advanced to transitional democracies. Among many other parties, Japan's Komeito, India's Bharatia Janata Party, Sri Lanka's Jahika Urumaya party, Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Palestine's Hamas

> have achieved stunning successes despite their short histories and weakly professed ideologies. The proliferation of religious groups has reached such a level that it is hard to find a country where religious symbols and beliefs have *not* become a crucial component of the political landscape.[83]

This religious resurgence, if nothing else, has become a growing concern for students of politics with the issue of church–state relations, questions that many democrats had thought were long settled. Moreover, it is not just Muslims but fundamentalist Christians in the United States and Hindus in India who are challenging these assumptions.

Religion, modernity and democracy

The case against religion in politics takes a variety of forms. Indirectly, the problem with religiosity, it is argued, derives from its sometimes explicit, generally implicit, rejection of the kind of scientific rationality essential to modernity. Strong religious views, it is suggested, are generally inhospitable to new ideas and critical thinking which inhibit economic development; and as we have seen economic development is positively associated with democratization. There is little empirical support for this once popular line of argument, and the attempt to associate any particular religion or religiosity in general with anti-modernism or underdevelopment has few scholarly proponents at best. Generally, in fact, secular states have slightly *lower* rates of development than those that have state religions.[84] If Weber's correlation of economic development and Protestantism was ever valid, moreover, it seems largely irrelevant today. As part of a larger tendency to conceptualize modernization in Western terms, it has failed to stand the test of time. Ironically, indeed, survey data show that "Catholics, not Protestants, tend to have a stronger work ethic among Christians, but Muslims have an even higher work ethic."[85] Modernization came to Japan without a Protestant ethic, and to the Soviet Union despite its rejection of both Protestantism and capitalism. Even Daniel Pipes, one of Islam's harshest critics, concedes that:

> Islam and modernization do not clash. Pious Muslims can cultivate the sciences, work efficiently in factories, or utilize advanced weapons. Modernization requires no one political ideology or set of institutions: elections, national boundaries, civic associations, and the other hallmarks of Western life are not necessary to economic growth. As a creed, Islam satisfies management consultants as well as peasants.[86]

This does not mean that religion is not an important variable in understanding the process of democratization. "It is not modern capitalism and the market economy which is favored by Protestantism and counteracted by the other world religions, as Weber would have it. It is the compatibility between democracy and religion, which today is the crucial question."[87] There are, of

course, extreme cases in which particular brands of fundamentalism can have significant economic implications. It seems clear, for example, that the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan was unusually inhospitable to modern science, education and economic development; and religiously inspired attacks on modernization in general are not uncommon; but these are, at best, the exceptions that test the rule. More troubling are the relations between explicitly anti-modern religious beliefs, less extreme perhaps than those of the Taliban, that more or less explicitly undermine the practices and values of democracy.

It is these indirect relationships between religiosity and democracy that make many secularists strong in their belief that there are substantial problems. There is, for example, considerable survey evidence to support the proposition that religious hostility "to scientific thinking and new ideas ... constitutes a barrier that prevents individuals from acquiring the knowledge needed to acquit themselves as good citizens."[88] Rawls's injunction to "take the truths of religion off the table" is derived not through any connection with modernity, but from a more direct fear that those whose ideas of truth are founded in religion are hampered in their ability to partake in the process of seeking the reasonable compromises essential to achieve his political concept of justice.[89] Some variant of this argument is at the base of most modern secularist arguments. Because they take religious doctrines as received truths that are not subject to compromise or debate, the argument goes, true believers see no point in democratic politics and thus by definition are inimical to it.

In philosophical terms, the hard-line secularist position is that the voter in a democracy must make his or her decisions on purely secular grounds: if his or her choices are dictated by dogma they are inappropriate. A somewhat softer line of argument—which Rawls has lately come to accept—holds that while such choices might be guided by religious beliefs, they must still be verifiable in secular terms. This somewhat revised Doctrine of Religious Restraint, as Eberle and Cuneo label it, does not require a thorough privatization of religious commitment. Indeed, it allows religion to guide a citizen's choice of political policies and to advocate them on religious grounds provided that "they reasonably believe that they have some plausible secular rationale ... which they are prepared to offer in political discussion."[90]

Even under this less restrictive rule, many secularists argue that people who bring religion into politics are not free agents. How, the secularist asks, can a true believer debate important issues "when one can hear the voice of God speaking through his chosen representatives on Earth?"[91] Not all religions have the formal hierarchies of the Roman Catholic Church or the Church of Latter-day Saints, and not all adherents of these tightly governed religions feel the need to obey the dictates of the Pope or the church's elders; but secularists are skeptical of the ability of believers to exercise independent judgments. "Movements with a strong religious vision indeed have a tendency toward authoritarian leadership and internal discipline. ... Having a strong religious vision often means settling on a single figure as the authority for the entire movement."[92]

The third, and in some ways most telling, argument against religion in politics derives from observations of the numerous instances in which sectarian beliefs have undermined nation-states, fomented wars, justified genocide, and divided communities. Strong religious beliefs, in essence, tend to manifest themselves in violence within divided societies and between nations. Deeply rooted conflicts based on ethnicity, race and religion have displaced territorial aggression as the primary sources of both civil and international war. One study found that of the 101 armed conflicts that took place between 1989 and 1996, ninety-five took place within the borders of a single country.[93] In many of the most bloody and persistent of these conflicts—in Northern Ireland, Israel, Sri Lanka and Algeria, for example—religious differences played a major role. (To put this observation in context it should also be noted that two of the most egregious practitioners of mass murder, Hitler and Stalin, were not religious at all.) Looking inward, "To retain its legitimate position of power, a state must inspire some sense of shared identity among all its diverse population. ... Identity groups tend to demand self-determination, or assert their rights to be treated equally with all citizens, precisely when a state is not fulfilling these objectives."[94] However, few states are capable of fulfilling these objectives when conflicts take on a zero-sum or "us versus them" character. The dynamics of these intra-state conflicts, moreover, often prove difficult to contain, spilling out in neighboring countries, involving the ethnic diaspora and inviting foreign intervention.

The uncomfortable aspect of these arguments for a strict separation of religion and politics lies in their implication that moral beliefs derived from religious sources are somehow less valid than those that are derived from other sources. Philosophically, of course, the citizens of a democracy make their choices on the basis of reason, and despite tons of evidence to the contrary, the myth of voter rationality continues to play an important philosophical and ideological role. In fact we know from studies of voting behavior that everything from sex appeal to astrology, money to patronage, and ethnicity to emotion can play a significantly more important role than rational choice. Religion is historically different in the extent, organizational capacity and perhaps intensity of its influence; and although it can operate on the far fringes of rationality it is, in many significant ways, not that dissimilar from secular nationalism. Both, as Mark Juergensmeyer argues, "serve the ethical function of providing an overwhelming framework of moral order," and are perhaps the only forces that can consistently "give moral sanction to martyrdom and violence."[95] In fact, he suggests:

> the line between secular nationalism and religion has always been quite thin. Both are expressions of faith, both involve an identity with and a loyalty to a large community, and both insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested in the leadership of that community.[96]

In other words:

> none of us actually escapes cultural and other motivations for our intellectual perspectives ... On the one hand, religious people cannot escape the prominence and power of the secular in the modern world, and, on the other hand, while the norms of secular argumentation may obscure deep evaluative commitments, they do not eliminate them.[97]

While both this concept of convergence and more traditional analyses of the "wall" between state and religion are intellectually appealing, they are not always helpful in understanding what is happening on the ground. When Thomas Jefferson used the metaphor of a wall dividing the boundaries of state and religion, his primary concern was to reassure church leaders that democratic legislators would not "make laws to govern the Kingdom of Christ."[98] Today, in the United States at least, that metaphor remains vivid even as its focus has flipped from that of protecting religion *from* the state to one of protecting the polity from undue religious influence. In any political system:

> the power-sharing arrangements rest on historical negotiations and compromises and can be understood only in relation to them. Even in cases where there seems to be a strict separation, religion's relation to state and politics is not straightforward. Once the wall has been built it does not remain intact and impermeable. In fact, more and more evidence suggests that the wall of separation is more permeable than ever. To understand the prevalence and analytical consequences of the separation paradigm, it is important to remember that it rests on a powerful idea derived from modernity: religious and political spheres are deemed to be in opposition to each other.[99]

Whether that remains the case is as much in contention (if not more so) as it was in Jefferson's time. And the directions in which the wall blocks, facilitates or impedes traffic are still very much in flux throughout the world. "It is," as Hurd puts it:

> a controversy over how metaphysics and politics relate to each other and to the state that calls into question fundamental received definitions of both secular and sacred. It therefore needs to be understood and explained not only through Western categories of sacred and secular, or private and public, but also and more fundamentally as a process through which the terms of the political order are socially constructed and politically negotiated.[100]

Democratic failure

Democracy is neither a permanent nor a static condition. Indeed, in the third wave—as in the second and the first—almost as many democracies failed as were created: in Tilly's words, "de-democratization occurs almost as

frequently as democratization," and "even established democracies such as India fluctuate constantly between more or less democracy."[101] This fragility often reflects the continuing underdevelopment of the conditions of democratization discussed previously, such as weak economic development or the continuing absence of a viable civic culture. The consensus of the literature is that these variables, economic development in particular, are far more powerful in predicting the sustenance of existing democracies than in their creation. However, democratic consolidation is also a function of the degree to which the old order is able to reconsolidate its grip on the institutions of power. Even in the most dramatic of revolutionary takeovers, there is almost invariably considerable reliance upon the same basic institutions and persons who ran the power plants and water works, staffed the courts and bureaucracies, delivered the mail and kept the peace.

When democracies fail, it is almost invariably the military that strikes the first blow. Between 1946 and 2005 there were at least 226 attempted military coups in Africa alone, eighty-nine of which were successful.[102] By no means did all these coups replace democratic governments. In most cases it was simply one faction or branch of the military replacing another, but it is clear, particularly in weak and less developed states, that the military is the prime driver of political change. It has the obvious advantages of being armed, organized and familiar with the centers of power. In many poor countries, moreover, the military has more abundant resources than do civilian agencies, thriving on foreign aid, control over its own business enterprises and various forms of corruption. The Indonesian military, for example, at one time owned and operated airlines, toll roads, timber forests, security services and less savory businesses which were estimated to account for as much as 60–70 percent of its total budget.[103] Similar patterns can be found throughout the world.

With some notable exceptions—the United States and Israel in particular—there is a tendency for highly militarized states to be less democratic than those that allocate fewer resources to their militaries. Of the ten states on the World Bank's list of those devoting more than 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to the military, all but the United States and Israel are authoritarian. Not surprisingly, "No other region of the world has devoted so large a share of its gross product to the military as the Middle East. Because in several states the military has monopolized political and coercive power, its invasion of the civilian economy has been inevitable and extensive."[104] Most countries in the region have been under direct military rule, as in Algeria and pre-revolutionary Libya, or civilian dictatorships like Hosni Mubarak's Egypt in which the military maintained veto power over all significant decisions even before it took complete control in 2013.

Military takeovers, at the same time, are often the symptoms rather than the causes of democratic failure. "A professional military's initial preference," it can be argued, "is to eschew the politics of governing" and to "let civilians deal with threats to internal stability according to civilian interests. But in a

civilian-dominant relationship in which the military has a legitimate role in defending the political system, a professional military will find itself drawn into the political battles if the civilians' own battles threaten the stability of the system."[105] Ethnic and religious destabilization, both domestic and transnational, have become the major source of such strife. The wars over trade and territory that characterized conflicts in the nineteenth century have been eclipsed by more deeply rifts conflicts, many of them in the Islamic world. The key then is to channel civilian conflicts in ways that do not destabilize the system. And thus our argument, in a sense, comes back full circle: the best ways of channeling conflicts are to eliminate their causes by encouraging economic development, creating loyalties to the state that supersede ethnic and regional ties, and creating a vigorous civic culture and associational life. How can this be done?

The classic American answer to this question, from Madison's celebrated argument in the *Federalist* No. 10 paper, points the way. In order to contain "the mischief of faction," Madison argued that there is an almost inevitable "division of the society into different interests and parties." The destructive influence of the conflicts that result can be controlled "by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence." Although Madison calls this remedy "worse than the disease" it is one frequently deployed in defense of authoritarian rule. Especially during the Cold War, modernization theorists argued that the surest road to democracy winds through strong, non-Communist authoritarian states that both repress factious rivalries and withstand the destabilizing forces of modernization. Liberty, in other words, might have to be suppressed in order to give less developed countries time to reach a level of economic development that could sustain democracy.

Samuel Huntington, perhaps the most prominent of these early modernization theorists, "has little to say about the process of institution building itself, about the moment when a country's institutions can be ready to face the test of mass politics, and when nondemocratic institutions can be replaced by new, democratic frameworks."[106] But he was adamant in putting state power, economic development, free markets and political stability ahead of democratization. Some tangential support for this approach can be found in Madison's arguments about what we now call pluralism. The more you "extend the sphere" of diverse interests in the society, he wrote in *Federalist* No. 10, the less likely it becomes for any one of them "to outnumber and oppress the rest." Bargaining and compromise thus become the necessary paths to public policy. In the absence of a complex "civic culture" of this kind, Huntington and other early modernization theorists could claim an ally in Madison in the sense that economically underdeveloped societies generally are not pluralistic. Whether the United States was any more pluralistic in 1787 than, say, Indonesia in 1965, is too complicated a question to pursue here. More interesting for our purposes are Madison's further arguments on democratization. Beyond pluralism, Madison suggested that relief from factional conflict would be found in "the Republican principle" of placing power

in the hands of elected leaders, diverse in their backgrounds and hopefully of the sort "whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustices," a rather indirect way of saying that the electoral system would basically be rigged to keep the rabble out. Madison by no means precluded further democratization, but, like Huntington, he and the American founding fathers were quite clearly in favor of a transitional period that would lay the economic and social groundwork for further democratization. With the suffrage essentially limited to male property owners and a complex electoral system that blunted direct popular control, the US Constitution was designed to frustrate strict majority rule. But just in case a "puff of popular passion" might push its way through the system, subsequent *Federalist* papers discuss a number of institutional checks on popular sovereignty that are built into the mix. These are the constitutional devices collectively known as "checks and balances." And the beauty of the Madisonian system lay in the tantalizing suggestion that a government could be structured in such a way as to blunt if not destroy the "mischief of faction."

The US Constitution was revolutionary in its premise that the institutional arrangements of the system could be structured in such a way as to shape the incentives attached to the choices which politicians might make in the future. Pluralism, and the good sense of the people would be "the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."[107] The key to these precautions was the system of checks and balances in which "the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner that each may be a check on the other,"[108] the president, in the United States, on the congress and the courts on both; the states on the national government, and so on. It is now quite widely accepted that although a constitution cannot create democracy in a system not ready for it, "Constitutions are forms that structure and discipline a state's decision-making processes. Constitutions establish *how* norms are to be created ... [and] *procedures* designed to ensure a controlled exercise of power."[109]

Evidently there is no clear road to democracy. The best maps may lead to dead ends and incomprehensible turns. But the general outlines are fairly clear:

> If we think of democracy in developmental terms, as a political system that emerges gradually in fragments or parts, and is always capable of becoming more liberal, inclusive, responsive, accountable, effective, and just, then we must see democratization not simply as a limited period of transition from one set of formal regime rules to another, but rather as an ongoing process, a perpetual challenge, a recurrent struggle.[110]

It is, more importantly, a struggle waged in diverse arenas through different processes. What is clear is that there is no secret or known formula for success. As Larry Diamond says in his many essays and books on the subject it is

an ongoing process and is undoubtedly site specific; what works in one country may or may not in another. The so-called preconditions of democracy are useful tools of understanding, but they are neither determinative nor indispensable. The question raised at the beginning of this book—whether Islam and democracy are compatible—is best answered by looking at the particular problems of and prospects for democracy in specific settings.

Notes

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4 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility* (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2011), 10.
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24 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay writing under the pen name "Publius," *The Federalist Papers* have been reprinted in countless formats and are generally cited in the order in which they were originally published. This quote is from *Federalist* No. 3, generally attributed to Jay. Emphasis in the original.
25 *Federalist* No. 1 (Hamilton).
26 *Federalist* No. 7 (Hamilton).
27 Many students of the US Constitution (myself included) have tended to skip over the early *Federalist* papers to focus on the more palpably political arguments that begin with Madison's celebrated No. 10. We are indebted to Rogan Kersh for bringing the question of union back into the analysis. See his *Dreams of a More Perfect Union* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
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3 The Middle East and North Africa

Strong states, weak democracies

Of all the Muslim-majority states in the world, those of the Middle East and North Africa have at once the longest historical experiences with democracy and the fewest contemporary manifestations. With the exception of Israel, not one country in the region was rated "free" in the Freedom House 2014 survey, and only three (Lebanon, Kuwait and Turkey) were rated "partly free." To emphasize this point: four of the world's nine lowest scoring (or least free) countries were in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It is not surprising that with so dismal a democratic profile in the historic heartland of Islam, the very idea of Muslim democracy is so often dismissed. The argument we will pursue is that the Arab case is in many ways the exception. The question is, why? Certainly, given our arguments about democratization in Chapter 2, there should be reason to expect a far better record; within the Muslim world, few areas are more prosperous, better educated and steeped in histories of both nationhood and experience with democratic institutions. What, to echo Bernard Lewis's famous question, went wrong?

A legacy of democratic struggle

The decline of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires left their core countries, now known as Turkey and Iran, increasingly vulnerable to European interference; but they are among a handful of Muslim-majority states whose experiences with democratic reform span more than a century. The democratic revolutions that took place in 1906 in Iran and in 1908 in Turkey coincided with similar uprisings in Russia (1906), Mexico (1910) and China (1911). This worldwide "wave" of democratization, perhaps because it never crested, has received little scholarly attention, but its symbolic significance—particularly in Turkey and the MENA—is strong. The revolt of the Young Turks in 1908 was in a sense a shadow of the similar rebellion of the Young Ottomans in 1876 which had produced a brief but significant period of power sharing between the sultan and an elected legislature. Although this system was to collapse within two years, and its parliament was never an effective force, the Young Turk movement gestated in this period became the core of

"the civil and military elites that would rule the empire and later the Turkish republic from 1908 to 1950."[1]

The 1906 Constitutional Revolution in Iran produced a parliamentary system that, despite sharp internal divisions and continuing international and domestic intrigues that undermined its influence, remained in office for two decades. As in the similar period in Turkey, "The 1906–1925 period marked the beginning of debates on freedom and order in Iran, when the ideals of accountable and effective government and central control of administration, functioning within clearly defined national boundaries, began to capture the language of politics and to influence the state's policy orientations."[2] Even earlier, in 1861, the Bey of Tunis promulgated a constitution and created a grand council which, although it was under his control, played a brief but not insignificant advisory role. A similar council, appointed by the village headmen, was created in Egypt in 1869. In Egypt the 1923 Constitution, though it retained the monarchy and continued to allow a British veto power over key issues, did produce a multi-party parliament elected through reasonably free elections and near-universal (albeit male) suffrage. Democracy never really took hold. The majority party (the Wafd):

> would win an election; the king or the British would object to its strident nationalism and controversial policies; the king would then dismiss the Wafd government and replace it with a government more amenable to the palace, which would rule for few years but gain little popular support; the king, in an effort to create a more effective and legitimate government, would hold new elections; the Wafd would win, and the cycle would start all over again.[3]

As in Turkey and Iran, however, there remains, if largely at a symbolic level, a very real history of democracy to serve as an indigenous point of reference. Egypt, as Rutherford points out, particularly in its legal establishment of trained lawyers, judges and prosecutors, has a very meaningful intellectual and judicial tradition of constitutionalism.[4] The quasi-independent niche that the courts carved out for themselves in the Mubarak years allowed them to maintain a highly assertive role in post-revolutionary Egypt, and perhaps even into the current era of military rule. Unlike many transitional states which lack any homegrown constitutional case law and must rely on precedents and doctrines developed de novo or abroad, a number of the MENA states, including Egypt, Iran, Morocco and Tunisia, draw upon rich rule of law resources of their own.

Despite this relatively long history of interest in and experience of democracy and the rule of law, the MENA remains the region of the world most firmly inoculated against liberalization. Of the twelve still powerful hereditary monarchs in the world, eight are in this region. And as can be seen in Table 3.1, there are only a handful of countries that can be characterized as even "partly free." The average Freedom House score for the MENA countries,[5] even if we

Table 3.1 Indicators of demography and democracy in the MENA

Country	*Percentage*			*Freedom House democracy score*		
	Muslim	*GDP*	*Diversity*	*1980–82*	*2000–02*	*2010–12*
Algeria	98	5,244	0.156	12	11	11
Bahrain	81	18,184	0.455	10	11.3	11.3
Egypt	95	2,781	0.065	10	11.7	11
Iran	100	4,526	0.344	11.3	12	12
Iraq	99	3,501	0.326	13	14	11
Israel	18	31,282	0.402	4	3	3
Jordan	99	4,666	0.057	12	9.7	11
Kuwait	86	62,664	0.363	8.7	9	8.7
Lebanon	60	9,413	0.239	8.7	11	8.3
Libya	97	9,958	0.117	12.3	14	13.7
Morocco	100	3,054	0.187	8.7	9.7	9
Oman	88	25,221	0.474	12	11	11
Qatar	78	92,502	0.339	10	12	11
Saudi Arabia	97	20,540	0.197	12.3	14	13.3
Syria	93	2,893	0.152	12.3	14	13.3
Tunisia	100	4,297	0.038	10.3	11	10.3
Turkey	99	10,524	0.255	6	6	6
United Arab Emirates	76	45,633	0.580	10	11	11.7
Yemen, North/South	99	1,631	0.074	12*	11.7	11.3

Note: *Combined average of North and South Yemen.
Sources: Pew Research Center, *The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2011); and various editions of the *Journal of Democracy*'s Annual Freedom House Scores, available at www.freedomhouse.org. GDP are for 2012 or the nearest available year and have been extracted from the table *GDP per capita (current US$)*, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.

include the special cases of Turkey and Israel,[6] is stunningly high at 10.5 points (compared with the sub-Saharan Africa average of 8.7). Unlike southern Africa, moreover, where average democracy scores improved rather markedly between 1980–82 and 2010–12, the MENA countries have actually become slightly *more* authoritarian.

The state of the states

Most of the contemporary nation-states in the MENA were created not along geographically natural boundaries or through generations of alliance and conflict, but as administrative units of large empires or from maps drawn in

the European treaty sessions of colonial powers. Boundary issues, both internal and external, have thus troubled almost all of the nations in the region, such that an average of more than four armed conflicts per year broke out between 1960 and 2000.[7] Even more than in most other parts of the world, moreover, these conflicts have frequently been, to some degree or another, fomented, prolonged, intensified or resolved by the intervention of outside forces. If only because of the complicated worldwide context within which the Arab–Israeli conflict has played out, few of these conflicts have been confined to the region. When Huntington argued that the Islamic world was both particularly fragmented along tribal lines, yet unusually dedicated to supranational loyalties, it is safe to assume that he had the Middle East in mind. In contrast with most other regions, however, conflicts in the MENA frequently tend to have religious loading, most obviously between Jews and Muslims, but also between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and in the complicated relations between various Christian and Islamic sects in Egypt and Lebanon.

The ethnic and linguistic identity of the Arabs—reinforced by Arabic being the language of the Koran—is at the core of the region, though it fades as one moves north into the Turkish sects of Anatolia and various Persian groups further east, Armenians and Kurds to north of them. Substantial pockets of Jews, Christians, Bahais, Zoroastrians and Copts are also found. Islam itself is also divided most sharply between Sunnis and Shi'ites, but also between the more "orthodox" of these sects and such offshoots such as Sufis, Salafis, Druze, Alawis and Alevis.[8] Although some countries in the region have firm ethnic, linguistic and religious identities (guest workers excluded, for example, Saudi Arabia is almost entirely Arab and Sunni), most have substantial minority populations and some—such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria—have no truly dominant ethno-religious population. Even where ethnic and religious differences are not sharp, as along much of the western coast of the Mediterranean, there are significant cultural differences between the more urban, commercial and cosmopolitan cultures of the coastal areas and those of the agricultural and tribal areas bordering on the Sahara.

The powerful nationalistic movements that took control in most parts of the region in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, together with a prevailing ideology of centralization, pretty much shattered whatever visions of a broader Arab ummah (community) some Muslim intellectuals had entertained. Pan-Arabism never really took hold, except perhaps sporadically in opposition to Israel. Even here unity has never been more than rhetorical with each country in the region quick to cut its own deals. Transnational interventions are not uncommon; take, for example, the recent use of Saudi troops to put down a rebellion in Bahrain and in Iranian military support for the crumbling Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Rather than reflecting allegiance to a broader community, what is displayed here is the fragmentation into competing ethnic, national and religious groups. These tensions are inflamed in countries such as Bahrain, where the minority Sunni king and mercenary army control a population that is 70 percent Shi'ite; and Syria, where a small Alewite sect

of Shi'ites—with the tacit support of some smaller ethnic and religious minorities—governs a largely Sunni country.

In most other aspects related to democratization, the differences between the MENA states and most other Muslim-majority countries are large. To begin with, the state tends to be far stronger. According to the 2012 figures compiled by the US Central Intelligence Agency, nine of the nineteen MENA countries, compared with only one in sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa), and two in Asia (Brunei and Singapore) were in the top fifty countries in terms of government expenditure.[9] Saudi Arabia spent more than three times as much on its military as *all the nations in sub-Saharan Africa combined.*[10] Although patronage, corruption and nepotism are rampant in most of the MENA countries, they are—in comparison with the Muslim nations to their south and east—strongly, if not always efficiently, governed. Adult literacy rates in the MENA region range from a low of 56 percent in Morocco to 96 percent in Qatar with an overall average of 83.1 percent. Figures on infrastructure are not widely available, but suggest an even wider gap. The reporting countries of the MENA region, for example, have nearly three times the percentage of paved roads than their neighbors to the south. Few governments are wildly popular with their subjects, but most—as illustrated by the recent failure of dissidents to shake the regimes in all but Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen—retain a remarkable capacity to endure.

The political institutions of the MENA states, above all the military, are also far more developed than those of most other Muslim-majority countries. While the end of the Cold War saw a dwindling of international military assistance in most of the world, the combination of oil and Israel has kept such support at relatively high levels, even for countries like Saudi Arabia that have substantial resources of their own. Morocco and Jordan, for example, have been able to retain strong military establishments despite their relatively anemic economies. Jordan, which receives substantial aid from the United States, ranks fifth in the world in terms of the proportion of its government resources devoted to the military.[11] A professional army, as illustrated both in Mubarak's rapid fall in Egypt and the subsequent unseating of the Mohamed Morsi regime, can tip the balance against an autocratic regime, oust an elected government and carve out a role of its own; but their general role is usually one of regime maintenance. To keep it loyal, as in Syria, the armed forces must to some degree be bought so that "loyalty to the regime often outweighs skill or professional merit in determining who gets promoted,"[12] and even then its support is not guaranteed. As shown by recent events:

> when the army decides not to back the regime (Tunisia, Egypt), the regime is most likely doomed. Where the soldiers opt to stick with the status quo (Bahrain, Syria), the regime survives. Where the armed forces are divided (Libya, Yemen), the results are determined by other factors such as foreign intervention, the strength of the opposition, and the old regime's resolve to persevere.[13]

However, the key point is that the strong militaries, particularly in the patrimonial countries of the MENA region, are a powerful force for the stability of authoritarian regimes. Theda Skocpol's argument that a state's coercive power, if sufficiently coherent, can normally face down all but the most determined revolutionary forces is confirmed in the modern history of the MENA region.[14] In many ways the autocracies of the region are autocratic because they are autocratic. Repression works, and it works even better when it has external support.

The persistence of autocracy also has roots in legitimate fears of anarchy. In divided societies, witness Iraq, Libya and Syria, the cure for autocracy can be worse than the disease. And from the perspective of other countries, especially those on the borders of divided nations, it is better the devil you know than the devil you might get, or the instability, violence and spillovers that come from unsuccessful revolutions.

Economic development

While the countries in this area are generally far more affluent than those of most Muslim-majority countries, there are substantial disparities of wealth both within and among them. Most of the oil-rich countries in the region—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and to a lesser degree pre-revolutionary Libya—are classic rentier states. Through control over valuable resources, the rentier state in effect "rents" the loyalty of its subjects by keeping taxes low while providing high levels of government services. In the early days of the Arab Spring, to give one rather vivid example, the government of Kuwait granted the equivalent of US $3,500 to every man, woman and child, plus groceries such as cooking oil and milk ($3,500, to put this sum in perspective, is more than double the entire per capita GDP of Yemen). Some states in the region, including Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have more sophisticated economies, and enhance their oil revenues through other avenues of economic opportunity. At the other extreme are resource-poor countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Yemen that have struggled to develop independent economies, and more complex industrializing countries, Israel and Turkey most notably, as well as Egypt and Tunisia.[15] The overall poverty rates in most of these countries are low—far closer to European than African levels—but the gaps between rich and poor are extremely large. Particularly skewed are "opportunities for educational and professional advancement," enforced both by barriers to upward mobility and extraordinary privileged access to the already affluent.[16]

Compounding the problem of extreme income inequality is the particular burden it has put on younger people. "Throughout the entire Middle East and North Africa, roughly one out of every three people is between the ages of ten and twenty-four."[17] What makes this youth bulge particularly disruptive is its occurrence, particularly in countries without oil and with stagnant economies; in Egypt, for example, they make up 90 percent of the unemployed.[18]

Civil society

What is weak in most of the MENA region, as in much of Africa and Asia, is civil society. A vibrant and fast-growing network of business and professional societies formed in the early years of independence, particularly in Egypt and French North Africa, was all but wiped out in the early post-colonial years when centralization was the norm. "Independent associations for workers and professionals were ... prohibited. They were replaced with a vast corporatist network of state-controlled unions and professional associations. The state also took control of radio, television, and newspapers."[19] There are a growing number of censored but independent newspapers in Egypt and other countries, and Egypt under Mubarak actually allowed two private radio stations to operate, but they were not permitted to broadcast news. As professional societies, in particular, regrouped, they were subjected to increasing harassment, co-optation and dissolution from the state. If they were sometimes able to serve as agents of change, most professional associations in the MENA states are at best quasi-independent. Actual patterns vary from country to country, but this kind of patrimonial relationship—not just to professional societies but to labor unions and business groups as well—has been characteristic. In 1980, for example, the Syrian government dissolved all the existing professional organizations and insisted upon membership of new state-run substitutes.[20]

The more purely authoritarian states, particularly the oil-rich principalities, either control all nongovernmental associations, or make it clear that there are strict limits on their operations; but as their economies become more diverse and globally interconnected sometimes they have actively encouraged the creation of business associations in particular. With much of their business—and sometimes their assets as well—overseas, a growing number of companies are able to operate with considerable independence. Yet they remain strikingly parochial and apolitical. For most business (and professional) groups, "their lobbying strategies tend to be reactive rather than proactive, and there are few cases where organized lobbying occurs with fully formed proposals on complex policy matters."[21] Business elites may sometimes work individually and behind the scenes to influence government politics, but they scrupulously tend to avoid politics "largely because authoritarian regimes still control most business opportunities and the formation of parties that might be seen as oppositional could jeopardize access to these opportunities."[22] There is, as one United Nations report put it, "an executive apparatus [that] resembles a 'black hole' which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and nothing escapes."[23] Yet "the Arab professional class is not static. Across the region new groups and minorities, not part of a given regime's social base ... are entering the business and professional middle class. ... greatly complicating previously neat distinctions between regime social bases and outsiders."[24]

In the more complex economies of countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, an accordion-like pattern of liberalization and repression accompanied by periods of co-optation have produced mixed and constantly shifting patterns. Some studies have shown that "by the mid-1990s Egypt boasted the largest NGO community in the developing countries."[25] Gradually, however, the noose was tightened and new limitations were imposed. Not only did the regulations change, but "the application of these regulations [was] used selectively. ... Civil servants are given immense power when it comes to interpreting the law, which has resulted in rejection of requests for registration by human rights CSOs [civil society organizations] on numerous occasions."[26] Periods of liberalization produce a proliferation of professional societies, business groups and human rights CSOs only to find their leaders jailed and offices closed before the cycle began again. It has been virtually impossible, in this context, for CSOs to accumulate what the literature calls social capital, a reservoir of intergroup interactions that builds an overall atmosphere of cooperation, negotiated conflict and trust. CSOs are further disoriented by patterns of favoritism that particularly privilege some organizations over others. As these states are more reluctant to take on associations of a religious nature or those backed by major foreign donors, repression is as uneven as it is sporadic. In periods of repression, moreover, a number of civic associations find that the only place they can meet without interference is in local mosques. In Egypt in particular, civil society increasingly fell under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood, and in most of the region similar patterns tended to benefit Islamic groups and those CSOs that were funded by foreign donors. Even for religious groups, however, state controls loom large. In extreme cases—Algeria, for example—the imams of all mosques are state appointed and paid, their sermons are reviewed and the use of mosques for nonreligious meetings is prohibited.[27]

"Because the organizations connected with foreigners are inherently somewhat disconnected from the grassroots, their presence is not directly indicative of a healthy civil society."[28] Groups funded by the same Western governments that support the governments in power are particularly unlikely to broaden their roles. Instead there is a ritual dance in which the CSOs push their agendas in ways to avoid stepping on the host countries' toes in exchange for being allowed on the dance floor at all. The entrenched regimes, for their part, cut these groups more slack than they would similar domestic advocates for fear of losing the foreign aid that helps to sustain regime power. The very fact that groups such as these "have become the most vocal secular opposition in several Arab countries" is a telling indicator of just how weak the indigenous civil societies are.[29]

Many observers also argue that groups with a largely religious base do not fulfill the democratizing roles that civic society theory anticipates. Putnam, for example, excluded Catholic groups from those he perceived as contributing to the building of social capital in Italy, and Gellner singled out Muslims whose search for an Islamic community transcending national borders would not

play a significant role within the confines of a single state.[30] In recent years this argument has most commonly been voiced when the CSOs are Islamic, and civil society may be "fairly robust, but because it is largely Islamic it tends toward passive acceptance of authoritarianism and the quest for a 'just prince' to lead."[31] Insofar as it relates to Roman Catholics—who remain, doctrinally at least, more accepting of "authoritarianism" under a just prince—this argument has been largely discredited as the Church has become increasingly supportive of democratic institutions. As regards Muslims, the argument takes an even more extreme form in the theory that organizations tinged with Islam are actually more of a threat to democracy than an asset. Comparing Islamic groups to Weimar Germany's Nazis—which she has studied more thoroughly—the historian Sheri Berman argues, for example, that "the expansion of civil society in Egypt and other Arab countries over recent decades is thus best understood as a sign not of benign liberalization but of a profound political failure, and an incubator for illiberal radicalism."[32] By focusing on Egypt, Berman describes Arab nations more generally as "weak states," in which their continuing inability to provide basic public services or inspire citizen loyalty has inadvertently shifted substantial control over the loyalty of citizens to those bent on establishing radical, undemocratic Islamic states. Even in stronger states, such as those in Western Europe, small, seemingly benign, Islamic groups, it is argued in some studies, pose a significant threat. Using the very freedoms that they would deny others, Basim Tibi argues, "in a conflict between European cultural relativism and Islamist neo-absolutism, it becomes clear that the Islamists are the winner of the ongoing war of ideas."[33] From this relatively unique perspective, instead of being a building block of democracy, civil society (if Islamist) is a danger that must be confronted. "It is," Tibi warns, "legitimate to defend an open society against the enemy within."[34]

In the MENA region, Islamic organizations have often been tied to the regime, quiet or, at best, reluctant supporters of democratic reforms, but few of them have had the opportunity to show what Tibi might call their true colors. In the two recent cases we have where they actually have enjoyed a brief share of the power to govern, in Egypt and Tunisia, Islamist groups failed to solidify their control in the former and became part of the democratic process of bargaining for power in the latter. And although they were sufficiently well organized to score initial electoral victories, they were not in any sense initiators of the movements pushing for regime change nor—when that came about—well-prepared actually to govern. As a general proposition, a vibrant civil society, religious or secular—as important as it seems to be in sustaining democracies—is an unlikely vehicle for regime change. Unlike political parties, most CSOs are interested less in taking over governments—a role that generally falls to military groups and political parties—than in influencing them on behalf of the more narrow objectives of their members. Their advocacy on behalf of specific groups or particular

principles, such as human rights or Islam, leaves them ill-equipped to mobilize a broader set of constituencies for regime change.

In some of the weaker states, the Islamic Brotherhood and kindred groups have been able to carve out areas of considerable independence. But although they have become major political players in post-revolutionary situations, they came late to the game. The wonder of the Arab Spring is that the massive demonstrations that threatened regimes could not have been blocked by rounding up the usual suspects:

> The Arab awakening has clearly not been the work of Islamic movements. Neither in Tunisia or Egypt, not Jordan, Libya, or Syria were they the instigators. The mass movements took to the streets without them, against the will of their leadership, and, in any event, without their agreement. In Tunisia, the Ennahda movement joined the protests several weeks after they had begun, just as the Muslim Brotherhood did in Cairo. The same prudent attitude has been on display in Jordan, Libya, Syria, and even Yemen.[35]

It was not simple prudence, but in the fundamental nature of these organizations that they were slow to join the revolution. It is in the nature of sectarian groups to be wary of coalitions and protective of their core missions. The kinds of compromises and coalition-building strategies necessary to gain shares of governing power are anathema to the hard-core movement supporters who seek purity and "truth"; these same core supporters, particularly those motivated by a spiritual vision of God's will, are unwilling to allow their leaders to "sell out," even for short-run gains.[36] In the final analysis, moreover, most Muslims, like most religious people, are more interested in personal salvation than power politics.

The international context

One final but crucial set of variables that must be reiterated and reinforced with regard to the MENA region is the international context within which its recent history has unfolded. Whatever the domestic prospects for democracy and change within each country of the region, there are two 500-pound gorillas in each room—oil and Israel. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union frequently backed authoritarian regimes. If that dynamic is largely gone, the international context remains a vital factor in the internal politics of most MENA countries. If it is simplistic to argue that any country's policies toward the region are determined by its thirst for oil, it is equally naive to pretend that it is not a factor. At a minimum there is a strong preference for stability that frames perspectives on the region. Riots in Kuwait, revolts in Libya, and demonstrations in Bahrain are as significant in their impact on the Dow Jones, the FTSE and the Hang Seng indices as they are on the regimes in question. Oil not only provides the money that feeds the

rentier states and helps to keep their regimes in power, it also reinforces the tendency of those who need it to support the political status quo. As a former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East once put it, the problem is not that many of the countries of the Middle East were not "ready" for democracy, but that Washington was "not ready for the choices that most would probably make."[37] Fear of Islamic militants has displaced fear of Soviet access to Middle Eastern oil and other resources, but Western support for democratization remains tentative at best.

Finally, the question of democratization in the MENA region cannot be fully addressed without some reference to Israel. Entire books can be (and have been) devoted to thorny issues that can only be touched upon in passing here. Aside from the uncertain state of its borders and its unique relationships with its Muslim citizens and residents of its unresolved boundaries, Israel is basically a European-style democracy that is at once the envy and the scourge of its neighbors. With a vibrant civil society, affluence and a large middle class, many of the attributes associated with democracy have long been present in Israel. Aside from the ambivalent status of many Palestinians within its acknowledged borders, and the still undefined issue of just what those borders are, its democracy remains vibrant even in the face of constant exogenous threats that make it virtually a garrison state. Despite this and the country's continuing conflicts between secular, reform and Orthodox Jews, between the early settlers and new arrivals, between and among African, West European and Russian immigrants, the system continues to function.

Yet the very existence of Israel casts a long shadow on the prospects for democracy in the countries that surround it. The political transformation of the MENA cannot succeed without some resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[38] The countries of the region are locked in what Juval Portugali calls "implicate relations," with social categories that "contain or enfold each other in an ever evolving movement."[39] The very success of Israel feeds both the bitterness of Islamic militants and the case for authoritarian regimes in the surrounding Arab world. Lebanon is, arguably, the crossroads of these conflicts. Since its independence from France in 1943, it has been the exemplar of "consociational" democracy. Fragmented into three large ethno-religious blocs, and a variety of smaller ones, the 1943 Constitution established a quasi-democracy in which the president, by agreement, is a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the parliamentary speaker a Shi'ite. With each of the three major ethnic groups thus effectively granted the power of veto, Lebanon's "dissonant politics," or unique combination of competition and power sharing, has served in some ways as an example of the ability of democracy to survive under the strangest of circumstances. Whatever freedom it has, moreover, has been teased out of a pressure cooker of external relations fired by the insecurities and ambitions of its stronger neighbors.[40] Despite a vibrant civic culture, and civil liberties uncharacteristic of the Middle East, "its power-sharing politics pivots more around interplay of extrinsic actors than around the magic formula of deliberative democracy."[41] Its political

history is one of recurring foreign intervention, frequently of a military nature, and involving troops from as far away as France, Britain and the United States, but most especially Israel—which sent in its troops five times between 1979 and 2006—and Syria—whose army occupied the country from 1990 to 2005. These fifteen years of what Mühlbacher calls "chaperoned power-sharing"[42] created internal fault lines that continue to frustrate all attempts to forge the national consensus essential to effective government, and that have only been exacerbated by the Syrian civil war.[43] Lebanese politics are, in a broad sense, the politics of the Middle East writ large: dependent as much upon the world outside as on the world within.

The special case of Iran

Iran's theocratic blend of democratic procedures fronting for authoritarian political realities is the specter that haunts Western attitudes toward Muslim democracy. The overthrow of the Shah in 1979 was, predictably, led largely by pro-democracy forces with the role of the Islamists essentially peripheral. The more secular reformers, however:

> were never able to separate the demand for democracy from leftist and Islamic revolutionary activism—to separate liberal values of democracy from the dogmatic utopianisms of the left and the fundamentalists. As a result, democratic forces were unable to clearly define their own positions, and so they could neither arrive at an agreement with the Shah nor control the flow of the revolution. Their moment of power—when they could have shaped Iran's politics—was fleeting, and before long they were devoured by the revolution.[44]

The Islamists, though slow to organize, were quick to consolidate their power once the divisions between democratic and status quo forces gave them an opening. With tactics appropriately described as "Leninist," they "purged public and private organizations, ranging from government agencies to universities to businesses and factories, of alleged and real supporters of the old regime,"[45] and essentially set up a parallel structure of militias, neighborhood councils, sharia courts and revolutionary tribunals. With a combination of state and private funding, they "controlled the revenue of religious taxes and donations from 59,000 mosques, 6,000 shrines, and 15,000 other religious places, as well as foundations. … This gigantic industrial and financial conglomerate controlled a major segment of Iran's economy but was accountable only to the supreme leader."[46] In the confusion of the 1981–82 occupation of the US embassy, they then used this parallel government to turn on their former democratic allies. In the fervor of the confrontation with the United States, the Iranian left allied with the Islamists to force the moderates out before themselves being mercilessly crushed.

The new constitution, reasonably reformist and democratic in almost all of its provisions, included a provision for a Guardian Council that was to prove fatal to Iranian democracy. It was thought by many of the secular liberals to be a necessary sop to the Islamists and a relatively marginal body of religious scholars who might intervene on matters of faith but leave governing to the elected politicians. Historically Iran's constitutionalists had seen the ulama as allies in advocating limits on the monarch; but "the post-revolutionary state, as Tocqueville had observed in the case of the French Revolution, turned out to be stronger, more vigorously coercive, than its predecessor":[47]

> Constitutionalism did not see itself as exclusively concerned with religious law or the *sharia*. Constitutionalists were primarily concerned with democracy and justice, not with secularism. In fact, they viewed the ulama as a bulwark against monarchial absolutism and instrumental in popularizing the movement, and as such an important ally in the quest for a constitution. The *sharia* was used to protest injustice and to demand accountability of the monarchy. Moreover, the *sharia* was viewed as primarily concerned with personal law, not public law.[48]

This, after all, had been standard Shi'ite practice, with the ulama more assertive in the public sphere than in standard Sunni practice, but essentially limiting both the scope and intensity of its direct involvement in politics. As we have seen in Chapter 2, however, this was not the role envisioned by Ayatollah Khomeini. The failure of the elected politicians to develop mass-based parties or coherent programs left them without popular support, and the Guardian Council became not the paper tiger some had anticipated but a real force. Khomeini used his own influence as Supreme Leader and the Council's power to veto bills of all kinds, and, more importantly, its power to vet candidates so aggressively as to all but nullify the democratic elements of the constitution.

In the end Iran has become almost a classic case of a democratic polity in an authoritarian shell. In many ways it is an oil-endowed rentier regime, using patrimonial, corrupt, patronage-heavy, nationalistic politics to stay in power, even in the face of (or perhaps in part because of) the sanctions and manifest hostilities toward the government emanating from the West. More than a quarter of a century "after the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic republic had not only failed to address the inequalities of the monarchial system it had overthrown, but it had in effect replicated them."[49] Yet quite remarkably, for all its militancy, Islamist control of the country remains contingent. Repressed as it certainly is, the country sustains a viable civic culture, made more resilient by the incredible youth of its population.[50] The regime's insistence upon following the rituals if not the substance of democracy, and its reiterated claims of popular support are significant not for "their plausibility or otherwise, but the very fact that they are made and invoked. Such claims reveal the continued and growing salience of democratic and, more broadly, social democratic aspirations in the Iranian public sphere."[51]

Particularly in the United States, there is a strong political movement, backed by a well-supported group of academics, who see the Iranian case as paradigmatic of change in the Islamic world. Once the Islamic camel gets its nose in the tent, the argument runs, it will soon take it over, never to be displaced. We shall argue in subsequent chapters that this has not essentially been the case in other Muslim-majority countries, making Iran, in effect, the exception that tests the rule. But the Iranian case does shed light on a problem that has reemerged in more recent attempts to overthrow authoritarian regimes in the MENA. With the exception of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Israel, groups growing out of the Muslim Brotherhood have not generally been politically active, but they have developed extensive networks of intra-faith communication and social welfare facilities. In Iran and—as we shall argue—in many other parts of the region, these ties have made them far more capable than more secular groups of shifting into a political action mode when the opportunity presents itself. Unlike the ayatollahs in Iran, however, they have yet to prove themselves capable of consolidating power when opportunity knocks.

The Arab Spring

In January 2011, inspired by the self-immolation of an anti-government street merchant, major anti-government street protests broke out in Tunisia and, shortly afterwards, in Egypt. Organized largely by tech-savvy young people, the protests united both secular and religious forces in a vague call for, as crowds in Egypt's Tahrir Square put it, "bread, freedom and social justice." Within a few months the contagion of anti-authoritarianism had spread throughout most of the region, forcing changes of government in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia; major military actions in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen; and serious challenges to the regimes in most of the area. Especially where the challenges were most successful, it was soon apparent that the protesters were more united in what they were against than what they were for. To describe these divisions as dividing secularists from Islamists cuts to the core of the problem, but vastly oversimplifies what were and remain very complex fissures that differed from one country to another. Some demonstrators opposed the regime because it was corrupt, some because of its failed economic policies, and some because it was too authoritarian and/or too pro-American, and/or too secular and so on. While the demonstrators might agree in Libya that Qadaffi had to go, that Mubarak was the problem in Egypt or Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, they were often as mistrustful of each other as they were of the dictators they commonly opposed. "The secularists," as one Jordanian put it, "are sometimes so terrified that they end up supporting an authoritarian regime, while the Islamist discourse links secularism and liberalism, as if Ben Ali and Mubarak were liberal."[52] And this is precisely what happened in Egypt where many of the supposedly liberal, pro-democracy forces

actively supported the military overthrow of the elected Islamist government, and continue to cheer the military government's suppression of dissent.

The most vital forces of rebellion, and indeed the only civic organizations allowed to organize—were Islamic. But these groups were divided among themselves, in countries like Syria, for example, between Shi'ites, Alewites and Sunnis; between those who had been co-opted by the regime (as with the Alewites); between those who were politically engaged and those who were not; and between the hard-line advocates of some version of an Islamic state and various shades of political moderation. In essence, the Arab Spring did more to expose and, in Syria especially, exacerbate the fault lines of conflict in the MENA region than to weaken its authoritarian governments. Only in Tunisia, arguably the most secular of the region's countries, has there been willingness by most parties to the post-revolutionary coalition seriously to negotiate the creation of a democratic regime. Its success in doing so—particularly in light of Egypt's failure to unite its reformist elements—is important beyond its borders. There is, as a Rand Corporation study argued in 2012, "more at stake in Egypt and Tunisia for the future of democracy in the region than the future of their own citizens."[53]

Beyond what are often called "demonstration effects" there are very tangible ways in which what happens in one country affects its proximate and distal neighbors. Direct intervention, as when the Saudis moved in troops to crush the protest movement in Bahrain, or when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created the no-fly zone that helped the opposition to oust Qadaffi in Libya are the most obvious, followed by the kinds of tangible resources the West, the Russians, Iran and the Saudis have provided to both sides in Syria, Yemen and countries we may not really know much about. Equally important are the disruptions conflict in one arena can bring to everyday life in another. Jordan, for example, whose population of just over six million people already includes more than two million Palestinian refugees, has more recently housed 620,000 new persons fleeing the civil war in neighboring Syria. Lebanon, with just over four million citizens, has absorbed over one million.[54] By their very presence, and in reflection of the struggles in Syria, they have greatly exacerbated internal tensions in both countries. In Lebanon, the Islamist Hezbollah faction—long supported by Iran and Syria—has actually sent troops to assist the Assad regime against those who they see as Sunni radicals, secularists and Islamic State (see below), thus complicating internal relations in Lebanon with numerous supporters of the Syrian revolution.

In the years between World Wars I and II, Turkey and Eastern Europe were the capitals of international intrigue with spying a major industry. Today's crossroads of conspiracy is clearly the MENA, with virtually every country in the world having some finger in the region's politics, resources and conflicts. What this assures, if nothing else, is that every conflict between and within states will be ramped up, doubly so when it involves oil, with democratization taking a back seat to geopolitics. A Rand Corporation study of the

area in 2012 concluded that given a history of US policies that "preferred stability to reform," and "close relationships ... with some of the region's autocracies ... [it follows that] pivoting to support reform may be viewed skeptically in the Arab world."[55] Nor can one expect anything like the European Union's work with the Turkish government (see Chapter 5) to be replicated anywhere else in the region: "there is no parallel to the role that the EU and, to a lesser extent, NATO, played in the Southern and Eastern European transitions."[56] What might be called the Algeria syndrome continues to haunt the democracy movement in the MENA. In Hamid's interviews and conversations with a variety of Islamic regime opponents, especially in Egypt, there were frequent references to what is often called the "American veto" of Algeria's 1992 elections when fear of an Islamist victory led to a West-backed military abortion of the election, the execution of the democracy movement's leaders and a subsequent civil war. The lesson, for many activists—as a leader in Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front put it—is that "victory is more dangerous than defeat."[57] In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood that won a plurality in parliament and elected Mohamed Morsi to the presidency in 2012 has been banned by the military. All of its senior leaders and at least 16,000 supporters have been arrested, with more than 1,000 executed.[58]

The tangible results of the 2010–12 uprisings that became known as the Arab Spring have been modest at best. In a nutshell, "democracy remains elusive in the Middle East";[59] Egypt's elected government was overthrown by a military regime that is arguably more heavy-handed than the regime toppled by the reformers. Years after the overthrow of Yemen's dictator, a National Dialogue Conference has yet to produce more than the general outlines of a new constitutional system, much less hold elections. Libya's weak and divided coalition government shares control of the country with violent militias that essentially rule important cities and provinces:

> And those are the "success stories." Elsewhere in the Arab world, uprisings have subsided or never materialized. The Bahraini monarchy literally beat its opponents into submission. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad's war on his own country has killed or rendered homeless tens of thousands. In eight more Arab-majority countries, autocrats have yet to face any concerted challenge.[60]

If there is a reform movement in the area that can claim success, it is in the country in which the Arab Spring began. Even in Tunisia, however, the fault lines between and among reformers run deep and democracy remains tenuous. Ennahda, the party loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, surprised most observers by winning a large plurality in the country's first free election. Its victory was surprising because it had been virtually invisible in the later years of the dictatorship and indeed played a largely peripheral role in the demonstrations leading to the fall of the Ben Ali government. While it

had once been an important player in Tunisia, by 1999 its membership was in exile, in jail or underground.

That a party that had virtually disappeared for fifteen years could win ninety out of 217 seats in the new parliament was due in part to the fragmented nature of the opposition and to the skill of the Ennahda Party's leadership in forming key coalitions. The Ennahda-led coalition government, however, was unable to improve Tunisia's fragile economy, security problems persisted, and Ennahda managed to alienate both its more Islamist and more secular coalition partners. It fell to second place in the 2014 parliamentary elections, losing twenty seats and did not field a candidate for the presidency. The presidential election was won by a margin of more than 8 percent in a run-off against a secular reformist, by Beji Essebi, an 88-year-old former minister who had held office in two of Tunisia's former dictatorial regimes. With two peaceful transitions in hand, Tunisia's "success" remains a hopeful tale for the region, but it also helps answer the question central to this chapter as to why the MENA region has been so resistant to democratization. The parallels with Egypt are revealing.

In both Tunisia and Egypt the fall of the dictatorship was as swift as it was surprising. Tunisia's military was never as powerful a force as Egypt's, but in both cases the military refused to support the regime when its unpopularity became manifest. In both cases, the largest Islamic groups—far better organized than their opponents—won significant pluralities and became the core actors in coalition governments. As negotiations over the constitution stalled, and as the coalitions in both countries displayed an increasing inability to deal with escalating economic and security issues, discontent grew. At this point the narratives diverge. In Tunisia the leaders of Ennahda persisted in their efforts to craft a constitutional compromise and keep the spirit of reform alive; in Egypt Morsi circled the wagons and tried to bull his way through. In the process he alienated not just the secular reformers, but other Muslim party leaders and, most importantly, the army. In a sense Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood may have turned out to be what Roberto Michels labeled a "subversive party," one elected by democratic means with a hidden agenda of subverting the democratic system.[61] From this perspective Islamic parties will be as moderate as they need to be in order to win elections, and as ruthless as they can be in implementing their hidden agenda of creating an authoritarian Islamist state. Hamid offers a slightly more subtle version of this interpretation, suggesting that it is not so much a hidden agenda as an essentially pragmatic approach to power that explains their acts. For Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood its goal is an Islamic state, and its means are more flexible. Once elected, Morsi found himself pressured by the right to move the Islamic agenda, and from within the Brotherhood more generally to consolidate power. A still more parsimonious theory is that Morsi—never the Brotherhood's first choice to run for office—overreached, and in the hubris of electoral victory thought he could have it all. As Tarek Masoud stated in a review of Hamid's book: "No grand social-science theory is needed to explain why

the leaders of a long-oppressed political movement, finding themselves suddenly presented with a surprising opportunity, tried to grab too much too soon. For that, the most cursory understanding of human nature will do."[62]

There are two good reasons, and one on the periphery, for thinking that this last explanation may be the best. First, Morsi's overreach had virtually nothing to do with Islam. There were no new initiatives of a religious nature, no persecutions of non-Muslims or attempts to impose Islamic values that inspired the massive demonstrations that preceded the military takeover. The decisive decision that led to the fall of the Brotherhood's government was Morsi's November decree that gave him absolute power. Simply put, "they alienated potential allies, ignored rising discontent, focused more on consolidating their rule than on using the tools that they did have, and used rhetoric that was tone deaf at best and threatening at worst."[63] Second, the opposition to the Morsi government came as much from Islamic groups—including the more militant Salafists—as it did from secular liberals. And finally, moving away from Egypt itself, the more patient approach of the Muslim parties in Tunisia has produced a very different outcome, and this, we would suggest, is not so much that they were any less devoted to their faith than that they were more adept in their politics.

That Tunisia's more or less democratic transition survives, essentially alone in the region, is testimony to the resilience of the old order in the MENA. Although Tunisia remains threatened by an enduring north/south split between the poor interior and the more prosperous, urban Mediterranean areas, its strong civic culture, weak military and clever political leaders have been able to keep a tenuous democracy alive.[64] As for the rest of the Arab Spring countries, one is reminded of Lenin's recondite but significant notion of "one step forward, two steps back." In most of the MENA region the spring of hope has become a winter of discontent. Syria is the emblem of failure. Its once peaceful movement for democracy has turned violent and cost hundreds of thousands of lives, expatriated close to a million refugees, become a magnet for the most vicious Islamist soldiers of fortune, and made a once moderately repressive regime an authoritarian nightmare. Libya seems destined to years of religious, regional and tribal warfare, and a power-sharing agreement in Yemen has yet to produce a stable government. Minor reforms in countries such as Morocco are balanced by increases in repression in Bahrain. One way to look at the paradox of Egyptian reformers eschewing their own quest for democracy in favor of a military regime is to consider the secularists' choice in the context of the Syrian and Libyan examples. Dictatorship often proves preferable to anarchy.

Authoritarian resilience

In the middle of the twentieth century, as dozens of new nations won or were granted independence from colonial rule, there was a rather strong consensus in the West that a period of authoritarian rule might be needed in order to

consolidate the new nations. Half a century later, many of these dictators were swept away in what Huntington called the third wave of democratization. Democracy came more broadly to such long-established countries in Europe and Latin America as Spain, Portugal, Argentina and Panama. The record in other parts of the world, as we shall see in Chapter 4, is mixed, everywhere, that is, except in the MENA.

An entire political science literature grew up to explain what China scholar Andrew Nathan labeled "authoritarian resilience."[65] A significant subset of this literature focused on the Middle East, explaining how Arab autocrats had successfully adapted superficially democratic-looking bodies such as the parliamentary institutions in order to shore up their authoritarian rule. Partly as a result, political scientists studying the Middle East were taken completely by surprise when popular revolutions brought down the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes with such remarkable swiftness.[66] As it turns out, however, the Arab Spring brought relatively little overt change. A sultanistic regime supported by the military in Egypt was replaced by an even more repressive military dictatorship. In Libya and Yemen regional and ethnic conflicts have frustrated all efforts to establish functioning governments, and Syria has become the battlefield for one of the world's most complex and bloodiest civil wars. Worse, the standoff between the government in various opposition forces in Syria and in parts of Iraq has given space to one of the most militant and effective offshoots of Al Qaeda variously known as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ISIL (the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant) or simply as IS. Following the declaration of the caliphate in mid-2014 it also became known as Islamic State. Some concessions to liberalizing forces have been made in a handful of countries, but with the possible exceptions of Libya, Iraq and Tunisia, no significantly democratized regime has emerged in the MENA region. Autocracies have endured or been replaced either by new ruling elites or by violent conflicts that will take years to sort out.

The question remaining is to what extent the extraordinary persistence of autocracy in the MENA region has to do with Islam. The slogan of some militant Islamists, "Islam is the answer," is matched by the similar tendency of many Western observers of the Middle East to perceive Islam as the problem.[67] While there is no small amount of pseudo-scholarship, paranoia and outright bigotry to be found in this literature, there is a serious case to be made that authoritarian cultural forces derived from Islam are particularly powerful in the MENA. It is, the argument goes, a culture resistant to the ideas of democratic decision making and individual rights, fostering instead a culture of submission to authority. Even the Arab Spring—some of the more dedicated adherents of this theory insist—was not about self-government or freedom but rather a disguised attempt to substitute an Islamic form of autocracy for more secular ones.

In a direct sense, it is difficult to find any solid support in reality for this theory. "On balance," as Fish puts it, "the empirical evidence suggests that Islam does not incline its adherents to extraordinary religiosity or enthusiasm

for the fusion of religious and political authority." Nor, in surveys of public opinion, is there "evidence that Muslims are particularly well disposed to the idea of religious leaders influencing people's political behavior."[68] Furthermore, surveys of public opinion in seven MENA states in 2009 and again in 2011 show "support for democracy is extremely high by a range of measures. ... In fact support for democracy in these countries is higher than in many longstanding democracies." In none of the countries studied in either time period did support for democracy fall below 83 percent.[69] There are year-to-year variations in these numbers, and important variations from one country to another, but evidence that support for authoritarian regimes flows directly from public opinion in the MENA is not there.

It has also been noted that the unusual survival of governing monarchies is far more prevalent in this region than in the rest of the world. "Royal houses in the eight Arab monarchies—Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf littoral states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE ... not only reign but *rule*."[70] One advantage that these regimes have lies in their ability to avoid contested successions, but they seem ever more vulnerable to competing claims from increasingly sophisticated and affluent constituents. The theory that sees the survival of these regimes tied to some sort of authoritarian culture inherent in Islam, the Arab world or both is difficult to sustain. Monarchies have fallen, in Egypt (1952), Tunisia (1957), Iraq (1958), Yemen (1962), Libya (1969) and Iran (1979). In Bahrain it survived the Arab Spring only through outside intervention. And when Islamists have taken control of new regimes (as in Libya) any mention of the possibility of restoring the deposed royal lines has been notably lacking. The rentier state monarchs continue to buy support, and the royal families of Jordan and Morocco have nimbly avoided serious challenges to their authority by combining outside support with alternating patterns of reform and repression. As rulers for life, they are probably better able to appear above the fray, and to deflect criticism from themselves to their agents. Thus during the two and a half years of Arab Spring protests, Jordan went through five prime ministers and six changes of government, while Morocco adopted a new constitution that theoretically gave more power to the elected parliament; but even here, support from the West and more directly from their wealthier fellow monarchs, the Saudis in particular, has been an important factor.[71]

In most of the Arab world there exists not so much a culture of authoritarianism but rather a politics of faith-infused authoritarian rule. Only in Iran do religious leaders control the state. In every other MENA country the role of Islam is defined and regulated by the state to one degree or another. While there may be some consultation between its princes and religious leaders, the harsh forms of what they call "Islamic law" in Saudi Arabia are manifestly *state* laws. In Algeria, the imams do not tell the government what to do, the government hires and fires the imams, pays their salaries and writes their sermons. The line between mosque and state is virtually nonexistent not because Islamic teachings erase it, but because authoritarian governments

tolerate no rivals and use their own self-serving interpretations of Islam to justify their control.

The authoritarian politicization of religion does have feedback effects on the region's political culture. As Islamic groups are carefully monitored and controlled, those that oppose the regime must operate clandestinely. Those that seek regime change—as happened in the 1990s in Algeria and more recently in Syria—will be violently repressed and forced either to abandon political action or to resort to violence. Whether Islam is a particularly violent religion is an open question; in the context of many parts of the contemporary world it most certainly is. Terrorism, often described as the instrument of losers, can be a rational and reasonable strategy even, in some contexts, when it opens vicious circles of repression and revolt. The percentage of Muslims who define suicide bombs and the killing of innocent civilians as legitimate forms of political struggle (jihad) is very small, but with sophisticated weapons available almost everywhere, terrorism amplifies the voice of even a small minority. And as terrorism increases, so does the rationale for action to contain it ratchet up. The escalating circle of violence this sets up has attracted militants, most of them religiously inspired, from all over the world, but particularly from among the large number of educated but unemployed MENA young adults. As the Islamist threat to the state grows so does the regime's repression, not just of the militants, but of all potential rivals; and as repression grows so does violence become the only viable tool of change. Citing potential violence, or the societal divisions that might emerge without a strong leader, there is what Brumberg calls "protection racket politics" in which the autocrats play up "whatever religious, tribal, or ethnic themes they can in order to *reemphasize* the divides and make rival groups feel as if they must look to the state to save them."[72] Even if the tyrant is overthrown, as with Mubarak in Egypt, these reinforced divisions leave a garden unsuited for planting the seeds of democracy. The remnants of enmity, distrust and suspicion sewn into the fabric of civil and political society can, as Brown puts it, allow the old order's autocratic politics to "reach out from its grave to hobble efforts to move toward democracy. … It was not so much that Egypt's political actors lacked democratic commitments (though some did), but more that they deeply distrusted their adversaries and regarded real democratic processes as full of potential pitfalls."[73]

In Chapter 7 we will discuss the question of whether Islam produces a particularly violent form of politics. The point here is that whatever such tendencies may exist, most of the MENA states have been locked in a long-running cycle of mutually reinforcing rebellion and repression common in newer nations. What is less common in most other regions is the confluence of outsiders taking part in supporting existing regimes or their opponents. The ethnic, tribal and religious conflicts that have long divided many of the MENA countries, together with their destabilizing effects, are thus intensified to the point where democratization is unlikely to be achieved. Enforcement of certain laws derived from Islamic teachings, moreover, probably does have the

effect of weakening demands for reform. By carefully controlling education and censoring educational materials in the name of Islam, dissent is not incidentally repressed. It may also be the case that demands for democracy are indirectly affected by laws respecting, for example, gender equality. Steven Fish's cross-national figures display a strong correlation between gender inequality and authoritarianism, and he speculates that in this indirect sense Islam may be an explanatory variable in the region's democratic deficit.[74] It is also possible to see the chain of causality working in the other direction: gender inequality in these countries exists because authoritarian governments see it as a useful tool in stifling dissent.

The role of Islam

Not one of the MENA countries has a secular government. All either declare themselves as Islamic or have established state-supported religions. Yet there is enormous variation from one country to another in the nature and extent of Islamic influence on public policy. Iran, Libya and the Sudan, for example, are the only countries that strictly prohibit bank loans charging interest, as required in most interpretations of the Koran; others offer variations of "sharia-compliant" banking; some have no restrictions at all. Laws regarding the wearing of the veil for women vary from those that require it, to those that restrict various forms of it, and to those with no formal dress codes at all. In Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia alcoholic beverages are prohibited entirely, in Yemen they are available to tourists in hotels and in Dubai and the United Arab Emirates a license is required to drink alcohol; but in most countries they are available—with various restrictions—to all. Inheritance laws, laws on marriage, divorce and polygamy, dietary restrictions and other policies said to reflect Islam also vary markedly from one "Islamic" country to another. If there is, in other words, some body of public policy that could be called "sharia law" it is not discernible in these core Muslim countries. Even among the more radical proponents of global jihad, the rhetoric may be global but the objectives on the ground are local. Some of these differences reflect the cultural traditions of different sects, Sunnis, Shia and the more liberal Alewites; but most are, quite simply, political.

Anna Grzymala-Busse has shown how officials of the Catholic Church in some countries have drafted and pushed through legislation, vetted political appointments and shaped policies through behind-the-scenes lobbying activities.[75] If there is such hidden sectarian influence in the MENA it is well hidden. Instead of religion using politics to achieve its goals, what we have is the use of religion to legitimatize and consolidate the political authority of authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian resilience wears the robes of religion in these states—perhaps more so than in non-Muslim dictatorships—but its successes and failures are the same, its uses of force, repression, rent seeking, corruption and patronage no different than those of dictatorships in other parts of the world. Islamic religious leaders may be complicit in these

repressive acts—as were members of the Catholic clergy in Franco Spain—but they are not the powers behind the throne.

Notes

1 Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 190–91.
2 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, *Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 23.
3 Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 40.
4 Ibid., especially in Chapters 2 and 3.
5 Compiled annually since 1972, the Freedom House survey assigns numerical ratings on two scales—for political rights an procedures on one, for civil liberties on the other—to 195 countries throughout the world. These numbers, ranging from 1 for most free to 7 for least free, can then be combined into a single indicator with countries totally 2 to 5 points described as "free," 6 to 10 as "partly free," and 10 to 14 as "not free."
6 Some studies, using membership of the League of Arab States as a guide, exclude Israel as well as Iran and Turkey from their definitions of the region. We treat Turkey as a separate case in Chapter 5.
7 Mirjam E. Sørl, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Strand, "Why Is There so much Conflict in the Middle East?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (February 2005), 149.
8 A very accessible short overview of these divisions is found in Chapter 4 of Colbert C. Held and John Thomas Cummings, *Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014), 81–162.
9 Figures updated for 2012 available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fa ctbook (accessed February 25, 2012).
10 Calculated from figures compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at www.milexdata.sipri.org (accessed February 25, 2012). Emphasis in the original.
11 Susan Heinke, ed., *2012 Annual Report of the Bonn International Center for Conversion* (Bonn: BICC, 2012), 12. Annual reports are available at www.bicc.de.pub lications. Five of the top countries on the global militarization index—Israel (in first place), Syria (third), Jordan (fifth), Kuwait (eighth) and Saudi Arabia (tenth)—are in the MENA region.
12 Zoltan Barany, "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military," *Journal of Democracy* 22 (October 2011), 32.
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14 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32.
15 This classification generally follows that developed in Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).
16 Mark Tessler, "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis," in John P. Entelis, ed., *Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 100–01.
17 Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, "Introduction," in Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 3.
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19 Rutherford, 132.
20 Pete W. Moore and Bassel F. Salloukh, "Struggles under Authoritarianism: Regimes, States, and Professional Associations in the Arab World," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (February 2007), 67.
21 Giacomo Luciani and Steffen Hertog, *Has Arab Business Ever Been, or Will It Be, a Player for Reform?* (Princeton, NJ: Arab Reform Initiative, 2010), 10.
22 Vicki Langhor, "Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes," *Comparative Politics* 36 (January 2004), 191.
23 United Nations Development Programme, *Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World* (New York: UNDP, 2005), 15.
24 Moore and Salloukh, 71.
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26 V. Finn Heinrich, *CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society*, Vol. 1, Country Profiles (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007), 118.
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28 Langohr, 182.
29 Ibid.
30 Robert W. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London: Penguin Books, 1994).
31 Serif Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam," in John R. Hall, ed., *Civil Society: History, Theory, Comparison* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995), 146.
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33 Basim Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism* (New York: Routledge, 2nd edn, 2014), 154.
34 Ibid.
35 Tariq Ramadan, *Islam and the Arab Awakening* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 14.
36 This kind of organizational tension is not confined either to faith-based organizations or to emerging democracies. During the 1980s in Iceland, for example, the Women's List once gained enough seats in the parliament to be invited into the governing coalition. Negotiations broke down, however, when the women refused to compromise on any of their defining issues. Their members were more comfortable standing on principle than in gaining only partial victories and a share of power. See Edward Schneier, "Icelandic Women on the Brink of Power," *Scandinavian Studies* 64 (Summer 1992), 1–22.
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4 The road to democracy in the Islamic world

The largely desert African country of Mali gained its independence from France in 1960. For thirty-two years it was run by a series of authoritarian rulers who won office following coups d'état and held it by force. But in a remarkable turn of events in the 1990s, President Alpha Kounaré initiated a nationwide dialogue leading to a new, democratic constitution that, although based on the French model, was remarkably sensitive to local concerns. Consistently ranked among the world's five poorest countries, Mali "exhibits some of the most unfavorable conditions for democracy to be found anywhere."[1] Yet for twenty years it held fair and free elections that regularly rotated power, had a robust free press and was consistently rated "free" or "partly free" on both of the Freedom House indices. Susanna Wing attributes much of this success to the unusually broad spectrum of groups involved in the process of constitution-building, as well as to the continuing dialogues and high levels of "constitutional literacy" that resulted.[2] Focusing primarily on women's groups, she also documents the striking growth of a vigorous civic culture in which, for example, in just the first ten years of the transition to democracy the number of registered associations grew from 345 to 2,449,[3] and the number of FM radio stations increased from one to 141.[4]

In a report written just two years before the elected government was ousted in a 2012 military coup, Wing and her co-author Brehima Kassibo underscored the regime's vulnerability. Widespread corruption and a consensus mode of decision making that made it almost impossible to reach important decisions were leading to widespread disillusionment with the government.[5] More importantly, a regional rebellion and subsequent coup revealed the incredible fragility of the state. When negotiations failed to resolve the long-standing grievances of the Tuareg rebels in the north, a small rebellion sent the national army to flight. When the Tuaregs were themselves overwhelmed by a coalition of opportunistic bandits and well-armed Islamic militants—many of them former mercenaries in the defeated army of the fallen Libyan dictator, Qadaffi—the rebellion spread to the south, quickly covering nearly half of the country's land mass and decimating the poorly equipped regular army. Dissatisfaction within the army led to a small demonstration that revealed an almost total vacuum of power in the capital and, to the surprise

of its rebels, resulted in the replacement of the elected president.[6] With the help of the French army, a precarious democracy has been restored, at least for now.

In its poverty and state of weakness, Mali resembles a number of third world countries, particularly in Africa, some of which are predominantly Muslim and some not. While it is difficult to compare countries such as these with their oil-rich neighbors to the north, or with former colonies in Latin America and Asia, the similarities among these nearby yet diverse countries provide a useful opportunity for isolating the religious variable. Both Mali's Muslim-majority and non-Muslim neighbors in and on the fringes of the Sahara desert and to its south are generally poor, have weak governments and have been unable to sustain democratic institutions. While many newer countries, as we shall see, suffer from similar deficiencies, overly broad comparisons are difficult. Unhappy countries, like Tolstoy's unhappy families, are unhappy in their own ways. The purpose of this chapter is to move region by region, beginning with sub-Saharan Africa, to compare Muslim-majority countries with their non-Muslim neighbors. The question that must be asked is whether the Muslim-majority countries in each of these areas face problems with democracy that are different from similarly situated non-Muslim countries?

Weak states, poverty and historic legacies in sub-Saharan Africa

Many of the forty-five countries located around and south of Africa's Sahara desert achieved independence in the early 1960s, when most of them were at least nominally democratic. A few, under the charismatic leadership of such figures as Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire and Sékou Touré in Guinea, became relatively stable one-party states. In most, volatility was the rule. In their first twenty years, three-quarters of the leaders of forty-six sub-Saharan African nations "who left power in the 1960s and 1970s did so through a coup, violent overthrow, or assassination."[7] More recent years have shown slow improvement. The Freedom House democracy ratings (see Table 4.1) depict considerable volatility but also gradual improvement throughout the continent since the 1980s. The mean Freedom House scores for the forty-five sub-Saharan countries have gone from 10.1 (14 points being equivalent to least democratic) to 8.8 (2 points being equivalent to most democratic). Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East can be said to represent the worst case scenario in terms of the democratization process. Returning to the indigenous forces discussed in Chapter 2 that are usually associated with democratization—stateness, economic development, civic culture and institutional development—the key problem in sub-Saharan Africa is best described as "all of the above." These are countries that have simply been unable to accumulate the constellations of social, political and economic capital that allow democratic institutions to take root and flourish. They differ markedly from their oil-rich neighbors to the north and, in different

Table 4.1 Democracy and Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, Muslim population, ethnic diversity, GDP and Freedom House ratings 1980–2012 for forty-five African countries

Country	*% Muslim*	*PREG**	*GDP*	*1980–82*	*2000–02*	*2010–12*
Angola	–	65	5,485	14.0	11.3	11.0
Benin	24	0.30	752	13.0	4.3	4.0
Botswana	–	0.00	7,191	4.7	4.0	5.0
Burkina Faso	59	0.00	634	9.0	8.0	8.0
Burundi	2	0.26	251	13.0	11.7	10.0
Cameroon	18	0.71	1,151	12.0	12.3	12.0
Central African Republic	9	0.23	473	12.3	9.0	10.0
Chad	56	0.66	885	12.7	11.0	13.0
Comoros	86	N/A	830	9.0	10.0	7.3
Republic of the Congo	2	0.19	3,154	13.3	9.7	11.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	10	0.80	272	12.3	12.3	12.0
Côte d'Ivoire	37	0.49	1,244	10.7	10.0	11.7
Djibouti	97	N/A	1,464	8.3	9.0	11.0
Equatorial Guinea	4	0.19	24,036	13.0	13.3	14.0
Ethiopia	34	0.57	470	14.0	10.0	12.0
Gabon	9	0.21	11,430	12.0	9.0	11.0
The Gambia	94	0.37	512	5.3	10.0	10.7
Ghana	16	0.44	1,605	8.0	5.0	3.0
Guinea	84	0.48	591	14.0	11.0	10.7
Guinea-Bissau	42	0.05	540	6.3	9.0	9.0
Kenya	7	0.57	862	9.3	10.0	7.3
Lesotho	1	0.00	1,193	10.0	7.0	5.7
Liberia	12	0.62	422	11.0	10.3	7.0
Madagascar	1	0.00	447	11.3	6.3	10.0
Malawi	13	0.55	268	13.0	7.0	7.0
Mali	92	0.13	694	13.0	5.0	7.3
Mauritania	99	N/A	1,106	13.0	10.3	11.0
Mauritius	17	0.60	8,124	3.3	3.0	3.0
Mozambique	23	0.36	579	12.7	7.0	7.0
Namibia	1	0.55	5,668	–	5.0	4.0
Niger	99	0.51	383	13.0	8.0	7.7
Nigeria	50	0.66	1,555	5.0	8.7	8.0
Rwanda	2	0.26	620	12.0	12.7	11.3

Country	*% Muslim*	*PREG**	*GDP*	*1980–82*	*2000–02*	*2010–12*
Senegal	96	0.14	1,032	8.0	6.3	3.7
Seychelles	1	0.00	11,758	12.0	6.0	6.0
Sierra Leone	71	0.56	635	10.0	8.7	5.7
Somalia	96	0.00	NA	14.0	13.0	14.0
South Africa	2	0.49	7,508	11.0	3.0	4.0
Sudan	97	0.41	1,580	14.0	14.0	14.0
Swaziland	–	0.00	3,044	10.0	11.0	12.0
Tanzania	30	0.59	609	12.0	7.7	6.0
Togo	12	0.49	574	12.3	10.3	9.0
Uganda	12	0.63	547	9.7	10.7	9.0
Zambia	–	0.71	1,469	10.7	8.7	7.0
Zimbabwe	1	0.41	788	8.0	11.7	12.0

Note: Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG). The closer the number to zero, the more homogeneous the country (i.e., the higher the percentage, the more ethnically diverse the country).

Sources: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population* (Washington, DC: Pew Forum, 2009), 30–31; GDP figures are for 2012 or the nearest available year and have been extracted from the table *GDP per capita (current US$)*, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. Daniel N. Posner's index of diversity (PREG) is from "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (October, 2004), 856; and the Freedom House ratings are available in a variety of formats from its website, www.freedomhouse.org.

ways, from the former Soviet republics of Asia or the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe.

The "weak state" problem, as generally presented, has two dimensions. On the one hand there are countries—Mali being a classic case—which lack the physical capacity to govern effectively. Short of funds, lacking trained civil servants to deliver what services they can offer, often lacking the infrastructure even to reach more remote regions from the capital, these are countries—whether democratic or not—that are simply too weak to get the job done. On the other hand there are states that might have the material capacity to govern, but which face internal social, economic and political obstacles, or threats from outside, that are sometimes insurmountable. Perhaps the classic case of a state too weak to succeed is the tiny island republic of the Comoros, sometimes known as the "coup-coup islands," which have changed government by coup on an average of once every two years. So fragile is the state that one successful coup was staged by an entrepreneurial businessman with a fleet of mercenaries in inflatable rafts.[8] Its component islands, in the meantime, have rather frequently seceded, and its most prosperous island rejoined France shortly after independence.[9] Small island countries should be—if only because of their face-to-face interpersonal ties and general ethnic uniformity—relatively easy to govern democratically, but in fact the record is mixed. Most of the former European colonies in the

Caribbean, particularly the smaller islands like the Bahamas, Bermuda and Dominica have become stable democracies; others, such as Cuba and Haiti, manifestly have not. Affluence is clearly a key factor, and one recent study suggests that religion may be as well. Virtually none of the island nations in which Muslims are the majority are democratic, while most that have Christian majorities are.[10] However, the very small number of Muslim-majority islands, most of them poor, that come into a study such as this makes generalization problematic. In southern Africa the non-Muslim Seychelles, though far more affluent and politically stable than the Comoros, has been only slightly more democratic (Freedom House scores for 2013 are Seychelles 6, Comoros 7). The Comoros, like Mali, have faced the dual problem of creating both a viable state and a democracy; but although there are some differences of language between the islands, and little real sense of national identity, they have experienced few of the enduring cultural conflicts that have troubled Mali and that have very seriously crippled a number of other African states. Relatively affluent countries can be weak states when ethnic, cultural and religious differences move to center stage.

In his earlier works Huntington argued that this latter kind of problem, while sometimes found in other parts of the world, is endemic to Islam. The core of the nation-state problem in the Islamic world, as he once succinctly put it, is that:

> throughout Islam the small group and the great faith, the tribe and the *ummah*, have been the principal foci of loyalty and commitment, and the nation state has been less significant. ... In addition, the idea of sovereign nation states is incompatible with belief in the sovereignty of Allah and the primacy of the *ummah*.[11]

Huntington's statement can essentially be parsed in terms of two hypotheses that can be tested in the African context: (a) that states in which Muslims are in the majority are more likely to be divided along enduring tribal lines than non-Islamic nations; and (b) are less likely to engender strong national, rather than transnational, loyalties among their Muslim residents. The second of these hypotheses, as we saw in Chapter 1, has been increasingly refuted by scholars, at least in such sweeping terms. As in the United States, where "almost twice as many evangelicals believe that U.S. laws should be based on the Bible rather than the will of the American people,"[12] there are Muslims throughout the world who, in theory at least, would put the Koran or some form of sharia law ahead of the national will. And the idea of restoring some kind of regional or worldwide caliphate has some backers (as we saw in Chapter 1), particularly among Muslim intellectuals and some radical groups; but the prospect of any real movement toward a transnational political community of Muslims—least of all in sub-Saharan Africa—has had little traction on the ground.

The opportunistic marauding of the Tuarg's ostensible allies in Mali, and similar border crossing alliances elsewhere in Africa and other parts of the world, have more to do with still poorly defined artificial boundaries than with abstract ideals of world community. Particularly for traditional nomadic tribes in the Sahara, the boundaries between Chad, Mali and Libya have little meaning. Rather than representing concrete forms of "post-nationalism" that, in Huntington's view, threaten the nation-state, moreover, most Islamic imaginings of a larger spiritual community present themselves, in Mandaville's words, "as being somehow outside the 'base' worldly concerns of nation, politics and culture."[13] When put into situations in which such restraints are deeply tested and where the possibility of creating an entire community living a "just" life changes the equation, even the most militant Islamists have, in practice, "been content to settle for an Islamic nationalism limited to the particular countries in which they reside."[14] Their "social movements of the everyday" transcend national boundaries in social and spiritual rather than political terms.[15]

Particularly in Africa and the Middle East, the growth of various Salafist sects has added a new dimension to the world of Islam that would seem in many respects to subvert the modern nation-state. Their call for a return to traditional values, while this relates largely to personal values and individual behavior, is, however, put to a different set of tests when the political dynamics shift and the personal becomes more political. In Egypt in 2011, as the protests against the dictatorship intensified, the traditional position of the Salafists declaring the impermissibility of rebellion became increasingly untenable. A January 25 statement affirming the obligation to obey was replaced in the following week by another statement calling for free elections and abolition of the emergency law; and "on March 22, 2011, the Salafist Call organization in Alexandria issued a statement declaring that it had reached a decision of 'positive participation in the political process.'" Indeed when the elections were held, the Salafists fielded a full slate of candidates. Much the same process took place in Libya. In both cases, Salafist demands for an Islamic state turned out, in practical terms, to be readily adaptable to the boundaries of existing nation-states and, through the Islamic concept of *shura* (consultation), broad enough to accommodate democracy. When push came to shove, in other words, the supposedly transnational, supra-political Salafists quickly accommodated national politics, or in Taylor's apt formulation, were able tangibly to separate "the immanent from the transcendent."[16]

Whether more overtly political Islamist groups can move in this direction is more problematic. With military training, international financing and a willingness to engage in terrorist tactics, a relatively small number of transnational Islamist militants have become important destabilizing forces in a number of countries. The so-called Arab brigades, formed ironically with help from both the West and Al Qaeda to support Taliban resistance to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, have become the core of a growing pool of disciplined, trained fighters from around the world who have deployed either

to new war zones or to their home countries. It was clearly groups such as these that tipped the balance against the central government in Mali. But while these groups have unquestionably had a strong destabilizing impact that weakens the state and threatens the processes of democratization in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere, it is not their identification with some larger *ummah*, as Huntington would have it, that motivates those militant groups, loosely affiliated with or resembling Al Qaeda, that the International Crisis Group describes as "global Jihadists."[17] It is not their vision of a utopia that marks these groups so much as a largely negative, even apocalyptic program of militant resistance "revolving around a final confrontation with Jews, Christians and all non-Muslims, a category that includes 'lapsed Muslims.'"[18] The so-called Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) has expressed as much hostility toward Shi'ites as towards any non-Muslim groups. How much they are linked to a single network such as Al Qaeda is neither as clear as most journalists would have it, nor particularly important. What is important is their continuing willingness and ability successfully to ally with local militants with country-specific agendas, like the Tuaregs in Mali.[19] In an ironic twist, they are motivated not by a vision of a universal ummah or Islamic state but by their enthusiastic acceptance of Huntington's idea of a "clash of civilizations." They are destabilizing not in terms of what they are for so much as what they are against. And what they are capable of, as the case of Mali shows, is further destabilizing or tipping the balance against weak governments.

The more widely accepted of Huntington's theories on the incompatibility of Islam and democracy lies in the notion that tribal loyalties, which presumably are more intense among Muslims, weaken the nation-state so much that democracy cannot take root. Nowhere are tribal and ethnic divisions more pronounced than in Africa where the colonial entities mapped out in European colonial offices bore almost no relation to traditional community boundaries. These divisions have been numerous, persistent and often violent. Around the world, major armed conflicts—twenty out of twenty-one in 2008, for example—were internal rather than between states.[20] More than half of these conflicts took place on the African continent. Scholars are increasingly convinced, however, that this dismal record of violence is rooted less in ethno-religious fragmentation than in poverty, failed political institutions, and economies that are overly dependent upon resource extraction.[21] A colonial legacy of rigid class distinctions and enormous gaps between rich and poor has often exacerbated what might otherwise have been containable conflicts. During the Cold War, moreover, both East and West were ready, willing and able to facilitate the escalation of these rivalries. But the important point, for our purposes, is that there is simply no relationship whatsoever between the frequency, intensity and persistence of such conflicts and religion in sub-Saharan Africa.

There have been a number of attempts to develop measures of the comparative extent of ethnic diversity. Adopting traditional measures of ethno-linguistic fragmentation in Africa, and taking into account the political

saliency of the patterns therein, Daniel Posner's index of politically relevant ethnic groups is recorded in Table 4.1. In Posner's study, and in others of a similar nature, ethnic divisions are adversely related to economic development: the higher the diversity, the lower the per capita GDP. However, although this relationship is statistically quite strong (yielding a significant correlation coefficient of –0.249), the data for these forty-five African countries show no linear relationship at all between ethnic diversity ($r = 0.001$) or GDP ($r = -0.05$) and democracy.[22]

Ethnic conflict, nonetheless, has been a manifestly important factor in democratic failures in Africa. In addition to continuing insurgencies in the Maghreb, Uganda has experienced four post-independence civil wars in less than fifty years, as have Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And all but a handful of African countries have had at least one insurgency that was sufficiently threatening to serve as a political justification for anti-democratic countermeasures. Indices like Posner's actually do show that each of these countries has a high potential for ethnic conflict. In most cases, however, ethnic conflict is only one dimension of the problem. The continuing conflict between Sudan and South Sudan bears some relationship to the religious differences between and among Muslims, Christians and Animists, as well as between Arabs and Africans; but even in this most tragic and enduring conflict, ethnic and religious differences are only part of the overall picture. "Oil-hungry Chinese, meddling Western politicians, over-simplifying activists, spineless African leaders, shamefully silent Muslim countries, land-greedy Arab tribes, myopic Sudanese politicians—all bear some responsibility for the tragedy of Sudan."[23] Recurring conflicts between north and south in Nigeria have similarly been an important variable in Nigeria's on-and-off democracy. Rather than serving as reflections of deep-seated ethnic animosities, however, relatively few of these conflicts have been "the outcome of *ancient* hatreds. ... it was often strategic, self-serving actions of politicians that were crucial in encouraging the politicization of ethnicity or religion."[24]

Our failure to find any correlation between ethnic fragmentation and democracy is probably explained largely by these political actions. Even relatively minor conflicts can be intensified and made salient when there are abundant material resources, oil and diamonds most commonly, that can be siphoned off by corrupt ruling elites willing to exploit them. In what is sometimes called the "resource curse," economies that depend upon a single stream of accessible income are often able to expropriate these funds for political uses. They thus "share a number of characteristics with 'failed states'—the private appropriation of state capital to the benefit of a small group of elites, the decline of public services, the criminalization of the economy, the use of ethno-regional divisions to cement allegiances, etc.—but differ from the latter in that they are highly stable."[25] State stability is maintained by elaborate divide and rule strategies such as those employed by Joseph Mobutu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Mobutu took power in 1965 and reportedly skimmed an average of 15 percent a year from state revenues, accumulating a personal fortune estimated at more than US $5 billion. Much of the remaining government revenue was spent, not on schools or employment programs, health or even the military (which he saw as a possible threat to his power), but on a constantly shifting series of deals with the leaders of various constituency groups. In the 1970s, for example, he gave the Cardinal of the Catholic Church an elaborate mansion, and every senior Protestant or Catholic clergyman a new Mercedes.[26] Government ministers were allowed, even encouraged, to enrich themselves, but were made constantly aware that they served entirely at the pleasure of the President. It was not uncommon for some senior figures to spend as many years in jail as in high office. The most viable parts of the nongovernmental economy were illegal, making them fair game for bribes and instilling an acute awareness among entrepreneurs of their dependence upon the willingness of state officials to look the other way:

> The fragmented nature of the country, combined with the impact of the Belgian colonial state, meant that there was no large group or socio-economic class that could offset the power of Mobutu and help obstruct his personal rule. ... Moreover, the regional and ethnic identification of different groups made it straightforward for Mobutu to engage in the types of targeted redistribution and punishment [characteristic of divide and rule politics].[27]

There are four countries beside the Democratic Republic of the Congo in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea) that can be fully characterized as single-commodity states with a likelihood of being rentier states, and five with more recent or less developed tendencies in that direction (Cameron, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania and Sudan). The mean 2010–12 Freedom House democracy scores for these ten countries is 11.8 points, collectively placing them among the most authoritarian in Africa. The mean for the remaining thirty-five is 8.2 (a country with a score of five or less is classified as "free"). Interestingly, if we exclude the rentier states from the calculation, ethnic diversity remains a nonexistent predictor of democracy, but the correlation between per capita GDP and freedom is a very robust 0.45 points.[28]

The bottom line for this part of Africa is that with the exception of the rentier states the theory that equates economic development with democracy is rather strongly confirmed. Ethnic and religious divisions in and of themselves are not a significant factor; and, Nigeria excepted, there are a number of countries with significant Muslim minorities on the one hand, or Muslim-majority countries with significant enclaves of other religions on the other, that have made substantial progress toward democratic consolidation. Mali aside, they include Benin (24 percent Muslim and a Freedom House rating of 4.0); Ghana (16 percent and 3.0); Mauritius (17 percent and 3.0); Sierra Leone (71 percent and 5.7); and Tanzania (30 percent and 6.0).

Poverty aside, sub-Saharan Africa's democracy deficit is also quite clearly a function of weak states and state institutions and the continuing absence of a strong civic culture. This latter variable is difficult to measure—and we are only just beginning to engage in systematic studies that successfully do so—but the overwhelming consensus is that associational life in sub-Saharan Africa is as weak as it is in any other part of the world. In his study of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda, Opoku-Mensah concluded that, "as the four countries indicate, and which resonates with similar studies, civil society in Africa remains weak and fragile. This weakness is characterized in part by a lack of financial resources, weak apex organizations, and a concentration of resources on a few [organizations] predominantly located in the urban areas."[29] This may partly reflect the bias of scholars in general and Western scholars in particular: business associations, labor unions and women's groups are easier to count and more amenable to empirical analysis than the looser kinship and "tribal" associations found in Africa where for both traditional and practical reasons much associational life takes place beneath the radar of outsiders and potential government regulators.[30] However, the effectiveness of countervailing sources of power has been and remains one of the key forces of anti-authoritarian rule:

> [K]leptocracy is less likely to arise when there is a balance of power between the ruler and a powerful producer group in society. This is consistent with the experiences of a number of more successful economies in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Botswana and Mauritius, which have both managed to become stable democracies and refrain from the most distortionary policies. A possible explanation is the political power of major producer groups, such as the cattle owners in Botswana and the sugar planters in Mauritius, which has placed real constraints on the behavior of political elites.[31]

More than in most parts of the world, civic associations in sub-Saharan Africa were stunted at birth and underdeveloped in infancy. During the colonial period, civic associations of almost any kind were regarded as essentially subversive. Religious organizations, if they were excepted, were generally more interested in attending to private affairs than in challenging the status quo. Independence did little to change the picture. "Early regimes, under Marxist and sometimes even Keynesian flags, sought to build integral states in which, in essence, civic organizations were seen as rivals to progress."[32] The notion was, in other words, that central planning implemented at the national and state level marked the fastest and most efficient road to economic development. Both Marxists and conservative Western economists viewed trade unions, cooperatives, environmental groups and so on, as impediments to prosperity. Only religious organizations were generally free from such controls, but for most of them support for the status quo was the norm:

> Silence in the face of poor and corrupt government following independence reflected a number of concerns: many benefitted materially from the status quo; they were inherently conservative; they believed that governments, however bad, were ordained by God; and, finally, they recognized that their Church's corporate position in a country was in part dependent upon State support.[33]

This was particularly true of the Catholic Church, which, as a hierarchical organization, took a corporate position that generally backed the status quo. Many Protestants did so as well, but the move toward democracy in many sub-Saharan countries found strong supporters among reform-minded clergymen acting alone, and the Catholic Church, starting with a few individual local priests acting in quiet defiance of the hierarchy, has—particularly since the Second Vatican Council—become a major force for reform. From colonial times onward, Muslims were allowed to administer their own legal systems, particularly in rural communities, with the mosques themselves steering clear of political involvement. But various local and national Muslim Brotherhoods and similar informal associations were active in the struggle for independence, and—when it was achieved—remained close allies of the new, often authoritarian, governments. Since independence, in many Muslim-majority countries:

> members of the Muslim national organizations receive salaries from the State, have the ear of government and are important in the maintenance of political order. They aid the creation of a Muslim political allegiance to the State in a way which is far more complete and systematic than that achieved by the mainstream Christian religious bodies. Even though ulama may sometimes lead popular protests when religious concerns are at issue, they must play a shrewd and skillful game to appear to be all things to all people: oppositionist enough to lead discontented Muslims when necessary, quiescent enough to maintain their relationship with State rulers.[34]

One final impediment to democratization in Africa was the absence of a firm institutional base within an existing state apparatus. The Tuaregs make up less than 5 percent of the Malian population in which ethnic differences have seldom played a major political role. Rather than ethnicity per se, the initial rebellion in northern Mali seems to have stemmed from the central government's failure to deliver on its promise of financial support for a program of decentralization. This was not simply an issue of money. Mali's ambitious plans to expand educational opportunities, improve transportation and so on were repeatedly frustrated by an inability either to fund or to staff the infrastructure needed to deliver the money to the problems. As with many weak states in Africa, Mali faced (and still faces) a wide gap between its desire to meet its citizens' demands and its institutional capacity to deliver the actual

goods.[35] In Mali, as in much of Africa, there was a process that has aptly been called "backward democratization":

> Free elections and accountability of the government to the electorate have been introduced before the institutions of a modern state are fully secured. The governors of these new democracies thus face a double challenge: completing the construction of a modern state while competing with their critics in free elections.[36]

Thus democratic transitions are unlikely to take hold when they are undertaken in societies that lack the institutions needed to make government work. Schools without trained teachers or administrators, courts without lawyers or judges, or construction projects without engineers seldom provide effective deliveries of service. The weakness of the systems' political infrastructures have been even more important impediments to democracy in the sense that they provide few of the checks on executive power or in support of the constitutional procedures fundamental to reform. The coup in Mali, while it appears to have been ephemeral, testifies to the continuing fragility of African democracies more generally.

Whether there are cultural vapors that sweep south from the Sahara to keep dictators in power, or make them removable only by force, the prototypical pattern of politics in the region was one in which "the Big Man" dominated, frequently in violation of the constitution, and almost invariably—during the Cold War—with support from one or more of the great powers. If they were kicked out, moreover, it was usually by unconstitutional means. But things are changing:

> [N]early three-quarters of the African leaders who left power in the 1960s and 1970s did so through a coup, violent overthrow, or assassination. ... In the 1980s, this dropped to just below 70 percent, and by the 1990s it was surpassed by the share of those who left power through natural death, voluntary resignation, or electoral defeat.[37]

Northern donor nations have become so much more reluctant to give unquestioned support to whoever is in power that it is sometimes questioned whether these changes are "a product of outside forces rather than internal change."[38] Whatever its roots, the shift toward democratization, if not democracy, is clear. There is strong evidence that the more free a society, the more rapid its economic development. Civil society grows faster when less inhibited by an authoritarian state, and the state itself grows stronger the more it is based on consent. By a process of accretion, the institutions of democracy grow as do the socioeconomic conditions that generally predict the emergence of a still sounder system of popular rule. Not every country in the region is moving toward greater democracy, and some will almost certainly revert to harsher authoritarian controls, but these fluctuations and trends are, quite

Table 4.2 Democracy and Islam in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Muslim population, GDP and Freedom House ratings, 1980–2012 for twenty countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Country	*% Muslim*	*GDP*	*Freedom House scores*		
			1980–82	*2000–02*	*2010–12*
Albania	80	4030	14	7.3	6
Armenia	0	3305	–	8	10
Azerbaijan	99	6916	–	11	11
Bosnia and Herzegovina	40	482	–	8.7	7
Bulgaria	12	7158	14	4	4
Croatia	1	14180	–	4.7	3
Georgia	10	3203	–	8	7.3
Kazakhstan	56	11357	–	11	11
Kosovo	90	3596	–	–	9
Kyrgyzstan	86	1075	–	11	10.3
Macedonia	33	4925	–	7	6
Moldova	1	1967	–	6.3	6.3
Montenegro	18	7111	–	–	5
Romania	0	8405	13	4	4
Serbia	4	6312	–	–	4
Slovenia	2	24142	–	2.7	2
Tajikistan	84	935	–	11.7	11
Turkmenistan	93	5497	–	14	14
Ukraine	1	3615	–	8	6
Uzbekistan	96	1546	–	13	14

Sources: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population* (Washington, DC: Pew Forum, 2009), 30–31; GDP figures are for 2012 or the nearest available year and have been extracted from the table *GDP per capita (current US$)*, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. Freedom House ratings are available in a variety of formats from its website www.freedomhouse.org.

simply, unrelated to the religious demographics of the area and the proportion of Muslims in the population. Religious leaders of all faiths, moreover, are increasingly less inclined reflexively to back whoever is in power, as they so often did in the early years of independence; nor are international politics as likely to tip the balance in favor of firm authority as they were during the Cold War.

Eastern Europe and Central Asia

In contrast with Africa, the post-communist countries of both Europe and Central Asia all have relatively sophisticated economies and central

governments capable of providing basic services, albeit in the often heavy-handed, bureaucratic style of the old order. Literacy rates, a standard indicator of modernity, exceed 90 percent in all twenty countries and are virtually universal in most. In addition to their socialist roots, the Muslim-influenced countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia have in common a recent history of secularism. In 1992, when prayers were openly offered in a mosque in Albania, it marked the first time in nearly fifty years that a legal religious service had been held in the country. Throughout most of Eastern Europe, across the old Islamic empires' trade routes through the Caucasus and Central Asia, religions of all kinds in these formerly communist states had been either discouraged or illegal. Church–state relations, as Haynes describes them, fell into one of two patterns: "confrontational," in which "state hostility towards religion was overt and scarcely disguised," and "accommodative," in which "religious officials would strive to avoid criticizing government policies in order to be left in peace."[39] For fifty to eighty years, depending on the country, generations were raised in countries that were essentially without organized religions.

Religion in general has made a remarkable comeback in these countries—particularly in Europe—but when the citizens identify themselves as "Muslims" it is not at all clear to what extent they are identifying with a set of beliefs and religious practices or with a more ambiguous cultural identity. The Pew Survey in 2012 found that:

> Central Asia along with Southern and Eastern Europe have relatively low levels of religious commitment, both in terms of the lower importance that Muslims in those regions place on religion and in terms of self-reported religious practices. With the exception of Turkey, where two-thirds of Muslims say religion is very important in their lives, half or fewer across these two regions say religion is personally very important to them. This includes Kazakhstan and Albania, where just 18% and 15%, respectively, say religion is central to their lives.[40]

It is notable that although some of its chief executives pay lip service to one faith or another, the region as a whole is without governments with any kind of significant religious orientation.

At the same time, a quick look at Table 4.2, which reports on those parts of this region in which Muslims have had some historic presence, shows a rather striking correlation between Islam and authoritarianism. The raw correlation between the 2010–12 Freedom House scores and the percentage of Muslims in the populations of these twenty countries is a remarkable 0.746, indicating that the higher the percentage of the population identified as Muslim the lower its ranking on the scale of democratization. Put another way, the seven countries that are more than 80 percent Muslim averaged a very authoritarian 10.8 (14 being the least democratic) in their combined Freedom House scores, compared with 5.7 for those nine countries that are less than 20 percent

Muslim (the three countries with mixed populations averaged 8.0). Despite these strong differences, most studies seem to point away from religious variables alone being determinants of the post-communist political dynamics of the region. As with similar, more global statistical analyses of the relationships between faith and politics, these numbers almost certainly conceal more than they reveal.

In the transitions to democracy we have thus far discussed (as with democratic failures), the process has usually involved a series of either overt or implicit negotiations between incipient social movements and entrenched elites. In contrast to these changes of regime—which are generally called "pacted" transitions—those that took place following the collapse of the Soviet empire were so sudden and dramatic that very little bargaining occurred. In academic terms, "the moment of transition for all of these cases ... was exogenous and therefore not caused directly by the balance of power between friends and foes of the regime."[41] Thus in countries that historically had pre-Soviet national identities, and especially in those with strong civic cultures and independent social movements—and we speak here primarily of Eastern Europe in general and its northern countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuanian, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in particular—there were previously marginal, generally democratic forces (such as Poland's Solidarity) ready and able to take up the reins of government. Although the former Soviet satellite countries differed, they generally allowed significantly more space to various civil society organizations, religious groups and economic entrepreneurs than did those countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union itself. This tended to produce very different patterns of regime change in the transition from communism. In his retrospective study of twenty-five years of transitions from authoritarianism, Philippe Schmitter distinguishes countries in which "an actual transition to democracy" took place with relatively free elections, and those in which "some elite from the old autocracy keeps control of the process ... This means that one must exclude all the Central Asian cases when considering transitions in the post-Soviet world."[42] In the most common pattern, the same Moscow-anointed leaders who had led the old communist regimes became the rulers of the newly independent states. These inherited regimes tended to follow the "strong state/weak society" model of their precedent Soviet republics, though the variations were considerable.

In Estonia and its immediate neighbors in the Baltic, and in some Central European states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, a relatively strong civil society had survived the Soviet period and was able to form the basis of relatively free democracies almost from the start. Slovenia, too, managed to slip out of the disintegrating Yugoslavia and establish one of the region's most stable democracies. Indeed, contrary to the assumptions of most Westerners:

> in Central and Eastern Europe and even in several of the more western republics of the former Soviet Union, the transition away from autocracy

> and the consolidation of democracy have proven to be easier—not to mention faster and more thorough—than they were in either Latin America or Southern Europe.[43]

In the poorer republics, particularly those that had been under direct Soviet rule, the absence of a strong civic culture worked in combination with the presence of a strong state security apparatus to enable the old Soviet commissars simply to change their titles and remain in office together with political cultures of corruption, repression and cynicism:

> The combination of a leftover Soviet reality (the absence of a rule of law) and a novel Western institution (private property) has proven particularly toxic to democracy. This lethal mixture has made political power the key to individual prosperity, has made a genuinely free market appear unacceptably dangerous to political rulers, has sharpened the lingering Soviet-era fear of spreading and sharing power, and has dramatically raised the price of ever letting go of power.[44]

After declaring their independence in the early 1990s, most of these former Soviet territories held elections and accorded modest liberties to their citizens. Many earned the label "partly free" from Freedom House in at least the first year. Belarus, thought having few Muslims, is typical in having a combined freedom score of 7 in 1992–93 which quickly moved up to 12, then 13, where it remains. Of these ten former Soviet republics included in Table 4.2, only Ukraine moved significatly (by two points) in the opposite direction.

Religion and ethnicity were at best marginally related to these reversions to autocracy. The far more parsimonious explanation is that, in the case of sudden transitions to independence, the old oligarchs were the only people with the institutional resources and skills to win elections. Having won, and thereby retained the material benefits—high salaries, choice homes, cars and other perks of office—they had both the incentive and the power to stay in office, which most of them did. The most consistently authoritarian of the former Soviet republics are those in Central Asia. Created by the Soviets, their boundaries and identities are the products of a Stalin-devised "nationalities program" that was intended to give the Soviet Union the appearance of a federal system. Their borders seemingly demarcated the five indigenous dominant ethnic majorities of the area, but in fact were drawn to include ethnic minorities in each sufficiently large to ensure that no single ethnic group became powerful enough to challenge the center in Moscow. Although Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have substantial oil and gas resources, the eight countries along the southern tier of the former Soviet Union have an average GDP of only US $4,229 compared with the $7,632 average for their Muslim counterparts in Eastern Europe (see Table 4.2). These countries are, in statistical terms, overwhelmingly Muslim. However, their governments are not simply secular, but often aggressively so:

> Two of them, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have state-controlled versions of Islam and repress any form of Islam that is outside of the state-controlled institutions. Another three, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have a tendency to repress or limit all manifestations of Islam. Kazakhstan ... supports moderate Islam and to a lesser extent other indigenous religions including Russian Orthodoxy and Judaism. However, it has taken a number of measures to restrict what it considers Muslim radicals.[45]

In three of the five Central Asian states, the same people who were in power when the "iron curtain" was lifted were still there fifteen yearslater; in the other two, the continuing presidents had been high-ranking deputies to the Communist leaders. Ironically the champions of democracy in these countries have been Islamic leaders whose "religious politics are extensions of their anti-Communist and anti-Russian attitudes."[46] Even the more radical groups in the region—including Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is linked to the Taliban and openly espouses a transnational caliphate—have largely eschewed violence and been essentially democratic in their internal governance, though they have been largely excluded from participation.[47] In Tajikistan in 1992, when a coalition of secular democrats and the Islamic Renaissance Party won control of the government, they were quickly suppressed. A brief opening to the Muslim opposition in 2000 led to a power-sharing agreement that promised democratic reforms that have yet to be realized. In general the authoritarianism of Central Asia's former Soviet republics (the "-stans," as I think of them) is despite rather than because of Islam.

The high scores of authoritarian tendencies in Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan are reflective of the continuing tensions that have kept these two countries in a real or near state of war for more than two decades. The abrupt nature of the way in which these republics became nations militated against democratization, particularly where historic ethnic conflicts were unresolved. The ongoing war can almost be seen as a continuation of the conflict that raged between the two countries a century ago that was postponed but never settled by Moscow. Throughout much of this region, in point of fact, the religious variable needs to be understood in the context of the long-standing ethnic conflicts that have historically characterized the Balkans and the Caucasus. There is perhaps no part of the world in which national boundaries, ethnic identities, languages and religions have been more complex and dynamic. In the Caucasus, for example, a region approximately the size of Texas, more than forty distinct languages (not dialects) are spoken.[48]

One outcome of the historic conflicts in this part of the world is the rather striking division of religious groups into ethnic enclaves. There are virtually no Muslims in Armenia or Christians in adjacent Azerbaijan. The fact that 90 percent of today's Kosovars and only 4 percent of Serbs are Muslim is similarly not an accident. As the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate in the

later years of the nineteenth century, nationalist movements creating such new nations as Bosnia, Bulgaria and Serbia initiated various formal and informal violent and voluntary relocations of ethnic minorities. Between the failed 1878 Conference of Berlin and the beginning of the twentieth century, hundreds of thousands of Christians and Muslims, especially the latter, relocated. The Balkan wars accelerated the process and brought civilians into the conflict as targets of what would later be known as "ethnic cleansing." The end of World War I and the subsequent Greco-Turkish War capped the process, forcing the exchange of more than one million Christians who were forcibly moved west toward Greece while the Muslims relocated to the east. Over the course of fifty years, over five million people were transferred and hundreds of thousands killed. "As a preliminary conclusion one can say that only 38 per cent of the Muslim population living in the Balkans region in the year 1911 remained in 1923. The rest had been expelled, had fled, had died in flight or had been killed."[49]

World War II blew new air on the remaining coals. Those Jews who had not already fled were wiped out, and the battles between competing ethnic, religious and national groups were renewed under the guise of wartime necessity. No one can say, without producing an argument, how many died: in Poland, as one Serb put it to Robert Kaplan, "Jews and Catholics argue over significance. Here Croats and Serbs will argue over numbers."[50] Similar histories of conflict can be found in the Black and Caspian Sea region and in the Caucasus, sometimes known as the Balkans of the east. Just as the Tito regime in Yugoslavia succeeded in keeping a tight lid on these conflicts in the Balkans without ever going to their roots, in the republics of the former Soviet Union a sort of contained cultural nationalism was actually encouraged as a means of defusing ethnic steam.

Not surprisingly, when these simmering conflicts were let out in the open, the new states put a high premium on unity, and on either repressing separatist tendencies within or resisting old enemies on the perimeter. But something else was happening in these conflicts, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, where ill-defined borders, divided governments, economic dislocations as well as ethnic conflicts encouraged smuggling and other criminal activities that unsettled the remaining law enforcement institutions and left large sections of the population impoverished, corrupt and disoriented. While the hideous acts of internecine violence that racked the region in the 1990s have been well documented, they were often less about religion and ethnicity but "something far more banal: the creation of communities of criminal violence and pillage."[51]

Democratization politicized and deepened some of the conflicts between ethnic groups by providing political incentives for the making of appeals to the shared interest of "the people" as opposed to the "machinations" of minorities. "The shift from one-party regimes to democratic multiparty government may entail incentives to emphasize other levels of ethnic differentiation hitherto of little political significance."[52] In Bosnia, for example, people

were targeted over issues of "appearance, language and clothing" with religion serving largely as a rationale for a variety of other feuds.[53] Even in countries that are not democratic, the *threat* of unraveling can give the ruling elites the political leverage to suppress dissent. And there is often a vicious circle of repression: the elected autocrat, who sees his or her power waning, outlaws or sharply restricts the opposition which, denied legitimate channels of protest, takes to the streets. The autocrat, citing the threat of lawlessness and terrorism, cracks down still further and the cycle continues. Donald Horowitz uses the term "flanking" to describe the attempt of a faction or party representing one ethnic group to challenge the dominant party of the same ethnic group by staking out a "patriotic" or extreme appeal to religion or ethnicity. Once this cycle begins, it is difficult to stop since the party itself is based on narrow ethnic interests as opposed to broader issues.[54] Nationalist ideology, as Susan Woodward argued early in the break-up of Yugoslavia, can take on a life of its own when political leaders find it difficult to "escape the roles they had created. Establishing their credentials as national protectors, nationalist politicians had to respond in kind when challenged by more extreme nationalists."[55]

But there is a less gloomy side to this picture: the dynamic *can* be reversed, and in many ways in the Balkans, it has been. Of the countries that only a decade ago were racked with civil strife and civil war—Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia—only Kosovo has a 2013 Freedom House rating over 6, and most students of the region attribute its democratic deficit less to religion than to the lingering effects of its strife-torn birth as a nation. The attenuation of these conflicts points to the encouraging notion that there may be "virtuous circles of progress" that can supersede and perhaps erase the effects of more vicious descents. Pushed hard by the EU and the promise of membership, each of these countries—some more enthusiastically than others—has undertaken a series of both economic and political reforms that reinforce each other:

> The virtuous circle arises not only from the inherent logic of pluralism and the rule of law, but also because inclusive political institutions tend to support inclusive economic institutions. This then leads to a more equal distribution of income, empowering a broad segment of society and making the political playing field even more level.[56]

To the east, by way of contrast, the so-called color revolutions that brought real democratic reforms to Georgia and the Ukraine in 2003 and 2004, respectively, instead of consolidating or spreading throughout the region, have been sharply reversed:

> A post-communist divide thus runs starkly across the Soviet-European border of 1939. Fifteen of the sixteen states to the west of that historic boundary are democracies, and most are free and stable. Even the

> exception, Bosnia, displays many elements of democracy. But nine of the twelve post-Soviet states to the east of that boundary are authoritarian, and the three democracies—Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova—are illiberal, even questionably democratic, and unstable.[57]

The aggressive democracy-promoting efforts of the EU are without doubt an important factor in the successful transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe.[58] Recent events in the Ukraine, including the takeover of the Crimea, suggest that Russia's slide toward authoritarian rule might similarly spread to its neighbors. But in this region, to be sure, whatever democratic deficits exist they cannot be attributed to Islam.

The Indian subcontinent

If we include Afghanistan, the six south Asian nations surrounding India are collectively home to a third of the world's Muslims. Whatever region we put it in, Afghanistan is a special case that on the surface seems to confirm all of the arguments that suggest a fundamental disconnection between Islam and democracy. When put in comparison with surrounding countries, the arguments of Samuel Huntington and others that Islamic countries are at once uniquely fragmented by tribal divisions and singularly threatened by international networks of Islamist "jihadists" have, I think we have shown, not been useful. In Afghanistan, however, both the Russian (1979–89) and US-led (2003–) attempts to bring stability to the nation have been consistently bedeviled by both of those forces. Internal conflicts between local warlords and with those loyal to the Taliban have, if anything, intensified over time.[59] First against the Russians, and throughout the more recent Western intervention, the conflict has attracted a steady stream of Islamist volunteer fighters from all over the Muslim world. According to one pessimistic observer, "For centuries, Afghan politics has been—and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, no matter how many 'free' elections are held—about ethnic identity and strict adherence to Islam. Tribal loyalties and religious conservatism trump all other values."[60]

An equally plausible argument can be made that more than twenty years of massive military intervention have so shaped the landscape of Afghani politics that few endemic values or institutions have been untouched. For much of the latter half of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was the crossroads of conflict between Russian and British Raj interests in a series of wars that British diplomats referred to as "the Great Game."[61] If there was anything holding the country together it was the monarchy, and—after it was abolished in 1973—religion, a common faith in Islam that was in fact fragmented by sharp ethnic and urban–rural conflicts. Helped by the covert support of Europe and the United States, the combined forces of the so-called Northern Alliance—the Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and the Taliban—were able to force the Russians to withdraw but unable peacefully to create a government. Nor

have twelve years of post-9/11 Western military operations created a viable central government. Under the Taliban's brief rule Afghanistan was perhaps, more than any other Islamic state in the world, the embodiment of every Western theory of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy. It was violent, anti-modern, inegalitarian and intolerant:

> Adopting an even stricter interpretation of Islamic law than most of the Kabul clergy, the Taliban leadership barred women from attending school or working, even as nurses and doctors in mixed-gender hospitals or as teachers in all female schools. Cinema, videos, and popular music were banned. Crimes such as petty theft were punished by the amputation of a hand, and rape and murder by public execution.[62]

Other religions were banned, and their artworks and places of worship destroyed. The government that came to power through US-backed elections allowed women back into school and abolished many of the strictest laws, but it has been unable to secure the countryside or keep the Taliban from regaining some its strength, particularly in the mountainous regions of the south bordering on Pakistan. Afghanistan's poisonous conflicts have, moreover, leached their conflicts into the soils of surrounding nations, Pakistan in particular.

As has been evident throughout recent wars in Afghanistan, the border between it and Pakistan exists largely as a line on a map. The bulk of Pakistan's population lives far from this line, both in terms of geography and lifestyle; but the political history of the country has in many ways been marked by struggles between very different cultures. Situated at the confluence of South Asia, the old Persian Empire and Central Asia, Pakistan has sometimes been described as an artificial state. By the time that the British had decided, at the end of World War II, that the game was up on its colonial rule of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan's Muslim League was enjoying increasing success in painting the Congress Party as a Hindu tool. The League's leaders "were not religious, but they used Islam as a focus for an evocation of nationalism, playing on its emotional power to gain the attention of the Muslims in the streets."[63] Islam, it should be noted, was realistically the only effective tool that the League could use in making its case (a) because India's Muslims were widely scattered throughout the continent and had no connected homeland to rally around, and (b) because the areas in which Muslims were in a clear majority—Bengal in the east, the Punjab, Baluchistan and Sind along the Arabian Sea, and the territories bordering on Afghanistan—could each lay claim to its own imagined community of national identity.

Interestingly the leaders of Pakistan's Islamic League were not themselves largely from Muslim-majority areas. Most of them, known as *Mujahirs* (literally migrants), favored a secular rather than a religious state. What united them, and eventually most of the local leaders of the Muslim-majority areas,

was a sense that they would always be second-class citizens in a Congress-dominated Hindu India. And so in 1947 India and Pakistan (standing for the P in Punjab, A in Afghanistan, K in Kashmir, S for Sind and "tan" for Bulachistan) came into being as separate states. The five main areas (including the eastern region of Bengal) of what was to become Pakistan were, to varying degrees, unenthusiastic about the idea of a strong central government. Bengal, which was 1,000 miles distant from the other Muslim-majority provinces, and the tribal areas bordering on Afghanistan were particularly interested in developing a federal system in which each province would enjoy substantial autonomy. However, the leaders of the independence movement prevailed in creating a strong, unitary government, founded in Islam but largely secular in practice, designed to govern the designated provinces and all Muslim residents of India who wished to relocate. These immigrants—seven million of them by the 1951 census—settled primarily in urban areas in the western provinces where they soon constituted one-fifth of the overall population, and as many as two-thirds in the larger cities such as the country's new capital Karachi:

> At the beginning, the Mujahirs acquired a sort of prestige. After all, they had played a decisive role in the establishment of Pakistan, and had given up everything to go and live there. They dominated the state through the Muslim League and its two leaders: Jinnah, the governor general, and the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who was himself from Uttar Pradesh. They also dominated the public services (95 out of the 101 Muslims in the Indian Civil Service left India) ... and the liberal professions. In Sind, the careers of lawyer, teacher and businessman had by tradition been filled by Hindus, who left in droves after 1947. The Mujahirs, taking advantage of their abilities in these spheres, took their place, to the great satisfaction—which did not last—of the Sindis.[64]

In anticipation of independence, a constituent assembly was formed in 1945 to develop a constitution for the new state. With actual independence in 1947, it was reconstituted and became the interim governing body under the constitutional umbrella of the old British Government of India Act; but neither it nor its successor was able to agree on a new constitution until 1956. The parliamentary system that the constitution created was in turn abrogated by the army in 1958 when martial law was declared. A 1962 Constitution, prepared under military auspices, created a presidential system which lasted until 1970 when civilian government was restored and new elections held. The 1973 Constitution, under which the country is still governed, created a two-house legislature with a separately elected president and a prime minister chosen by the lower house, or National Assembly.

In continuing recognition of its fight to prevent the secession of the northwest provinces and Baluchistan in 1947 and reach a standoff with India in Kashmir, the military has long seen itself, and is seen by many Pakistanis, as

the force that brought the country into being. For more than half of the period since independence (1958–71, 1977–88, 1999–2008) Pakistan has been under direct military rule. "In none of these cases did the military remove a government for religious reasons. In fact, while the parties removed from power were nominally confessional parties, the military retained links with the strongly religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami."[65] And most of the laws restricting religious minorities and promoting Islam have been passed under military rule. Since Freedom House began keeping score, Pakistan's ratings have fluctuated from fairly democratic levels of 6, 7 and 8 points in the early 1970s, late 1980s and mid-1990s to an almost purely authoritarian score of 12 points in both the early 1980s and in 1999. Its 2013 score was 9 points.

In its swings between partial democracy and dictatorship, and in spite of its somewhat sophisticated economy, Pakistan remains a largely feudal society. Many of its urban slums are virtually without public services. In rural areas, peasants burdened by crushing debts to their landlords work tiny plots of land that provide bare subsistence:

> Even now, most legislators and other high-ranking government personnel at both the national and provincial levels come from the landed class. Moreover, the feudal families are heavily represented not only in government and the military officer corps, but also in industry and higher education. In a country that consistently ranks as one of the world's most corrupt, the poor commonly find themselves fated to lives of virtual servitude.[66]

Following one of a series of wars with India over the disputed province of Kashmir, the election of 1970 saw the newly formed People's Party of Pakistan, led by the charismatic Zulfikar Bhutto, win a substantial victory in West Pakistan. However, a pro-independence party won all but two of seats in the east, forcing a standoff in parliament that led eventually to the secession of what is now Bangladesh. The charismatic Bhutto was elected in a relatively free election founded in a socialistic appeal to the poor. The poorly planned nationalization of key industries proved an economic disaster and Bhutto quickly moved to the right, thus adding leftists—union leaders, intellectuals and students in particular—to his already strained relations with the business sector and the feudal lords. The military intervened and Bhutto was executed in a summary trial that made him something of a martyr.

Bhutto's daughter, Benazir—generally considered to be the most brilliant and popular of Pakistan's modern leaders—was later to take up her father's mantel and run successfully for prime minister in 1988 and 1993. Under Pakistan's then mixed presidential system Bhutto's first term consisted largely in a series of battles with the military-controlled presidency which finally dismissed her government. But Bhutto came back and in her second term got a president more to her liking. Although she was popular in Europe and the

United States for her anti-communist and generally moderate foreign policies, her second term did not go well. With many of her cabinet members, and her husband Asif Ali Zardari, implicated in a widening circle of corruption, Bhutto and her children fled to Dubai, Zardari went to jail and General Pervez Musharraf took power in a coup.

During the Bhuttos' two generations at Pakistan's helm, and even in a subsequent return to Bhutto politics by Benazir's husband (following her assassination in 2007) the family has become almost synonymous with democratic governance in Pakistan.[67] Indeed, in 2013 Zardari earned the distinction of becoming (a) the first elected president in Pakistan's history to serve a full five-year term, and (b) the first to hand over power peacefully to a newly elected administration. What is perhaps most striking about politics in Pakistan, however, is *how little difference* it makes whether power lies in the hands of elected politicians or the generals. It is the close balance between these forces (not to mention a professional bureaucracy and active judiciary) that gives leverage to what remains a relatively small Islamist movement. The Islamist parties have been divided, unstable and seldom able to win more than 10 percent of the popular vote; but they are just large enough to serve as tipping points in the balancing acts of the political and military elites:

> Since the country's inception, Pakistan's leaders have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan's identity. Under ostensibly pro-Western rulers, Islam has been the rallying cry against perceived Indian threats. Such rulers have attempted to "manage" militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves its nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western countries.[68]

Two recent studies of the Punjabi region show significant gaps between formal sharia-based laws and actual practices. The sharia's mandates on female inheritance rights, for example, have been almost entirely ignored in favor of customary patterns of male primogeniture.[69] A blasphemy law has been selectively used to threaten civic discourse and freedom of the press, but what appear on the surface to be strict interpretations of Islamic law have not been rigidly enforced,[70] at least in urban areas. In the countryside, on the other hand, local imams, officials and mobs have sometimes enforced interpretations of sharia law that go far beyond these standards.

The rise of the Taliban allowed the military to control domestic politics more effectively. Militant groups could be used to challenge civilian rule and to justify new resources and powers both from the government and foreign donors such as the United States. General Musharraf was particularly adept at using extremist forces domestically and in Kashmir to undermine civilian governments. But while the more militant Islamists are a destabilizing force:

> it is not Islam or religion that is the problem; it is how religion has been exploited by the state. The genie has escaped, and much of Pakistan's future will be determined by the effort to contain these groups. The most pessimistic of Pakistanis feel that the battle has been lost, and some seek refuge elsewhere. Pakistan is far from a theocracy—the Islamists are too much at each other's throats for that—but they are driving Pakistan towards a different kind of civil war, one in which religion and confessional avenues determine which side you are on.[71]

Pakistan's pendulum-like swings from military to quasi-democratic civilian governments provide—to use Yogi Berra's famous redundancy—continuing cycles of déjà vu all over again. What has been perhaps most striking over the years is how little actually changes. The wealthy elites continue to pay virtually no taxes, the government provides correspondingly few services, and corruption is the norm whether the regime du jour is parliamentary or presidential, elected or self-appointed, military or civilian:

> Its struggles with poverty, ethnic and sectarian militancy and military unilateralism have coexisted with heroic attempts by its emerging civil society to achieve an accountable political order, an unfettered judiciary, and an independent media. The interweaving of Musharraf's pronouncements on enlightened moderation, Bhutto's reformism, and political Islam are indicative of resilient party politics that is unique in the developing world.[72]

As one of the largest Muslim countries in the world, indeed the only one with nuclear weapons, Pakistan cannot be ignored. As stated earlier, its border with Afghanistan is a continuing source of problems on both sides but its long-standing and long-range problems on the Indian border are of even greater relevance. As Goodson points out, "India, China, and the United States are all major powers with a lot at stake in Pakistan. The unresolved issue of Kashmir still clouds India's relations with Islamabad, while China's burgeoning energy and geopolitical needs have prompted it to invest heavily. ... The United States and its NATO allies have a host of security concerns related to Afghanistan and the war against terror."[73] And the Saudis have also heavily invested in supporting Pakistan's Islamic institutions. Of all these important sources of influence, challenge and example, none come close to that posed by Pakistan's long history of association with India which, since Partition, has virtually defined the nation. One historian of the region has argued that Pakistan has essentially defined India as an "existential" threat, part of its founding fathers' vision reinforced by repeated clashes in Kashmir and the lingering belief that it was India that made the secession of Bangladesh possible.[74]

The temptation to compare India and Pakistan is virtually irresistible, if only because they are similar in so many ways. "Many scholars and other

experts," says Phillip Oldenburg, "believed that neither country would develop into a stable democracy. Both countries were so desperately poor, so grossly inegalitarian in practice *and* belief, and so prodigiously multilingual if not multi-national that sustaining a democracy would be difficult if not impossible."[75] Oldenburg is quick to dispel some common misperceptions about the two countries, the first being that they had similar experiences during the colonial era. The British devolution of power to local governments that began in the early twentieth century did not apply to the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab, two provinces that would form the core of Pakistan after the 1947 partition. The residents of these territories, moreover, were at the center of the empire's local military, whose heritage continued.

Pakistan's military, combining paranoia, pride and opposition to India—made manifest in the first war (1947–48) over Kashmir—refused to join its hated neighbor in the nonaligned world. The United States was only too happy to enlist Pakistan as a bulwark against China, the Soviet Union and such neutral countries as India, then later as a staging ground for help to the anti-Soviet Taliban in Afghanistan. So munificent was US direct aid that the Pakistan military was virtually a rentier state within a state. Although India, like Pakistan, has nuclear weapons and a military that has more than held its own in the many episodic conflicts with its northern neighbor, it has always maintained a strong tradition—never achieved in Pakistan—of civilian control of the military.

Equally important in explaining India's greater relative success in democratization were the ways in which the political dynamics of the countries evolved. In the fight for independence, India's Congress Party was a broad coalition embracing both Hindus and Muslims and including the men and women who in 1947 would be the founders of the independent new states of both India and Pakistan. But while Congress continued to be the dominant party in India, developing the nation's first plans for governance and public policy, Pakistan's new leaders had no real agenda beyond that of autonomy. Maya Tudor is worth quoting at length on this:

> The *presence* of programmatic content within its nationalist ideology substantially affected each county's likelihood of regime *stability* after independence because such content facilitated the party's ability to broker compromises among its diverse membership. ... Pakistani nationalism was not programmatic, defined almost wholly by its opposition to Congress rule, and was characterized by neither clear principles nor practices associated with those principles. This weak form of nationalism meant that Pakistan's political party was unable to invoke a programmatic basis for reconciling regime-building political conflicts. ... The presence of a programmatic nationalism which became valued in and of itself in India meant that, after independence, India's governing political party was more able to reconcile post-independence state-building conflicts by invoking the substantive goals of nationalism as a basic for political compromise.[76]

The Congress Party dominated Indian politics in the early years and established a model of carefully brokered "big tent" politics. Slowly, ever so slowly, Congress wore down Hindu caste systems of discrimination, and it continues to garner support in the Muslim community at much the same rate as it does overall. Perhaps because those Muslims who were the most passionate about their religious identity left for Pakistan in 1947, those who have remained are politically integrated into the larger polity: surveys show that they vote with equal fervor, support democratic institutions and feel that their votes count. There has never been a significant Islamist party in India.

Where religion has come largely to matter in Indian politics is with the rise of Hindu nationalists who, it might be said, increasingly felt that the big tent of Congress was getting too big. There had always been a small conservative core of Hindu organizations which were unhappy with the secularism of the Congress Party. A general religious revival in the 1960s, centered largely in the originally apolitical World Hindu Council, became politicized in the 1980s in response to alleged foreign-funded (i.e., Arab) efforts to convert Hindus to Islam. It became a political issue, "because they saw the state's policy of religious neutrality on conversion as protecting these Muslim assaults. In 1983, a great 'Procession for Unity' organized by the [World Hindu Council] brought over a million people to New Delhi in one of the largest gatherings of its type in history."[77] A series of subsequent skirmishes, some violent, over holy sites and other sectarian issues helped to push the various Hindu action groups into a political coalition, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP—Indian People's Party). Gradually building on such appeals, the BJP and its allies won control of parliament following the assassination of Congress Party leader Rajiv Ghandi in 1990. Since then, Congress and its allies and the Hindu alliance have traded control of the government in roughly equal measure. In 2009 Congress's Manmohan Singh became only the second premier in history to win a second term in office; however, the party's subsequent decline has been dramatic.

The BJP coalition, when in power, has been somewhat more conservative economically than the Congress, thus expanding traditional democratic choices into the general election arena and marking a significant opening in India's democratic politics. It has, predictably, taken a harder line toward Pakistan, but has otherwise actively promoted a sectarian agenda only in the area of education, where it has overhauled the curriculum in conformity with conservative Hindu and nationalist ideas. Especially at the provincial level, it has also been accused of failing to check the sometimes violent anti-Muslim activities of more radical Hindu groups: indeed one of its leaders was denied a visa to enter the United States in 2005 on the grounds that he was responsible for "severe violations of religious freedom."[78] Its overwhelming victory in the 2014 elections—virtually annihilating the Congress Party—has clearly altered the balance of power in Indian politics symbolically at least, bringing religious questions into sharp focus, though not necessarily displacing India's secular state traditions.

While our concern in this book is primarily with Muslim-majority countries, the Indian case is worth noting because of the concerns that these policies—whether derived from Hindu or Muslim parties—raise in terms of Western concepts of democratization. The question, which we raised in briefly in Chapter 2 and will return to in Chapter 7, relates to the ability of political parties founded in organized religion to stay true to their own supporters without tipping the rules of the game so far in their direction as to restrict the citizen rights of others. India's BJP coalition has pushed the edges of that fine line. "It has acted like any other political party," says Juergensmeyer, "in its organizational calculations, often to the frustration of its more religious supporters. At the same time," he continues, its "defining itself as a religious party," its policies of "cultural nationalism" and the suggestion that "spirituality is an important component of social order and civic duty" are troubling to many Muslims, Sikhs and Christians.[79] While the world continues to view India, especially in comparison with China, as the quintessential third world democracy, these tensions are by no means trivial. While the likelihood of democratic failure is slim, continuing ethnic and religious tensions, and—much more importantly—the astounding and largely unaddressed gaps between rich and poor have left the road to democratic consolidation largely unpaved. Bumpy as it is, however, the fact that for almost a lifetime (nearly ninety years) of the oldest Indians, conflicts have almost always been resolved through negotiations, elections, bargains and compromise. Democracy has become a way of life.[80]

Bangladesh, by most measures, should be quite another story. But although it remains the poorest country in South Asia (and one of the poorest in the world), its progress in recent years has been quite impressive. When its early leaders began cashing in on Bengali nationalism largely for their own benefit, many citizens welcomed the subsequent military takeover; but as it too became overly assertive, citizen activists slowly took power back. By 2002, when the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance produced its first country report on Bangladesh, the situation was so murky that its authors could argue on the one hand that:

> (a) Political instability, absence of democratic norms and values, economic chaos, social insecurity, socio-political atmosphere of indecision, mutual distrust, abuses of power, government's failure to maintain law and order are common features of life in Bangladesh.

And on the other hand that:

> (b) Bangladesh has achieved a high level of political coherence and stability. The basic human rights especially civil and political rights and freedoms are not only entrenched in the constitution but are largely protected and defended. The courts are generally autonomous and the media is relatively free and often critical of the government. The civil society is active.[81]

More recent accounts remain similarly ambiguous.[82] Bangladesh's economic progress has been substantial: from a country whose largest "industry" was foreign aid, it has become almost self-sufficient in agriculture, has developed a major textile industry and brings in millions of dollars in hard currency from its huge network of overseas workers. Its per capita GDP is still very low at US $747 in 2012, but that is double what it was a decade ago.

Following the assassination in 1975 of its founding ruler Sheikh Mujubar Rahman, up until 1991 the country was governed by a series of military and civilian dictatorships. Since that time, each new government has been (formally at least) elected. Rule by decree, once common, became unusual, and after a particularly blatant case of electoral fraud in 1996, the winning party was forced to establish a non-partisan electoral commission making subsequent contests corrupt only at the margins. However, in 2013 the two major parties found it impossible to agree on a commission or caretaker government to assure fair elections, and the opposition boycott of the 2014 elections—marred also by widespread violence—left a residue of repression and a parliament without an effective opposition bloc.[83] For most of the nation's semi-democratic years, power had alternated between the once Socialist Awami League (AL) and the more conservative Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNL). With neither able to form a majority on its own, minor parties, factions within the BML, the AL and the military were often the tail that wags the dog. The radical Islamist parties have never been able to garner more than 10 to 15 percent of the total popular vote, but have benefitted enormously from their ability to play balance of power games. "Closer to the ground, fundamentalism benefitted from Saudi and Gulf state funding as well as a steady traffic of Bangladeshis traveling to and from the Arabian peninsula for work."[84] The strongest of these parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) has turned increasingly to sometimes violent protests since the Supreme Court ruled its charter unconstitutional in 2013.

Bangladesh is unusual in having fought for its post-World War II independence twice, first in opposition to British colonial rule in 1947, and again when it separated from Pakistan in 1971. While the sores from the former struggle have healed, the latter scabs are still being picked. Many Islamists actively opposed the split from Pakistan, often militarily. Recent government decisions to prosecute the leaders of some of the more militant of these anti-independence groups have revived issues of religion that have perhaps lain dormant for a number of years. Although the largely Bengali population of the country has nothing approaching the kinds of tribal differences that have haunted Pakistan, episodes of political violence are not uncommon.[85] Two small radical Islamist parties were banned in 2005 and hundreds of their suspected members arrested following a series of attacks on legal institutions.[86] And one year later, acting under a declared state of emergency that essentially handed the government over to the military, public criticism of the government was banned and as many as half a million people were detained.[87] Remarkably, however, the state of emergency proved evanescent

and with help from the United States and India, democracy was restored. Whether this can happen again, following the banning of JI in 2013, is problematic.

Given the rise of religious influence in society, and the ability of the Islamists to secure concessions from the governing parties, secularism remains surprisingly strong. Sarah White's study of Bangladesh provides strong empirical evidence to the once-unaccepted idea that individuals can become simultaneously more "modern" and more religious. Peoples' real world orientations toward each other, she argues using Bangladesh as her model, can coexist comfortably with more pious religious identities that are more about personal life than politics.[88] Radical Islamism is a sometimes significant distraction in the politics of Bangladesh, but the failure of its democratic norms fully to take hold has other roots. Extreme poverty, exacerbated by an extraordinary series of natural disasters, makes it an unlikely candidate—in most theories of democratization—for even the most basic reforms. Yet democratic forms and procedures, together with a vibrant political culture have proven remarkably resilient.

The failure of democracy in Bangladesh stems from an almost toxic combination of institutional designs that are highly democratic in the abstract, but woefully unsuited in practice to the country's sharply competitive party system. Bangladesh's institutional structure is based on the British parliamentary model of election by what are called single-member districts in which there is only one winner in each geographical constituency. This system works well with moderate parties and traditions of compromise. As Arend Lijphart has shown, however, single-member districts have a tendency to further polarize highly adversarial parties such those found in Bangladesh.[89] Instead of working to resolve their conflicts, the two major parties in Bangladesh have become zero-sum players in which there is only one winner and one loser. "In Bangladesh's case, this polarized atmosphere draws further intensity from a sharp antagonism between leading personalities plus the frequent inability of either of the two main parties to attract a majority of votes."[90] A pervasive atmosphere of corruption raises the stakes giving the party in power (and its coalition allies) undiluted access to patronage, bribes, graft and nepotism. Shut out of jobs, local government projects, bribes and patronage, the opposition parties have few alternatives to obstructionism and extra-parliamentary actions. It can also lead them into the temptation of playing the religious card. In 2013, when a coalition of Islamist groups demanded passage of a package of laws banning blasphemy on penalty of death, ending programs for women's equality and imposing a number of controls on dress and gender-mixing in public, the BNP joined the demonstrations protesting the government's refusal to pass the bill.

Whatever core of democracy that remains in Bangladesh lives despite its ostensibly democratic institutions. The system may have unraveled almost completely in 2014 with the rigging of the election rules and the opposition boycott that "produced a de facto one-party Parliament that was voted in by

no more than a fifth of the electorate.... [with a ruling party that does] not seem to be in mood to heed any appeals aimed at restoring stability."[91]

In rather an odd way there is a parallel situation in the island country of Sri Lanka. Gradually negotiating its freedom in the wake of the break-up of Britain's Indian Empire, Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) became one of the early success stories in the narrative of post-colonial transitions to democracy. Like Bangladesh it chose a Westminster-style parliament and electoral system which, similarly to Bangladesh, tended to impede rather than facilitate its path toward democratic consolidation. Although there have always been rather sharp divisions between the largely Hindu Tamils in the north and the majority Sinhalese Buddhists in the south, relations between them, and the substantial minorities of Christians and Muslims scattered throughout both areas, were generally peaceful. Although the Sinhalese were clearly in the majority politically, the better-educated and wealthier Tamils tended to play disproportionate roles in the professions, the higher civil service, education and the legal system.

Sri Lanka's descent into chaos can be traced in no small part to the election of 1956 when S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike played the language card to become prime minister. Capturing the seething resentment in the largely Buddhist majority Sinhalese community, he enacted a strict Sinhalese-only language law that polarized the country, but won him reelection by a substantial margin, a popular vote margin greatly enhanced by the electoral system in use. It was, in a real sense, a predictable (and predicted) outcome. The British Commission that, in 1927, set out the basic rules for independence, itself conceded that it could "detect few signs ... to make us confident that parties, if and when formed, would owe their origin to political or economic differences in national policy rather than to racial or caste divisions."[92] As in Bangladesh, a conflict that had been kept in check, and might have been worked through, was exacerbated by a winner-takes-all electoral system that continually upped the stakes. Those moderates who favored a federal solution or negotiations with the Tamils could not compete against the increasing table stakes of those playing the ethnic card: imposing quotas on Tamil admissions to universities, limiting their access to civil service and political positions, and increasingly condoning violence against them. The extra-large majorities that the electoral system gave the majority party, moreover, enabled it to amend the constitution at will both to secure its own future and to legalize their restrictions on minorities. Attempts to change the electoral system came too late, and as the violence escalated into all-out civil war, hundreds of thousands died.[93] Who killed whom, when, where, how and why? These are questions that will haunt the country for generations. Worse, despite the thorough defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the culture of violence engendered during forty years of civil war persists with Muslims now becoming particular targets of rage. Banished from many Tamil-held areas for allegedly being pro-government, Muslims now find themselves the targets of Buddhist violence for speaking the Tamil language, for slaughtering sacred

animals and for reproducing rapidly in an alleged attempt to take over the country (at current rates it is estimated that Muslims might in fact become a majority in about forty years).[94]

The twenty-plus years of civil war that ended with the decisive defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009 created "a culture of impunity with regard to the actions of the security forces."[95] Held partly in check outside the war zone by a generally impartial court system, the northern sections of the island were under virtual martial law. Despite these serious problems, and, in many cases because of them, a vigorous civil society has emerged in the south and in defense of civil liberties. Long overdue changes in the electoral law appear to be having the desired effect of moderating party competition. But the new system has apparently reduced the prospects for women,[96] centralized executive power in the hands of the president and done nothing to limit corruption. The continued use of emergency powers to restrict civil liberties and the increasing use of government offices and funds to manipulate elections have led Freedom House to again downgrade the country's democracy ratings. The surprise victory of reformer Maithirpala Sirisena in the January 2015 election offers the promise of significant change, if he can work with the parliament.

Sri Lanka's island neighbors, the Maldives, have been independent only since 1965. Its relatively liberal democracy soon morphed into what was essentially a family presidency, overturned only after a series of attempted coups that eventually resulted in the Maldives' relatively free elections of 2009; however, its elected president was in turn deposed in a coup organized largely by the old elite. Spread over what were once as many as 200 inhabited islands, the country is the world's lowest (less than five feet above sea level), and was literally shrunk in size by a massive tsunami in 2004. Most of the islands are poor, based largely on subsistence farming and fishing, and have little physical connection with the rest of the country. By law and custom, the Republic of the Maldives is an Islamic state: all citizens are required to be Muslims, imams are licensed and appointed by the state and no other public forms of worship are allowed. On the islands reserved for tourism, on the other hand, alcohol is freely available, dress codes are not enforced and there is a generally cosmopolitan resort style. A strong religious revival has slowly been altering the islands' notoriously laid-back style, with conflicts between the tourist zone islands and the rest of the country intensifying. The Maldives seem increasingly to manifest a "clash of civilizations," not between Islam and others, but between the tolerant, syncretic, more worldly Islam of the wealthier islands and the increasing rigid Islamism of the rest of the archipelago. Although the country remains "partly free" in the Freedom House classifications, these growing gaps are difficult to bridge. They are also, perhaps, prototypical of conflicts we may see play out with increasing frequency—even in highly developed countries—as more fundamentalist religious groups use democratic opportunities to impose their moral codes on their less pious countrymen.

Southeast Asia

Writing in 1944 about the impending independence of Indonesia, Malaysia and other parts of Southeast Asia, the British writer and colonial administrator J. S. Furnival predicted that the enormous ethnic diversity of the region would condemn it to a nightmarish "anarchy."[97] While Furnival's concerns may have been overblown, the area's movement toward national and democratic consolidation, as shown in Table 4.3, has not been smooth. Aside from the special case of Indonesia, which we will evaluate in Chapter 6, none of these countries has been rated fully free in the most recent Freedom House ratings; four of the ten are coded not free at all. Collectively they have the most authoritarian ratings of any region save the Middle East. As Furnival predicted, ethnic conflict has been a continuing problem throughout the region, increasingly with religious overtones. In quantitative terms, "by global comparison, Asia is a region particularly prone to conflicts," and "compared with the rest of Asia, Southeast Asia is subject to a disproportionally large number of cultural conflicts." And finally, "The number of ethnically colored conflicts is stagnating while religious conflicts are gaining in importance."[98]

Muslims settled primarily in the islands between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, and along the coastlines of the Malay Peninsula. A lucrative trade, particularly in spices, later in rubber and other resources brought European traders to Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century and led to

Table 4.3 Democracy and Islam in Southeast Asia: Muslim population, GDP and Freedom House ratings, 1980–2012 for eleven countries in Southeast Asia

Country	*% Muslim*	*GDP*	*Freedom House scores*		
			1980–82	*2000–02*	*2010–12*
Brunei	75	32,000	N/A	11.7	11
Myanmar (Burma)	4	1,027	13	14	13.7
Cambodia	2	880	14	11.7	11
Indonesia	87	3,420	10	7	5
Laos	2	1,620	14	13	13
Malaysia	64	9,800	7	10	8
Papua New Guinea	2	1,790	4	5	7
Philippines	6	2,740	9.7	5	6.7
Singapore	14	47,210	9.7	9.7	8.7
Thailand	6	5,210	7.3	5	8.7
Timor-Leste	0	3,670	–	7.3	7

Sources: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population* (Washington, DC: Pew Forum, 2009), 30–31; GDP figures are for 2012 or the nearest available year and have been extracted from the table *GDP per capita (current US$)*, accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. Freedom House ratings are available in a variety of formats from its website www.freedomhouse.org.

extensive colonization by the Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish. Apart from the Philippines, East Timor and a few scattered areas around the region, Christian missionaries were not particularly successful in Southeast Asia. Until various evangelical sects began penetrating the area in the late twentieth century, many of the Christians in the region brought their faith from China. Indonesia rather quickly became the center of Islam in the region, with its community spreading from there into the adjacent coastal regions of the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. Although Portugal's colonial empire in the region was relatively short-lived, its aggressive policies toward Islamic traders pushed them into what Means calls "enclaves of Islamic militancy" that persist to this day. "In these enclaves, Islam became an ideology of resistance to subjugation by colonial authorities, and in the postcolonial era, traditions of political militancy were revived in defense of autonomy, independence, and Islamic orthodoxy."[99]

The core countries of mainland Southeast Asia—Myanmar (formerly Burma), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam—are neither democratic nor Muslim. A long history of internationally inflamed civil wars, however, has deeply affected all of these countries with the exception of Thailand (which has, not coincidentally, the best record of democracy in the area). Whatever the roots of these conflicts—and theories abound—religion in general, Islam in particular, does not make the cut.

As can be seen in Table 4.3, the only Muslim-majority countries in this region are Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. We can dismiss Brunei, which is an essentially Middle Eastern-style rentier state, fabulously rich in oil and gas resources, carved out of Malaysia by its British-backed Sultan. Free education and healthcare, guaranteed pensions and thousands of well-paying government jobs have combined to mute criticism of the royal family's lavish lifestyle. It has ruled under emergency powers for three decades, with Islam as the official religion and all others proscribed. A generally moderate sharia law applies to domestic issues and some crimes, though British common law is used for most commercial activity. The use of Islam as a unifying ideology can be, as Talib puts it, "a double-edged sword. It invites discussion and debate on the extent to which Islam has been incorporated into politics and may, in future, be used to question the legitimacy of a monarchical system of government in Brunei."[100] That debate, however, has yet to take place.

The Muslim minorities in Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines have been virtually at war with the central governments for decades if not longer. In each case, the conflict is both ethnic and religious, with the proportions attributed to each very much in dispute. Until international terrorism became an important focus of political and scholarly concern, these conflicts were viewed almost exclusively from local and ethnic perspectives. Recent conflicts in south Thailand, for example, once described as pitting ethnic Malays against Thais are now routinely referred to as religious conflicts between Muslims and Buddhists.[101] In the Philippines, the Moro insurgency can be traced back to the colonial period. Divided and partially satisfied by central

government grants of regional autonomy, its remaining loyalists are clearly connected with fellow Islamic insurgents and terrorists in Indonesia and around the world. Important ethnic, regional and political differences continue to be the driving force behind these insurgencies, but there is little doubt that the conflicts have become increasingly loaded with religious symbolism and content.[102] The problem of finding solutions to these conflicts is compounded, moreover, by the proximity of other sympathetic actors in the region. The major areas of dissidence in the Philippines are found in the chain of southern islands that blend almost imperceptibly into Muslim Indonesia; Thailand's rebels are located almost entirely in areas bordering on Malaysia. Porous borders in both cases facilitate separatist activities and compound the problems of peacekeeping.[103]

Throughout Southeast Asia, the process of decolonization was colored not just by ethnic diversity but by the legacy of Japanese occupation during World War II and the looming presence of China and its revolution. Communism was a very powerful force throughout the region serving, in many cases, to reinforce (or be reinforced by) ethnic and regional splits. In its early years, for example, the Huk rebellion in the Philippines was generally described as a communist rather than a religious or regional rebellion. In contrast with the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in Indonesia, the British recognized the formal end of the colonial era, and perceived the process in the Malay Peninsula as something of a continuation of the liberation of India. Their desire to install a quasi-independent but strong anti-communist government in their soon-to-be-independent Southeast Asian colonies led them to create a sprawling Federation of Malaya providing a "crucial link in an extensive British strategic and military presence stretching from Aden to New Zealand."[104] Brunei was the first to opt out of this grand design, quickly followed by Singapore, leaving the new federation without its two wealthiest components. Even with these subtractions, Malaysia remains a sprawling, highly diverse country that has been surprisingly successful in keeping its ethnic and religious groups from each other's throats and in achieving a level of economic development hitherto unsurpassed in the region.

Almost from its inception, Malaysia has been essentially a one-party, quasi-democratic state which displays most of the trappings and little of the substance of democracy. The ruling party coalition strongly resembles an old-fashioned urban US political machine. Like the precinct captains who were the foot soldiers of machine politics, Malaysia's "head of ten" and "adopted child" party members work effectively at the grassroots to bring out the faithful on election and act as the party's eyes and ears during the rest of the year.[105] The party's base is in the poorer, more rural ethnic Malay areas where this formidable organization delivers the vote. Patronage and pork barrel politics are the norm, often tinged with corruption. Manipulation of the electoral system through discriminatory voting rules and the drawing of district lines combined with questionable voting practices are commonplace. Yet the opposition, though sometimes harassed and its message censored,

continues to function and even win an occasional election. A third party, originally backed largely by ethnic and religious minorities, has also become increasingly viable and further opened the system. But as long as the ruling party remains united, its tenure in office is likely secure, and "without true institutional reform, Malaysians must always fear that while repression and coercion may abate in the short term, they lie perennially ready to hand as the last arguments of threatened power holders intent on saving an authoritarian status quo."[106]

That the dominant Barisan Nasional (BN—National Front) has continued to give the opposition space and even tolerated limited reforms is due in no small part to the country's long-vibrant civil society. While "visible, coherent associations" are not particularly numerous, Weiss suggests that in Malaysia "networks of public intellectuals or floating activists, trade unions, student groups, and even perennially out-of-power opposition political parties, which tend between elections to function more like NGOs than like parties" play the same role.[107] Many of Malaysia's civil organizations, even those of a largely religious nature, she also suggests, differ from those in many other parts of the world in seeking consensus rather than confrontation, and in blurring the lines between direct action and advocacy.[108] In rural areas in particular, the networks of the BN party machine often blend almost imperceptibly with those of many NGOs.

The presence of a supposedly more pious opposition party, at the same time, has pushed the ruling majority to play the religious card with increasing frequency. Although it remains true that "of all nationally organized and administered Islamic beliefs and practices in the Islamic world, Malaysian Islam is perhaps the most monolithic and most state-regulated,"[109] a growing Islamist movement is pushing the envelope and—if only to preempt the opposition—the ruling elite has pushed through a series of laws extending the reach of sharia law and punishing deviant sects. In a process that Liow calls "piety trumping," "Islamic credentials have assumed greater importance for politicians and Muslim attitudes and perspectives have in general become discernibly more conservative."[110]

Conclusion

Despite theoretical schemas and worldwide comparative studies that suggest a disconnection between Islam and democracy, when it comes to country-by-country comparisons within regions, the religious variable more or less washes out. In southern Africa, independence created weak states that were economically underdeveloped and generally lacking either an experienced governing class or a developed civil society. Statistically, the Muslim-majority countries lag slightly behind the others, even when controlling for underdevelopment; however, the narratives of individual cases generally point to factors other than religion that better explain the democracy deficit. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, it is non-Islamist countries such as Cambodia,

Laos and Viet Nam that statistically lag behind those with Muslim majorities. To attribute the problems of Viet Nam and its neighbors to Buddhism rather than to colonialism, war and international politics, however, makes no sense. And comparable countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe similarly show few differences that can be attributed to religion.

What cannot be ignored is the MENA where, despite the recent developments of the Arab Spring, authoritarianism remains the norm. Its more militant form of Islam, emanating particularly from Saudi Arabia and reinforced by anti-Western attitudes, moreover, is spreading in influence throughout most of the countries we have looked at in this chapter, often as an anti-democratic or at least destabilizing force. This, as we will discover in more detail when we look at Indonesia and Turkey in Chapters 5 and 6, is the most important problem facing many of these countries today. It is not that some kind of massive upheaval will topple the nascent democracies we have examined, or that an elected Islamist regime will use its victory to rescind democracy in favor of some kind of new caliphate, but rather that there will be—in the name of religion—a gradual wearing down of the egalitarian values and basic liberties on which democracy rests.

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5 Pathways to democratization

Turkey

Although they are among the most democratic countries in the Islamic world, neither Indonesia nor Turkey is a fully consolidated democracy. Indonesia's transition in 1999 from authoritarianism remains a work in progress, but its remarkable turnaround—one of the most dramatic in recent history—has made it the target of an extraordinary increase in academic interest in a country once largely ignored by political scientists and journalists. The many recent books on Indonesian democracy can be described as viewing the glass as half empty, half full or too opaque to describe.[1] In the more studied case of Turkey there are similar questions of interpretation, albeit over a far longer time span and with a more volatile political scene.Its Freedom House ratings have ranged from a score of 5 (considered "free) from 1974 through 1979, to 10 ("not free") in in 1980-81 and 1993-94, to fairly consistent "partly free" scores of 6 and 7 in the last decade.

Modern Turkey is the phoenix that arose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Geographically connecting Europe and the Middle East, it is culturally and politically part of both. It is tempting in this context to see Turkish politics as evocative of a continuing conflict between modernist (European) forces and the traditional (Middle Eastern) culture of Islam. The central figure in defining the terms of this struggle is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose portrait hangs in most public offices and many a private home throughout the country. The Kemalist Revolution of the 1920s used the government to impose a secularist vision of a modern state on a largely traditional society. Early scholars of Turkish politics, many of them steeped in 1960s concepts of modernization theory, tended to view Kemalism as an important step in "an upward march from Islamic empire to secular republic."[2] Subsequent events and evolving academic paradigms have replaced this formula with one based on a more "complex and multifaceted relationship between Islam and the state" that recognizes both the Islamic foundation of the Turkish state and the nationalistic roots of Turkish Islamism in the partially modernized core of the Ottoman Empire.[3] If politics in Turkey is not simply about religion, however, these tensions are always near the surface. In 2013, for example, a small group of environmentalists occupied a park adjoining İstanbul's Taksim Square to protest plans to replace the park with a shopping mall and luxury apartments.[4] When the police forcefully dislodged the demonstrators, the

protests grew. The demonstrations and Prime Minister Erdoğan's heavy-handed response were, first and foremost, about a park and the government's economic development policies. The dispute grew with incredible rapidity into a more general protest against the government's semi-authoritarian policies regarding dissent, and eventually, after both sides raised the stakes, into issues concerning religion and nationalism. "Taksim," interestingly, is a Turkish word for "divided" from the days when the square was at the point from which reservoir waters were divided among sectors of the city. In the same manner as water systems, however, Turkey's political divisions flow in many directions. The lesson of the 2013 conflict is not that sharp divisions between secularists and Islamists persist, but that today's political realities are too complex to fit such easily marked channels. The objectives of the 2013 demonstrators were too inchoate to be deemed successful, but the protesters' ability to face down the government was unprecedented. In the words of Orhan Pamuk, winner of the 2006 Nobel Prize in Literature:

> The Taksim events were a good way of saying to Erdoğan, or to any future leader of Turkey, or to anybody in this part of the world, that once a country gets too rich and complex, the leader may think himself to be too powerful. But individuals also feel powerful. And they just go out in parks and say no. They may not have a political program and a party, but they go out and say an impressive no.[5]

Just what the protesters are saying "no" to is not at all clear. The direction of Turkish politics is highly contested, both within Turkey and among scholars, journalists and members of the EU's committees considering the country's application for membership. The twists and turns of the past four years have been, well, byzantine, with real, alleged and imagined conspiracies presented almost every day. While most observers agree that in bringing the army under civilian control, meeting a number of EU conditions for political liberalization and playing fairly by the rules of electoral politics, President Erdoğan and his Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS—Prosperous Justice Party) have advanced the cause of democracy. However, the years since the party's first stunning electoral victory in 2002 have seen a troubling consolidation of central power and assaults on civil liberties. As prime minister and (since 2014) president, Erdoğan's increasingly blunt espousals of very conservative Muslim social values—particularly those regarding gender—have also sharpened concerns, both at home and abroad, that his government is tilting away from the EU and toward the Islamic states of the Middle East.

The emergence of modern Turkey

Atatürk's overthrow of the crippled remains of the Ottoman Empire, defeated and decimated in the wake of World War I, was essentially a revolution from above. Frustrated in defeat, a small military-bureaucratic elite, clearly looking

to European models, used the levers of state power to secularize, modernize, but not necessarily democratize, a largely traditional society. "No nation was ever founded with greater revolutionary zeal than the Turkish Republic," as one journalist has argued, "nor has any undergone more sweeping change in so short a time."[6] From cosmetic to cultural, symbolic to systemic, the Kemalist reforms were indeed substantial and extended from education and religion to dress codes and language.

The Ottoman modernization efforts had left the religious institutions of the state largely untouched. Although the caliphate had become chiefly ceremonial, one of Atatürk's first steps was to abolish it entirely, in part *because* of its ceremonial significance, more pragmatically from concern that its continued presence would serve as a point of entry into Turkish society for Muslims throughout the world. More substantively, sharia courts were abolished in 1924 and Islamic law was subsequently replaced with variations on the Swiss, Italian and German civil, criminal and commercial codes. A new education law replaced traditional Islamic education with a system of free public schools, and the traditionally independent ulama were brought under a central Directorate of Religious Affairs that paid their salaries and wrote their sermons. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1925 along with the Gregorian calendar, and laws were passed abolishing the veil and traditional forms of hairstyles and hats. Finally, Turkey was officially made a secular state. Atatürk's goal was not to abolish religion, as in the Soviet Union, but to develop a secular state in control of a "Turkified" Islam. The state insisted, for example, that all religious affairs, from Friday sermons to the daily calls to prayer and readings from the Koran, should be conducted in Turkish rather than Arabic. Although there was some resistance from the more traditional ulama, these reforms were not unpopular, and Atatürk's personal popularity helped to carry them through. Many of the reforms challenging Islamic and other traditions were more about equality than secularism. The so-called Hat Law that prohibited the fez, sometimes cited as a symbolic gesture toward Europeanization, was in fact an attack on "the conventions of the Ottoman empire according to which headgear was worn to identify one's station: one's religion, profession, and social status."[7] The fez, as Kemal himself put it, "sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilization."[8] The prohibition on veiling women was similarly less about Islamic traditions than a vigorous assertion—if largely symbolic—of gender equality as a precondition of modernity. Such reforms were divisive, but among certain sectors of the middle and upper classes, particularly in urban areas, they were enormously popular and Europeanization became the norm. It became prestigious to wear European clothes, drink European whisky and eat European food.[9] But traditions die hard, and while it is easy to exaggerate the extent of the developing rift, in broad outline, the gap between a more secular, urban society centered in İstanbul, and a traditional, religious, rural periphery, nevertheless grew.

Although the ulama had been brought under formal government management (as they largely had been during the Ottoman era), many remained

important local leaders. But the real core of Islamic influence—particularly outside of İstanbul—was a complex network of Islamic brotherhoods whose close ties with various commercial and professional groups, artisans and merchants made them a powerful force, particularly in the countryside.[10] As quickly as the new Turkish state was able to establish authority over the formal institutions of Islam, these networks were never really brought under state control. Not all of them opposed the reforms, and indeed many of them had been active in supporting the Kemalist overthrow of the Ottomans. Others, such as the Alevis—spiritual Shi'ites who make up as much as a quarter of Turkey's population—welcomed the reforms which marked an end to Sunni domination and harassment, backed by government favoritism. Generally, however, the further the reforms seemed to weaken Islam, the more opposition grew, leading to at least two significant rebellions. The first, led by the Kurdish sheik Şeyh Said in 1925, resulted in a short but violent armed conflict, and a second, less extensive, attracted widespread attention following the brutal assassination of a Kemalist army officer. Although both were quickly suppressed the regime used their example to pass laws banning the brotherhoods, thus effectively driving them underground.

If the brunt of the opposition to reform came from religious leaders, it is important not to exaggerate either its nature or extent. The introduction of the Roman alphabet, for example, had little practical effect on almost 90 percent of the population which was illiterate in any language, or on the elite 11 percent, most of whom who were fluent in at least one European language (usually French).[11] Most importantly, the relatively firm hand of the Kemalists was welcome in a country that was emerging from a series of disastrous wars culminating in the humiliating Treaty of Lausanne that devastated the economy, dissolved the empire and forced major portions of the Muslim population of Greece and the Orthodox population of Turkey to emigrate and settle in often hostile lands.

Kemalist rule

Despite the astounding scope and pace of the reforms, they did not express a clear social or political philosophy. Most observers agree that Atatürk himself intended to follow his agenda of social reform with a political restructuring that would lead to multi-party parliamentary democracy; but for a variety of reasons, those aspects of reform were slow in coming. Following World War I, under the control of the occupying Allied armies, a Grand National Assembly—based on the Ottoman model but combining executive and legislative powers—enacted a new constitution for the new state. Although it handed effective power to the Assembly, the 1921 Constitution did not officially abolish the sultanate, a step not achieved until after final settlement of the war with Greece in 1922 when the Kemalist-dominated Assembly overrode the objections of a poorly organized minority faction and promptly elected Atatürk to the presidency. A new constitution was drawn up in 1924.

Lacking meaningful checks and balances, the new constitution was "democratic" in only a crude sense, particularly given the hegemonic role of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP—Republican People's Party). As the leading scholars of Turkish constitutionalism note, its "simplistic" nature was manifest in:

> its creation of an all-powerful Assembly; its somewhat emotional distrust of the executive; its insufficient safeguards for the independence of the judiciary; and failure to institute formal restraints on the legislative power, notably the lack of a judicial mechanism for reviewing the constitutionality of laws. Although the Constitution declared and enumerated the basic rights of Turkish citizens, it often stated that such rights would be enjoyed only "within the limits stipulated by law." Hence, the Assembly was constitutionally empowered to restrict basic rights, almost at will.[12]

In 1924, with Atatürk's assent, thirty-four deputies banded together to form an opposition party, the Progressive Republicans, which was generally considered to be slightly to the right of the CHP. Although the new party supported reform and secularism, it tended to attract the support of more traditional groups. Thus it was putatively implicated in the 1925 Şeyh Sait revolt and quickly outlawed before it could ever contest a national election.

The 1925 Law for the Maintenance of Order was a watershed in the evolution of the first republic. Although not directly targeted at the Progressive Republicans, it clearly tightened regime control and provided new tools with which to attack its perceived enemies. A failed attempt to assassinate Kemal intensified the effort: newspapers were shut down, dissidents arrested and many civic associations (including the new party) banned. A 1936 Law on Organizations extended the ban to strikes, collective bargaining and unions. Although many of these repressive measures were couched in the language of modernization, their impact on civil liberties was devastating. Again a one-party state:

> the Kemalists saw the RPP [CHP] primarily as a mechanism for social control from above. Vested with enormous power in the hands of the party leader, it was an instrument of both social control and the implementation of the decisions of the leadership. Now the Kemalist leadership and the close union of party, army and state administration formed a hegemonic bloc that looked upon the state as their personal domain. ... Thus, the authoritarianism of the Ottoman state became an essential element of the political culture of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, the RPP set the example for the Turkish party system, with its extreme party loyalty and partisan style of politics.[13]

There was another brief attempt to create a rival party in 1930, but after performing well in municipal elections—particularly in the provinces—it too

was disbanded under pressure from the CHP. More significant was the tightening of party discipline within the dominant party. From its origins among soldiers and bureaucrats in the dark days of the aftermath of World War I, the CHP had always been a "cadre" rather than a "mass" party, that is, a party in which control radiated out from a small center of leaders rather than from the grassroots up. In the Turkish case, the elitist nature of the party was reinforced by an increasing integration of government agencies into its orbit. Party leaders increasingly doubled as provincial governors, high-ranking military officers and bureaucrats, down to local municipal officials. This "party-state monolith," as Findley calls it:

> was not exempt from favoritism, abuses of patronage, and financial corruption, abuses criticized by writers of the period. Even joining the party, easy at first, became harder. At the lowest levels of the hierarchy, the membership reflected the social makeup of the locality. At the higher levels, the membership was dominated by members of the wings of the bourgeoisie, both propertied (local notables and merchants) and bureaucratic-intellectual (officials, teachers, physicians, lawyers).[14]

Following Atatürk's untimely death in 1938, central control tightened. The legislature became a rubber stamp for decisions made in the closed sessions of the party caucus, newspapers were closed down if they questioned government policies too closely, and the few remaining civic associations were either banned or replaced with government-run groups.

Atatürk's successor, İsmet İnönü, did not aspire to be a dictator; however, his expressed desire to open up the system was increasingly overwhelmed by tensions arising from the gathering storms of World War II. Courted by both the Allies and the Axis, İnönü's primary goal was to keep Turkey out of the war. Threatened by an Italian invasion via Greece, a possible German invasion via the Balkans, or even a Russian move on the Bosporus, the Turks had to play a delicate diplomatic game of balancing one side against the other, while still rebuilding their decimated army. Within the government there was a strong consensus that:

> the expression of dissent would encourage enemies within and outside to take advantage of any sign of division or weakness. Remembering the Ottoman period, and World War I, İnönü was determined to restrict outside interference in Turkey's domestic affairs, and believed that the only way to do it was be strong and united. ... Only after the Germans went on the defensive after 1942 did the government begin to show tolerance for expression of alternative viewpoints, and that tolerance remained quite narrow.[15]

Although Turkey survived the war intact and militarily unscathed, its loss of European markets and shift to a wartime budget left its finances in a shambles.

The CHP's wartime emergency measures managed to alienate almost every sector of Turkish society; but as the possibility of invasion receded and the government began gradually to ease restrictions on dissent, small cracks began to appear among the party's members. Talking about a "new period of effort," İnönü suggested in 1945 that, as "the need for cautious measures disappear, democratic principles will prevail in wider measure in the political and cultural life of the country."[16] True to his word, he ordered the government to go ahead with elections in 1946, and to allow an opposition to organize. Given little time to prepare and overwhelmed by the ruling party's resources, the Demokrat Parti (DP—Democratic Party) led by one of Atatürk's former prime ministers—won just 66 out of 465 seats in the Assembly.[17] One-party rule by the CHP prevailed for the "four-year period after the 1946 elections, if not by popular vote, by Byzantine design and rigging the elections, which constituted another flaw of the democratic transition process in the 1940s. The 1946 elections poisoned the relationships between the [ruling party] and the [opposition] for many years to come."[18] But despite calls from his cabinet to crack down, instead İnönü urged reforms to guarantee fair elections, leading in 1950 to an overwhelming DP victory. A new era had seemingly begun.

One step forward, two steps back

Both Atatürk and İnönü were nationalists first and foremost, who were determined to build a cohesive, modern state whether democratic or not. Their legacies are complex and controversial. Their inspiration, as Findley puts it, "was authoritarian, corporatist, and defensive of state power."[19] But as Findley and most other students of the period acknowledge, democracy was not high on the agenda in world politics during this period. Compared with the dictatorships that came into power in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Spain, and Stalinist Russia, Turkey's centralized polity was light on authoritarianism. In a sense, the time line of Turkey's post-Ottoman development mirrors the classic formula of early modernization theory: a period of centralized authoritarian rule—preferably under a charismatic leader capable of forging national unity—followed by the consolidation of these reforms in a strong economy, effective institutions of governance and the development of a solid infrastructure capable of supporting a sophisticated economic system. With this foundation in place, the country should theoretically have been ready to begin developing a civic society and democratic institutions such as a free press, an impartial bureaucracy, apolitical army and an independent judiciary. But although the 1950 elections were in a broad sense fair and free, Turkish democracy remained a work in progress. The DP, to be sure, was allowed to campaign freely, opposition newspapers were able to cover the campaign, and the votes seem to have been accurately counted; but two left-wing parties were banned on the grounds that they might be pro-Soviet, trade unions were strictly controlled and martial law continued to be enforced in

many parts of the country. The DP, moreover, having campaigned on a platform that stressed liberalization and democracy, showed another face once in power and, as Banu Eligür says it:

> increasingly became a source of authoritarianism, with its resort to repressive measures against the opposition such as tightening the press law, jailing scores of journalists, using the state radio in a one-sided manner, banning political meetings and demonstrations except during election campaigns, barring judicial review of acts forcing civil servants to take early retirement, and changing the rules of procedure of the parliament so as to stifle opposition criticism. Having secured the majority of the votes in a series of general elections, the party concluded that it had received a mandate from the public, and hence had the right to monopolize and use for its own purposes all the institutions of the state.[20]

In a sense, the Democrats were simply emulating their predecessors in using every available lever of state power to assure continued success at the polls. The institutions they inherited were highly conducive to the maintenance of what has recently been called "electoral authoritarianism" or "semi-authoritarianism."[21] The head of the ruling party, if not the prime minister, picked both the cabinet and the president who became largely figureheads. Facing opposition from the bureaucracy, still staffed by CHP loyalists, and a hostile military, the Democrats passed laws that limited the tenure of civil servants, university professors and local officials. Although it did not abandon secularization, it sought to secure its Muslim vote (whose support was based less on positive feelings about the Democrats than opposition to the CHP). It abolished a network of local cultural centers and libraries under the Ministry of Education in favor of a major expansion of the Department of Religious Affairs and the building of hundreds of new mosques and religious schools. From its position of neutrality during World War II, Turkey began soon afterward to lean increasingly toward the West as the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified. The Democrats accelerated this trend, formally joining NATO in 1952 and receiving in return a substantial uptick in direct financial aid. With Western backing, the regime was also able to use the specter of communism as a tool both for cementing ties with traditionalist Muslims and traducing their political enemies. But while these tactics may have produced some short-run victories, they also increasingly alienated the party's Kemalist base. A crude attempt by the party leader, Adnan Menderes, to link his opponents to the Greek side in the ongoing struggle over Cyprus backfired, causing destructive rioting, the imposition of martial law and—as a direct result—the resignations of many DP deputies. Those who stayed with what Findley calls the party's "increasingly dictatorial and paranoiac leader" pushed a series of repressive laws that won the Democrats a narrow, disputed victory in the 1957 elections, but both the economy and the political standing of the DP continued to decline.[22] In 1960

when the Menderes government barred most CHP deputies—including former President Inönü—from the parliament there were riots in the streets and the army intervened.

The military intervenes

The 1960 coup, which was to be the first of three in Turkey's modern history, was unusual insofar as it was neither organized nor led by senior military officials. Although it is sometimes depicted as round one in a continuing grand conflict between a secularist military and an overreaching Islamic government, the actual narrative is more complex. By 1960 the old guard Kemalists in the military had mostly retired or been forced out by the Democrats. A growing number of the younger officers, moreover, had been trained to NATO standards, largely in the United States, and it was these newer officers, not the senior staff, who executed the coup. But beyond a shared opinion that the Menderes government had to go, there was little discipline or unity in the group whose act violated not only the constitution but the armed forces' own hierarchical code. "Not only had there been no forward planning, but the members of the junta had widely different views of what to do next."[23] Nordlinger characterizes the 1960 coup as a "guardian" action, designed not to put the military in a position of long-range power, nor to veto particular policies but rather to put the civilian government back on track.[24] And this is what they eventually did, first adopting a new constitution and holding elections before withdrawing to their barracks.

In creating what is known as the Second Republic, the 1961 Constitution had two primary objectives: generally to check the ability of a single party to completely dominate the system, and—more specifically—to protect the independence of the armed forces from such a regime. Introducing more checks and balances into the system, the new constitution created a two-house legislature, established a constitutional court and provided a relatively liberalized system for the independence of voluntary associations. Perhaps the most important change, from a political perspective, was the introduction of proportional representation in the electoral system that made it significantly more difficult for a single party to dominate the legislature.[25] The old DP had been abolished, but its supporters still formed a plurality of voters in the electorate and through the newly created Adalet Partisi (AP—Justice Party) won the largest number of votes in the National Assembly. It was, however, short of a clear majority and was forced to negotiate the formation of a coalition with its long-standing rival, the CHP, under the renewed leadership of İnönü.

The AP's victory in the 1965 elections gave it an absolute majority in the Assembly, marking the only period in the history of the Second Republic in which a single party was able to rule. The party and its leader, Süleyman Demeril, ducked in and out of a kaleidoscope series of changing coalitions that alternated in power until the military again intervened in 1971.

Ideological parties of both the left and right grew in strength as did a number of extra-parliamentary movements, some of them violent, working outside the system. Escalating clashes between right and left, Turks and Kurds, Sunni Muslims against Alevis, were exacerbated by the fluid politics of coalition government. The thousands of patronage jobs available to each new coalition of parties in the cabinet meant that what was at stake "was not just ideology, but work on roads, waterways, forestry, and even postings to the police."[26] With the economy declining and a new crisis brewing over Greek-Turkish claims on the island of Cyprus, "Turkey was becoming ungovernable."[27] A second military coup appeared imminent, yet the armed forces were themselves seriously divided. Rumors of a left-wing coup led by a group of junior officers united the generals and moved them to force the Demirel government to resign. Not coincidentally, five generals, one admiral and thirty-five colonels were relieved of their positions.[28] A caretaker cabinet of technicians was installed.

Because the military never actually took over the government, the 1971 coup is sometimes referred to as a coup by memorandum. It soon became clear, however, that this was not a "guardian" action designed simply to put the existing government back on track, but one with the more ambitious goal of changing the basic distribution of power. At first the junta worked with a cabinet drawn from the elected government to trim certain constitutional rights and provide "order" in an increasingly unstable environment. As public unrest grew and the violence persisted, however, a far more militant military agenda emerged. A new cabinet was put in place and the military purged itself of its left-leaning officers. "Many academics, intellectuals, journalists, student leaders, trade unionists with leftist reputations were arrested, some were tortured, and most were imprisoned by the military authorities"; and the constitution was amended to undo the liberalizing reforms of 1960.

The 1971 coup scrambled the historic alliances between political, bureaucratic and military elites that had formed the backbone of Kemalist power. In purging its leftist officers, the armed forces found strong allies among more conservative, strongly anti-communist Islamists, but "the coherence of the old Center, which had been built around the coalition of the public bureaucracy, universities and secularist intellectuals, and the military started to show signs of breaking apart."[29] The impact on the CHP was particularly profound. A conservative faction had already left the party in the wake of its 1967 convention, but the military takeover divided the party still further, resulting, at the 1972 convention, in the resignation of İsmet İnönü after thirty-three years as party chairman. The more conservative CHP was able to win a plurality of seats in both the 1973 and 1977 elections but it was never again to be the country's majority party.

Following 1973, when civil government was fully restored, the fractured parties found it difficult to form stable governments or maintain order. Unlike the left–right conflicts of the Cold War, the violence of the 1970s involved religious conflicts between Sunnis and Alevis, linguistic and cultural conflicts

involving Kurds and Turkish nationalists, and even clashes between tribal groups. The legislature reflected this social fragmentation with a dozen different coalitions shuffling in and out of Ankara. Whatever ideologies might have guided the parties in their origins, opportunism and patronage ruled the roost. When the president's term expired in 1979 the parliament took over 100 ballots without being able to name a successor. A new military venture in Cyprus, instead of unifying the country, divided it further and antagonized the United States and Europe whose economic sanctions further destabilized an already weak economy.

The military coup of September 1980 was far more carefully planned and comprehensive than previous efforts, and was organized directly by the high command. Similarly to the first military takeover (in 1951) it is generally classified as a "guardian" coup, designed not to change particular policies but to put a flailing political system back on track. Indeed its blending of ultra-nationalism, anti-communism and moderate Islamism came to involve what one author describes as the most ambitious attempt at political engineering in the post-Kemal era.[30] The constitution that emerged was designed to strengthen the executive branch and in particular the role of the military in the National Security Council. As with many so-called semi-presidential systems, it provided a rather ambiguous blending of parliamentary government in which a separate executive (the president) had a significant, but vaguely defined, ability to intervene. "It is generally argued," as Özbudun and Gençkaya put it, "that the basic philosophy of the 1982 Constitution was to protect the state and its authority against its citizens rather than protecting individuals against the encroachments of the state authority."[31] In essence, it created a one-house parliamentary government in which the prime minister and his or her cabinet would normally govern; but in which the president—elected by the assembly for a seven-year term—could select the prime minister, appoint members of the Constitutional Court and other high officials, rule by decree in emergencies, appoint the military chief of staff and chair the National Security Council.

In order to curb the fragmentation of the party system that had made the second republic virtually ungovernable, the electoral law required a party to receive at least 10 percent of the vote in order to be represented in the General Assembly. The old parties were abolished and many of their leaders banned. In the first post-coup election, only three parties were allowed to compete with the only non-military party—Turgut Özal's Motherland Party—and winning a substantial plurality. Whether Özal, who served as prime minister from 1983 to 1989, and as president until 1993, "reoriented Turkish politics more significantly than anyone since Atatürk,"[32] his leadership did smooth the transition back toward democracy. Combining supporters of the older center and rightist parties, without alienating the military, Özal very conspicuously made a Haj pilgrimage to Mecca early in his term. His government repealed the law banning the use of the Kurdish language, increased state support for Islamic schools, repealed some of the military's

restrictions on civil liberties, and applied for membership of the European Economic Community. Despite these achievements, his government's support dissipated in the face of continuing economic problems and an increasingly restive Kurdish insurgency. By the time of his death in 1993, the Motherland Party had disintegrated into warring factions and it had again become difficult to form a governing coalition.

Perhaps the most significant political development of this period was the rise of the Islamist Prosperity Party (Refah). Although its roots could be traced to an earlier Islamist Party that was banned by the military in 1991, Refah became the first openly religious party to make a major electoral showing in municipal elections, and it subsequently outperformed all the other parties in the 1995 elections to the National Assembly, winning 28.7 percent of the seats. The attempts of the two secular parties to form a coalition government dragged out for months, until one agreed to a power-sharing arrangement with Refah that was based, not so much on policy, as on an agreement on the part of the Islamist leaders not to investigate corruption charges against its new coalition partner. Satisfied with seats in the cabinet and a slice of the patronage pie, Refah's coalition partner gave the newcomers a lot of rope—which they quickly used to hang themselves. Prime Minister Erbakan's disastrous visit to Libya,[33] heavy-handed patronage appointments favoring Islamists, ties with some rather shady underground militant groups and so on, combined with a series of other largely symbolic attempts to burnish its Islamic credentials, led to what is sometimes called the "fourth coup" in which, prodded by the army, the Constitutional Court shut down the party. Its leader resigned and a series of new coalitions were formed in which, as Findley puts it, "the governments represented the military more than the electorate."[34]

In comparison with the formal coups of 1951, 1971 and 1980, the armed forces' intervention in 1997 was more subtle. The Erbakan government was allowed to remain in office provided that it complied with a list of eighteen demands including the closure of religious schools and foundations operated by religious brotherhoods; the extension of the required period of public, secular and co-educational schooling from five to eight years; and an end to policies favoring fundamentalists in public service jobs. The chief state prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to close down Erbakan's party, which it did later in the year after Erbakan had already resigned. Although badly crippled, Erbakan's followers formed a new party which was also dissolved, seriously dividing its remaining supporters and resulting in the creation of two parties: the short-lived Felicity Party and, more significantly, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP—Justice and Development Party, with *ak* meaning white or clean in Turkish) led by Recep Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül under the slogan "we have changed." While a series of weak coalition governments, strongly influenced by the National Security Council, bumped from one crisis to another, Erdoğan—now Mayor of İstanbul—was becoming a national figure. Although he had been imprisoned in 1998 for inciting religious

intolerance,[35] and was still banned from seeking national office in 2002, there was little doubt that Erdoğan was a major player in Turkish politics.

The Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

The turning point in modern Turkish politics was reached with the 2002 elections that left only two parties and a handful of independents in the legislature. The CHP, almost out of business a few years earlier, came back to win nearly a third of the seats (with just under 20 percent of the popular vote). Most surprisingly, the new AKP became the first party in decades to win an outright majority in the National Assembly. Its victory was no doubt a protest vote against the squabbling, corruption and indecisiveness of its predecessors; but the party had (and has) a number of positive attributes that have kept it in power since 2002. Indeed it has become the first party in modern Turkey to have won outright majorities in the National Assembly in three consecutive elections (2002, 2007 and 2011). After a constitutional amendment was passed allowing Erdoğan to become prime minister (despite his "criminal" record), Gül stepped out of that role and was elected president in 2007. In that election, the AKP not only became the first incumbent party to increase its parliamentary majority, but its popular vote actually increased by almost 15 percent. And its margins increased by still more in 2011.

In 2007, when the legislature met to elect a successor to the retiring president, secularist deputies boycotted the meeting leaving it short of a quorum. Although Turgut Özal's election in 1989 had occurred under similar circumstances, the Constitutional Court intervened in 2008 to rule Gül's election invalid. The AKP's response was to put a constitutional amendment on the ballot calling for direct election of the president. It passed, Gül won handily, and the court did not challenge. Despite its electoral successes, the party was and remains controversial. Findley, for example, cites its description of itself as a "conservative democratic party." In matters of religion and family values, he argues:

> the party is conservative; but it takes accommodative positions toward those who do not share its views. It combines this conservatism with emphases on socioeconomic justice, democracy, individual rights, and EU integration; on these points the AK party resembles European social democrats.[36]

Many others describe the party's democratic conservatism as "*takiyye* (a permitted behavior of disguise for the sake of promoting the cause of Islam)."[37] The AKP, they argue, is simply the latest iteration of previous attempts to evade the laws banning religious parties by disguising their true goals: "there would be no JDP," as one former Minister of State put it, "if Erbaken could have remained legally and politically active":[38]

> The JDP [AKP] presents itself as a moderate party. But the personal histories of its leaders and the policies it proposed and/or adopted in power both suggest the continuing strength of Islamism in the party. Moderation of the party is a response to the demonstrated willingness of the military to intervene and the increased weariness/watchfulness of a military leadership that has reaffirmed its commitment to secularism.[39]

The party's actual record in office can be mined to provide evidence for both of these positions. Its responsiveness to the economic needs of the poor has greatly helped to extend its base of support beyond religion. Direct subsidies, in the form of food packages, fuel, clothing and scholarships have been increased substantially, the healthcare system is being expanded and reformed, and thousands of units of new public housing have been constructed. Working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the party's economic policies produced stunningly high rates of economic growth that, until a falloff in 2014, averaged nearly 8 percent a year even as Europe and the United States were mired in recession. Per capita income almost doubled in just a decade. The Erdoğan government, moreover, moved more quickly than its predecessors to meet EU conditions for admission, including the abolishment of capital punishment and restructuring the role of the military in the government. Following EU guidelines, it also adopted a law, albeit limited in scope, for Kurdish-language broadcasting and education.[40] Less frequently noted than the party's embracing of the EU was its rejection of an Islamic Common Market because it would not, in Erdoğan's words, "base relations on ethnic and religious roots."[41]

As much as its record of public policies and economic progress has disarmed the AKP's critics, its repeated symbolic and tangible moves toward its Islamist foundations have both enraged and frustrated its secularist opponents. Banned by Atatürk for all public employees and in public institutions such as courtrooms and universities, the hijab, or headscarf, was routinely worn by many women during the course of their everyday lives. Enforcement of the ban—particularly in schools—was sporadic, as it was in the private sector where some companies allowed the hijab and others did not. Following the 1981 military coup, restrictions were tightened: university students and teachers and civil servants were essentially not permitted to cover their heads. A member of parliament, elected in 1999, was denied her seat when she attempted to take the oath of office while wearing a headscarf. The AKP government's first law allowing certain students and civil servants to cover their heads was vetoed by the incumbent president. Erdoğan's election campaign in 2007 contained a pledge to remove the ban in public institutions, and in 2008, with Gül now president, parliament passed a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to equal treatment by state institutions that was clearly directed at the hijab issue. Despite large public demonstrations against the move, the vote was overwhelmingly in favor with many other deputies joining the AKP in support of the amendment. When the Constitutional

Court ruled that the amendment was in violation of the essential spirit of the constitution, the hijab had become relatively commonplace at many universities and the court's ruling was widely ignored, especially where AKP supporters had been appointed as university administrators. Thus in 2010, when the Higher Education Board denied İstanbul University the power to ban headscarves, the protests were more muted and the court did not take up the case. Civilian nonjudicial employee dress codes, and bans on the wearing of headscarves in other colleges were eliminated two years later. In 2013 four AKP headscarf-wearing parliamentarians took their seats in parliament.

For the opposition, Erdoğan's incremental process of lifting the ban on the headscarf is emblematic of what they fear will happen in other areas—a sort of creeping Islamization. Having increased taxes on alcoholic beverages in its first two terms, a 2013 law banning their advertising and sale after certain hours and in certain locations has led to fears that total prohibition will follow. What makes the AKP's actions in these areas particularly frustrating to secularists is that they have frequently been packaged with widely accepted reforms—particularly those associated with EU requirements—or argued in terms less associated with religion than with civil liberties. The Muslim students demonstrating against the ban on the headscarf, for example, "did not resort to Koranic references or to requirements of a pious Muslim lifestyle in defense of their choice to wear the headscarf, but rather evoked liberal democratic values, namely freedom of conscience and individual rights."[42] The lifting of the ban on the headscarf for civil servants was packaged in a law that permitted the Kurdish language to be more widely used and allowed a number of cities to revert to the use of traditional Kurdish names. A package of 2004 bills designed to harmonize Turkish law with EU requirements gratuitously included strong penalties for adultery, that were quickly withdrawn following criticism from Brussels.

Despite its overwhelming victory in the 2011 election, the AKP did not win the 330 seats needed (it won 326) to put constitutional amendments to the ballot, much less the 367 to pass amendments on its own. A major reason for this was the Kurdish Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi's (Peace and Democracy Party) ability to surmount the 10 percent threshold and win 36 seats. Arguably the most active elected government in Turkey's history, with a significant record of reform including Right of Access to Public Records, Municipal Home Rule and the constitutional amendments required for EU membership, the AKP has become the dominant force in Turkish politics. There is more than a little irony in the fact that the quintessential "outsiders" in Turkish politics have now controlled the levers of power for more than a decade: in the traditional depiction of a divided Turkey, the "periphery" has become the "core." Whatever its future, it is clear that the AKP benefits enormously from the remarkable fragmentation of its political opposition. Indeed some of its appeal, even to many confirmed secularists, is that it can form a stable government, and it is virtually the first party in a generation to be able to make

that claim. But if this is one of the AKP's greatest strengths, it is also the source of some concerns.

At its inception, the AKP set out to become a "mass" rather than a "cadre" party, that is, a party based on a large membership and run more from the bottom up rather than from the top down. It retains a very large and "efficient network of party activists, militants and volunteers at the grassroots," with perhaps as many as four million members.[43] Yet its original promise of "transparency, participation and collective thinking," embodied in the party's internal rules, soon gave way to the same kind of highly centralized leadership that traditionally has prevailed in Turkish party politics. Every post in the party, from the national to provincial and local, is filled from the top down, and Erdoğan, as the party leader, has the right to dissolve local organizations that don't meet his standards.

There is little doubt that the AKP—not unlike many of its predecessors in power—has overreacted to perceived challenges. The war-like attacks on demonstrators and mass arrests at the 2013 Taksim Square demonstrations were out of all proportion to the issues raised, and served only to ramp up the conflict. In December 2011 sixty-five journalists were languishing in jail, apparently making Turkey the largest jailer of journalists in the world.[44] And the number subsequently increased in 2014 to include the editor of the country's leading newspaper. "In nearly every case, the actual 'offense' is that of having expressed a political opinion offensive to someone in power."[45] Some of these reporters, as well as a significant number of jailed academics and writers have indeed been legitimately convicted of actual conspiracies: even paranoids have real enemies. But the sheer number of prosecutions—more than 1,000 Turkish cases have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights—strongly suggests a political dimension.[46] The varying interpretations of the AKP's record in the worldwide dialogue between concerns about civil liberties on the one hand and counter-terrorism policies on the other are tied together in Turkey in the so-called Ergenekon case.

In June 2007 Turkish police discovered a cache of arms in a cheap suburban apartment connected to two retired generals. Their captured computers allegedly revealed the existence of a long-rumored underground movement seeking to destabilize the AKP government. As police followed the trail of evidence over the next three years, a patchwork collection of military officers, journalists, academics, known criminals and businesspeople were formally charged with being members of what became known as the Ergenekon conspiracy. Evidence regarding four separate coup plots, assassinations of major politicians and intellectuals, and conspiracies to launch terrorist attacks were leaked to the press. Further police raids uncovered arms caches, and supposedly secret military plans to undermine both the AKP and the popular Islamic Fethullah Gülen Movement. Charges were filed against yet more military officers including the Chief of the General Staff.

Picking up on this trail and some leads of their own, public prosecutors launched a second investigation into a putative military conspiracy—Operation

Sledgehammer—to overthrow the government in 2003. This inquiry added another 223 active and retired members of the military, including more than 10 percent of the country's serving generals and admirals, to the number of those already imprisoned or awaiting trial.[47] In 2013 236 of the 257 defendants in the Ergenekon case, including lawyers, journalists and academics as well as members of the military, were convicted. As bizarre as some of the charges brought in these cases were, they retained a gloss of authenticity in the context of the military's long and active history of hostility toward Islamic-oriented governments. There is no doubt that the then head of the military in 2005 had threatened a military coup if the AKP went ahead with its plans to install Abudullah Gül as president. And there was certainly ample precedent in the hard and soft coups of 1951, 1971, 1980 and 1997 for taking such threats seriously. There is a widespread belief in Turkey, moreover, that there is a "deep state" that originated in the Cold War and was centered in the military that covertly supports secularist forces against whatever elected government is nominally in power. At the same time, the extent of the supposed conspiracy, the sometimes bizarre details and above all the heavy-handedness of the prosecution has left many doubts. The international media have been particularly skeptical. "In its initial stages," said *Time* magazine, quoting a Turkish journalist, "it was a justified investigation. But as time went on, it changed shape. It became a politically motivated trial" which, the magazine went on to argue, questioned the very viability of the rule of law in Turkey.[48]

The prosecution's case was clumsy at best, and the special court established to pass judgment was less than scrupulous in applying due process. One important piece of "evidence," to use an example frequently cited by the defense, was a captured document supposedly produced as a Microsoft Word document in 2003 but written in a format that did not exist until 2007. As in a military court, moreover, many of the defendants were imprisoned for years as the case stretched out and were left uninformed about what the specific charges against them were. Here is a description, for example, of the case against a former AKP member of parliament who had resigned from the party in 2007 and who was arrested shortly thereafter following his criticism of the government:

> The evidence against Şirin was not merely thin; it was preposterous, as though it had been assembled by a group of schoolchildren—or by a prosecutor who never imagined that an independent observer would examine it. The central piece of evidence against Şirin was a fifteen-page transcript of wiretapped telephone conversations that Şirin had allegedly made to other Ergenekon members. Yet nothing in the transcript appeared remotely criminal in nature; many of the calls were to Şirin's girlfriend. And—here's the showstopper—all of the recorded calls were made after his arrest. When I asked a senior Turkish prosecutor about it for my story, he told me, "It's not one of the strongest cases."[49]

There was, at the same time, enough evidence of conspiracy to have shaken public confidence in the military. Whether through resignation or removal it has profoundly altered the higher echelons of the officer corps. And, perhaps most importantly, it has glaringly revealed a shift away from nearly a century of Turkish politics in which the military was virtually above challenge.

The changing role of the military

The great paradox of Turkish politics is that the military has been at once the key protector of democracy and the greatest barrier to its success. It was the military that created the modern state following the shambles of Turkey's World War I defeat. Despite, or perhaps because of the fact that the military has removed four elected governments in the past fifty-five years, it has consistently been evaluated in the polls as the country's most popular institution. Perhaps because it always returned to its barracks after replacing governments that were, in most cases, hopelessly deadlocked, incompetent or corrupt (and sometimes all of these things), it has never really been perceived as anti-democratic. At the same time, as Ilter Turan has noted, each of the military interventions "had its own agenda and produced its own policies. But uniformly they have effected changes that have enhanced both the autonomy of the military from politics and institutionalization of the military's input into politics."[50] Thus until very recently the military constituted an autonomous state-within-in-a-state that was not only free to set its own policies and budgets, but to make political statements on a wide variety of issues outside its jurisdiction but backed with the implicit threat of active intervention. While this implied threat was argued to have forced elected governments to remain dedicated to good government and true to republican principles, it was a dynamic that could not be sustained. "The trouble with this approach is that democracy can gain strength and legitimacy to the extent that it is perceived as producing solutions. If every crisis is treated as an occasion to call the military, if democracy is suspended, then there is little hope of a democracy gaining resilience."[51]

"Democratic consolidation," it is generally agreed, "requires a strategy by which military influence over nonmilitary issues and functions is gradually reduced and civilian oversight and control is eventually established over matters of broad military and national security policy."[52] That process did not begin in Turkey until the rules of engagement with the EU gave the government the leverage it needed to change the rules of civil–military relations. The Accession Partnership Documents and subsequent EU reports focused on four areas: (1) the composition and role of the National Security Council; (2) control over the military budget; (3) the respective roles of civilian and military courts; and (4) military representatives on various civilian boards.

Considerable progress has been made in all of these areas, particularly the first two: military courts are now limited to trying cases involving members of the military, and members of the military committing civilian crimes can now

be tried in civilian courts. And although the process is not complete, the number of military officers serving on government boards and committees that have nothing to do with issues of national security has been sharply reduced. In the more important areas of governance and budgeting, however, there has been more activity than reform. The National Security Council was created in 1960 and given an expanded role by the military junta that controlled the government after the 1980 coup. It was a key component of the Cold War-inspired "national security regime" that placed "state authority, national unity and secularism ... within a threat framework."[53] Armed with the sole authority to define threat situations:

> This "insecure security" ideology, whose continuing legitimacy depends on the perpetual existence of the threats it fights against, is a means for the state as embodied by the military and the civil-service elite to maintain its control over the fate of the regime and society.
>
> The national security regime relegates democratization to the status of a low-urgency issue at best.[54]

Thanks largely to continuing conflicts with Kurdish separatists (see below), this regime was able to keep the country on a national security footing long after the Cold War became a memory. Although Turkey's National Security Council had civilian members, including the prime minister and minister of defense, military leaders were in the majority and the Council had the power—without the need for cabinet or parliamentary approval—to set national security and foreign policy. The Council's National Security Policy Document, sometimes called Turkey's "secret constitution," defined "national security issues in such a way that it could be interpreted to cover any policy field."[55] Beginning in 2002, the Council has been changed to give it a civilian majority and make its role more advisory than determinative. However, the military's chief of staff continued to report directly to the prime minister, leading to the ironic situation at NATO and other international meetings where the minister of defense had to wait in the hall while the chief of staff attended ministerial meetings. Further reforms in 2005 essentially transferred control over some internal police powers from the military to the Ministry of the Interior, and transferred the power to set national security policy from the General Staff to an inner circle of the cabinet; but it did so without making the process more transparent. "The National Security Policy Document is now a purely 'political' document, that is, it reflects priorities more in line with the political priorities of the Government and the governing party. Concerns related to domestic politics have also gained higher importance. Other than that, the whole process is still closed to Parliament, civil society and the public."[56]

Despite the superficial reforms of the past decade, actual civilian control over military expenditures exists only in a limited sense. Roughly a quarter of the military's funds continue to come through four channels that are not part

of its formal budget. A separate Defense Industry Support Fund, to begin with—funded through exports, contributions from NATO, various Arab governments, profits on some of its operations and other sources—is not part of the military budget submitted to the government. The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is similarly independent, as is a pension fund, established "in 1961, mainly to support officers with low salaries [that] has become one Turkey's foremost holding companies," and is thought to be one of Turkey's three largest private employers.[57] Finally, a Scientific and Technological Research Council, reporting to the prime minister, operates off-budget and with little transparency both because "our knowledge of the amount of funding allocated for research in universities is limited," and because its projects "are exempt from audit by the Court of Accounts."[58] Even for that part of the military budget that is subject to civilian control, the figures presented are opaque and the members of the legislature with responsibility for oversight have neither the staff nor the experience to make it effective. What seems to have happened under Erdoğan is a largely secret but significant shift of oversight power from the legislature to the office of the prime minister. During his decade in power, moreover, normal and forced retirements from the officer corps has given the prime minister the ability to put a number of his own people in those positions.

Two of the Grand National Assembly's eighteen standing committees, the National Defense Committee and the Plan and Budget Committee, oversee the military. The Turkish Court of Accounts was briefly given the authority to audit military accounts, but that power was sharply limited in 2012. Similarly to the legislative investigating committees, moreover, the effectiveness of audits is limited by rigid security laws that make many aspects of military affairs state secrets.[59] Members of the Assembly are further handicapped in their supervisory role by the virtual absence of professional staff and their own inexperience. The parliament elected in 2007 was the first in recent history in which a majority of the delegates had served previously in the legislature.[60]

The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials have profoundly shaken the military's standing and influence, at least in the short run. Even Prime Minister Erdoğan, whose party had frequently clashed with the top brass, has expressed concerns that "these operations against the army are affecting morale. There are 400 serving and retired officers in jail. At this rate we will have no officers left to appoint to command positions."[61] In a hierarchical organization there are, of course, always replacements in the pipeline, but between voluntary resignations and these arrests, it is clear that the Turkish military has undergone a revolutionary transformation. Emboldened in part by its overwhelming electoral strength, the civilian authorities—from the government to the police and the courts—have shown an increasingly confident willingness to act on their own: "a fascinating display of Turkey's divided governance system in which cops working for the elected civilian *government* of the day are targeting that supreme institution of the permanent unelected

state, the army."[62] Even before his 2013 conviction, General İlker Başbuğ's 2009 speech on civil–military relations was unique in the extent and detailed manner in which he openly discussed the military's role in politics and emphasized the importance of civilian control.[63] And beyond rhetoric, the military's willingness to stand by while members of its own officer corps were arrested and tried "would have been unimaginable in earlier years."[64] This silence would seem to confirm a general impression that the military has essentially lost control over its own internal power structure, that questions involving the promotion and retirement of military personnel are increasingly made in the offices of the prime minister, in some cases against the preferences of the command structure.[65]

Despite its current problems, the Turkish military remains a potentially potent political force. The requirement for universal male military service—while not universally popular—means that almost one out of every two adults in the country has had military training, with the armed forces deeply embedded in Turkish history and culture. "The saying 'every Turk is born a soldier' sums up this still-popular belief in the 'army nation,' Even today, men are often sent off for their mandatory military service amid jubilant celebrations, and those who do not serve are regarded with skepticism and even disrespect."[66] Until 2010, moreover, every secondary school student was required to take a military-designed course in national security. Although it had been formally aligned to conform with EU standards in order to put some emphasis on human rights, nationalism and patriotic themes remain at its core.[67]

It remains an open question as to whether and to what degree the military culture is changing. Erdoğan has quite clearly seized personal control at the top, though civilian control has not been, in any significant sense, institutionalized. In the lower ranks, the military continues to control its promotional system, tending to favor graduates of military schools or undergraduate programs under military control.[68] There continues to be something of a two-track system in each of the armed services in which practicing Muslims and the graduates of civilian schools do their required service and return to civilian pursuits, while the professional soldiers who become the officers of the future largely come from these military schools. In her fieldwork in Turkey in 2008, Jenny White found that despite non-discriminatory rules to the contrary, "the military prunes all personal practices and beliefs, whether ethnic or religious, that deviate from the Kemalist national narrative, even going so far as to purge officers whose wives wear headscarves."[69]

There is clearly pressure from the government to change this culture, and public support for the military is no longer as uncritical as it once was. One author talks of an emerging "liberal-Islamist alliance in Turkish intellectual life, the common denominator of which is its critical view of the army."[70] The military's old guard, moreover, now confronts—really for the first time—a government with a clear electoral mandate that is backed with an EU process that has gained it a clear external ally in keeping the officers in their barracks.

Metin Heper goes still further to describe an emerging sense of professionalism within the military that eschews political intervention in favor of a working relationship with the government that comes close to the liberal model of civil–military relations.[71] For this cooperative relationship to endure, however, there may still be limits on the extent to which the military would accept a more aggressive form of Islamization than the Erdoğan government has proposed, or whether it could survive the shock of a major military emergency. The pace of democratic reforms, already slowed in the mid-2000s by the military's response to increases in Kurdish acts of sabotage and terrorism, could be further slowed by more internal problems of this kind or by spillover effects from continuing conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq.

Ethnicity, nationalism and civil society

Bridging Europe and Asia, modern Turkey is an ethnic composite blending a wide array of genetic and cultural streams. In broad terms, it has been variously estimated that the Turkish Republic embraces between forty and fifty distinct ethnic groups, eight or nine linguistic communities, and both major varieties of Islam plus a number of smaller sects. The largest ethnic and linguistic minority is Kurdish, native largely to the southeast, and divided into a number of clans and linguistic dialects. Those theories that view nationalism as a product of preexisting ethnic communities do not fit well with the Turkish experience. Far more on point is Gellner's notion of a sometimes forced congruence between politics and culture in which nations emerge from the creation of a standardized educational system, with a common language and cultural self-awareness.[72] The Turkish nation was created not by an easily demarcated organic community nor in the map rooms of colonial powers, but by a newly created Turkish state. Anatolia had been one of the poorest and most exploited regions of the Ottoman Empire, and had suffered enormously from the war. Indeed the word "Turk" had a largely negative connotation both within the empire and in much of Europe. The Turkish nation did not exist before the twentieth century. Thus the goal of Kemalist nation-building was exactly that of building a nation, a nation that was, moreover, "to replace Arab Islam, which was viewed as conservative, backward, and more interested in a romanticized past than the present, with a modern, scientific, Turkish Islam."[73] Atatürk's nationalism did not hark back to an irredentist notion of restoring empire, but to an idealistic vision of a cohesive, modern European state.

A major component of this vision was language reform, designed not just to make Turkish the official language of the country, but the *only* language of everyday discourse:

> Turning citizens into "real" Turks through linguistic assimilation became the central goal. It was through such homogenization that the political elite were expecting to eliminate alternative sources of power that could

> in the long run challenge the regime. However, in doing so, a rift was created between being a Turkish citizen and being a Turk—a rift that still persists today.[74]

As if to underscore the nationalistic "Turkification" of the Turkish language, the imposition of the Roman alphabet differentiated it from any wider identification with similar languages in surrounding Islamic areas. What Saylan calls "the state-centric character of Turkish modernization" has given a particular meaning to nationalism that "has almost sanctified a homogeneous Turkish national identity in the name of National unity. Even any non-violent challenge to this tends to be regarded as tantamount to high treason, thus creating narrow boundaries to the 'political.'"[75] Dissent that conveys the vaguest odor of cultural pluralism is suspect, so that "although the extent of coercion and violence has varied, the basic assumption has been that society needs to be cowed, that its diversity must be neutralized, either homogenized or purged, in order for the state to survive and prosper."[76] The top-down nature of the state-creation process has yielded the paradox of a state that is strong in its governing capacity but weak in its community roots. Ironically "the extreme centralization of policy-making in Turkey did not help develop enough institutional relationships between the state, the political sphere, civil society and the economy in order to facilitate the creation of a high capacity state."[77] Thus although its military is modern, its bureaucracy well developed, and its economic development impressive, one can also observe in Turkey the kinds of social polarizations (particularly ethnic, though sometimes religious), poor security (especially from the activities of more militant Kurdish separatists), military coups and citizen disconnections from the polity that usually characterize far less developed states. State policies toward minorities have ranged from relatively tolerant to harshly repressive. While the AKP's failure to offer individual freedoms, rights for women and civil liberties in general has been manifest, its record is no worse in these regards than those of its secular predecessors. Even today, as Turam puts it:

> while the AKP and the CHP are busy disagreeing about secularism, they largely concur about their shared intolerance for homosexuals, their lack of concern about the status and treatment of women, and their relative insouciance when it comes to political and civil liberties (particularly of young people and ethnic or religious minorities).[78]

Significantly, in this regard, and the conflicts in Taksim Square notwithstanding, "civil society has yet to produce a youth or women's movement strong and vocal enough to call the politicians to account."[79] Even as the scope of Turkey's organized civil society expands, moreover, it tends to do so on two tracks with parallel business associations, women's groups and so on, which are loyal to the AKP forces on the one hand and the secular elites on the other.

Recent incidents of ethnic strife have not been common at the grassroots level, but neighborhood disputes, particularly between secularists and more devout Muslims are, by some accounts, more common.[80] İstanbul in particular has long been an incredibly cosmopolitan city and, following the millet system of the Ottomans, the Turkish Republic promoted toleration of minorities. At the same time, there have been a number of ugly incidents, both officially sanctioned and not, that hark back to the Ottoman actions against Armenians in World War I. What gives this event continuing relevance is the refusal of the Turkish government to allow open discussion of what most non-Turkish scholars call genocide.[81] A long history of conflicts with Greece have also resonated internally, going back to the European-imposed ethnic swap following World War I that sent nearly two million often long-assimilated residents of both countries back to their supposed home countries. "What took place," as Bernard Lewis has written, "was not an exchange of Greeks and Turks, but rather an exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims. A Western observer, accustomed to a different system of social and national classification, might even conclude that this was no repatriation at all, but two deportations into exile of Christian Turks to Greece, and of Muslim Greeks to Turkey"[82] Acts of violence against the remaining Turks of Greek origin also occurred as tensions between the two nations, usually involving the status of the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus, erupted. World War II was also a difficult time for ethnic and religious minorities with most of İstanbul's Jewish, Greek and Armenian males between 18 and 45 sent to special work camps. Particularly violent attacks on İstanbul's Greek neighborhoods in 1955 resulted in tens of thousands of voluntary expatriations, leaving only a few thousand Greeks in the city today.

Alevis, who are about two-thirds Turkish and one-third Kurdish in ethnicity and origins, form the largest Shi'ite sect in Turkey. They, and other Shias, have no government-salaried religious leaders and no representation in the Department of Religious Affairs. Although they have rarely been singled out as objects of violence, there are frequent charges of discrimination, particularly in employment. Their hopes that the government's 2013 reforms would respond to some of their demands were not met, and indeed a number of Alevis joined the anti-Erdoğan demonstrations at Taksim Square, and later in a large demonstration of their own in Ankara. One *New York Times* columnist went so far as to suggest that the prime minister was "exacerbating sectarian tensions to shore up his own political base."[83] The Alevi issue has become particularly potent in the area along the Syrian border where rivalries between Alevis and other Muslim groups have been among the defining cleavages in the Civil War.

The Kurdish insurgency is by far Turkey's most long-standing and consequential uprising. As the country's largest minority group, Kurds have seldom been discriminated against in government employment or forced to pay special taxes, as have some Alevis and non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.[84] But while the 1921 Constitution granted the Kurds limited self-rule,

the 1924 revisions basically defined them out of existence: "Our state," it says "is not a multi-nation state." A policy of resettlement—moving Kurds out and others into traditional Kurdish communities—designed to speed assimilation was abandoned in the 1930s when economic change produced many of the same results. But although significant pockets of Kurds have been found throughout the country particularly in urban areas, the population remained concentrated in the southeast until the 1990s when a more aggressive resettlement effort was launched. In 1987, despite a clause in the constitution declaring Kurdish the official second language of the country, a law was passed that effectively banned it by prohibiting broadcast or publication "in a language other than the first public language."[85] This law (repealed a few years later), together with renewed attempts at forceful resettlement, coincided with a sharp rise in violent conflicts between the security forces and a newly aggressive Kurdish separatist movement. Though simmering for some decades, it literally burst on to the political scene in 1984 when armed militants occupied the police stations and military barracks of two southeastern provinces. Initially dismissed as a small group of bandits, the rebels turned out to be the vanguard of a continuing insurgency that is generally agreed to have cost at least 40,000 lives. The impact of continuing military actions in the southeast has been substantial. The international organization, Human Rights Watch, has estimated that the army has essentially destroyed more than 3,000 villages and left almost 400,000 Kurdish villagers homeless.[86]

"Although there are no official surveys, the Kurds account for around 23 per cent of the population of Turkey while their reproductive rate is arguably double that of ethnic Turks, an important factor for the future of the conflict."[87] As in Turkey as a whole, the overwhelming majority are Sunni Muslims, which is also the case for Kurds living in Iraq, Iran and Syria. In keeping with Kemalist ideology, the government has historically been unwilling even to discuss a "Kurdish problem," preferring to regard the lingering insurgency as rural, anti-modern or—particularly between the 1960s and 1980s—communist. In the 1990s, as the question of EU membership arose, it became increasingly difficult not to see the issue as being one of human rights as well. But as Loizides points out the difficulty in even raising the issue was illustrated when various officials, including President Gül, were officially admonished by the courts or threatened with actual prosecution for simply using the word "Kurdistan" in public.[88] The Erdoğan government has become increasingly willing to take that chance. As early as 2002 it passed a law allowing some limited use of radio and television programming in local languages. And in 2009 political campaigning in languages other than Turkish was legalized, and minority television and radio programming permitted. The promise of further reforms led to a cease-fire with rebel groups in 2013. The reforms proposed by the AKP government will, if passed by the legislature, allow greater parliamentary representation for small regional parties and eliminate some of the more galling nationalist rules such as the ban on the use of the letters Q, W and X (which appear in Kurdish but not Turkish).

However, the bill did not permit the teaching of Kurdish in public schools or, more importantly, liberate any of the thousands of Kurdish leaders imprisoned by the government.[89]

Even as it pursues negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem, the government has continued to pursue a hard line as well. Whether on its own, or on orders from the government, the military and the legal system have continued on-and-off campaigns against perceived dissidents. Thus in 2009, just as the government was passing its reform package, the police launched an operation directed against the Kurdistan Communities Union, one of the area's largest civic associations. Mayors from around the southeast were hand-cuffed and publicly displayed in front of the courthouse in Diyarbakır. Altogether, nearly 2,000 Kurdish politicians were rounded up in less than a year.[90] Many of these dissidents, including key leaders of the opposition, remain in custody.

Turkey's Kurdish problems are not simply internal. From a global perspective, Turkey finds itself the focal point of world conflict. It is, whether by choice or not, deeply involved in the volatile politics of the Middle East. More immediately, sitting directly on the border of turmoil in Iraq and more recently Syria, it has accused the Kurds in Iraq of sheltering terrorists, and been accused in turn by Syria for the same offense. The creation of a relatively peaceful quasi-independent Kurdish province in Iraq, directly adjacent to Turkey's major Kurdish provinces, has produced "growing cultural and economic ties" which "seem to have reinforced the self-confidence of Turkey's Kurdish citizens in resisting assimilation."[91] In 2013, the AKP, bypassing the central government in Iraq and over the strong objections of the United States, encouraged private companies in Turkey in contract with the Kurdish government in northern Iraq to build a new pipeline and substantially increase imports of both gas and oil. The deal is contingent, however, on the government's ability to sustain the cease-fire with the Kurdish Workers' Party whose more militant allies have frequently disrupted oil deliveries in the past. Whatever the short-term outcome of these negotiations (which were ongoing at mid-2015), the larger question is one of the willingness of the Turkish nation (not just the AKP) to accede to a definition of nationalism that is pluralistic rather than exclusionary. Much as the United States has more or less adjusted to the concept of hyphenated citizenship (Italian-American, Hispanic-American, etc.), it is hard to see a resolution of the "Kurdish problem" without a significant modification of Turkish nationalism.

There are, of course, many assimilated Kurds who have little or no interest in these negotiations. Polls show that roughly half of those who self-identify as Kurds voted for the AKP, and the country's two other substantial minorities—Armenians and Alewites—are equally assimilated. One frequently meets deeply patriotic Turks from all of these ethnic groups who have little or no sense of being "hyphenated" Turks. As White observes, "fantasies of community that rely on difference to mark a frontier between *us* and

them. ... have become harder and harder to maintain as ostensibly opposite groups converge in their characteristics and practices, and as individual and group identities proliferate."[92] The Turks are becoming at once more alike and more diverse. If the beginning of wisdom about Turkish politics is to recognize its polarization between core and periphery—its Kemalist, urban, modern, secular core on the one hand, and the traditional, rural, Islamic periphery on the other—a real understanding of contemporary Turkey begins with the recognition of how much of an oversimplification of reality this is. There is a growing pluralism in which:

> The economically driven move from rural areas to the big cities has had a demographic impact comparable to the nation's forced population movements. The once poor and rural parts of the population, largely practicing Muslims, often Kurdish or Alewite, that were once seen as archetypes of the periphery are now living in cities and have tasted affluence. Class differences, religious conflicts, and urban–rural distinctions persist, but they tend increasingly to be complex rather than congruent with neither piety nor poverty confined to the countryside.[93]

There is no doubt that many polarities remain, as vividly displayed in the 2013 Taksim Square demonstrations. But what political scientists call "cross-cutting cleavages," whereby people agree with each other on one issue but disagree on others, are beginning to pave the way for the development of a political space in which a genuine pluralism is replacing the kind of polarization that for so long has divided the country into rival camps. "The polarization of parties at the power center along a narrow secularist–Islamist axis fails to meet the complex and diverse economic and social needs of Turkish citizens. At the same time, because civil society is weak, it is unable to fully represent the vast diversity of Turkish society,"[94] which in turn gives the main parties little incentive to change. The real consolidation of Turkish democracy depends heavily on its ability to break out of this vicious circle of reliving the past.

A related shift in Turkish politics is occurring almost entirely at the elite level. Until the AKP won a majority of seats in the Grand National Assembly, hard-line secularists effectively controlled all the key institutions of power in the country, from their direct domination of the banking and business centers, the bureaucracy, the military and the courts, to their sometimes direct sometimes behind-the-scenes ability to either control or displace the elected government. To one degree or another power has shifted in all of these areas. Islamic banks, known in Turkey as "participation banks," became legal in 2006, held more than 5 percent of all bank assets as of 2013 and are growing rapidly. The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSIAD) continues to represent the mostly secular, large conglomerates with close ties to the state (and continues to exclude small business owners), but it is increasingly challenged for government subsidies and

influence by the largely Muslim Association of Independent Businessmen (MUSIAD) which was founded in 1990. Only 30 percent of the latter are located in İstanbul compared with 70 percent of TUSIAD members,[95] but the business community is no longer a seamless elite. Long-range trends, accelerated by a decade of AKP government actions, have eroded if not destroyed Kemalist domination of the civil service and university systems. MUSIAD corporations, especially in the construction industry, have particularly profited from the AKP's ambitious building programs. The military leadership, as we have seen, has both changed its composition and withdrawn to its barracks.

The judiciary long remained the key protector of the old order, but working with Fethullah Gülen, the AKP began slowly to replace retiring secularist judges and prosecutors with new recruits drawn from religious backgrounds and schools. The 2010 "packing" of the Constitutional Court (increasing its membership from 11 to 17) weakened its inclination to check the government. In addition, the government has gradually been changing the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, which actually makes the key appointments to lower judicial positions. Having failed to amend the constitution to limit the board's powers, in 2012 the government replaced most of its staff and made the board an elective body rather than one that, in effect, replaced itself. More recently, the government—in response to police investigations and prosecutorial charges of corruption—moved aggressively to reshuffle the offices of state prosecutors and transfer investigating police officers to traffic duty, and since 2012 has begun to replace alleged Gülenists with those who are more faithful to the AKP. The 2014 elections to the board were especially favorable to AKP candidates, giving the party a very strong position in bringing the judiciary under its control.

Still another major change in Turkey is in growing evidence of a nascent civil society. The early Kemalists perceived most NGOs as a threat to the unified nation. This "strong state tradition has historically hindered the development of a robust and democratic civil society,"[96] to the extent that one study counted the *total* number of associations in 1946 at just 820—most of them sporting clubs in urban areas.[97] Civic organizations of all kinds were abolished by the military in 1980–82, and sharply restricted by the 1983 Law on Associations and a separate act that virtually banned trade unions. These rigidly nationalistic laws were modified in 1995, 2004 and again in 2010, partly in response to pressure from the EU.[98] Furthermore, the importance of NGOs was vividly displayed in coping with the Marmara earthquake in 1999. But the remaining laws on associations are still rigidly and arbitrarily enforced in ways that particularly affect labor unions and groups affiliated with international organizations. While official figures, for example, suggest that nearly half of the work force is unionized, it seems that fewer than 10 percent are represented by unions with rights to collective bargaining.[99] Nonetheless, recent studies suggest that there are now more than 150,000 voluntary organizations in the country, and that as many as 10,000 are added

every year. Roughly 18 percent of these groups are religious, and 14 percent sports clubs; but a substantial political community is emerging.[100]

Even a casual visitor to Turkey cannot ignore the visual and audio symbols of a rapidly changing society. It seems clear that "the modernization stimulus is still alive, that the bourgeoisie and working classes are becoming more active and organized, and that access to higher education and wealth is spreading all around the country."[101] The controversial Fethullah Gülen movement, with its rapidly growing network of schools, businesses and community organizations, worked with, but also threatens the unity of the AKP by being both proudly Islamic and nationalistic, and is on the verge of overt opposition in ways that could scramble the political dynamic. One can find strong remnants of the center–periphery conflict, expressed with perhaps a too passionate intensity; but the cross-cutting cleavages that compound the currents of controversy are grinding away at the sharper edges of conflict. What remains is for state institutions to provide the means for representing the fundamental interests of these emerging forces to find true representation in the polity. For all its growing diversity and social dynamism, Turkey's civil society "scores," as rated by organizations such as CIVICUS, are at the very low end of world rankings, pushed down, in large part by the failure of the government to foster conditions conducive to their development.[102] In academic terms, "the hegemonic economic and political role of the state has shaped its civil society organizations. ... As the largest allocator of resources, the Turkish state has been the sole protective, regulatory, administrative and mediatory power, both economically and politically." As a result, civic organizations have tended to work in the shadows of their party and administrative patrons.[103] If Americans and many Europeans worry about "special interests" having too much control over their governments, the problem in Turkey is one of the government having too much control over private organizations. "There is an empty space in the Turkish polity where staunch liberal democrats should stand, and contestations over freedom play out on neighborhood streets instead of in the halls of high-level politics."[104] In a nutshell, the "strong state tradition in Turkey has hindered the development of robust and democratic civil society."[105] Continuing political polarization, moreover, reduces the system's capacity for compromise without genuinely providing meaningful channels of representation through the legislature and the political parties. Analyzing the 2010 vote, Ünver argues that instead of a partisan polarization that reflects the real political differences in society, Turkey presents a case of "popular polarization" in which "the society is pushed toward two extremes that are independent of party politics and relate to issues and topics about which the electorate feels more strongly."[106] Superimposed on this kind of strong but inchoate polarization is a patronage-heavy politics that gives the party in power—which for more than a decade has now been the AKP—substantial resources for, in effect, "buying" the support of stakeholders in the building trade, real estate and other economic growth areas.

Conclusion: Islam and democracy in Turkey

The Turkish word for politics is *siyaset*, but "in earlier official parlance siyaset (politics) was also a synonym for a death sentence imposed by the state."[107] In this light it is perhaps not surprising that over the course of fifty years four elected prime ministers have been forced to resign and were banned from politics, one has been executed and another found dead under suspicious circumstances. The often intense political polarization long characteristic of Turkish politics is, ironically, not reflected in electoral politics in which ideological differences between the parties are difficult to discern. A comparatively high 20 percent of Turkish voters switch their votes between parties from one election to the next.[108] But if differences between the parties are opaque, the perceived importance of election results is high. State policies change rather slowly in Turkey, yet politics is played as a zero-sum game that has high stakes in the form of patronage, symbolism and pelf. Not surprisingly, political trust is very low in Turkey. It is almost as if the elites in Turkey have themselves become so much captives of the narrative of polarization that it blinds them to the pluralistic realities that surround them.

Incentives from the EU, which have had an important effect in accelerating overdue reforms, have slowed. By imposing conditions on candidates for membership, the EU has been remarkably successful over the years in producing significant changes in the patterns of governing in a long series of cases, most recently in the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe.[109] But despite having a significant head start on the road to democratic consolidation, Turkey has proven to be a tougher case:

> The EU's conditionality has been influential on democratization at the constitutional/legal level. Nevertheless, it is not in any way possible to reach a decision concerning its influence on civil society and political culture. Therefore, all these amendments and regulations, which must be considered vital of course in terms of the elimination of "perverse elements" within the democratic system, do not remove completely the fragile state of democracy in Turkey.[110]

The AKP has used the leverage of EU conditionality to enact reforms that have strengthened its own position and weakened that of its enemies, but the fact that these reforms have benefitted the party does not mean that they are not real or needed. Yet within Turkey and among outside observers—including some very careful scholars—the sincerity of the AKP's reformism is not trusted. The idea that the clash between Islam and the secular state is inevitable is deeply ingrained. Since assuming the presidency, Erdoğan has increasingly fanned these flames. His November 2014 remarks praising motherhood and bluntly denying that women are equal to men, and a December speech calling for a return to teaching the Ottoman language and Arabic script in the public schools have deepened the divide. Furthermore, limited actions tilting toward

the AKP's traditional Muslim base have been taken. Thus Ottoman Turkish is now taught as an elective subject in the public schools, and the number of students studying it in state-funded religious schools has increased from 63,000 to more than one million in twelve years. Yet despite its Islamist and anti-Western roots, its leaders' occasional rhetoric of extremism, and its increasingly poor record on questions of civil liberties, it remains basically true that:

> the AKP has never attempted to implement a radical, anti-system set of policies that would undermine (rather than mitigate) the secular character of the Turkish state and challenge its democratic institutions. On the contrary, it can be argued that it has deepened these institutions by implementing a set of liberalizing political reforms [that] ... have resulted in a marked reduction of the role of the military in politics. It is in retrospect quite clear that the AKP has put Turkey on path leading to a more liberal and democratic future.[111]

Whether this position can be maintained in light of the government's harsh reaction to the Taksim Square demonstrations, its arrests of numerous journalists and its handling of seemingly well-founded 2013 charges of corruption is not clear. In 2012, when police and prosecutors launched an investigation of the intelligence service, Erdoğan, claiming the existence of a "parallel state" undermining the legitimate government, ordered the dismissal of the prosecutor and the transfer of the police agents working on the case. A year later, another set of investigations in İstanbul and Ankara focused on corruption in the banking sector, in the government's many construction projects and in money-laundering for Iran. As the corruption inquiry grew—including lurid leaked photographs of an implicated banker carrying shoe boxes overflowing with cash, charges against the sons of three cabinet members and rumors that Erdoğan's son would soon be arrested too—as in previous cases virtually all of the policemen and prosecutors involved in the corruption inquiry were dismissed or transferred to other duties. Although in the course of a larger reshuffle Erdoğan did fire the three ministers most openly implicated in the corruption inquiry, he has essentially denied all charges, attacked the attackers and stopped all further inquiries. And when pictures purporting to show actual bribery transactions began circulating on social media, the prime minister ordered them to be taken down.

The idea that the police might investigate politicians, or that a prosecutor might bring corruption charges against an elected official, is widely accepted in many democracies. It poses a problem, however, for unconsolidated regimes in which a more populist or majoritarian (to the winner belong the spoils) idea of democracy holds sway (as, for example, in parts of the United States in the nineteenth century). As Ilter Turan writes with regard to Turkey: "The initiation and implementation of a corruption investigation without informing the prime minister may be standard in an operating democratic

system characterized by checks and balances. However, it has run counter to Erdoğan's majoritarian understandings of democracy, in which those elected by majority vote are expected to be unrestrained in their exercise of political power."[112] In 2014, indeed, the AKP parliament passed a law that explicitly required prosecutors to secure government approval before launching such investigations. Rather than acknowledging any problems within his government, Erdoğan lashed out at the Islamic Fethullah Gülen Movement which, he insisted, had captured the justice system with the goal of bringing down his government.

The reality of contemporary Turkish politics is that the traditionally described conflict between the center and the periphery has been stood on its head: the old guard elite that controlled the army, the bureaucracy, the courts and the economy has been routed. At institutional level the AKP is firmly in control. Erdoğan won the presidency in 2014 with only 52 percent of the vote, but between them the two leading opposition parties won less than 40 percent. Despite Taksim, despite the corruption charges, the jailing of dissidents and journalists, the AKP's share of the vote in the 2014 municipal elections was off by less than 5 percent, and its control of parliament is solid (though perhaps a little short of the margin needed to give Erdoğan the constitutional amendments he wants to strengthen the powers of the presidency, the office he won in 2014). However, Turkey's social divisions are far less binary outside of Ankara than they are at the level of governance. The AKP plurality, despite its firm control of the government, has never before 2014 won a majority of the popular vote, benefitting instead from a weak and divided opposition and an electoral system that favors the largest party. And the party itself is not as cohesive at the grassroots as it is at the top. Kurdish and Alewite voters—their loyalties strained by events in neighboring Iraq and Syria—are neither particularly secular nor particularly supportive of the AKP. That part of its Islamist wing based in Fethullah Gülen, which, until recently enjoyed a share of government patronage, is now depicted as being part of a sinister conspiracy to undermine Erdoğan's government. First in statements in their respective party newspapers, more recently in more direct confrontations, personal clashes between the expatriate Gülen and Erdoğan have accelerated. The divisions in the governing coalition are more than matched in the opposition where the Kurds remain restive, the hard-core Kemalists dwindle in support while refusing to change, and there is no left to mobilize voters along economic lines. Thus the 2014 elections appear to have offered a Hobson's choice between a further tightening of the screws by an increasingly authoritarian AKP majority, or a return to the near-anarchy of earlier periods of multi-party fragmentation.

The AKP has been in power for more than a decade, during which time it has consolidated its control over Turkey's major institutions to a degree unmatched by a civilian government since the days of Atatürk and İnönü. It has played to its Islamist constituency by lifting the ban on the hijab and expanding the role and funding of religious schools. It has imposed higher

taxes and put new limits on alcoholic beverages not dissimilar to those in about half of the US states, and it has offered and later withdrawn new laws on sexual behavior that are reflective of a socially conservative ideology. Furthermore, it has used its patronage and police powers to reward its (largely Islamic) friends and punish its (largely secularist and Fethullah Gülen) enemies. Given the fact that it has been in office for longer than any Turkish government in sixty years, and given its ability effectively to neutralize the military and other potential secularist checks on its power, however, the notion that the AKP has imposed an Islamic agenda on Turkey remains unsupported. If it has such a hidden agenda, why has it remained largely hidden?

A more troubling set of questions revolve around the AKP's commitment to democracy. It won near-majority support from the electorate with the promise that when "good Muslims" came into power they would put an end to the corruption, patronage, oligarchy and backroom dealing of the old order. And they did indeed throw the old oligarchs out, de-fang the military, open the economy to new enterprises and empower communities long ignored by Ankara. Not content with these victories, however, they have insisted on further tightening the reins of power, purging the bureaucracy then the police and prosecutorial agencies, first of secularists, more recently their erstwhile Islamic allies in the Gülen movement in what, even the prime minister admits, could be characterized as a "witch hunt." What happened instead of democratization:

> is that good Muslims indeed came to power, but they have proven to be guilty of every single type of misconduct that their secular predecessors were blamed for, nepotism, partisanship, corruption, arrogance and authoritarianism. Moreover, the state power they grabbed initiated a bitter power struggle between them, leading to the current witch hunt.[113]

In the 1950s, when the Menderes government attempted to shut down the minority, purge the civil service and tilt toward Islam, the military intervened. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the elected governments were unable to form stable governing coalitions, it intervened again. Today, the AKP seems almost to be intervening against itself, whether to "restore" democracy, as in the wake of most previous coups, or simply to consolidate and protect its patronage and privilege remains to be seen. By turning first on his allies in the Gülen movement, then on the party's moderate wing, by isolating the former president and one-time party co-founder Abdullah Gül, Erdoğan has eliminated virtually all of his significant real and potential rivals. Those who feared that the AKP would turn Turkey into an Islamist state have yet to garner much evidence on their side. But if "the crucial difference between fully authoritarian, semi-authoritarian and democratic regimes lies in what the opposition is allowed to do,"[114] the real threat of the AKP may be less to Turkish secularism than to its democracy.

Notes

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2 Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 1.
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4 "Peaceful Protest Over Istanbul Park Turns Violent as Police Crack Down," *New York Times*, May 31, 2013.
5 Pankaj Mishra, "Orhan Pamuk on Taksim Square, the Effects of 'Breaking Bad,' and Why the Future of the Novel Is in the East," *New Republic*, July 29, 2013.
6 Stephen Kinzer, *Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 10.
7 Sina Akşin, *Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 202.
8 Dietrich Jung with Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East* (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 60.
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10 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2002), 404–09.
11 Ersin Kalaycioglu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 57–58.
12 Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey* (New York: Central European Union Press, 2009), 13.
13 Jung, 72.
14 Findley, 257–58.
15 John M. Vander Lippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2005), 75.
16 From a speech about the May 19, 1945 National Day celebrating Turkish youth, as quoted in Vander Lippe, 113.
17 As a handful of independents were also elected, some of them more or less closely associated with the Democrats, the number of seats won by the party is given in the literature as anywhere from 61 to 66.
18 Kalaycioglu, 73.
19 Findley, 270.
20 Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 58.
21 See, for example, Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2006); and

Marian Ottoway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

22 Findley, 308.

23 Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2004), 95.

24 Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

25 Under the single-member plurality system used in the First Republic, the candidate with the most votes (a plurality) in each district would win the seat. Thus in a four-person race, a candidate with, say, 40 percent of the total vote would win that seat while those finishing in second, third and fourth place would gain nothing. Multiply this across hundreds of districts and it is possible (in fact quite likely) that a party with only 40 percent of the vote nationwide could win an enormous majority of the total seats. Under various forms of proportional representation, seats are awarded in relation to the proportion of the vote they receive. Thus a party with as little as 5 or 10 percent of the total vote receives something like 5 to 10 percent of the seats. Turkey's Second Republic system was not strictly proportional—it mixed district-based elections with local districts—but did operate dramatically to increase the smaller parties' shares of seats in the National Assembly. On electoral systems generally see especially Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986). On Turkey, see William Hale, "The Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politics," *International Journal of Mideast Studies*, 11 (May 1980): 401–17.

26 Pope and Pope, 135.

27 Findley, 316.

28 Akşin, 272.

29 Kalaycioglu, 107.

30 Garret Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 62.

31 Özbudun and Gençkaya, 22.

32 Findley, 356.

33 As part of a larger effort to develop closer ties with the Islamic world, Erbakan made a highly publicized visit to Libya's Qadaffi. Instead of the flowery welcoming speech the Turkish Prime Minister expected to receive, the television audiences watched him stand by in embarrassed silence as the Libyan leader dressed him down for his treatment of the Kurds.

34 Ibid., 358.

35 Erdoğan's specific offense of inciting religious hatred was based on his public reading of a poem by Ziya Gokalp that contained the lines, "the mosques are our barracks, the domes are our helmets, the minarets are our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers ... My reference is Islam. If I am not able to speak of this, what is the use of living?"

36 Findley, 359.

37 Eligür, 254.

38 Ibid., 247, 259. Interestingly, Erbakan himself complained in 2007 that the AKP was no longer an Islamist party.

39 Eligür, 254.

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41 As quoted in Bora Kanra, "Democracy, Islam and Dialogue: The Case of Turkey," *Government and Opposition* 40 (October 2005), 529.

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46 Ibid.
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48 Peter Trugut, "How the Ergenekon Verdicts May Deepen Turkey's Political Divide," *Time*, August 5, 2013, 14. For similar reports see, for example, the August 5, 2013 edition of *Der Spiegel* at www.spiegel.de/international/world/verdicts-in-turkish-ergenekon-trial-reflect-deep-divisions; and the August 10, 2013 issue of *The Economist* at www.economist.com/news/europe/21583312-harsh-verdicts-are-handed-down-ergonokan-trial-justice-or-revenge?
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58 Ibid., 50.
59 Sami Faltas, "Good Governance in the Security Sector: Too Much to Ask?" in Kayhan and Hartog, 139.
60 Omer Faruk Gençkaya, "Professional Development Structure for Parliamentarians in Turkey." Paper presented at the International Conference on Effective Capacity Building Programs for Parliamentarians, Bern, Switzerland, October 19, 2011.

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92 White, 135. Emphasis in the original.
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6 Civil Islam
Indonesia

Indonesia is a nation comprising some thirteen to 19,000 islands (6,000 of which are inhabited), stretching more than 3,000 miles from the tip of Malaysia across the Indian Ocean to Australia and the Philippines and connecting the Pacific Ocean with the South China Sea. With nearly 250 million residents it is the fourth largest country in the world, and home to roughly 300 ethnic groups, most of them at least nominally Muslim.[1]

Although various sultanates had spread their influence over large sections of the islands, there was nothing before the nineteenth century that bore any geographical resemblance to contemporary Indonesia. As a political entity it had its origins in a corporate enterprise that was later expanded and taken over by the colonial office of the Netherlands. The Dutch not only shaped the physical boundaries of what is now Indonesia, but their imposition of colonial rule served, in a largely negative sense, as the incubator of Indonesian nationalism. The force behind this sense of nationality was less cultural unity than "a sense of shared experience and the specific solidarity that flowed from it. That experience was to a considerable extent a shared sense of oppression."[2] Dutch rule was not unusually repressive; indeed the Japanese occupation during World War II left many Indonesians rather nostalgic for the Dutch, but the latter did overstay their welcome. The independence movement was encouraged by the occupying Japanese promise of "Asia for Asians," by the weakness of post-war Holland, and by the United Nation's vague but not insignificant commitment to decolonization. Scarcely more than a day after the surrender of Japan, the leaders of the independence movement, Sukarno[3] and Muhammad Hatta declared the Republic of Indonesia a sovereign nation. Even before the Japanese surrender, they adopted a vague but workable constitution founded in the philosophy of the five principles of what they called the Pancasila: nationalism; social justice; belief in one God; popular sovereignty; and a just and civilized humanity. Unlike Turkey, and similarly to most Muslim-majority countries, the fact that Indonesia had to fight for its independence and identity has made nationalism a force that both confounds and complicates the role of Islam in its politics.

The occupying troops, which were mostly Australian, British, Indian and American, were primarily concerned with demobilizing the Japanese military.

As the last pockets of resistance were neutralized, however, the allies increasingly tilted toward supporting the Dutch governors released from Japanese prisons and the Dutch troops as they began to trickle back.[4] As the independence movement grew, the Dutch position became increasingly untenable, and by 1947 most parts of the two most populated islands—Java and Sumatra—were in republican hands. After helping to broker a cease-fire, the British banned all arms assistance to the Dutch, who could not continue fighting without help. Washington found it difficult to formulate a coherent policy. How much US Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands was diverted to its East Indies effort, and how much humanitarian aid actually went on armaments is difficult to say, but the Dutch were sufficiently supplied to mount an offensive.[5] In August 1947, the United Nations Security Council ordered a cease-fire, which to the disappointment of Sukarno and Hatta let Holland's territorial gains stand. With this advantage secured, the Dutch pushed for a "federal" solution that would divide the islands into semi-autonomous states under "temporary" Dutch rule. Stonewalled by the Dutch in the hope that they could reestablish their hegemony, the United Nations created a Peace Commission comprised of representatives from Belgium (recommended by the Dutch), Australia (nominated by Indonesia) and the United States (as the choice of the other two) to mediate the conflict.

The Communist Party of Indonesia represented a significant minority faction in the republic. An abortive revolt in 1948, organized by a loose coalition of communists, unions and local militias was quickly and brutally put down, not by the Dutch, but by an increasingly professional Republican army. By the winter of 1948, a consensus began to gel in Washington that if communism were an imminent threat, then Sukarno and Hatta were as capable of dealing with it as were the Dutch. Meanwhile, the Dutch had decided—without informing the United States—that it was time for a renewed war. They quickly took the Republican capital in Yogyakarta, and executed local communists and imprisoned Sukarto, Hatta and Prime Minister Syahrir. However, the Indonesian army and local militias launched an effective series of guerilla attacks that made Dutch prospects increasingly grim. The decisive indicator that their position was untenable was the resignation of several leaders in key states of the putative Dutch Federation, particularly in the east.[6] In December 1949 the Dutch finally agreed to hand over sovereignty. Millions of people engulfed the park surrounding the presidential palace in Batavia (soon to be renamed Jakarta) as a military escort guided Sukarno through the cheering crowds. From the top of the steps he raised his arms and cried, "*Alhamdulillah*—thank God, we are free."

Creating an Indonesian state

"Making Indonesia was not easy. Once made, it was neither cohesive nor secure... . Indonesia could suppress Dutch influence, and its president could voice the glory of a new country. But pride alone could not guide it."[7] The

obstacles faced by the new government were substantial. The Dutch remained in control of the economy, and while their low wages were preferable to the slave labor imposed by the Japanese, poverty was widespread, and the new republic was saddled with substantial debts. In both the public and private spheres, Indonesians continued to staff clerical and low-level management positions, but few were trained in higher management. Popular support for democratic institutions was strong, but virtually no one had any experience of elections, parliamentary procedure or the rule of law.

Among the first priorities of the new republic was the creation of a nation from the loose confederacy of island autocracies that the Dutch had ruled. On my first trip to Indonesia in 2001 there were reports of serious crimes in a remote town near the center of New Guinea. The jungle was so dense that helicopters could not fly in, and roads to the village so crude that it took the police three days to reach the crime scene. A year or two later, when my wife and I were vacationing on the west coast of Java, we found that the only way to visit some of the areas around our resort was on horseback or by foot—this, more than fifty years after creation of the Indonesian nation. In 1950 neither the Dutch nor the Japanese had settled more than a fraction of Indonesia's islands nor penetrated far beyond coastal and resource-rich areas of the larger islands. In 1956 fewer than 300 miles of road in South Sumatra—one of the nation's richest regions—were paved.[8] There were whole areas of the larger islands, and whole islands throughout the archipelago, that never experienced the governing presence of the Dutch.

Inadvertently, however, by failing to support a Sundanese, Dayak, Batak or Achenese culture, the Dutch had created a single sense of place:

> Virtually all the major ethnolinguistic groups were, by the end of the colonial period, accustomed to the idea that there was an archipelagic stage on which they had parts to play. Thus, only one of the rebellions of 1950–64 had *separatist* ambitions; all the rest were competitive within a single Indonesian political system.[9]

Through commerce, moreover, the roots of a common language had been planted throughout the islands. Without any central plan or idea, a language of convenience arose out of the needs of traders and travelers. Based on the Malaysian language:

> by the early nineteenth century it was solidly in place inside officialdom. When print-capitalism arrived on the scene in a sizeable way after mid-century, the language moved out into the marketplace and the media. … By 1928, shaped by two generations of urban writers and readers, it was ready to be adopted by Young Indonesia as the national(ist) language *bahasa Indonesia*. Since then, it has never looked back.[10]

Sukarno's "great gift," as one historian describes it, "was that he could speak directly to the hearts of the people." With his mixed Balinese and Javanese ancestry, and having spent time in exile in Bengkulu and Flores, and working for independence in Sumatra, as well as his Dutch education and familiarity with the West, Sukarno had the ability "to give Indonesians the sense that they were simultaneously cosmopolitan participants in a new world and a people firmly rooted in their own traditions."[11] What Sukarno could not do was to unite the nation's fractious parties. The provisional parliament, drawn together by negotiations among the victorious revolutionary forces, was essentially comprised of four groups. The best organized, on a national basis, was the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI—Communist Party of Indonesia). The Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI—Nationalist Party), which had grown out of the study groups formed by Sukarno, Hatta and other early members of the independence movement, was secular, nationalist and, although it began with vaguely leftist orientation, had increasingly become the party of a nascent business community. Muslims were split between those affiliated with the modernist association of middle-class, largely urban intellectuals called *Muhammadiyah*, and the more traditional association of ulamas, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). There was also a scattering of unaffiliated members, and minor parties representing Catholics and various regional interests. Each of these factions, as Vickers puts it, "spent as much time fighting internally as they did fighting with each other."[12] With the exception of the PKI, political parties had few organizational roots of their own, relying instead largely on local suborganizations to provide links between their central offices and local communities.[13] Even the military remained as much a coalition of local militias as a hierarchical army, though that was soon to change. Shifting alliances within and between the parties, and growing patterns of patronage and corruption made it increasingly difficult to put together governing coalitions. Thus between 1949 and 1957 the cabinet was reshuffled seven times as Sukarno juggled support from his own PNI, the PKI, moderate Muslims and the military. With no single dominant group, "The colonial-era truce between ideologies, partially disrupted during the revolution, was now largely restored, not by the discipline of a common struggle toward shared goals but by the polycentrism of the political system."[14]

A relatively fair national election was held in 1955. Even if it failed to produce a coherent governing coalition, it did provide a useful lens into the rough distribution of popular attitudes at the time, and, with a turnout of nearly 90 percent, an indicator of the high stakes at issue. Of the 257 seats contested, the nationalist PNI and Musyami (a party formed by the Japanese that brought together Muhammadiah and some smaller Muslim groups) each won 57 seats (22 percent); NU, which ran its own candidates, 45 seats (18 percent) and the PKI 39 (15 percent). A disparate variety of regional and other parties won the remaining 59 seats (23 percent).[15] The simultaneous election of a Constituent Assembly, charged with drawing up a new

constitution was similarly divided. Of equal and growing importance were two other groups, not directly involved in either election.

The most important of these was the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI). With its origins in the local militias which it had brought together in the fight for independence, ABRI had a weak but well-defined top-to-bottom command structure that extended throughout the country, and had become almost as a parallel government. With substantial business interests of its own, and control over local and national police forces as well as the army, navy and air force, ABRI, though technically under civilian control, was—even more so than the military in Turkey—largely free from budgetary and legislative checks. In 1958, when General Nasution propounded the doctrine of *dwifungsi*, or dual function—civil and military—he was both articulating what was already in place and consolidating it into a permanent structure of civil–military relations.

Nasution contended that Indonesia's geographical, demographic and financial condition did not allow for a highly concentrated military with modern equipment and rapid deployment capacities. Instead, the country would have to rely on a network of military micro-units with strong roots in the local population, collecting intelligence, preparing for warfare and mobilizing the people should the need arise. The units were placed alongside the hierarchy of the civilian administration, so that every military command had a civilian counterpart. Consequently, the military became an influential political and economic player in local affairs, even in areas that were not under martial law.[16]

A very different kind of organization—more perhaps a network than an organization—that became a player in early Indonesian politics was the militant Islamic movement generally known as Dar'ul Islam (Islamic Home). Its original leaders, arguing that the secular nationalists were as evil as the Dutch, never accepted the republic's refusal to create an Islamic state. Militarily defeated and driven underground, variants on the original movement have emerged in separatist movements (most persistently in the north Sumatra area of Aceh), in localized acts of violence (particularly against Christians, ethnic Chinese and Buddhists), riots and assassinations. Although its well-organized network of local organizations was basically wiped out and its leader executed in 1962, its actual and putative successors have periodically reappeared in different guises.[17] Never strong enough effectively to compete for a share of power at the national level, the primary impact of their sporadic riots and insurrections has been to strengthen the political hand of the police and military. The rather strange symbiosis of militants and militarists has been a recurring phenomenon.[18]

Guided Democracy

Using his public popularity and broadly but vaguely defined constitutional powers as president with skill, Sukarno managed to weave these diverse forces

together for the better part of a decade. In the mid-1950s, however, the fabric began to tatter. A sharp decline in the world price of rubber and other key commodities combined with weather-related declines in rice production to badly hurt an economy that had become accustomed to solid growth. These economic problems were compounded by Sukarno's 1957 nationalization of Dutch and other foreign companies "which had the combined effect of halting foreign investment in the republic and cutting shipping within the multi-island state by the Dutch shipping company ... which had provided about three-quarters of the transportation between the islands."[19] A law that pensioned off more than a third of the military sorely strained relations with ABRI. Banditry, shakedowns and smuggling—some of it policed by and some of it perpetrated by the military—became rampant. Politically, relations between Sukarno and the more conservative Hatta led eventually to the latter's resignation. At issue in part was Sukarno's insistence on pursuing an expansionist "Greater Indonesia" project which envisioned the takeover of the still Dutch half of New Guinea; the Portuguese East Timor; and much of Great Britain's newly independent areas in Malaysia. Sukarno's attempts to position himself as a leader of third world countries, combined with these expansionist activities, severely tested the country's ties with the West and brought Sukarno himself into increasingly close relations with the PKI at home.

Meanwhile, the increasingly fractious parties in the legislature managed to retain some semblance of order by carving the bureaucracy into patronage domains, bloating the civil service payrolls with no-shows and party hacks. The Constitutional Convention—though it had agreed on the outlines of a remarkably liberal and sensible framework for governing—remained deadlocked largely over the question of secularization. At issue was the so-called Jakarta Charter which had been replaced in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution with the Pancasila. The charter, originally proposed by moderate Muslims opposed to a sharia-based system, rather vaguely declared the obligation of Muslims to uphold sharia principles. In the convention, it was opposed by the Communists, the Nationalists and many moderate Muslims; but the more conservative Islamists deadlocked the convention by refusing to vote for the passage of a constitution that did not contain it.[20] Unable to broker a compromise, Sukarno dissolved the convention and articulated a new direction for the country which he called "Guided Democracy," essentially a euphemism for semi-authoritarian rule.

If these problems were not enough, following a failed attempt to assassinate Sukarno, a group of army officers joined a number of militant groups (including what was left of Dar'ul Islam) in Sumatra and Sulawesi in a full-scale revolt. They were joined by elements of Masyumi and a smaller Islamic party. Rumors that they were backed by the CIA were confirmed when a US-piloted bomber was shot down. "CIA sponsorship of right-wing military officers in the regional revolts came in the form of substantial provisions of arms, training and intelligence reports," going around the government to factions in the armed forces,[21] but if such aid was enough to encourage

anti-American feelings, it was insufficient to win. The support given to the rebellion by Masyumi, based on its opposition to Sukarno's drift toward communism, hurt it more than Sukarno. The revolt was crushed within a year, and Masyumi was dissolved. The ironic result was to further strengthen the political standing of the communists.

The "guides" to which Guided Democracy now turned were the military, the PKI, a few Islamic leaders and the Nationalists. Guided Democracy took on an increasingly anti-Western, pro-Soviet and Chinese bent. The PKI's work in rural areas and the absence of Masyumi "was blamed for drawing support away from Islamic preachers. Sukarno's support for the party, then the largest communist party outside China and the Soviet Union, left Muslims increasingly disillusioned with his leadership. The same dynamic was at work within the military."[22] A more hardened Islamic leadership came to fore. As the economy spluttered and Sukarno's battles with the West intensified, the end of Guided Democracy was near. A strong showing by the PKI in local elections, along with Sukarno's appointment of more communists to the weak parliament, intensified tensions.

From Guided Democracy to the New Order

Despite their impact on the nation's history, the events of September 30, 1965 remain controversial. That evening, six high-ranking military officers were assassinated by a group of junior officers who were in turn rather quickly arrested by an army force led by General Suharto. "Although the exact parameters of PKI involvement are still unclear, the PKI was implicated in some measure in the coup attempt. The precise role of Sukarno has yet to be fully explained, but his regime was badly discredited."[23] In March 1966 he signed an order (at gunpoint it is sometimes alleged) giving General Suharto a virtually blank check to restore order. The next day, Suharto banned the PKI. Three days later, he asked Sukarno to dismiss three cabinet members believed to be close to the PKI. When Sukarno refused, they were arrested and jailed, a clear signal that real power had been transferred. Sukarno was allowed to remain in office for almost two years, but under house arrest, unable to communicate with the media or his supporters. Suharto had clearly taken command, and his story of having thwarted a communist coup became the official narrative.[24]

The first two years of Suharto's rule produced one of the worst periods of genocide in the twentieth century. Thousands of civilians (whose numbers are still in doubt) were simply executed and more than one million were imprisoned without trial. After sacking the PKI headquarters in Jakarta and rounding up the party leaders, the army's Red Berets used ABRI's territorial command to work with local groups in a systematic "poliscide" (or state extermination of an enemy), the actual scope of which has never emerged. A sort of collective amnesia, enforced by the regime within Indonesia, and glossed over in the West where the official story squared with Cold War

ideology, has seen the erasure of documents, memories and curiosity. The works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Indonesia's most celebrated literary figure, were banned during the Suharto era, and on account of his insistence on raising the issue, he was regarded as something of a crank until his death in 2006. His saga of ten years of incarceration in the Baru Island prison camp offers an unforgettable picture of this largely ignored time of troubles, but was unavailable in Indonesia.[25] Cornell political scientist Benedict Anderson and some of his former students also tried to focus on what really happened, and were denied visas until 1999.[26]

As research interest in these events has grown, there remain two primary differences of opinion. First, with regard to the coup itself, it is clear that a group of left-wing officers assassinated six generals and attempted to kill Army Chief of Staff Nasution, but instead killed his six-year-old daughter while the general escaped. Most studies also agree that the conspiring officers had met earlier with the general secretary of the PKI, who was apparently in on the plot. The goals of the conspirators remain in doubt. The conspirators themselves argued that they had acted to prevent what they said was a planned military coup to overthrow the Sukarno government. In the government account, the assassinations were the opening wedge of what was to be a full-scale revolution that would have begun with the army and extended throughout the country were it not for the quick reaction of General Suharto. Still another interpretation is that the conspirators had a more limited intra-military agenda. The youngest branch within the armed forces, the air force, was considered close to the PKI, as was the navy. The police and intelligence services were most firmly anti-communist, with the army leaning in that direction. If, as the leaders of the coup suggested, they were acting to forestall a coup from the right, there is little evidence that such a maneuver was imminent. But the coup's more limited objective might well have been to change this balance of power by taking over the army and by extension ABRI as a whole. Still another possibility, somewhat more remote, envisages the plotters as having been lured into an elaborate trap. Noting that Suharto—despite being second-in-command to Nasution, anti-communist and in recent contact with at least one of the assassins—was not targeted, it has been suggested that the whole plot was a devious scheme on the part of the general to seize power by setting up the conspirators in a plot he knew would fail but open his own road to power. The only member of the conspiracy not immediately executed testified that Suharto had been informed in advance of the plot; however, his subsequent refusal to elaborate on this explosive statement has left this charge up in the air.[27] The most parsimonious of these theories—that the coup was an intra-military matter, not intended to serve as the kick-off to a larger communist plot—probably makes the most sense in the absence of any indication that subsequent action was planned; however, there simply isn't enough evidence decisively to support (or reject) any of these theories.[28]

The second area of continuing disagreement surrounds the nature and extent of the subsequent violence. In the early days, the killings were largely

orchestrated and orderly. "There was paperwork, a bureaucracy of murder. You can't say this was communal conflict among naturally violent people."[29] Dossiers were compiled that listed suspects in three categories: an "A" list of PKI leaders to be instantly arrested and/or killed; secondary PKI suspects to be incarcerated without trial (or killed if they resisted); and other suspicious individuals, such as union leaders and leftist intellectuals, to be arrested and held for trial. The US embassy was asked for, and provided the names of at least 5,000 suspects. General Wibowo, head of the Red Berets who conducted many of the attacks, once boasted that they had eliminated nearly three million communists, a number that few find credible.[30] Official government figures have ranged between 78,000 and one million dead, plus another million to one and a half million imprisoned. In the official account, many if not most of the murders were committed by angry citizens. There were many such killings, some at the direct urging of the military, and some which took place spontaneously some months later when it became clear that murders committed under the banner of anti-communism would not be punished. A number of studies have suggested that Islamic organizations actively arranged killing parties, although curiously the murder rate was as high in largely Hindu Bali as in Muslim areas. Particularly in the year following the early days of terror, mass and individual murders of convenience were committed to settle old scores: landlords who had lost plots in the Sukarno land reforms killed their tenants and repossessed the land; a mine operator whose work force had been unionized under government pressure had the union leaders executed as communists (which many probably were). How much vigilante violence there actually was, and there was a lot, has almost certainly been exaggerated. As Anderson says:

> The strategy of involving large numbers of civilians in the massacres achieved two goals. First it allowed the military to announce, and a good number of foreign reporters to believe, that the citizens had "run amok" on a vast scale. Second, it ensured that there would never be any investigation of the killings, since blood was on too many civilian hands.[31]

The full story of these events will never emerge. Many of the reports, documents and military dispatches of the period were systematically destroyed, and the newspaper and periodical collections of Indonesian libraries have no existing records of it.[32] More importantly, as Anderson argues, neither the victims nor those with blood on their hands wish to revisit this hideous period of their lives. With notable recent exceptions, the topic is not discussed.

Whatever the actual truth, there is little doubt that the movement's suppression was a defining moment for the country. From its inception, the new:

> regime incessantly drilled the event into the minds of the populace by every means of state propaganda: textbooks, monuments, street names,

> films, museums, commemorative rituals, and national holidays ... depicting the PKI as ineffably evil. The claim that the PKI organized the movement was, for the Suharto regime, not an ordinary fact, it was *the* supreme fact of history from which the very legitimacy of the regime was derived."[33]

Anti-communism became the mantra of what Suharto called his "New Order." His first step was to consolidate his own power, thus easing Sukarno and his supporters out of the picture. As Suharto was a relatively junior and unknown member of the military brass, most of the remaining senior officers assumed that he would share power, or that perhaps, with the emergency over, power would simply flow back up the chain of command to Nasution. It never happened. Nor did the New Order make any dramatic changes to the system of Guided Democracy as it had evolved under Sukarno. In contrast to Sukarno's populism, pluralism and balancing of the diverse groups represented in the legislature, Suharto epitomized unity and order. It began with the military. In the army, where Suharto had his roots, this meant isolating or transferring officers loyal to Sukarno and replacing them with cronies. The air force, a bastion of Sukarno support, was thoroughly purged, while the navy, which was also largely loyal to Sukarno, was gradually brought to heel. Through political maneuvering between late 1965 and March 1967 Suharto and his supporters in the army not only purged the armed forces, but also cleared the civil service of pro-Sukarno elements.[34]

Fully accepting Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, Suharto spent his first two years in office moving slowly but methodically to consolidate his power within this framework. Having given Suharto emergency power to restore order, Sukarno was essentially isolated in his summer palace until 1968 when the legislature officially elected Suharto president. The general was thus able to get rid of his rival without establishing a precedent of impeachment (which Nasution and others had recommended), and without violating the constitution. The New Order also adopted and expanded a Sukarno-initiated project of giving special recognition to "functional groups," such as lawyers, civil servants, farmers and members of the military. Foremost among these was Golkar (a short form for "functional groups" in Indonesian), an organization that had been founded by military leaders in 1964 to bring together regional and national government officials in opposition to the PKI. Civil servants were required "to demonstrate loyalty to Golkar rather than to political parties, breaking up the nexus of the parties' control over the bureaucracy."[35] Through its affiliation with Golkar, ABRI was able to legitimatize the role many of its officers had assumed in the 1965 purge as local and provincial governors. Although farmers and some workers were also classified as functional groups, Golkar, dominated by civilian and military officeholders, was in effect a government party.

The 1945 Constitution was almost unique in its fungibility. Its nested two-house parliament had a core legislative body (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat,

or DPR as the People's Representative Council was known in Indonesia) which met regularly to enact laws, pass budgets, oversee the bureaucracy and essentially act as a legislature. It also formed the core of the larger Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR— People's Consultative Assembly), which was, in theory, the supreme governing body of the country with the power to elect the president, issue "guidelines" on state policies and amend the constitution. Despite the purging of its PKI members, the DPR and the MPR remained divided bodies. Although they named Suharto Acting President (in 1967) and elected him to a full term in 1968, a bill (sponsored by Nasution) to strip the presidency of some of its powers was seriously considered. In 1969 Suharto began the full consolidation of his power by having Nasution voted out of his chairmanship of the MPR, and reconstituting the legislature by adding 100 members from "functional groups" appointed by the president. Particularly important in consolidating power was the military, which strengthened its territorial structure by placing active and retired military personnel in leadership positions at every level of government, in provincial as well as the national legislature, in administrative positions in what had been civilian agencies, and even in the Supreme Court. "About half of the provincial governors and one-third of district heads had military backgrounds."[36]

It also undertook an educational mission, both for its own members and for the general public that stressed the importance of national unity and continued vigilance against the threats of communism, liberalism, militant Islam and separatism. Despite the fact that the Muslim parties and social organizations had supported Suharto's coup and enthusiastically joined the fight against communism, they were kept at arm's length by the New Order:

> No one was repressed more harshly than the communists. But from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s militant Islamists were the second most important target of coercion by Suharto through the armed forces. Former leaders of Masyumi were not allowed to return to politics. Other Muslim leaders deemed too independent were purged. Muslim daily newspapers were closed down or taken over. Preachers in mosques were closely watched and subjected to interrogation. Even so, "green scares" were common, as the regime exaggerated the threat posed by small-scale, highly localized Islamic cults in order to justify repressing them.[37]

The New Order's anti-communist stance and accompanying turn to the West in foreign policy was accompanied by an equally strong reversal of Sukarno's socialization of the economy. Working with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and a group of largely US academic advisors, free enterprise and deregulation became the order of the day. Buckets of foreign aid and investments poured in to restore the free market. But although some of the nationalized corporations and plantations were restored to their previous owners, most were distributed among the regime's supporters and the military.[38] As in the Dutch colonial period, the line between government

and business became increasingly blurred as the administration used its powers of licensing, taxing, subsidization and spending to decide which players would be allowed to sit in on the feast. As the state monopolies were disbanded, "they forged increasingly complex and extensive business empires based on partnerships between the politico-business families, big Chinese conglomerates and foreign investors."[39] Ignited by the privatization of inefficient state monopolies, and fueled by massive injections of foreign aid and a fortuitous spike in oil prices, the economy took off.

Having eliminated the political left, the remaining threat to the political, business and military elite was the potentially disruptive force of Islamic militancy. In helping to eliminate the secular left and pushing Sukarno to the sidelines, many Islamic leaders expected if not a full implementation of the Jakarta Charter at least some moves in that direction. Despite a poor showing in the 1971 elections—won overwhelmingly but not necessarily fairly by Golkar—Muslim organizations were firmly established as the only viable alternatives to the New Order. In 1966, in what was widely seen as a payback, they had managed to get a law passed mandating religious education in the public schools. At the same time, the various political manifestations of Islam were constrained by a ban on all but political parties: Golkar; the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP—United Development Party), which combined the four Islamic parties that had competed in the 1971 elections; and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI—Democratic Party of Indonesia), which combined the secular parties with Christians and Hindus. A decade later, all parties were required to embrace Pancasila as their official ideology in order to run candidates. As Adam Schwartz has noted, these attempts to defuse Islam as a political force had the ironic effect of strengthening its communual roots. Particularly on university campuses, as Schwartz observed, "the New Order government's efforts to depoliticize Indonesia have driven many to look to Islam as an alternative political arena," with the result, as one activist put it, that "all the activity is now funneled to the mosque."[40] This movement was formally recognized in 1984 when Abdurrahman Wahid, then head of the Islamist NU, "argued that as the New Order did not allow political discourse, membership in the PPP and participating in the charade of politics was actually destructive and distracted the NU from accomplishing its goals."[41]

The decline and fall of the New Order

The stronger and more unified the New Order seemed at the top, the more it was losing its grip on the country at large. Part of the slippage was sewn into the very fabric of regimes built on patronage and pelf. The problem, as one US politician once sagely suggested, is that when you choose one person to get a good job or a lucrative contract you create three disgruntled enemies and one ingrate. Even within the governing elite there was unhappiness with the increasing tendency toward a "sultanistic" state, one in which decisions are

arbitrarily subject to the despotic intervention of a single individual, often acting to aggrandize his own personal fortunes and those of his family. Tommy Suharto, son of the dictator, was an exemplar of these tendencies with a long wake of insider deals, many of which went wrong. Perhaps the most extensive in its impact was the clove fiasco of the early 1990s. Clove-based cigarettes, known as *kretek*, are ubiquitous in Indonesia. A handful of ethnic Chinese families had controlled much of the *kretek* business for generations until a group of entrepreneurs enlisted Suharto in an attempt to monopolize the wholesale market. In 1990 Tommy persuaded the minister of trade to appoint his company as the sole agent for cloves, then immediately doubled the price paid to farmers (securing their support and encouraging them to plant more trees) and quadrupling the price charged to manufacturers. The deal was financed out of a special fund in the central bank set aside to help farmers. By the end of 1991 the company had more than two years' supply of cloves in its warehouses. Tommy's solution was to push parliament for a law requiring all clove farmers to burn half of their stocks. This was too much, even for the rubber-stamp parliament, which did, however, prohibit all clove sales until Tommy's stock was gone, thus forcing most competitors out of business.[42]

The clove case was extreme in its scope, but all too typical of New Order politics, making economists and investors both inside and outside the country increasingly wary to the point of jeopardizing economic growth. In an ironic twist, often found in rapidly developing economies, the New Order was also in a sense a victim of its own success. There was enough in the trickle-down from the fantastic wealth of the politico-economic elite to create a rapidly growing middle class and a revolution of rising expectations. With education and affluence, modernist Muslims became increasingly articulate yet frustrated in their social, economic and political marginalization. With characteristic shrewdness, Suharto sought to co-opt this growing wave of discontent by creating a new Muslim organization known as the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) and to tilt toward the movement with a number of reforms. Between 1990 and 1993:

> Suharto approved the founding of an Islamic bank, expansion of the authority of Islamic courts, the lifting of the prohibition on the Islamic veil (*jilbab*) in schools, the founding of an Islamic newspaper, the abolition of the state-run sports lottery, greater Muslim programming on television, increased funding for Muslim schools, and the replacement of the Catholic head of the armed forces with generals more sympathetic to Islam. Conservative modernists applauded these concessions. Reform-minded Muslims countered that Islam's highest values could be realized only through democratic reform.[43]

Despite these maneuvers, by the middle of the 1990s the New Order had become a house of cards. Its solid base in the military and bureaucracy was

weakened by its tilt toward Islam, a force too divided to be reliable. Economically, corruption had become so pervasive as to discourage investment and alarm foreign investors. The regime's support for the military's brutal repression of the East Timor independence movement served further to alienate Western supporters. Pressure for reform increased throughout the 1990s particularly among college students. Protests against the New Order in the 1970s had been diffused by a combination of direct disciplinary actions, the banning of political organizations and more subtle changes, such as isolating most college campuses outside of downtown areas. However, as one observer puts it, Indonesia was "saved from genuinely totalitarian rule by general incapacity and pervasive incompetence."[44] Student groups in the 1980s developed "alternative political vehicles," as Aspinall describes them, including a rich variety of study groups that seldom produced direct action but created a more open and critical political culture; a restrained, but increasingly critical student press; and cooperation with a variety of off-campus civic associations.[45] As is common in developing societies, a growing middle class in Indonesia produced a concomitant proliferation of civic associations interested in issues ranging from the environment to women's rights and poverty. Similarly to the ICMI many of these groups were ostensibly apolitical, more interested in analysis than advocacy; however, the line between studying issues and working to change them becomes blurry indeed. The administration, moreover, had grown confident enough in its power to allow some opposition voices to be heard, and greater population mobility, the spread of traditional media such as television and the rise of new media had given opposition voices new chances to be heard.

There was, however, a strange reluctance to act. Even when the economic bubble burst, the rupiah lost much of its value and per capita GDP fell by 34 percent in two years,[46] Indonesia remained "a nation in waiting."[47] There were, to be sure, numerous rumblings of discontent: as early as the 1980s a "petition of 50" had been sent to the DPR by a number of retired politicians, community leaders, clergymen and military officers (including Nasution). Although some had been arrested, lost their pensions and passports, and been banned from the media, they reappeared in 1993 with another call for greater openness. Land disputes erupted with increasing frequency, and even in the usually understated official statistics, 350 industrial work stoppages occurred in 1996 compared to just nineteen in 1989.[48] At the MPR meeting in 1993, the military succeeded in installing one of its own as vice president; but as the economy slowed and a new generation of officers slowly replaced the aging generation of independence movement leaders, neither ABRI nor Golkar was a unified force. The Islamic community was also divided. Abdurrahman Wahid slowly but surely had moved NU into full support of pro-Suharto candidates in the 1997 elections; but Muhammadiah was cautiously edging toward outward opposition, and even within Habibie's ICMI there was growing concern with the risk of identifying too closely with a government that was both losing its popularity and increasing its resistance to reform.

Perhaps the most serious challenge before the collapse of the economy, however, came neither from the military nor the Muslim community but from a resurgent PDI.

The PDI, though subject to numerous constraints, had an organizational structure and official place in the system that nongovernmental advocacy groups could not match. Although organizationally depleted, and dependent on government patronage, it had a strong grassroots following in an informal network of former Sukarno supporters from the old Nationalist Party, and from young people drawn to the Sukarno legend. During Indonesia's relatively brief period of open elections, most students of Indonesian politics found Clifford Geertz's term *aliran* (literally a stream) useful to describe Indonesian voters' tendencies to form networks of like-minded groups stretching across large regions. In these unorganized sociological streams of cultural and political linkages, Sukarnoist nationalists were united as much in their opposition to religious Muslims as in their own *abangan*[49] or less orthodox Muslim orientations:

> One glue that kept the old *aliran* base of the party alive was a distinct sense of cultural identity. The PDI prompted a secular nationalist appeal which stressed integrative symbols like Pancasila. Two of the parties which joined the PDI in 1973 were Christian. The PNI itself had received strong support in communities like the largely Protestant Bataks of North Sumatra and Balinese Hindus; in Java it was strongly identified with the nonorthodox Muslim *abangan* cultural variant.[50]

What suddenly brought these deep streams to the surface was the unexpected candidacy in 1993 of Megawati Sukarnoputri for leadership of the PDI. Megawati herself was anything but a known quantity, but as Sukarno's daughter she became a symbol to the old nationalists of what might have been and to the young of what might yet be. Ironically her candidacy was prompted by Suharto's own determination to oust the incumbent head of the PDI, who had used the party's strong showing in the 1992 parliamentary elections to call for electoral reforms.

When the party conference met it was clear that Megawati was its overwhelming choice, but as with all New Order parties, the key party leaders were largely loyal to the regime. The result of the conflict between the leadership and the delegates turned the convention into a circus in which delays, blackouts, brawls and walkouts ended at midnight of its last session with Megawati proclaiming herself the de facto chairperson. A triumphant tour of the country confirmed her popularity, leading to speculation that she might challenge Suharto for the presidency at the MPR meeting in 1998. With help from segments of the army, a challenge to Megawati pushed her out of the party leadership at the disputed PDI convention in 1996. Megawati struck back with a lawsuit challenging the result and launching a daily "free speech forum" that was soon joined by student groups and various NGOs. ABRI

responded by labeling the growing movement a security threat and calling for a halt. When troops took over the PDI's Jakarta headquarters riots ensued following which some 200 demonstrators were arrested or disappeared. Linking the PDI and its supporters with communism and an illegal "ghost" party of communist sympathizers, the military so overplayed its hand that it produced a split in its ranks. By "intensifying the conflict between various retired officers and the current military leadership" the attack on the PDI led to "the first systematic demands in the history of the New Order for *dwifungsi* reform."[51] Thus, "in a pattern common to many authoritarian regimes which pull back after limited liberalization, the return to coercion failed to end opposition, but instead galvanized it."[52]

Although the puppet leadership of the PDI fielded a full slate in the 1997 parliamentary elections, its campaign was a farce. Party candidates found empty halls at their rallies or were confronted by hostile, pro-Megawati crowds: its vote total fell to three and a half million from fourteen and a half million in 1992. With just eleven seats in the DPR, compared with 89 for the Muslim PPP and 325 for Golkar, it was no longer a political force. Thus although many of those who filled appointed seats in the MPR were no longer blind supporters of the regime, Suharto's reelection in 1998 was assured. More importantly, the aging president, suffering from a variety of maladies, was able to pick his own successor, his long-time friend B. J. Habibie. And instead of attempting to reach accommodations with the reformers, Suharto installed a very narrow group of loyalists in his cabinet.

The reelection by the MPR of Suharto and the appointment of Habibie as his vice president occurred in the context of widespread student demonstrations. But "although political tensions were building and oppositional sentiment was widespread, organized opposition remained weak. No vehicle could claim to be a viable alternative government, or even unite a broad spectrum of opposition groups on an explicit democratic platform."[53] Students, however, had developed an organizational base, and, by the 1990s were able to communicate with each other via Internet social media that obviated the need for central meeting places. The demonstrations fed upon themselves, particularly when there were clashes with the police that were widely reported in an increasingly uninhibited press. Consciously borrowing from the example of the student-initiated overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines, Indonesian students depicted the struggle less in terms of ideology than "people power," the masses versus the elite.[54] And as student protests spread other reformers found their voices.

The turning point in the regime's downward spiral came in May 1998 when a group of demonstrators from the elite Trisakti University were fired upon by the army, killing four. The immediate response was still larger demonstrations throughout the country, a student occupation of the parliament building in Jakarta and increasing calls from previously silent political leaders for Suharto to step down. The president's attempts to promise reforms were—almost in a matter of days—too little too late. "In the words of one

anonymous figure who was requested to join the reform committee which President Suharto proposed on May 19 as part of his attempt to stay in power, 'Are you crazy? The people will burn down my house.'"[55] Although most military leaders remained loyal (or at least quiet) until the end, the civilian establishment—perhaps mindful of their post-regime standing—grew increasingly rebellious; and even the military, in the final analysis rejected a last-minute attempt to crack down. When Habibie urged Suharto to resign, he did.

Reformasi

B. J. Habibie took office in the midst of what the World Bank had described as one of the worst economic collapses in recent history. After more than a decade of sustained growth, the economy contracted by almost 14 percent in 1998. As Suharto's hand-picked successor, Habibie had little credibility either with the key financial institutions or the reformers. The military, though divided, was unenthusiastic to the point that some observers openly predicted a military coup. From his years as head of ICMI, Habibie had solid support in parts of the Islamic community, but his close relations with Suharto and the West —he was educated in Germany and lived much of his life there— made him suspect to many. Overwhelming majorities in both houses of the legislature and major figures in the bureaucracy had been hand-picked by Suharto with many of them up to their necks in what Indonesians call KKN (*Korrupsi*, *Kolusi*, *Nepotisme* or Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism). Repelled by army atrocities in East Timor and troubled by a serial collapse of corrupt economic enterprises, many Western governments and foreign investors cut back or eliminated their involvement with Indonesia. Sporadic demonstrations, some of which were violent, took place, and emboldened separatist groups in East Timor, Ache and Papua continued to confront ABRI and the central government. And the coalition that had brought Suharto down lacked either the institutional foundations or positive programs of action for the government to adopt:

> A dissident mentality prevailed in which opposition groups framed their criticisms in moral terms and stressed their aversion to "practical politics" (this was evident in a wide variety of forms, ranging from the "moral force" outlook common among student activists to [the] notion that Muhammadiyah should be concerned only with the "high politics" of speaking out on ethics and morality). Overall, there was a proliferation of quasi- and semi-oppositional activity, combined with considerable organizational fragmentation, ideological ambivalence, and programmatic incoherence.[56]

The more opposition groups refined and purified their own positions, the less they were able to form alliances, leaving room for Habibie to push his own plans of political reform:

> To the surprise of many observers, Habibie quickly and quietly shed his image as a holdover from the authoritarian New Order regime. He wanted his presidency, he said, to be known as the Reform Order, and in fact he oversaw some important reforms. Habibie even had the gloss of a democrat: releasing political prisoners ... ending press censorship, tolerating the birth of new political parties, showing flexibility on the issue of East Timor and other troubled provinces such as Aceh and Papua.[57]

In November 1998 Habibie called a special session of the MPR, the same MPR that just eight months earlier had reelected Suharto. With an alacrity that took many observers by surprise, the legislature not only accepted these reforms but began serious work on its own. One of its first acts was to bring the date of the next general election forward from 2002 to 1999, and begin work on formulating a law on political parties that would open up the process. Though it refused simply to abolish the seats in the DPR allocated to the armed forces, they were reduced from 100 to seventy-five and then, in 1999, to thirty-eight. There were comparable reductions in the numbers of seats allocated to "functional groups" in the MPR and in provincial legislatures. A major, and still controversial, decentralization law was also enacted in 1999. Within the New Order, there were five levels of government—national, provincial, regional, sub-regional and local—of which the last four were essentially administrative. The lower-level governments existed, in essence, to enforce and implement decisions made in Jakarta. The new law gave a great deal of autonomy, and the funding to make it viable, to the regional governments known as regencies.

As it became clear that the Habibie government was sincere in its commitment to reform, the frequency and intensity of student demonstrations declined. Many reformers continued to believe that Habibie's gradual approach would not work, that without a thorough overhaul of the political system and the economy it would be business as usual and that KKN would continue to sap the system. Another source of opposition, from the radical Islamists, intensified as it became clear that Islamic law, in the form of the defeated Jakarta Convention, was not on the agenda.

The last days of the New Order, moreover, had witnessed some violent demonstrations, many of them directed at largely Christian, ethnic Chinese neighborhoods. The fall of the regime further unleashed such conflicts: "From 1998 onwards the lack of faith in state institutions such as the police meant that local militias and vigilantes took over," as Vickers puts it. In some areas, he continues:

> conflicts revolved around ethnicity, the most horrifying examples of which were attacks led by ethnic Dayaks against internal migrants or transmigrants, particularly Madurese. ... Local politicians used such assertions to attempt to gain control over local resources. ... Violence was

> an easy tool to use if, like many military and political leaders, one wanted to destabilize the government and assert one's right to control.[58]

A perceived vacuum at the top, in other words, gave license to opportunistic power seekers at the grassroots. Particularly in smaller island communities, such as Ambon and Maluku, where a delicate balance between Christians and Muslims had long prevailed, new patterns of migration upset these numerical ratios and brought in new residents who were not part of the tacit agreements that had sustained decades of peaceful coexistence. The fight to keep the newcomers out could easily be turned into a fight against all people of their faith or ethnicity.

Sidney Jones argues that these conflicts were actually operating on two related tracks. The more visible set, involving conflicts such as those between the Dayaks and Madurese, was vividly played out in the media. It involved "the emergence of militant Muslim groups as major actors instead of bit players in Jakarta politics" and sometimes involved the security forces in curbing and sometimes provoking communal violence.[59] In some cases, private militias—criminal gangs essentially—were set up to settle old scores. The first of Jones' two tracks began as the New Order was collapsing, fueled by the dwindling economy and the fragmentation of state authority. A United Nations-supported study of this period found that the number of incidents and fatalities due to social violence during the transition period reached a peak in 1999–2000. It increased from just 131 deaths in 1997 to 1,343 in 1998, and 1,813 in 1999; however, it then declined to 1,617 in 2000 and 1,065 in 2002. Although thousands died in these conflicts, and as many as one million people were displaced, these eruptions gradually wound down and never reached the point—as in places like Bosnia, Somalia and the Sudan—where they escalated into ever larger circles of mutual recrimination.

More important, Jones argues, was what she defines as a second, less visible track of violence within Indonesia. Centering on the militant Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), there was an extension of a network north into the insurgent Muslim Mindanao area of the Philippines and over into Malaysia. Some JI members believed that with Suharto's fall the possibility for an Islamic revolution was at hand or that at least there was a window of opportunity to build an Islamic state. The outbreak of the Ambon conflict for them was an unexpected bonus in this regard because it allowed JI to put its teachings on jihad into practice in a way that could serve these larger goals by attracting new recruits and giving them combat experience.[60]

Although some of these recruits have moved on to other conflict-prone countries (Syria has apparently received significant numbers) and have never posed serious challenge to the state, their continuing ability to attract attention and arouse public anxieties have recurred in widely reported bombings of a nightclub in Bali, hotels in Jakarta and at the Australian embassy in Jakarta. Since 2010, however, a declining number of terrorist attacks have been directed almost entirely against the police.

Not all of the emerging violence had ethnic or religious roots. The demise of the New Order meant that "the boundaries of identities and interests in Indonesian society, long determined by a fixed, hierarchical source of recognition firmly anchored in the state and centered in Jakarta, were left in flux."[61] An outpouring of anti-Western sentiment in response to what were felt to be attacks on Islam in Afghanistan and Iraq led many Indonesians to sympathize with the terrorists. In the wake of the Bali bombings, for example, "bizarre conspiracy theories appeared in the Indonesian media to explain the event—like 9/11, the Bali bombings were said in the press to have been caused by the Western-Jewish-Chinese-Masonic plot to discredit Islam."[62] When the police were able clearly to link the 2002 Bali bombings to Islamic terrorists, however, it "shocked Indonesians out of their complacency toward the reality of religiously motivated terror."[63] Leaders of virtually all of the country's major religious groups spoke out against violence, and the opening of channels of legitimate dissent brought grievances into the open that might previously have smoldered into violence. Contemporary Indonesia's murder rate of 8.1 per 100,000 persons is higher than the world average of 6.9 (or the US rate of 4.7), but far below the average rates in the majority of the southern hemisphere countries.

In general, the country's extraordinary fragmentation has become more political and less violent, a fragmentation clearly reflected in the party system. As the 1999 elections approached, literally hundreds of parties sought certification with forty-eight finally qualifying. Habibie's fate was sealed when Golkar—despite financial advantages, institutional power and thorough organization—won fewer than 100 seats and 22 percent of the vote. The big winner was Megawati's Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P—Democratic Party of Struggle), an offshoot of the old PDI—that won a third of the popular vote and 135 of the 500 seats; however, the party leader never actively pushed her candidacy for president. Three moderate Islamic parties that won a combined total of just over 30 percent of the popular vote coalesced around Abdurrahman Wahid for president and Amien Rais for chair of the DPR and were able to win majority support.

Despite his adept outmaneuvering of Megawati, Wahid, known by his nickname Gus Dur, was not a popular choice, and, after a day of resumed rioting, was forced to accept Sukarno's daughter as vice president and appoint a cabinet representing a broad spectrum of uneasy allies. Always unpredictable and sometimes too clever for his own good, Wahid was also blind, diabetic and the recovering victim of two crippling strokes. His wavering policies on the conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, Papua and the Malukus brought him into growing conflict with the military and parliament. Hoping to strengthen his hand, Wahid relied increasingly on a small circle of personal advisors, distancing himself from both the cabinet and the DPR. In his first year and a half in office he replaced more than half of the cabinet, thus destroying the multi-party coalition that had put him in office. Long a model of probity, he protected some of the country's more notorious grafters,

allowed his own cronies and family members to become rich, and proved surprisingly reluctant to recover the substantial state assets appropriated by the Suharto family.

Failing to explain the worst scandals in his government, Wahid was censured by the DPR. To salvage his government, he agreed to reshuffle his cabinet and to allow Megawati to run its meetings. Within weeks, however, he again played musical chairs with the ministries and, without consulting Megawati, replaced all the Golkar and PDI-P ministers with his own people. The DPR then voted for a special session of the MPR for the purpose of calling the president to account. Although the 1945 Constitution was vague on the issue, this was generally considered a preliminary move toward impeachment. Wahid's response was to issue a state of emergency and call upon the armed forces to head off the expected "coup." The army did indeed circle the presidential mansion, but pointed their guns inward, not outward. On July 21, 2001, 591 of the 600 members attending the meeting of the MPR voted to dismiss the president and replace him with Megawati. After a few days of bargaining, the choice for vice president boiled down to a conflict between a reformist army general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Hamzah Haz, leader of the most conservative of the three largest Islamic parties. Haz—notable for having declared that Megawati, as a woman, was unfit to be President—won. It probably did not help Yudhoyono that his candidacy was endorsed by Gus Dur.

The decline and fall of Gus Dur was in a sense the triumph of the old New Order. Almost three-fifths of the MPR members who voted to impeach were carry overs from the pre-*reformasi* MPR; most of the others had held office during the New Order. Wahid's incessant cabinet reshuffles can be viewed as evidence of political ineptitude and unwillingness to compromise, or as a highly principled attempt to break up the patronage system it embodied. Either way, it was not a success, and it left the country in a state of doubt as to whether *reformasi* would succeed. In this environment, the ascension of Megawati Sukarnoputri to the presidency—if nothing else—provided, through the blood link to the country's founding presidency, a comforting sense of continuity. Her leadership style, as one close observer put it, "was seen as bland and compliant. But after the repression of the Suharto years, the interim presidency of Habibie, and the chaos of Abdurrahman Wahid's abbreviated term in office, it also meant that Megawati's presidency was seen by many Indonesians, at least initially, as reassuring."[64] During her five years as president, Megawati had few programmatic victories, but there was a gradual return to normalcy. Violence decreased, the economy rebounded to pre-crisis levels and beyond. Moreover, her ready willingness to cooperate with the United States in its post-9/11 "war on terror" improved relations with the West and brought tangible help in the restoration of military aid suspended in the wake of the military's brutal repression of the independence movement in East Timor.

Slouching toward democracy

Having rejected Habibie and impeached Wahid, the legislature was clearly at the zenith of its power,[65] an ascendency that few felt would endure. The contrast between its rubber-stamp status in 1998 and its emergence as a major player in 2001 was remarkable. In effect, it "changed a presidential system with parliamentary characteristics into one in which the parliamentary characteristics were more evident"[66] While many reformers were disappointed at the failure to seek total revision of the 1945 Constitution, the MPR passed amendments to nine of its thirty-seven articles. Collectively considered, these amendments strengthened the legislature and the judiciary at the expense of the executive; established a separately elected presidency, limited to two terms; required legislative advice and consent for major executive appointments; defined the grounds for presidential impeachment and required judicial review of the process; made all seats in both legislative chambers elective; gave constitutional force to the legislature's investigatory powers; separated the Indonesian National Army (renamed the Tentara Nasional Indonesia—TNI) from the police, and gave the legislature the power to define and regulate its respective powers. The revised constitution also included many provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; created a Constitutional Court; clarified the new political and economic powers of local and provincial legislatures; and created a regionally based, less partisan Dewan Peraklian Daerah (DPD, or second house of parliament), which has only limited veto powers, but has the legitimacy of a popular mandate.[67] And in a move quite possibly unique in the history of legislatures, the MPR then proceeded virtually to abolish itself.

As remarkable as the new vigor of the legislature was the atmosphere of transparency within which its deliberations took place. Under the skilled (and still underappreciated) leadership of Jakob Tobing, the MPR's Ad Hoc Commission on Constitutional Reform held numerous hearings and consulted widely with scholars, politicians and representatives of a variety of civic organizations. While the step-by-step process of amendment denied the nation a constitutional moment and failed to arouse the kind of public attention it warranted, the final product was a framework for governing that is workable and basically democratic.[68] These new institutions, however, were erected on a foundation that was shaky at best:

> In mid-1998, when President Suharto resigned his office, not a single principal institution of the state remained reasonably healthy. Corruption, incompetence, misorientation, and organizational breakdown were characteristic. The courts, prosecution, and police were underfunded and self-funded. All had been subjugated by political authority since at least 1960 and allowed substantial leeway, within the terms of their subordination, to fend for themselves. Legal process had little integrity left, as was equally true of public policy.[69]

As in many badly governed societies, there was (and remains) substantial sentiment for a strong leader who was able to cut through these knots to "restore" order and rectitude. Thus a key issue for the Reform Commission was how to choose the president. Many members of the MPR were reluctant to give up their own powers and sincerely concerned that a directly elected president might demagogically assume dictatorial powers. Worse, in Indonesia's fragmented party system, a popular vote might split in so many directions that a regional candidate or an extremist, with as little as 20 or 30 percent of the vote, might win. The solution was a direct popular vote in which only the larger party coalitions could nominate candidates. If no candidate was able to both win a majority and to garner significant support in more than one major region in the country, the two top vote winners would compete in a run-off. In short, "the presidential electoral formula reflected what most Indonesian political leaders had sought persistently to avoid: fragmentation, on the one hand, Javanese domination or Islamic domination on the other."[70]

The 2004 election, the first under the new rules, began in April with elections to the DPR, the new DPD and the regional and provincial legislatures. Twenty-four parties qualified to run for seats in the DPR. Those identified as Islamic increased their share of the vote to 21.2 percent, up from 17.7 percent in 1999, largely on the basis of the youthful Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS—Prosperous Justice Party), which won 7.3 percent.[71] Also new was the Partai Demokrat (PD—Democratic Party), formed in support of the presidential candidacy of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly known as SBY). More than 70 percent of the new DPR's members were new, with nearly half (237 out of 550) from either Golkar or the PDI-P. Significantly, even with the PKS, Islam was not an issue. As the legislature convened, the representatives increasingly divided themselves between coalitions supporting the presidential campaigns of Megawati on the one hand and SBY on the other.

The 2004 elections displayed the continuing fluidity of Indonesia's nascent party system. In addition to Yudhoyono's PD, five other parties entered candidates for the presidency: Wahid failed a physical test and was disqualified, leaving the contest to Megawati; former Suharto military aide, General Wiranto of Golkar; DPR speaker Amien Rais, supported by many moderate Islamists; and Hamzah Haz, supported only by his own Islamic party. Yudhoyono defeated Megawati in a run-off and more easily won reelection in 2009, taking more than 60 percent of the vote in the first round. Particularly in 2009, the president's victory was largely personal, having little or no connection with traditional regional, cultural or religious divisions. (Muslim, but secular in style—the wives of neither SBY nor his running mate wore veils, for example—the ticket carried Islamist Aceh with 87 percent.[72]) His PD, riding the president's popularity, became the largest party in the DPR with 148 of the seats (26.4 percent), followed by Golkar with 105 (down 22 seats from 2004) and the PDI-P with 94 (down 15). The PKS won 57 seats to become

the fourth largest party in the DPR. This party—widely thought to have been inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and to harbor a hidden preference for a sharia state—drew support as much from its anti-corruption credentials as from its Islamism. Its calls for clean government, along with SBY's promise to invigorate a new Corruption Eradication Commission gave promise to reformers.

Yudhoyono, as Indonesia's first directly elected president, appeared to have a clear mandate; however, although his personal victory was substantial, his party had nothing close to a working majority in the DPR. SBY's post-New Order predecessors, having been elected by the parliament, consulted with its leaders in forming their cabinets, and although Yudhoyono would seemingly have been able to act more independently, it was not to be. The DPR's party leaders control intra-parliamentary patterns of advancement, networks of corruption and candidate recruitment. Not only *can* an MP be dismissed by party leaders, but quite a few *have* actually been expelled, not on policy grounds but for failure to toe the line. The DPR's eleven policy committees have relatively broad jurisdictions and large memberships of between 35 and 55 members each, balancing party ratios roughly in proportion to those of the plenary, and allocating chairmanships through negotiations among the leaders of the dominant parties. Their jurisdictions closely coincide with the organization of the president's cabinet, but the constitutional definitions of the respective powers of the legislative and executive branches are far from clear. Article 20A of the constitution, for example, states that "the DPR holds the power to make laws," but also provides that "each bill is discussed by the DPR and the President to reach joint agreement," and it forbids the reintroduction of bills that have not been negotiated. Thus although the constitution does not formally grant presidential veto powers, he or she can effectively defeat a bill simply by refusing to appoint a minister to negotiate it. Lawmaking is thus a shared process in which the president and department heads play a very active role in both drafting and refining bills. Compounding the problem of tracing the lines of division between the executive and the legislature, a long tradition of deliberation and consensus makes it extraordinarily difficult to trace the locus of decision making. Both in committee and plenary, formal votes are rare and decisions almost always unanimous. "All political systems," as Slater puts it:

> are largely driven by backroom maneuvers, but what is striking in the Indonesian context is the abject unwillingness of ostensibly democratic political elites to discuss even the gist of their discussions after they reenter the public sphere. Even after clearly well-planned discussions among party leaders, participants almost universally claim that it was only a *silaturahmi* (a friendly social call), and not a political negotiation at all.[73]

These informal meetings are at the core of the legislative process. During the past few years there have been a handful of openly contested votes in the

DPR. In general, however, plenary sessions do not overrule and almost never modify the work of their committees, whose bills, in turn, seldom deviate from agreements approved by party leaders. Committee leaders who negotiate the details of legislation see themselves less as rivals to party leaders than as allies. "The party never has to tell me what do in committee," one committee chair told me in 2002, "because I sit in the leadership meetings that would have to give those orders."[74]

Indonesia inherited from the Dutch an pervasive tradition of rent seeking which was refined and expanded under both Sukarno and Suharto. The concept of KKN is so deeply ingrained in society that President Suharto once described it to the president of the World Bank as something that "in our part of the world, we call family values."[75] There are important instances in which KKN is not a significant factor in politics, and there are times when the DPR has asserted itself in principled terms. In 2004, for example, despite Megawati and the military's objections, it amended a draft military bill that would have increased the TNI's territorial role and allowed its active duty officers to serve in civilian government roles. The DPR bill also denied a presidential proposal that "the Indonesian military be granted the power to take preemptive action measures against groups suspected of threatening national unity before they were capable of launching an armed rebellion."[76] Such instances of independence and principle are, unfortunately, rare, and the general pathways of political corruption are best understood not just in cultural terms but in the context of the overall structure of the system. Although some cabinet members are appointed and retained on the basis of technical competence, most ministries—particularly those known as "wet" because of their access to jobs and money—are allocated by agreement among the leaders of parties in the DPR's dominant coalition. To his credit, SBY pushed hard for and won the creation of a potentially effective, independent Corruption Control Commission; however, its task is formidable.

At the national level, the political cartels that divide cabinet portfolios and committee chairmanships between the established parties have created a system of corporatist subgovernments that is virtually immune to central control. As almost everyone has some cards at the table, there is little incentive for whistle-blowing. The fluid "ideologies" of the parties, moreover, put an electoral premium on the ability of candidates to raise money and deliver patronage and pelf. It is a telling symptom of the pervasiveness of this system that the Islamist PKS—once the fastest-growing party in the DPD, largely on the basis of its "clean" image—has seen some of its top leaders caught in the web of KKN. (One result was that its share of the popular vote, having risen to 7.3 percent in 2004 from 1.4 percent in 1999, was essentially stable in 2009 and rose only slightly in 2014.) An unusual feature of corruption in Indonesia, as Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland have pointed out, is that it involves not only "relations between the state and society but also within the state itself." Even everyday negotiations between the executive and legislature have monetary prices:

> In other words, political horse-trading ... is literally a matter of negotiating prices and payments as part of the outcome. Money politics in Indonesia therefore penetrates much deeper into the state than the pork-barreling associated with electoral politics in many other countries. The informal behaviors that govern the collection and distribution of slush funds have monetized relations even between the organs of the state and created a large political marketplace at its heart.[77]

The pervasiveness this kind of patronage politics is due in large part to the absence of any other overriding basis for party cleavage. With the left eliminated in the 1965 purges, conservative forces have never had to organize a countervailing party. And unlike Turkey, where the division between secularists and more pious Muslims is sharp and long-standing, Indonesia's Muslims range along a broader and far more nuanced continuum. With the exception of the PKS, Indonesia's mainstream parties differ little on issues or in their demographic bases of support, have tenuous organizational bases and exist largely as elite-level networks of distributive politics.

The more things change...

The Indonesian bureaucracy could be described as corrupt by design. The wages of civil servants are ridiculously low, and are set with the expectation that they will be supplemented.[78] Knowing this, it is common for citizens regularly to offer a small fee—almost like a tip in a restaurant—for routine services. Not all such surcharges are voluntary. Most permits, such as driver's licenses, are available for a nominal charge if one is willing to wait two or more months for processing. Applications can be expedited by payment of an extra fee to the individual bureaucrat. In many cases the size of the "bribe" follows a set schedule: X amount for a one-month turnaround, double X for one week and so on (plus, in Jakarta, at least, a special surcharge for citizens of Chinese ethnicity). Mail deliveries, packages especially, frequently arrive with "postage due." It is common for motorists involved in fender-benders to work out their own settlements rather than report to the police, whose unofficial fees can substantially raise the costs to both parties. The same kind of extractive systems that operate at the lower levels of the bureaucracy are also operative at the higher levels and with higher costs. Monopolies and concessions, as in the case of Tommy Suharto and the cloves (see above), are a major source of illicit revenue as are traditional forms of graft such as kickbacks, sweetheart contracts and deliberate failure to enforce traffic violations, business regulations and so on.

The decentralization reforms have compounded the problem, creating, as a popular saying goes, a thousand Suhartos where once there was only one. Early in the days of *reformasi*, a local government civil servant told me of a colleague who had granted a logging permit to a company who had provided a free trip to Hawaii: "A trip to Hawaii!" he snorted, "Ten years ago it would

have cost them 100,000,000 rupiah [roughly $100,000]." Studies estimate that nearly 90 percent of community mining in Indonesia, and two-thirds of the annual timber harvest are illegal.[79] The Corruption Eradication Commission has broken up some very large conspiracies and had an impact on attitudes, but its work has been hampered by the pervasiveness of the problem and the opposition of key actors. Neither the local and national police nor the prosecutors have been of significant help to the Commission, and most courts—widely "perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions in the country"[80]—are openly hostile. The case of Endin v. the three judges is, unfortunately, all too typical. In this case the anti-corruption team had found a witness willing to testify how he had bribed three judges to win a court victory. Using "poorly justified and spurious technical arguments," the Supreme Court acquitted all three judges and in a subsequent case convicted Endin of "criminally defaming the judges by making the original allegations of corruption against them."[81]

In the 1950s "the courts, prosecution, police, and professional advocacy actually worked remarkably well, given post-revolutionary conditions,"[82] but the sorry condition of this once decent legal system remains the most intractable legacy of the New Order. Similarly to the bureaucracy, "The imposition of very low salaries relative to comparable private sector levels ensured that judges would be forced to play by the rules of the franchise if they were to enjoy a standard of living commensurate with their professional status."[83] The orderly system of court reports, inherited from the Dutch, was allowed to fade into disuse, with the result that there are no retrievable precedents to follow; each case is, in effect, decided de novo. If the outcome of court cases is always somewhat unpredictable, in Indonesia it is wildly so. In the worst cases, the corruption of New Order courts was manifest. The late Yap Thian Hien once exposed the system in a Jakarta District Court:

> in which cases were put up to bid among the judges by court chairman Soemadijono and his clerk. They would assess cases on their approximate value when they came in, and then in weekly meetings "auction them off" to the judges who were willing to pay. (Some judges refused to participate in the racket). ... This corruption funnel went all the way up to the Supreme Court and the chief justice.[84]

In essence, the courts were part and parcel of the New Order kleptocracy.

The collapse of educational standards and the abandonment of performance standards and their replacement with arbitrary decision making—not least in the process of professional placement and promotion—all conspired to create judges who were, by natural disposition and professional outlook, comfortable in a subordinate role.[85] Their comfort in that role is manifest in the fact that the government never lost a single case in the forty years of Suharto's rule.

So deeply entrenched was this system of inertia, corruption and incompetence that the courts have been almost impervious to *reformasi.* Beyond the "servant mentality" and "political marginalization" of the justices are issues of "capabilities, faculties, and facilities" such that "the 1998 career judiciary would not have been able to come up with a good reform plan even if it wanted to."[86] Whatever changes there have been, and progress is being made, have been entirely from the outside, particularly with the appointment of new justices. The 2002 appointment of Professor Bagir Manan as chief justice, and the subsequent release of five "blueprints" for reform, laid a solid foundation for reform; although, as the authors of a recent report concluded, the blueprint has "done very little to build the house."[87] Beginning with the Wahid administration, attempts have also been made to bypass the corrupted courts by creating new special courts, the most important of which is the Constitutional Court, which, unfortunately, had virtually no impact on the country's lower courts. The court, moreover, suffered a serious blow to its reputation for integrity in 2013 when its chief justice was arrested by the Corruption Commission on charges of accepting bribes.

Despite the gradually improving quality of the Supreme Court, it has yet to involve itself in what is emerging as the major challenges to rule of law deriving from decentralization. As local courts, created and appointed by local governments, increasingly serve as trial courts, inconsistencies in their rulings raise questions of ethics, equity, competence and efficiency. Even in cases of clear corruption, such as a 2013 case in Bandung where two judges were convicted of taking substantial bribes, the Supreme Court essentially reduced the penalty to time already served. The laws passed by local governments are not regularly subjected to higher review. Though the appropriate ministries or the Supreme Court can theoretically overrule local statutes, in practice "unless a local law seeks to impose a tax or user charge, it is highly unlikely to be reviewed. This is so even if its content breaches fundamental principles of law including human rights, or has otherwise deleterious effects for citizens."[88] The Supreme Court has lacked both the resources and the will to apply the standards of national law to local rulings. Thus despite the limited progress of reform in the national judiciary, it has been even less robust at the local level.

In some ways, the most successful courts in Indonesia have been the Religious Courts with voluntary jurisdiction over many areas of family law. "Contrary to common assumptions about Islamic courts, nearly two-thirds of applicants in the Religious Courts in Indonesia are women. Even more counter-intuitively, the vast majority of women win their cases, most of which are decided procedurally on the basis of codified state versions of sharia."[89] Religious Courts were pioneers in working outside of capital cities to give the poor in remote villages access to legal rulings in cases involving divorce, inheritance and property, and were the first to implement the right to counsel. Access to these courts has increased ten-fold, and they have become the courts of first resort in some areas. Similarly to civilian local courts, however,

they have created an unresolved patchwork of rulings, many of which—appropriately, it can be argued—enforce local customs such as the West Sumatran tradition of matrilinearity, others which may violate some of the basic human rights guaranteed in the constitution. However, few, if any, will ever be reviewed. Special courts, based on religion or local customs, have their roots deep in the colonial past, and it was not until well into the New Order that significant attempts were made to impose some uniformity on rulings governing such issues as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Under the law, all religious court rulings are subject to review both by higher civilian courts or by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but in practice such reviews seldom take place.

The military

In some senses, the most significant contribution of the military to *reformasi* was in letting it happen. By refusing to crack down on rebelling students, it implicitly made Suharto's resignation a matter of course. The seeds for military reform were sown in the generation change that saw Suharto's cadre of high commanders retire or die. The high command that oversaw the 1965 massacres and made anti-communism its mantra was dead or gone thirty-three years later. Thus the reforms which removed the military from its direct role in the political process were not entirely forced upon it. Indeed a portion of the *reformasi* agenda had been anticipated within the military in the years leading up to Suharto's downfall. A group of younger officers had been agitating for a professionalization of the armed forces that would reexamine the *dwi-fungsi* doctrine. The military's direct involvement in politics, they suggested, both eroded its credibility and made it a tool of the patrimonial state. The support of these officers for what was sometimes called the "back-to-basics" movement anticipated *reformasi*'s elimination of direct representation in the legislature. What it manifestly did not include was substantial diminution of the military's independent command structure. In a widely quoted 1990 article, the former General Yudhoyono—one of the leaders in the movement for internal reform—ridiculed what he called the liberal presumption of civilian supremacy, and insisted, as Honna puts it, that the military was "the only institution in Indonesia which was capable of handling security, stability and development in an effective way."[90] By eschewing a direct role in politics, the military could actually uncouple itself from the demoralizing and divisive politics of patronage that had engulfed it during the New Order. Instead of attempting actively to direct Golkar as its own political party, ABRI's "New Paradigm" would stress "influencing" politics instead of "controlling politics," moving from a "direct" to an "indirect role" and "sharing power with civilians."[91]

In his last efforts to remain in power, Suharto leaned toward the reformers. The hard-liners' brutal suppressions of rebellions in East Timor and Aceh, in particular, were beginning to attract both international and domestic

condemnation; to crack down violently on the student demonstrators could have brought the country to the brink of civil war. The military, moreover, seems to have calculated that a peaceful transition to a new president would be less disruptive than a protracted period of uncertainty. But if it is true, as Mietzner argues, that its decision to negotiate Suharto's resignation "made a much larger contribution to the democratic transition than political scientists tend to admit" his suggestion that "its obstructive impact on the subsequent democratic transition has been widely exaggerated"[92] is more controversial. The first four years of *reformasi* clearly witnessed substantial changes, some with the support of a significant segment of the military, and of these the splitting of the police from the army and the loss of its direct representation in parliament were the most significant. What has remained firmly in place, however, is the territorial command structure which has always been the foundation of the military's power. The abandonment of the *dwifungsi* doctrine has not altered the basic entrenchment of the military in Indonesian society:

> First practiced during the guerilla war and institutionalized in the mid-1950s, the territorial units exercised social control and allowed the military to access off-budget funding sources in the regions. Through this system, the armed forces have remained largely independent from central government and civilian control institutions. Maintaining the territorial power base and the financial independence it generated was therefore one of the main interests of the armed forces in the post-Suharto polity. Accordingly, when the military announced its plans for internal reform, the territorial command structure was conspicuously absent.[93]

Decentralization actually enhanced the powers of territorial commanders, in the short run at least, because it distributed funds to arenas in which the armed forces had a competitive advantage. "With political parties struggling to establish a presence at the grassroots, and legislatures and bureaucracies trying to cope with their new roles, the military stood out as the only institution with a widely connected and already tested infrastructure."[94] In 1999 it is estimated that there were 6,800 active members of the military plus another 5,500 retired officers holding office in "civilian" agencies, these in addition to seventy-five members of the DPR and 2,800 non-elected seats in regional legislatures.[95] Despite the severing of some links between military and civilian leaders by splitting the police from the TNI forces, and the ban on their direct involvement in politics, a disproportionately high number of retired officers secured positions of civilian leadership. It is not insignificant, however, that this pattern appears to be progressively less pervasive. Thus, the percentage of retired generals serving as provincial governors had fallen to only 9 percent in 2012 from 50 percent in 1998 and 27 percent in 2005.[96] Although the pattern is less clear at the local level, the military's direct role in politics is clearly in decline.

Despite a 2004 law that ordered the military to give up its business interests by 2009, and a 2009 executive order transferring all remaining enterprises to the government, periodic reports still appear in the press about "invisible" or "disguised" military-run businesses. Many, for example, are in the form of separate companies, associations or foundations whose actual directors are not easily identified; some are illicit; and there are almost certainly a number of small enterprises—some legal and some not—at the local level that are either run by the military or in some form of profit-sharing relationship with it. "Fully elected regional authorities," as Horowitz puts it, "may ultimately undo the benefits to the military of the territorial system, but in the short run the armed forces traded influence at the center for resources at the local level."[97] As with underpaid judges and bureaucrats, a primary cause of the military's entrepreneurial activities is the chronic underfunding of its legitimate budget. Until the Yudhoyono government approved a 30 percent increase in 2013, official military spending had been essentially flat for more than a decade.

During the New Order period, major acts of violence seldom occurred without the active or tacit support of state actors:

> In remote areas of the archipelago—(e.g., Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor ...)—security operations against separatist elements became standard practice, terrorizing many local residents. In urban areas, military repression targeted the press, students, intellectuals and labor and legal activists. ... In the name of establishing a stable political system, ABRI relied on repressive political control with the doctrinal backup of *dwifungsi*.[98]

The military also allowed various freelance militants to settle old scores through the use of violence. In the violence directed against the Communist Party in 1965 a pattern was established in which "actors associated with New Order agencies organized networks of local toughs to deal with political enemies... . By the late 1990s there were many such hybrids of political paramilitarism operating across the country. There was, however, a new ingredient in the formula as well. Now some of the paramilitaries were of a radical Islamist bent."[99]

Religious violence in Indonesia is not new, but it began to take on new dimensions as development and mobile populations upset traditional village life. The strong but variable connections between class, education, religion, ethnicity and violence have made it difficult at times to isolate any single causal connection. Violence, as Sidel has argued, "may be 'religious' in very different senses: both the perpetrators and the targets may vary in the nature and extent of their religious identity."[100] It has, he suggests, progressed through three stages. Riots, which became almost common in the 1990s, often attacked businesses, churches and government offices but seldom involved killings or violence against persons. The fall of the New Order, however, was

accompanied by new forms of violence, ranging from lynchings to gang wars and assaults on entire neighborhoods. Violent acts of ethnic cleansing, forcing thousands from their homes and killing thousands more—generally in religiously and ethnically diverse neighborhoods—became almost commonplace between 1999 and 2001:

> By late 2001, however, these pogroms too had apparently run their course and were replaced, as it were, by a new form of violence crystallizing under the sign of jihad. First apparent in the guise of armed paramilitary groups dispatched to Maluku and Poso in 2000–2001, this jihad soon assumed the form of bombings, beginning with explosions at the residence of the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta (August 2000) and at Christian churches around the Indonesian archipelago in December 2000, but then shifting to such Western targets as a tourists' nightclub on Bali (October 2002), a McDonald's outlet in Makassar (June 2003), an American hotel in Jakarta (August 2003), the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (September 2004), and tourist resorts in Bali (October 2005).[101]

Although even these kinds of terrorist acts have been largely contained, the perceived link between religious violence in Indonesia and the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York made the Indonesian violence more visible. Just days after 9/11 the Bush administration found that the Indonesian military had complied with the reform objectives set in law and urged the reestablishment of direct aid. "The role of international pressure in promoting military reform, which had always been rather marginal, was now reduced to an absolute minimum."[102] Unlike Turkey, where pressure from the EU was important in curtailing the military, the "war on terror" gave the TNI a psychological and financial boost. In the spirit of cooperation with the United States, moreover, it led the Megawati government to revive the intelligence operations of the territorial commanders and to reintegrate the armed forces into the anti-terrorism ranks of the police.

During the New Order, the military's territorial commanders often worked closely with local gangs both to enforce political order and extort money. *Reformasi* has both weakened the gangs and changed the dynamic of their relations to authority. No longer tied exclusively to the military, they often have ties to local branches of political parties through which they have been increasingly able to promote their Islamist agendas through less overtly violent means. The growing ability of labor unions and women's groups freely to organize has been significant; however, it has also been significantly limited by "the tactic of hiring goons associated with youth organizations or party militia to intimidate workers during protests and at their homes."[103] Gangs often work closely with security forces in extracting protection money from bars, brothels and the litany of businesses that have been the targets of protection rackets all over the world. Although some local public officials have been increasingly wary of allowing gang violence to the point at which the

military would have an excuse to intervene, remnants of Dar'ul Islam and other more radical groups have been able to forge connections with some local governments giving them special access to charitable contributions and the selective enforcement of laws regulating alcohol, prostitution, and so on. Some local governments have also looked the other way when these groups have closed down Christian churches or those of non-Sunni Muslims. The rise of violence in the early stages of democratization, together with its abatement as dissident groups learn to work the system more peacefully is not unique to Indonesia and has made the military's role seem less essential.[104]

As in Turkey, the Indonesian military's direct involvement in the political system has largely been pushed into the background. But the ability of the elected branches to monitor and direct its activities remains limited. In short, "the military's offensive capacities in the political system, so to speak, were abandoned, but its defensive capacities vis-à-vis its corporate prerogatives were not."[105] The government, moreover, has virtually no civilian ministry control over the military, and legislative oversight remains weak to non-existent. Thus although it is no immediate threat to Indonesia's fragile democracy, the military remains, potentially at least, "the most important and powerful institution in Indonesian society."[106]

Islam, *reformasi* and democracy

Running as a thread in the literature on Islam and democracy is the notion that the Indonesian version of the faith is distinctive if not unique. Drawing on Robert Hefner's seminal study of Muslims and democratization, it is argued that Indonesia's "civil Islam" is distinct in its tolerance, civility and culture of participation. Even Basim Tibi, who perceives radical Islam as being behind most putatively democratic movements in the Islamic world, regards Indonesia as "a paragon of civil Islam."[107] Hefner's arguments are not simply about theology, but about the more subtle factors of leadership, state institutions, culture and social pluralism that make Indonesia's Islam "civil." "Without a state to expand their democratic role, 'networks of civic engagement' may get lost in the backstreets of society rather than open to a democratic public sphere."[108] During the colonial period and the New Order years, "most of the ruling elite who dominated Indonesian society, rather than consolidating precedents for civility and pluralism, ignored or abused them;"[109] but political Islam was never forced underground nor coopted by the state. During various periods of its modern history—most especially since 1998—it has been able to express its values and contest its programs openly.

In contrast to Turkey and many Muslim-majority countries, moreover, Islam in Indonesia was never part of an Islamic empire. As with Judaism and Christianity, Muslims in Indonesia were defined as, and came to see themselves as, existing in a world that ran in parallel with or in opposition to the state. Early in their history, European Catholics developed the theory of the

two swords, that of the state and that of the church. They rendered unto Caesar that which was Caesar's, that is, they deferred to secular authority in some areas, but only with the assertion of authority in others. Muslims in Indonesia were similarly compelled to practice their faith in parallel with a colonial power system that was different and often hostile. Not surprisingly:

> in the first decades of the twentieth century Muslims listened to the words of the nationalist anthem and made much of it their own. In the independence era they learned the language of democracy and constitutionality, and took enthusiastically to its forms. In matters of civic association Muslims showed themselves second to no one. None of their rivals match the breadth and vitality of their associations. Even under the New Order, Muslims were better able than others to resist state controls and nurture alternative ideas of the public good.[110]

Clifford Geertz used the terms *abangan* and *santri* to distinguish the relativist, ritual-oriented and less doctrinal Muslims of rural areas on the one hand, from orthodox, "true Muslims" on the other. He saw these tendencies as forming the basis of two broad streams of culture that had political and cultural as well as religious dimensions. Most scholars continue to agree that Indonesia's Muslim community is generally divided along a continuum of "orthodoxy" with poles at the *santri* and *abangan* ends that have continuing political significance. Rooted partly in history, with multiple waves of Islamic traders arriving on different islands in different epochs, partly in Dutch efforts to discourage central religious institutions, and partly in the continuing diversity of Indonesian society, Islamic authority in Indonesia continues to be fragmented. But it is important not to take these distinctions too far. The two historic Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, have a combined following of about one-quarter of the Indonesian population.[111] In their origins they loosely reflect the *santri/abangan* split, with the core of NU being comprised of traditionalist clerics, while Muhammadiyah is reformist, more "modern" and less rural. The use of the word "traditionalist" with regard to NU should not be construed as anti-modern or fundamentalist. In the Indonesian context, traditionalists (*abangan*) are those who follow the syncretic traditions of blending more orthodox Islamic doctrines with local customs and religious aspects of Hinduism and local spiritual movements. The so-called reformers, who seek a more orthodox Islam, are often more "conservative" on matters of both faith and politics. In point of fact, however, the doctrinal differences between NU and Muhammadiyah are not large and are continuing to narrow as the mass media and population mobility erode diversity. Both organizations have developed extensive networks of social service and educational institutions throughout the country; indeed one study suggests that no other Muslim society in the world has a larger network.[112] If Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, and NU (1926) have sometimes represented a wide range of opinions on both religious and political questions both

"have consistently rejected a militant agenda and affirmed their support for democratic freedoms in Indonesia."[113]

Throughout the early years of independence, NU, unlike Muhammadiyah, was directly involved in politics. Indeed, for most of the nation's early years, one of its members served as Minister of Religious Affairs and the organization enjoyed both the power to help to shape public policy and the patronage opportunities a position in the cabinet afforded. Strongly anti-Communist, its relations with President Sukarno grew increasingly tense as he moved closer to the PKI; NU strongly supported Suharto in the 1965 purge. But the organization's support was not reciprocated. When Suharto made Pancasila the official state ideology and the teaching thereof mandatory in schools, and made the military its official guardian, he also ended NU's privileged position in the Department of Religious Affairs, and caused a major identity crisis for the organization. Suharto also worked to neutralize NU and other independent Islamic organizations by creating various state-directed segments of the Islamic community—such as women's groups, intellectuals and preachers—under the umbrella of a new Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI—Council of Indonesian Ulama), described by one scholar as embodying an extreme form of an attempted "bureaucratization of Islam."[114] Although MUI continues to be funded by the state, its relationship with the post-New Order state are, as one author puts it, "complex and not static."[115] Although it is the theoretical umbrella organization of all Islamic groups, including NU and Muhammadiyah, its legal pronouncements (*fatwas*) have been more likely to serve as the starting points for dialogue than as definitive statements of doctrine.

Suharto's attempts, through MUI, and the parallel organization of Islamic intellectuals (ICMI) designed to unify people belonging to diverse Islamic factions and religious orientations, did not pose direct challenges to Mahammadiyah and NU, but they did force them—NU in particular—to reexamine their relations to the state. "Recurring tension between the NU's religious agenda and the exigencies of practical politics goes a long way to explain the organization's inconsistency and ambivalence toward central authority over the years."[116] In the New Order, when it lost control over the Department of Religious Affairs, NU members voted to withdraw from electoral politics and devote the organization to social work, education and religious training. Twenty years later, with *reformasi*, and in conjunction with Wahid's sense of a political opening, a group of NU leaders formed the National Awakening Party, sought NU support and in some areas gained it; but by and large the organization has maintained its civil society focus and eschewed direct political action. Muhammadiyah has been even more careful to avoid direct involvement in electoral politics. Particularly as elections rather than appointment became the route to political power, Islamic organizations began increasingly to discover that the combination of faith and partisanship could be toxic to both. In the 1999 elections, relations between supporters—and frequently of party-supported gangs of thugs—of the two largest Islamic parties, each claiming to be "more Islamic," became so tense that their

supporters "called each other 'infidels,' attacked each other, burnt homes belonging to members of the other group, and caused severe physical and psychological damage among themselves."[117] With "no principle that could distinguish the programs of one Islamic party from another," the public perception was that their campaigns were "the result of a very strong appetite for power among the various Islamic leaders."[118] The remaining Islamic parties—even the new and supposedly "clean" PKS—have found it difficult to keep their politicians free of the temptations of office. Thus while local branches of NU and Muhammadiyah continued sometimes to support particular candidates, they essentially withdrew from electoral politics during the early reform years.

Rather than weakening their political influence, however, both organizations found themselves more actively courted by all parties. As one leader of Muhammadiyah put it during the New Order:

> yes, we compromised in accepting the *Pancasila*, and there were many people who disagreed. But at first we didn't really understand what the consequence of this would be. Before, there was one party identified with Islam. But look what has happened. After being depoliticized, suddenly Islam is no longer confined to any one party but is promoted to all of them.[119]

What Hefner calls the "greening" of the parties (green being a symbol of Islam) has continued into the post-New Order years. Even as the Islamic parties become less identifiably "Islamic," Islam has been integrated into all the parties. Oliver Roy has used the term post-Islamism to describe the tendency of the worldwide religious revival in the faith to target society more than the state,[120] precisely the direction in which Indonesia's major Muslim groups moved during the New Order and have pretty much remained ever since. Put another way, Muslims in Indonesia have worked increasingly and more successfully as interest groups than as political parties.

Moreover, both the Islamic parties and the traditional Muslim groups have broadened the focus of their concerns, becoming more involved with issues like education, poverty and the environment, and in effect widening the boundaries of what counts as "Islamism."[121] This does not mean that more traditional issues of faith and morals have been ignored. Indeed without Islamic parties having more than a minor share of direct political representation in the system, Indonesia's Islamists have gone considerably further than Turkey's Islamic majority in enacting faith-based policies, a role reversal that actually has roots in the New Order. After Suharto pushed NU out of its favored position in relations with the Department of Religious Affairs, the more politically tractable MUI actually went even further than before in pushing an Islamist agenda on such issues as lifting prohibitions on the veil, increasing funding for Islamic schools and creating an Islamic bank. In most cases, laws based on sharia have sought not to impose them on

the general population but to establish state guidelines for religious courts for those agreeing to use them. The 2006 Act on Religious Courts provided for Supreme Court review of virtually all cases from the religious courts, and, two years later, the top court issued a Compilation of Economic Sharia Law that in theory at least provides uniform guidelines for resolving economic disputes among those agreeing to use the religious (as opposed to civil) courts. Similar regulations of an optional, voluntary nature have also been enacted with regard to Islamic banking, religious foundations and charity.[122]

Laws enforcing Islamic doctrines have not all been applied only to those choosing to resolve disputes through the religious courts. Interestingly, however, recent actions of the government in support of issues that might be considered Islamist have not been initiated primarily by mainstream Islamist organizations or parties. The largest and most controversial of these initiatives was an anti-pornography bill signed into law in 2008. While it was not high on the agenda of any particular party or interest groups, drafts of various anti-pornography bills had been circulated within the Departments of Religion and Women's Affairs since the beginning of the *reformasi* era. An actual bill was not introduced until 2003 when twenty-four members of various parties (mostly Islamic) submitted a draft that was referred to the leadership council of the DPR (chaired by the speaker and including the chairs of all standing committees) and scheduled for preliminary debate. It was then referred to a special committee of fifty members that produced a relatively uncontroversial bill regulating the production, sale and viewing of pornography. As the bill more or less languished in the committee, some of its members added to it a section on *pornoaksi*, a term coined a few years earlier in a fatwa from a group of conservative ulamas meaning "pornographic actions." These included such things as wearing scanty clothing and kissing in public. Ignored by the president and having few active proponents in the DPR, the bill died. In the newly elected parliament in 2005, the Committee on Religious and Women's Affairs created a new special committee to again consider the bill. Sherlock's interviews show that the initiative for reviving the bill was not—as widely rumored—primarily from the PKK and other Islamist Parties.[123] Only when public hearings began later in the year and the controversy became public did it become clear how broad support for the bill actually was. (PDI-P's members of the special committee were the only major party members in opposition and boycotted the meetings.) The bill remained in committee until late in 2007 when SBY appointed a ministerial team to open legislative-executive deliberations on the bill. The most enthusiastic supporters of the bill in the DPR were Golkar and the Democratic Party, that is, from secular party legislators attempting to burnish their Islamic credentials. In the spirit of compromise and, arguably, because many legislators in the DPR are less than rigorous in the examination of pending bills, the committee accepted a number of amendments to the bill that they later claimed to oppose.

The final bill exempted tourists in some areas from the ban on ladies' bathing suits, and reduced the enumerated offenses from ninety-three to forty-five; but special allowances for regional differences were virtually eliminated, and some of the more draconian punishments (one to five years imprisonment plus a fine for kissing on the lips in public) stayed in. Legislators from PDI-P and a small Christian party refused to vote on final passage, but the bill passed overwhelmingly and was almost immediately signed by President Yudhoyono. Just three days later, before the bill formally became law, three female strippers were arrested in Jakarta, though their male supervisors were not. Women's groups were incensed, as were a number of regional groups such as Papuans, where males frequently wear only loincloths and women often go topless; but the Constitutional Court was quick to rule against arguments that the bill was unconstitutionally vague and violated the principle of regional autonomy.

There have been other national laws and proposals—such as revisions in the criminal code that would punish the undefined crime of "witchcraft"—that have raised alarms among human rights advocates; but the primary concern with a conservative Islamist agenda is at the local level, and particularly in the ways that various national and local laws are interpreted and enforced. Laws against prostitution, for example, have been used to arrest single women traveling home from work, waiting at bus stops or having coffee at roadside stands. "These regulations did not on the face of them derive from Islam, they were intended to enforce morality or build 'good character.' Their problematic outcomes had to do with the patriarchal nature of their content and the ways in which they were enforced, not with a reliance on Islam."[124] But as Bowen goes on to point out, "Other regulations clearly *did* set out to enforce certain behaviors on Islamic grounds."[125] Some provinces and local governments have begun to require civil servants and others to wear the hijab, to prohibit men (or women) from wearing shorts, to require prayer or the paying of *zakat* (charity). The rituals of many traditional Islamic sects—particularly those involving provocative dances, alcohol, magic and mysticism—have been outlawed. In the first years of decentralization, many of the local and provincial leaders were carry overs from the old order; but as elections became competitive, politicians (especially those whose Islamic credentials were weakest) increasingly pandered to hard-line Islamists by enacting "sharia-based" laws and regulations. The number of religion-influenced regulations peaked at twenty-five in 2005 and have become less common, but restrictions on alcohol, gambling and alleged prostitution—while not written into local laws—may be enforced all the same by the police or local gangs.[126] "What seems most disturbing about the local religious regulations," as Pringle says, is their illegality. "Indonesia is not a federal system. ... Purposely, the powers given to the districts in 1999 did not include religion, because the framers of the decentralization law felt that having different religious regimes by district would be unsettling."[127]

While the national government and its courts have been loath to overrule these local rules, particularly when the MUI-dominated Ministry of Religious Affairs was in charge, there are limits. In ending the separatist rebellion in Aceh, the province was given special autonomy that gave its sharia courts undefined jurisdiction over "Islamic sharia as found within the system of national laws." In 2009 the provincial parliament adopted a criminal code that included such provisions as death by stoning for adulterers. The governor refused to sign it, and the Constitutional Court, without actually ruling on the law since there was no case before it, ruled that the law could be challenged. The bill was subsequently withdrawn, but the ambiguity remains, as does the general reluctance and inability of the Supreme Court to use its powers to intervene. Even in Aceh, "The Islamization of laws in Indonesia, therefore, is not a real or complete introduction of *sharia*. What on the surface appears to be the Islamization of laws in Indonesia is in reality a symbolic token for the most part."[128] Even in Aceh, it is significant that so-called sharia laws were enacted not through religious leaders but by an elected, civilian parliament. Aceh aside, the more radical Islamic groups in Indonesia have had their parochial influence limited by election laws that virtually prohibit the establishment of purely regional parties. Thus, for example:

> The Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Sharia Law in South Sulawesi province, dubbed the most active local movement struggling for the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia, has failed to establish a political presence in the province precisely because it is not allowed to form official party structures.[129]

From a Western perspective, and to many Indonesians, the cutting edge of the Islamization issue revolves around gender. "Reform" Islam takes many of its cues from the Middle East, which are far less gender neutral than those in traditional Indonesian culture. But traditional culture still exerts a powerful pull, even in the sharia courts where there has been a strong "Indonesianization of sharia law."[130] "Indonesia's legal structure," as Pringle says, "is ahead of that in many Muslim-majority countries."[131] Its laws on marriage and divorce, inheritance and family matters in general are "liberal" in comparison with those, not just of Muslim countries, but throughout the world. Feminists have been appropriately concerned about lingering polygamy, growing puritanism directed largely at women and local laws that seem to be eroding previously won gains. But:

> despite ambivalent legislation and ongoing problems of implementation, the law brought an end to the unlimited freedom of Muslim men to divorce their wives at will and to take a second, third, or fourth wife as they liked. It assigned the Religious Courts the power to decide whether a man had good reasons for a divorce or a next marriage. The law also almost equalized divorce proceedings for men and women. Thus, in spite

> of puritan resistance over the past quarter of a century, the law of divorce by the Indonesian courts has been gradually and quietly transformed.[132]

Much the same can be said for the laws on inheritance, and for the many areas of the old Dutch civil code that have not been changed. While the role played by religious courts is likely to be viewed with skepticism by many Westerners, opposition from Indonesian women has not been pronounced in part because these courts have often been more balanced than their civilian counterparts, and because their jurisdiction is voluntary. And although their jurisdiction has been expanded, they now come under the appellate wing of the Supreme Court rather than the Ministry of Religion.

Since the beginning of *reformasi* increasingly women's rights have received formal recognition, and have had a real impact in such areas as education. The perspective on the ground is more ambiguous. Women's organizations have a long and diverse history in Indonesia that was seriously disrupted in the 1965 coup. One of the largest and most effective women's groups at that time, Gerwani, was closely associated with the PKI. Severely punished in the poliscide that accompanied Suharto's takeover, its demise and example made it difficult if not dangerous to engage in feminist politics. This is no longer true in a legal sense; however, the cause continues to suffer at the national level from a paternalistic culture combined with a sense in some circles that because many of the leading feminist NGOs receive financial and other forms of assistance from the international community, the issue of gender equality is often seen as a "foreign" doctrine. The ineffectiveness of women's organizations in opposing the pornography bill is a telling reflection of this cultural gap as well as of the organizational weakness of civil society organizations in general in penetrating the crony networks of the political system. The status of women in Indonesia varies enormously from one island or region to another. Religion has played a role in shaping gender orders, but it is also worth noting the extent to which Islam in particular has "accommodated to the structures of gender relationships that it encountered."[133]

The gap between legal and actual rights can be perceived, for example, in politics where the law that every party should have a minimum of 30 percent of women as its candidates has been evaded by almost every party simply putting their female candidates too low on the voter list to have a real chance. Thus in the 2000 elections only 9 percent of the winners were women, a proportion which rose to only 18.6 percent in 2014. And, while there are a few significant exceptions, women's groups (together with labor unions and other groups) are at best poorly organized at the local level and have no program for countering the ability of domestic and foreign corporations simply to ignore them. In the absence of significant change, those who pin their hopes on the seemingly vibrant aspects of Indonesia's civil society, as Hadiz puts it, must first explain "how this might come about in the context of very unequal relations of power."[134]

The civil liberties won in terms of freedom of expression and association during the *reformasi* years have been nothing short of remarkable. With the exceptions of NU, Muhammadiyah, and a nascent student movement, there were essentially no independent private associations in the New Order polity. Labor unions were tolerated only within the parameters set by the state, and women's groups—such as the women's organizations for the wives of civil servants and military men—were centrally funded and controlled. No one wishes to see such co-optation again. Organizationally, however, most civil society groups in Indonesia are perched on the horns of a dilemma: they need to be independent of the state but are encouraged by it to expand their capacity to mobilize their constituencies and to link them to the powers that be. "Contrary to the dominant Western civil society discourse, Indonesian scholars and activists stress the need for increasing cooperation between the state and civil society."[135] Without greater transparency in the operations of the government, moreover, even the most dynamic civil society will fail as will the entire process of democratization.

Democratic consolidation

Recent studies of Indonesian democracy divide into two camps: those who see the glass as half empty and those who describe it as half full. Indeed the 2014 election for the presidency could be used rather precisely to measure the actual volume in the glass at 53–47, the 53 representing the percentage of the vote won by Jakarta mayor Joko Widodo on the one hand, and retired General Prabowo Subianto, the one-time son-in-law of Suharto on the other. Jokowi, as he is generally known, campaigned as a reformer, while Subianto stressed stability, strength and repeal of the reform amendments to the 1945 Constitution. While the vote shows substantial sentiment for some sort of return to the stability of the New Order, the inauguration of Jokowi marked more than fifteen years of peaceful democratic transitions. All the trappings of democratic consolidation are in place: above all, a vigorous media and freedom of speech almost unchallenged in new democracies; remarkably free and fair elections,[136] with four untroubled changes of regime; a system of justice relatively free from police brutality and arbitrary arrest; and a genuine sharing of power between the legislative and executive branches. But the deficiencies are almost equally obvious: debilitating levels of corruption, a dysfunctional court system, parties that offer few meaningful programmatic choices, a barely functional legislative process that operates with a minimum of transparency. *Reformasi*, as Edward Aspinall has argued, traded democratic success for democratic quality:

> It was precisely by achieving a low-quality outcome the Indonesia's democratization proceeded so smoothly. Key elites and potentially disruptive political forces such as the military were not starved out of Indonesia's new democracy. Instead, they were all given a piece of the

> democracy pie, reducing their incentive to resist and challenge the system from the outside. The price of this approach was that the potential spoilers were empowered to undermine the quality of Indonesian democracy from within and, more important that patronage and corruption became the means by which they—and everybody who counted—were brought into the system.[137]

So smooth was this transition that a growing body of literature suggests that *reformasi* was less about democracy than an intra-regime shifting of influence in which the ruling oligarchs could no longer trust Suharto to sustain the old order. When a sultanistic regime such as Suharto's falls apart, the literature suggests, "chances are this new democracy will display strong clientelist tendencies, with the democratically elected leaders using the resources of their office to build nationwide patron-client relations."[138] Indonesia's decentralization laws also helped to develop parallel clientelist networks at the local level, significantly spreading the action, as it were. In effect, *reformasi* "democratized corruption and leveled a meritocracy of pilferage."[139] Moreover, the Indonesian case shows that shifts of this kind can at once witness more or less significant changes in who gains and who loses in the oligarchic shifting of power without fundamentally challenging the status quo. "The hierarchical patronage of the New Order has given way to much more horizontal competition between parties and factions," to be sure; but it has also seen a remarkably stable "elite consensus" that has not "resulted in unstable coalition government."[140]

The ostensible "loser" in this shifting of power has been the military. Shorn of most of its domestic police functions and its direct representation in parliament, it has also been steadily losing ground in the number of present and past members currently holding office at all levels. Furthermore, decreasing levels of violence have weakened its claim to serve as a necessary bastion of civility in an otherwise anarchistic world. "It is arguable that local elites have now developed an interest in the peaceful running of elections, in order to safeguard the legitimacy of the political process that ensures their ascendant social position."[141] Active and former members of the military are still prominent in public affairs; the territorial command structure remains intact; and the military, the police and the intelligence services retain strong potentials for power; but the "back to basics" movement begun decades ago has essentially withdrawn the military from a direct role in politics. It almost certainly has the capacity to recapture an overt position of political strength, but it no longer appears to have the organizational will directly to invest its resources in the political arena.

A second "loser," at least in the short run, has been militant Islam which has had its energy sapped by the ability of political Islam to achieve some its objectives peacefully, by its inability to play off the military, and by the general stabilization of the system. The prolonged and intense struggle for independence in Aceh earned the province special autonomy which it used to

enact some aspects of sharia law. More remarkable, however, "was a rapid shift toward economic and governance matters."[142] The leaders of the Free Aceh Movement have emerged less as Islamic firebrands enforcing religious orthodoxy than as contractors, entrepreneurs and politicians not very different from their secular counterparts in other provinces. As with many of the leaders of the national PKS—the most militantly religious of Indonesia's Islamic parties—they have been largely co-opted into the clientelist politics of the new oligarchs. Islamists have found, moreover, that they can achieve at least some of their political objectives by working peacefully through the existing system, leveraging their influence through the vote-hungry secular parties. As in the case of the pornography law, puritanical provisions are proffered as patronage, more goodies to be exchanged for electoral support. But this process works both ways. Where "the state has become a site of fierce inter-elite contestation for the political spoils,"[143] the leaders of Islamic organizations are claimants as well, able to compete effectively within the rules of the democratic game:

> To be successful, Islamist parties need to adapt their political programs to incorporate the everyday concerns of voters. Their slogan of "Islam is the solution" is no longer enough. The point here is not that every Islamist's democratic credentials should be taken at face value. It is simply that Islamism's purported incompatibility with democracy should not be assumed, nor should the moderating impact of the successful participation by Islamist parties in democratic processes be underestimated.[144]

While the Indonesian state is not weak—in the manner of, say, Mali—many of the central controls emanating from Jakarta in the New Order have been weakened to the benefit of a variety of elites, mostly at the local level. Among a growing number of anthropologists and political scientists, there is a relatively new research agenda that focuses on "actual state practices, or the interactions between state and non-state actors, particularly at the local level which often holds the richest and most instructive hints."[145] In the pithier words of the former speaker of the United States House of Representative, "Tip" O'Neill, "all politics is local," an aphorism that applies with particular force in Indonesia where a weak party system encourages locally rooted rent-seeking behavior. Despite their control over DPR members once elected, party leaders in Jakarta have almost no influence over the "local-level alliances—frequently cross-party in nature— [that] take shape quite independently of any central party directive."[146] Candidates for both local and national office negotiate their places on party ballots not through long service or party loyalty but by negotiating deals, deals which often involve public and private projects focused on the immediate community, and put into play with the help of other local notables. While the most contentious aspects of these negotiations involve contests for tangible rewards, symbolic rewards can be distributed as well, as with Prohibition in

nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States and various Islamist laws in Indonesia.

The winners in this changed system of politics are those best able to deliver blocks of votes or the money to buy them. In contrast with those who see only the more corrupt and oligarchic facets of this evolving system, some recent scholarship suggests that "to understand this change as merely a change of costume—an act of an established politico-gangster clan donning the new hats of parliamentarians—is to fail to appreciate the dynamic, *democratic* force of what Carl Trocki and others have called gangster democracy."[147] There is a democratic logic to this system: although mediated largely by money, it is a politics in which votes are determined by policies and policies are determined by votes. The similarities with the United States in the late nineteenth century are instructive. The political machines, generally reviled as corrupt and inefficient, have also been defended for their role in the political socialization of immigrants, the circulation of elite power and the delivery of new government services. So how do you change a system like this to ameliorate the corruption yet preserve the democracy? If we look to the United States, a number of things happened at the turn of the century that initiated a process—it took a half century to complete it—that made the system relatively fair and clean. Among the most important of these was a rapidly growing middle class and a rising trade union movement that helped to form the backbone of a network of reformist "good government" civic associations that both pressed from the outside for reform and worked within the party system to elect, and support, reformist candidates. It was their efforts that resulted in the displacement of most patronage appointments with a merit system and depoliticized the courts. Second, the religiously based temperance movement demonstrated the power of ideas and ideals to trump patronage politics. Third, there was a growing recognition, even among the corrupt, of the instability and inefficiency of the system. Vote buying is very common in Indonesia (as it once was in the United States) both at the retail level of pay-offs to individual voters and making wholesale purchases through community leaders. The more such systems become entrenched, however, the more expensive they become as voters and vote influencers discover their ability to bid up the price or simply not deliver as promised. And finally, the realigning elections of 1896 and 1932 reconfigured the party system along more ideological lines that transcended patronage.

Whether any of these routes are likely to lead to significant change in Indonesia is not clear. Some of the prerequisites—such as the secret ballot—are already in place (in contrast to the United States where such rights had to be won). Civil society organizations, particularly in the areas of labor, women's issues and human rights, have grown and become increasingly active in their work to penetrate and reform the party system.[148] Clientelist politics, however, are political tar babies: to confront them is to risk becoming helplessly stuck in their grasp. Abdurrahman Wahid, with strong reformist credentials, became partially stuck and when he tried to extricate himself was

impeached. Yudyohono campaigned on a platform of forming a cabinet that was above politics, and indeed did create the Corruption Control Commission, but in the final analysis found himself deeply trapped in the system. Even the PKS, for all its pious ambitions to clean up the system, has become just another party contending for spoils. Muhammadiyah and NU have been joined by a rich panoply of both Islamic and secular NGOs, but have gained little traction in any systemic manner. Thus the general consensus among recent studies of the civic culture is that "the patrimonial state of Indonesia is unlikely to foster new pro-democratic social forces able to encourage change from within."[149] Studies of political corruption suggest a rather nasty symbiosis between corruption and civil society in which weakness in the latter is related to strength of the former.[150] Honest players tend to do badly in crooked games. The 2014 legislative elections saw some minor reshuffling of the parties, with the Islamic parties increasing their combined share of the popular vote to 32 percent from 26 percent, and Yudyohono's Democrats slipping to just over 10 percent—but no significant realignment. The post-election wheeling and dealing to form the coalitions necessary to nominate candidates for the presidency, moreover, was very much old politics, and if the contest between the "outsider" Jokowi and retired New Order General Prabowo Subianto was pointed in the direction of realignment, it was well hidden. Jokowi's victory is, perhaps, a mandate for reform, but whether there is institutional backing for him to move in that direction—given the old-style coalition that put him in power—is problematic at best. Like Gus Dur and Yudyohono before him, Jokowi promised to appoint a "professional" cabinet but wound up appointing most of his ministers in accordance with the priorities of his supporting coalition in the legislature. Particularly revealing was his appointment as Police Chief of Budi Gunawan, reportedly at the urging of PDI-P party chair Megawati Sukarnoputri. The DPR quickly approved Gunawan's appointment, but Jokowi suspended it pending resolution of charges brought against Gunawan from the Corruption Eradication Commission. The old order's response was to bring charges against the chair of the Commission.

If Marcus Mietzner is correct in his controversial argument that Indonesia's political parties are in fact better institutionalized than those in most emerging democracies,[151] they have yet to demonstrate any significant capacity to develop programmatic linkages with the voters. But Mietzner's basic point about the institutionalization of Indonesia's party system is well taken: at this point along the road to democratic consolidation, Indonesia is far closer than most other new democracies at comparable stages. More importantly, from the perspective of this book, Islam has not been part of the problem to this point, and is in fact likely to be part of the solution at least to the extent that the institutional resources of the more moderate Islamic groups can be harnessed to rein in the power of patronage and pelf both nationally and locally. None of the Islamic parties have or appear likely to give voters a good reason to increase their support, and the Islamic community is learning that the

more focused opportunities presented by civil society are the more appropriate vehicles of political influence.

On the road to democratic consolidation, the pieces are in place, and Jokowi's reform credentials are in order. At the time of the 2014 elections, one-third of the Indonesian people had grown up in a democracy. But in a cautionary note of warning it is also true that almost half of those who actually cast votes for the presidency in 2014 cast them for a candidate with strong ties to the pre-reform military, and who campaigned in part on a promise to undo the reforms of 2000–03 and return to the 1945 Constitution.

Notes

1 Many of the "islands" in the archipelago are little more than sand spits that disappear one year and reappear another, thus accounting for the widely disparate numbers that appear in the literature. The islands of Sumatra and Java are home to roughly 80 percent of the nation's population of more than 200,000 million. Other large populations are found in the southern part of the Island of Borneo (known in Indonesia as Kalimantan), Sulawesi and the western half of New Guinea (West Papua).
2 R. E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 15.
3 Many Indonesians have only one name and no surname.
4 The ambivalent, sometimes contradictory, stance of the United States in this process is wonderfully captured in Frances Gouda (with Thijs Brocades Zaalberg), *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002). There is some evidence that the undermanned British forces, under General Mountbatten, used units of the Japanese army to keep the nationalists in their place until Dutch troops arrived. Roland Challis, *Shadow of a Revolution: Indonesia and the Generals* (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 2001), 25.
5 See especially Chapter 9 of Gouda. Among the many difficulties the independence forces experienced in trying to keep the United States neutral was, as one advocate for the Republican cause put it, the difficulty of convincing the Americans that the Dutch "were even capable of being bad" (p. 213).
6 Elson, 111.
7 Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard, 2003), 47.
8 Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 134.
9 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso Books, rev. edn, 1991), 132.
10 Ibid., 132–33.
11 Vickers, 115.
12 Ibid., 123.
13 Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 9–10. See also Clifford Geertz, *Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns: Peddlers and Princes* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 13–14.
14 Robert Cribb, "Nation: Making Indonesia," in Donald E. Emmerson, ed., *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 29.

15 Dwight Y. King, "Observations on Indonesia's Electoral System, Past and Present," in R. William Liddle, ed., *Crafting Indonesian Democracy* (Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2001), 121.
16 Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 48.
17 Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2005), 46. On the more militant groups in general see John T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
18 Although most observers dispute the actual extent of these connections, Elizabeth Drexler makes a convincing case that the three-decade-long violent separatist conflict in Aceh province was in some ways prolonged and sustained by the military. The armed forces, sent by the central government to put down the uprising, she suggests, "may actually create, arm, and exercise some control over key elements of the opposing guerilla forces, both to discredit the actual advocates of regional autonomy, who are often nonviolent in principle and practice, and to terrorize the civilian population in the region and provoke a 'security' emergency." Elizabeth F. Drexler, *Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 9.
19 Ibid., 49.
20 The charter was defeated by a vote of 269 to 199, but because the rules required a two-thirds' majority to adopt a new constitution the losers had the power to block its final adoption.
21 Vickers, 140–41.
22 Adam Schwartz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 17.
23 Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 23.
24 Vickers, 156–57.
25 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *The Mute's Soliloquy: A Memoir*, trans. William Samuels (New York: Penguin Books, 1999).
26 In 1966 Anderson, together with Ruth McVey and Frederick Bunnell, put together twenty privately circulated and confidential copies of "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia." Although it was not released until five years later, its sharp critique of the Indonesian and US analyses of the events was widely circulated. Some of his further reflections on these events can be found in Benedict Anderson, "Exit Suharto: Obituary for a Mediocre Tyrant," *New Left Review* 50 (March/April, 2008), 27–59. Among the earlier scholarly accounts of the 1965 events see also John Gittings, "The Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66," in Mark Levene and Penny Roberts, eds, *The Massacre in History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 247–262; and Robert Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali* (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990).
27 John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 6 and passim.
28 Still another theory, not found in the literature, is that the conspirators had no real plan, thought that the country would spontaneously rise up to support them and were just plain dumb. I kind of like this explanation and the more general explanatory power of the theory of stupidity. From the battle of Gallipoli to the Bay of Pigs, the theory's explanatory power seems to exceed that of most other explanations in its plausibility and simplicity.

29 Hilmar Farid, "Out of the Black Hole: After the New Order, the Lid on Indonesia's Past Is Beginning to Lift," *Inside Indonesia* 68 (October/December 2001), 32.
30 Anderson, "Exit Suharto,"14.
31 Ibid.
32 Robert W. Goodfellow, "Sing Wis, Ya Wis: What Is Past Is Past. Forgetting What It Was to Remember the Indonesian Killings of 1965," PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, Australia, 2003, 68, 92–93. Available at www.ro.uow.edu.au/thesis/1425 (accessed June 6, 2013).
33 Roosa, 7.
34 Kingsbury, 60.
35 Vickers, 161.
36 Agus Widjojo, "Repositioning of the Indonesian Military: A Process of Reform Necessity or a Political Issue?" in Uwe Johnson and James Gomez, eds, *Democratic Transitions in Asia* (Singapore: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2001), 163.
37 R. William Liddle, "Regime: The New Order," in Emmerson, 48.
38 The largest of these was Pertamina, the umbrella corporation for all of the state oil companies, which was placed under the control of one of Suharto's military colleagues. "By the height of the oil boom in the early 1970s, Pertamina had become not only the major source of Abri funding, but accounted through tax payments for almost 40 percent of domestic revenue." Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order* (New York: Routledge, 3rd edn, 1998), 72.
39 Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 43.
40 Schwartz, 174.
41 Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 64. Given that Wahid himself continued to be involved in politics, even to the extent of becoming Indonesia's second post-Suharto president, it is debatable whether this involved a real redefinition of NU's political role or was more of a ploy to keep the government off its back. See Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 100–03.
42 Schwartz, 153–57.
43 Robert W. Hefner, "Social Legacies and Possible Futures," in John Bresnan, ed., *Indonesia: The Great Transition* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 112.
44 M. C. Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2012), 124.
45 Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 121.
46 John Bresnan, "Economic Recovery and Reform," in Bresnan, 191.
47 Schwartz.
48 Robison and Hadiz, 135.
49 The distinction between *santri* (devout) and *abangan* (less pious) Muslims, or those who generally mix Islamic and traditional Javanese values, has always eluded precise description. And its applicability to contemporary Indonesia is drawn into increasing question as population mobility, the media and economic development have blurred traditional social cleavages. But despite these trends and a general rise in piety, the *santri/abangan* has had a long half-life in serious studies of Indonesian society. According to Marcus Mietzner, while its "cultural

features have undergone important changes, its political dimension continues to influence voting behavior to this day." Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*, 70.

50 Aspinall, 172.

51 Jon Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 39.

52 Aspinall, 180.

53 Ibid., 218.

54 The Philippine students, as Vince Boudreau has shown, were far better organized, aggressive and connected with other groups than were their Indonesian counterparts, but they served as a very important model for conscious emulation. Vincent Boudreau, "Diffusing Democracy? People Power in Indonesia and the Philippines," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 31 (October/December 1999), 3–18.

55 Aspinall, 234.

56 Ibid., 257.

57 Annette Clear, "Politics: From Endurance to Evolution," in Bresnan, 158.

58 Vickers, 217.

59 Sidney Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam since 1998," in Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan, eds, *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 111.

60 Ibid.

61 Sidel, 141.

62 Vickers, 219.

63 Franz Magnis-Suseno, S. J., "Christian and Muslim Minorities in Indonesia: State Policies and Majority Islamic Organizations," in Künkler and Stepan, 81.

64 Kingsbury, 314.

65 Patrick Ziegenhain, *The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 112.

66 Angus McIntyre, *The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal toward Constitutional Rule* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 130.

67 Stephen Sherlock, *Indonesia's Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions* (Canberra: Center for Democratic Institutions, 2005), 9.

68 Donald L. Horowitz, *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 116 quotes the apt words of Andrew Ellis in describing the work of the Ad Hoc Committee as "The Fundamental Changes That Nobody Noticed."

69 From an unpublished paper quoted in Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt, "Unfinished Business: Law Reform, Governance, and the Courts in Post-Suharto Indonesia," in Künkler and Stepan, 168–69.

70 Ibid., 123.

71 Two other parties, though both opposed to adopting Islamic law, are sometimes classified as Islamic because they have their organizational bases in Muslim groups. They won a combined 17 percent of the vote. Voting data in this section are taken from Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Leo Suryadinata, *Emerging Democracy in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 21.

72 Horowitz, 197.

73 Dan Slater, "Indonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transitions," *Indonesia* 78 (October 2004), 72.

74 Edward Schneier, "Emerging Patterns of Legislative Oversight in Indonesia." Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, January 11, 2004. Much of this section is

adapted from this paper and the revised version, "Evolving Patterns of Legislative Oversight in Indonesia," in Rick Stapenhurst et al., eds, *Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), 201–16.

75 James D. Wolfensohn, "Preface," in Thang D. Nguyen, ed., *The Indonesian Dream: Unity, Diversity and Democracy in Times of Distrust* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004), xvii.

76 Ziegenhain, 235.

77 Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland, "The State as Marketplace: Slush Funds and Intra-Elite Rivalry," in Eward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken, eds, *The State and Illegality in Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010), 85.

78 Most government employees' salaries are officially supplemented by a variety of formal perquisites such as housing and transportation allowances that although hidden and widely suspect are not substantial. Few teachers or civil servants could live comfortably on their government paychecks.

79 John F. McCarthy, "The Limits of Legality: State, Governance and Resource Control in Indonesia," in Aspinall and van Klinken, 89.

80 Lindsey and Butt, 175.

81 Ibid., 177.

82 David S. Lev, introduction to Sebastian Pompe, *The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2005), 4.

83 Ross McLeod, "Institutionalized Public Sector Corruption: A Legacy of the Suharto Franchise," in Aspinall and van Klinken, 45.

84 Daniel S. Lev, *No Concessions: The Life of Yap Thiam Hien, Indonesian Human Rights Lawyer* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 373.

85 Pompe, 472.

86 Ibid., 573.

87 Quoted in Horowitz, 245.

88 Simon Butt, "Regional Autonomy and Legal Disorder: The Proliferation of Local Laws in Indonesia," *Sidney Law Review* 32 (2010), 179.

89 Tim Lindsey and Kate Sumner, "Indonesia: Islamic Courts and Governance Institutions," *East Asia Forum Quarterly* 3 (July 9, 2011), 1.

90 Honna, 78.

91 Ibid., 166.

92 Marcus Mietzner, "Veto Player No More? The Declining Political Influence of the Military in Postauthoritarian Indonesia," in Künkler and Stepan, 96.

93 Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*, 13–14.

94 Ibid., 15.

95 Leonard C. Sebastian and Iis Gindarsah, "Taking Stock of Military Reform in Indonesia," in Jürgen Rüland, Maria-Gabriela Manea and Hans Born, eds, *The Politics of Military Reform: Experiences From Indonesia and Nigeria* (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 31.

96 Mietzner, "Veto Player No More," 104.

97 Horowitz, 218.

98 Honna, 9.

99 Hefner, "Social Legacies and Possible Futures," 120.

100 Sidel, 8.

101 Sidel, 7.

102 Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*, 41.

103 Vedi R. Hadiz, *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 149.

104 On the rise and fall of ethnic violence see Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, "Educated but Poor: Explaining Localized Ethnic Violence during Indonesia's

Democratic Transition," *International Area Studies Review* 16 (March 2013), 24–49.

105 Horowitz, 213.

106 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2002), 51.

107 Basim Tibi, *The Sharia State: Arab Spring and Democratization* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 157.

108 Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 25.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid., 217.

111 Concrete membership numbers cannot be found. One generally reliable study estimates between twenty and thirty million for Muhammadiyah, and thirty-five to forty million for NU. Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker and Sally White, "Indonesia," in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker, eds, *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 40–41.

112 Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty and Robert W. Hefner, "Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia," in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds, *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 193.

113 Bush, 195.

114 M. B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam: Secular Change Through Contemporary Fatāwā* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 60.

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117 Syamsuddin Haris, "Politicization of Religion and the Failure of Islamic Parties in the 1999 General Election," in Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth, eds, *Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 70.

118 Ibid., 71.

119 Lukman Harun, as quoted in Hefner, *Civil Islam*, 122.

120 Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), 4.

121 On this broadened political face of "post-Islamism" see Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

122 Jan Michiel Otto, "Sharia and National Law in Indonesia," in Jan Michiel Otto, ed., *Sharia Incorporated: A Comprehensive Overview of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), 454.

123 Stephen Sherlock, *Indonesia's Anti-Pornography Bill: A Case Study of Decision-making in the Indonesian Parliament* (Bangkok: Friedrich Naumann Institute, 2008). Much of what follows is based on this essay and on more recent coverage in various online editions of the *Jakarta Post*, the *Jakarta Globe* and other periodicals. The United States–Indonesia Society (USINDO) provides its members with a very useful daily clipping service from which much of this material has been sourced.

124 John R. Bowen, "Contours of Sharia in Islam," in Künkler and Stepan, 155.

125 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

126 On the number of religious-based local statutes passed by year between 1999 and 2007, see the interesting chart in Pringle, p. 175, based on research by Greg Fealy and Sally White.

127 Pringle, 175.
128 Arskal Salim, *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 177.
129 Michael Buehler, "Islam and Democracy in Indonesia," *Insight Turkey* 11 (January 2001), 56.
130 Otto, 480.
131 Pringle, 141.
132 Otto, 480–81.
133 Kathryn Robinson, *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 32.
134 Hadiz, 31.
135 Mikaela Nyman, *Democratizing Indonesia: The Challenges of Civil Society in the Era of Reformasi* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2006), 208.
136 The 2014 legislative elections were marred with enough instances of dubious practices as to warrant critical warnings from the electoral commission and numerous NGOs. Instances of overt vote-buying were widely reported (at a going rate of about $5.00 per vote).
137 Edward Aspinall, "The Irony of Success," *Journal of Democracy* 21 (April 2010), 32.
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141 Hadiz, 167.
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144 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East and Indonesia* (Doha, Qatar: Brookings Doha Center, 2005), 49.
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146 Hadiz, 178.
147 Ryter, 183. Emphasis in the original.
148 Marcus Mietzner, *Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013), 124–27.
149 Yuki Fukuoka, "Oligarchy and Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Political Studies Review* 11 (January 2013), 62.
150 See Michael Johnston, *Syndromes of Corruption* (New York: Cambridge, 2006).
151 Mietzner, *Money* ..., Chapter 1.

7 Islam and democracy

Despite the small gains of the fading Arab Spring, the Middle East and North Africa remain outliers on the road to democracy not just in the Islamic world but in the world as a whole. Representing, as it does, the cradle of Islamic civilization, the area has often served as the focal point for arguments suggesting the basic incompatibility of Islam and democracy. But even if we exclude the MENA region, there is, statistically, an overall "democratic deficit" in which the Muslim world lags behind the rest of the world in its overall record of democratic consolidation. Even Indonesia and Turkey, though they remain near the head of the class, give reasons for pause: Turkey under Erdoğan as he continues to suppress opposition groups and consolidate his personal control; Indonesia as it wallows in corruption and tightens its control on civil liberties. In 2013 Senegal stood alone as the only Muslim-majority country in the world to be rated fully "free" by Freedom House.

What previous chapters have shown, however, is that the mixed records of Muslim-majority countries in the rest of Africa, in countries of the old Soviet bloc and in South Asia are comparable to those of countries in the same regions that are not largely Islamic. The overall statistical differences between Muslim-majority countries and others disappear when we control for the more important variables of poverty, region, nation-building and civil infrastructure. Turkey's growing centralization of power is analogous less to the Islamic takeover of Iran than to Hugo Chávez's authoritarian tendencies in Catholic Venezuela or Vladimir Putin's in atheistic Russia. Indonesia's rocky road to democratic consolidation winds through a long-standing terrain of corruption, civil strife and elite privilege that is at most tangentially related to Islam. Whatever differences there are in the rates of democratization between and among these countries are explained by variables other than religion. The Arab Spring showed, moreover, that even in the most profoundly undemocratic nations of the Muslim world, the wish for democracy is strong. What we have found, in common with most serious scholars, is that Islam itself is not a significant independent variable in explanations of democratization. The so-called democratic deficit of the Islamic world, in other words, is almost entirely attributable to the relative poverty of Muslim-majority

countries and their location in parts of the world that were late to achieve independence from colonial rule and therefore—together with Christian-, Hindu- and Buddhist-majority countries in those same regions—unable to have developed clear identities as nation-states or to develop independent post-colonial civic cultures.

Similarly, although surveys linking religion and political attitudes show small but consistent tendencies for Muslims to be personally less supportive of democratic values than adherents of other faiths, when one controls for socioeconomic levels, "being a Muslim has no meaningful substantive effect on attitudes toward democracy; the scores of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents ... are virtually identical."[1] But if Muslims are not particularly distinctive at this level of analysis, there remains the distinct possibility that the West (or more specifically Europe, the Americas and a few other European-dominated countries such as Australia) is. It is most distinctive, moreover, in the ways in which it defines the roles of religion and politics and tends, artificially perhaps, to conflate concepts of secularism, modernity and democracy. Suggesting that secularism is "a particular Western Christian theological category," José Casanova makes a strong case for the recognition "of the multiple and diverse historical patterns of differentiation and fusion of the religious and the secular, as well as of their mutual constitution, within European and Western societies."[2] When the question of Muslim democracy is put in this broader fashion it helps to explain why so many observers both in the West and within the Islamic world continue to argue that the disconnection is both real and permanent. It is not democracy in particular that is at issue, but a set of secularistic assumptions that are perceived to be part of the package. The issue, in this sense, is not one concerning the core values of democracy we outlined in Chapter 2, but a set of ancillary variables, the most important of which is the linking of secularism with democracy. To those of us who have grown up with the arguably simplistic assumption that democracy works only when the state refrains from governing religion and vice versa, the bigger questions raised in the cases examined here involve the evolving relationships between faith and politics.

More broadly, to extend this line of reasoning, it is not just Islam that is at issue but the more general compatibility of liberal democracy with what Almond et al. call "strong religion." "While the understanding of, and reactions against, secularization may vary," they argue, "fundamentalists across religious traditions and regions of the world share an animus against political cultures that would deny religion what they feel should be its central position in ordering society."[3] It is not just Muslims who might challenge the idea that a sharp separation of church and state is either necessary or just; however, radical Islamists have been—at least since 9/11—the most visible faces of this position. Before developing this argument in greater detail, let us first review and consolidate the findings of the previous chapters.

Developing democracy in the Islamic world

The three interrelated factors most closely associated with successful transitions to democracy are the character of the existing regime, its level of economic development and the nature and extent of its civil society. Exogenous actors—neighboring countries and great powers in particular—can also play decisive roles. The key problem in the emergence of many third-wave democracies stems from a lack of "stateness," the existence of both a recognized "imagined community" of citizens and of a government with the resources to provide basic services (see Chapter 2). Especially in ethnic, linguistic and religiously divided societies there needs to be a sense of a set of shared values, cultural traditions and patriotism that override potential conflicts. To govern effectively, moreover, a nation's governing institutions need the capacity to govern; to govern democratically it helps to have these as well as a sense of how to conduct elections, run legislatures and provide fair trials. Some colonial regimes provided such experiences for their citizens; most did so only marginally. Many colonies, as noted, were administrative constructs rather than countries in any historic or cultural sense. It would follow then, that the longer a country's experience of self-government, the greater is its likelihood to have stable government and a state that is "ready" for democracy.

The colonial experience is important in two ways. First, it almost invariably created bastard nations, nations whose parental origins were rooted less in family histories than in the political and economic needs of the imperial powers. Second, traditions of dependency, a lack of bureaucratic skills and economic and educational deficiencies characterized all but a handful of newly independent states in the period following World War II. Although Table 7.1, similarly to Table 1.1, makes some rather arbitrary assumptions about when particular nations become "independent," it shows that the earlier countries established their identities as nations, the more democratic they are likely to be today. Thus two-thirds of the fifty-two nations that were independent before 1900 were rated "fully free" in 2013, compared with just over one-third of countries that became nations in the years following World War II. Put another way, of the forty-one nations classified by Freedom House as "not free," thirty (73 percent) are among these newer nations. The overwhelming majority of "fully free" democracies among recently independent countries (i.e., twenty-two out of thirty—73 percent) are small island nations such as Barbados, Malta and Mauritius with clear boundaries and relatively homogeneous populations. Excluding these rather unique boutique nations from the overall totals, of the post-1945 countries 51 percent are not free, 31 percent are partly free and only 18 percent are free. What makes these numbers particularly relevant is that the vast majority of Muslim-majority countries are new nations, 95 percent of them were created after 1900, and a large proportion of them in the past fifty years. They achieved nationhood, moreover, in the cauldron of the Cold War when both East and West were

more interested in issues of global power than internal governance. Nader Hashemi argues that:

> as a general rule, the less the external intervention in the Muslim world the better the prospects for democracy. It cannot be overemphasized that the most powerful organizing theme in the Muslim world is colonialism. In particular, there is a widely held view among Muslims that the chief reason that Islamic civilization has declined and cannot be rejuvenated is present and past victimization by external powers.[4]

Whatever the validity of this sentiment, the widespread equation of colonial oppression and Western values has almost certainly diminished support for democracy in most of the Islamic world.

Moreover, the world's Muslim-majority countries are notable for their poverty, especially those in Africa. Aside from the major oil producers, at least one-third of the world's poorest countries (those with per capita GDP of less than $1,000) have Muslim majorities. And fifteen other Islamic countries (26 percent) are among the fifty-seven with per capita incomes of less than $5,000. Put another way, more than half of the world's Muslim-majority countries (25 out of 46) are among the world's least affluent with per capita annual GDP of less than $5,000. In 2003 Alfred Stepan compiled a table comparing these numbers with figures on elections and found that Muslim-majority countries were actually more likely to be "electoral overachievers," than their poverty rates might suggest.[5] Nonetheless, the greater a nation's poverty, the less able it is to deliver good government, not just to provide public order educational and social services, but simply to run the government itself.

One of the more significant developments in political science in recent years has been the rediscovery of the importance of institutions. Cultural and economic theories of democracy have an important place, but political institutions matter. Perhaps the most crucial variable in explaining democratic consolidation—the ability of newer democracies to remain democratic—can be found in their relative success in establishing functioning legislatures, bureaucracies capable of implementing the policies adopted by the government, courts willing and able to implement the rule of law, armies that take orders from civilians not vice versa and parties that link programmatic goals to elections. A handful of Muslim-majority countries inherited competent bureaucracies and courts from their colonial masters, but most did not. At a minimum it takes time and resources to develop these institutions, but also to reach a tipping point whereby a new paradigm takes hold. For court systems, for example, it takes time and resources for students to complete their legal training; but when they must work within a thoroughly incompetent and corrupt system, how do they do their jobs without themselves becoming part of that same system? The long-run answer is top-down reform, endeavoring to place competent, independent justices at the higher appellate levels and

Table 7.1 Colonialism, democracy and religion: year of independence and 2013 democratization scores for nations of differing religious populations

Year of independence	*Predominant religion*				
	Muslim	*Catholic*	*Protestant*	*Other*	*Mixed*
Before 1800	Iran	Andorra	Denmark	China	Belgium
	Oman	Austria	Ethiopia	Japan	Germany
		France	Sweden	Mongolia	Netherlands
		Hungary	UK	Nepal	Russia
		Portugal		Thailand	USA
		Spain			
1801–1900		Argentina	Liberia	Bulgaria	Canada
		Bolivia		Greece	Ethiopia
		Brazil		Romania	
		Chile			
		Colombia			
		Costa Rica			
		Dominican Republic			
		El Salvador			
		Guatemala			
		Honduras			
		Italy			
		Luxembourg			
		Mexico			
		Panama			
		Paraguay			
		Peru			
		Uruguay			
		Venezuela			
1901–44	Albania	Ireland		Australia	Czech Republic
	Afghanistan	Lithuania		Finland	Estonia
	Egypt	Poland		Iceland	Latvia
	Iraq			New Zealand	
	Lebanon			South Africa	
	Saudi Arabia				

Year of independence	*Predominant religion*				
	Muslim	*Catholic*	*Protestant*	*Other*	*Mixed*
1945–59	Indonesia				Burma
	Jordan				Bhutan
	Libya				Ghana
	Morocco				Cambodia
	Pakistan				India
	Sudan				Israel
	Syria				Laos
	Tunisia				North Korea
					South Korea
					Vietnam
					Sri Lanka
1960–	Algeria	Brunei	Antigua	Armenia	Angola
	Azerbaijan	Cape Verde	Bahamas	Belarus	Barbados
	Bahrain	Republic of the Congo	Central African Republic	Benin	Belize
	Bangladesh	Croatia	Namibia	Georgia	Bosnia
	Chad	Dominica	St. Vincent	Mauritius	Botswana
	Comoros	East Timor	Swaziland	Moldova	Cameroon
	Djibouti	Equitorial Guinea	Togo	Samoa	Brunei
	The Gambia	Gabon	Tonga		Democratic Republic of the Congo
	Kuwait	Kenya	Tuvalu		Eritrea
	Kyrgyzstan	Lesotho	Zambia		Fiji
	Maldives	Malta			Grenada
	Mali	Rwanda			Guinea-Bissau
	Mauritania	Sao Tome			Guyana
	Niger	Seychelles			Jamaica
	Qatar	Slovakia			Kosovo
	Senegal	Slovenia			Macedonia
	Sierra Leone	Tanzania			Madagascar
	Somalia	Uganda			Malawi
	Tajikistan				Montenegro
	Turkmenistan				Mozambique

Year of independence	*Predominant religion*				
	Muslim	*Catholic*	*Protestant*	*Other*	*Mixed*
1960–	United Arab Emirates				Nauru
	Yemen				Papua
					St. Kitts
					St. Lucia
					Serbia
					Singapore
					Solomon Islands
					South Sudan
					Trinidad and Tobago

Sources: Most of the dates in this table have been extracted from Barry Turner, ed., *The Statesman's Yearbook: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); data on religion have been taken from various publications and numerous visits to the website of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.

working downwards. Even here, as the Turkish case shows, the ability of a strong popular government to pack a too-independent judiciary presents a cautionary tale.

Legislatures are the key institutions in democracies, and perhaps the most difficult to build into effective bodies that combine the sometimes contradictory roles of representation and programmatic efficiency. Throughout the world, they are generally better at providing patronage and particularistic benefits to their constituents than at solving national problems. In Theodore Lowi's terms they prefer "distributive" politics and "logrolling" as opposed to direct bargaining:

> When a billion-dollar issue can be disaggregated into many millions of nickel-dime items and each item can be dealt with independently, multiplication of interests and of access is inevitable, and so is reduction of conflict. ... In the distributive arena, political relationships approximate ... "pork barrel" and "logrolling," but these colloquialisms have not been taken sufficiently seriously. A logrolling coalition is not one forged of conflict, compromise, and tangential interest but, on the contrary, one composed of members who have absolutely nothing in common; and this is possible because the "pork barrel" is a container of unrelated items. This is the typical form of relationship in the distributive arena.[6]

The scale of such relationships is very different in developing countries, but the tendencies of legislatures to play distributive games are analogous. This

has three important consequences in developing democracies. First, it tends to cede to the executive whatever key decisions need to be made on the overall allocation of resources (what Lowi would call "redistributive" and "regulatory" issues). Second, it frequently produces massive inefficiency: scarce resources flow less reliably to those with need rather than to those with power. And third, what distributive politics do in this context is particularly to favor those local and particularistic interests best organized to ask for special treatment. Whatever mandate a new government may have to challenge the status quo, the pull of the legislature is thus to sustain and augment the resources of those who are already organized and powerful. This leads to the third key variable in predicting levels of democratization, which goes under the general heading of "civil society."

The notion of civil society, as we saw in our case studies, is difficult to operationalize. One would expect newer countries to lag on this dimension (a) because few colonial powers were tolerant of nongovernmental groups; and (b) because most civil society organizations—labor unions, business and professional societies, and so on—were banned or tightly controlled. Civil society is seldom robust in new democracies in general, but in many Muslim-majority countries they emerged in a distorted form. In many cases, colonial administrators and the indigenous dictators who replaced them were more reluctant to suppress religious groups than secular groups. What this means in political terms is that religious groups, being better organized, become favored players in the post-independence game of distributive politics. Direct patronage, in the form of new mosques, madrasas and so on, is one side of this coin. However, there is also a sense in which acts like Indonesia's pornography act serve as a form of patronage: while it does punish some unorganized groups and may disproportionately impact women, it went through the legislature largely as a "cost-free" sop to conservative Islamists. As a religion, Islam is particularly susceptible to distributive politics. In Indonesia, for example, the collection of alms for the poor (*zakat*, the giving of such aid is a fundamental obligation of the faith) is often used to strengthen the financial position of local government leaders.[7] Unlike most Western religions, Islam has no orthodoxy, no central authority that can be called to a national bargaining table. There are, to be sure, important umbrella organizations in the Islamic world, such as the many variants of the Muslim Brotherhood, the NU in Indonesia and transnational extremist groups like Al Qaeda. Furthermore, in most Muslim-majority countries the state has imposed an orthodoxy through its control of education, by paying the salaries of mosque leaders and so on. In general, however, the state interfaces with Islam largely at the local level where, in both authoritarian and post-authoritarian settings, the local mosque is the only civic organization in operation.

However, in a very basic sense, there is no single "Islam": it is best understood one country, one mosque, even one individual at a time. Sometimes out of ignorance, more frequently for their own political purposes, both militant Islamists and Islam's most shrill critics in the West are inclined to depict

Islam as a fixed and unchanging body of doctrines embodied in a defined sharia law. There are, in fact, many Islams. The basic divisions between Sunnis and Shi'ites as well as many smaller sects are long-standing and often highly contested. More importantly, in a world of nation-states, the Islam of the Saudis is not that of the Turks. And in countries where the state does not control the institutions of the faith, there is even greater diversity. Field work in countries that have sharia courts, for example, has consistently shown enormous diversity not just from one country to another but from one community to another both in the substance of the law and in the courts' willingness to invoke religious texts, local customs and civil laws as the basis for their rulings.[8] "Indeed the diverse ways in which the law is embedded and instrumentalized ensure that the sharia is far more porous in its public meanings than in scholarly discourse, which is already marked by great internal diversity."[9] Where Muslims are not required by the state to speak with one voice, there is in fact an enormous diversity of opinion on matters both religious and political.

While many of the organized religious groups in Muslim countries, such as NU and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, became important players in building a democratic state, there are reasons to be more skeptical of religious organizations that do not have such ties. As we argued in Chapter 2, many faith-based organizations are hierarchically organized or so inflexible that they provide little of the training in democratic procedures that de Tocqueville and most subsequent scholars attributed to participation in civic organizations. "Movements with a strong religious vision indeed have tendency toward authoritarian leadership and internal discipline."[10] Even in Islam, where individuals are encouraged to find their own roads to salvation, there is a clergy, and there are learned scholars who play a strong role in guiding the masses toward the "best" roads to salvation. That guiding hand is not always above politics, particularly in authoritarian systems or those recently emerging from political systems in which resources were centrally controlled. Where they are required to work underground, moreover, as in most authoritarian systems, cohesion is the key to survival.

Faith-based civil society organizations often fail to provide the mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution attributed to civil society organizations. Many faith-based NGOs are focused on narrowly defined ethnic and sectarian concerns such that "the growth of civil society in ethnically divided (Indonesia) or fragmented (Argentina) societies may lead not to democracy but to divisions."[11] As we saw in Chapter 6, Indonesia has succeeded in resolving many of these conflicts by shedding East Timor and decentralizing power to Aceh; however, as much as it is still troubled by religious and ethnic divisions, there is a developing pragmatic kind of pluralism that is willing peacefully to contest competing principles. Whatever the downside of patronage politics, it beats civil war. At the same time, Indonesia has the advantage of being able largely to contain sectarian conflicts within its own borders. Compare this situation with the unfolding horrors in Syria and Iraq, or the problems

Mali faced with the spillover following the overthrow of Libya's authoritarian state.

The failure of many Islamic nations to develop robust civil societies that foster democracy is not unique; but as the cases of Iraq and Mali show, factional strife, often violent, is a serious factor in the Islamic world, the Middle East in particular. For many years, the lid was kept on these conflicts by the overwhelming force of colonial and authoritarian governments; however, transitions (particularly those to democracy) often unleashed long-simmering rivalries that had grown in hidden intensity when they were kept underground. "Whether grievances are based on economic, political, or cultural conditions and comparisons, the likelihood of violence increases when significant changes lead to worsening conditions for disadvantaged groups or offer potential threats to the privileged status of dominant groups."[12] Some emerging Muslim democracies have largely been able to overcome these divisions. Indonesia, as we have seen, is not free of conflict but has come a long way since its early years of transition. Turkey under Erdoğan and the AKP has not resolved the Kurdish problem, but has defused it to an extent never achieved by earlier secular governments. Senegal, through "trial and error" rather than "any theory of government," has been able to accommodate factionalism with a system that "combines formally secular state institutions with informal Islamic governance in its interior."[13]

This is not the case in the Middle East, where conflicts founded in religious differences have been repeatedly intensified both by outside intervention and more subtle forms of support for one faction or another. The oil-rich dictatorships of the Middle East have been particularly active in recent years in supporting fellow authoritarians and promoting their own sectarian comrades. Proxy wars between Saudi-backed Sunnis and Iranian-funded Shi'ites have been common in other MENA countries. In the extreme case of Lebanon, successful efforts at democracy-building have been repeatedly frustrated by outside interventions. Progress is difficult if you live in a bad neighborhood. In the aggregate, Muslim-majority countries may be more likely to engender ethnic and religious conflicts, particularly, it seems, in countries where sharp divisions between Shi'ites and Sunnis are exacerbated by the willingness of outside forces to intervene; but they certainly have no monopoly on civil wars, pogroms or ethnic cleansing.

In contrast with the tolerant caliphates of the Ottomans, Sajavids and Moghuls, contemporary Muslim-majority countries seem far more prone to conflicts both within Islam and in relations with other faiths. In part, these conflicts derive from overlaps with other, unresolved conflicts: Kurdish rebellions in Turkey and adjacent countries, a variety of isolated ethnic communities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Papuan separatism in Indonesia. But they may also be related to the inability of the relatively new Muslim state system to impose a peace upon rather than exacerbate internecine conflicts between sects. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War, ushered in an era of relative freedom from religious warfare in Europe.

Throughout Europe, and in most of the Christian world, violent conflicts between Catholics and Protestants or between diverse strains of Protestantism were virtually eliminated. "It is arguable," as Fox puts it, "that this and many other historical events have given Europeans a healthy respect for the power of religion to disrupt politics."[14] It is a lesson, however, that many other parts of the world have not learned. That there has been no Islamic Westphalia is obvious, but whether it is Islam or Western Europe that is unique is not clear. Increasingly, moreover, it appears as if Westphalia's privatization of religion was neither complete nor permanent. What we may be witnessing is "the gradual emergence of post-Westphalian, post secular conceptions of religio-political authority ... In some ways, we are back to Europe in 1517. In other ways, we never left."[15] Once again, as Stepan puts it, there is a recognition that "secular patterns of democracy are not singular in their practice and values but are multiple."[16]

One of the key factors in making the Westphalia agreements work was the ability of the religious groups involved in the process to enforce them. The Vatican, at the apex of a hierarchical organization, was able rather simply to halt attacks on Protestants; most Protestant churches, though less formally hierarchical, were able to define orthodoxy. Islam has neither central authority nor a fixed creed, no way—except through state or military intervention—of favoring Shias over Sunnis, of excommunicating violent jihadists or declaring their doctrines heretical. The early caliphates essentially circumvented these problems by letting 1,000 flowers bloom, by tolerating rather than controlling, regulating rather than repressing, certain sects. More modern, post-colonial governments have moved in the other direction, using state power to favor and enforce a particular orthodoxy. What is perhaps unique to the Islamic world is the development of guerrilla groups like Islamic State to attempt the creation of a state founded in its own peculiar version of religious orthodoxy. What is not at all unique to Islam is states' use of religious symbols to sustain themselves in power in ways that intensify rather than dissipate latent conflicts.

Donald Horowitz's distinction between "ranked" and "unranked" ethnic divisions is suggestive here,[17] especially in situations in which the privileged group uses its political hegemony to sustain its social and economic status. In Northern Ireland, to use a frequently cited example, conflicts between Catholics and Protestants were exacerbated by the fact that the political hegemony of the former was reflected in sharp economic inequalities as well. We see this frequently in conflict-prone parts of the Islamic world where an Alewite minority in Syria "ranks" above the majority sects it governs, and in Turkey where Kurds feel themselves both economically and politically marginalized. In the United States, we have only to look at our history of race relations to understand how persistent and difficult such ranked divisions can be, even in the face of persistent efforts to ameliorate their effects. In the Islamic world, Sunnis and Shi'ites have lived in harmony for centuries, but

struggles for political hegemony in times of rapid change can destroy these connections virtually overnight:

> As Rwandans and residents of the Balkans can sadly testify, mixed marriages and a history of communal coexistence are no guarantee against fratricide. Even Sarajevo's cosmopolitan blend of Muslim, Croat, and Serbian communities, with its hybrid culture and mixed families, did not protect it from the violence of Yugoslavia's genocidal wars. ...
>
> What makes sectarian conflict in the particularly relevant to the future of the Middle East is that it is surfacing at a time when anti-Americanism, religious conservatism, and extremism are on the rise. Sunni extremism feeds on anti-Shia bias and even violence, which—at least in places where the Shias can fight back—leads to a vicious cycle of provocation and revenge followed by more of the same.[18]

Democratization, unfortunately, can have the effect of intensifying these conflicts first by allowing the open articulation of conflicting views, but more importantly by increasing the stakes of the game. By opening the possibility of changing the government, debates about abstract issues of theology are suddenly imbued with very real and material potential for patronage and power. When the possibility looms that adherents of one culture or another may take over the apparatus of the state, group positions may become too crucial to allow for compromise. Political parties, instead of brokering interests, often intensify these differences. Many instances of such sharpened conflicts have their roots, in the countries we have examined, in the purging of the left that took place largely in the context of the Cold War. Conservative political parties that almost by definition represent the interests of the entrenched elites do not engage in the political mobilization of the electorate unless and until they are challenged. This challenge typically comes from the left, from forces representing the have-nots and seeking a redistribution of resources. In both Turkey and Indonesia, the left was eliminated by the military and has never recovered as a political force. The voids created in these cases were filled by parties that were programmatic in only the loosest sense (Indonesia) or founded (Turkey) in religio-cultural divisions that are largely symbolic and essentially non-negotiable. The legislatures, in both systems (and as in many new democracies), have proven far more interested in (and capable of) distributing patronage than policy-making.

In Pakistan, the purge of parties was both more thorough and insidious. Under the military rule of General Zia in the 1980s, it was thought that abolishing political parties would lead to the primary goal of creating a purely Islamic state. It did not. Instead it resulted in "the distortion of the system favoring a narrow elite based on the bureaucracy, the military, large landowners and elements of the religious community." It also forced opposition forces "to find their own outlets, which were under the circumstances essentially outside the formal political structure."[19] And the political parties that

emerged in the post-Zia years lacked ideological cohesion and durable bases of support. Many years ago, but with enduring wisdom, E. E. Schattschneider described "the displacement of conflicts" as a key factor in politics. "What happens in politics," he argued, "*depends on the way in which people are divided* into factions, parties, groups, classes, etc. ... [T]he development of one conflict may inhibit the development of another because a radical shift of alignment becomes possible only at the cost of a change in the relations and priorities of all the contestants."[20] By displacing negotiable conflicts about the distribution of resources to either/or issues of ethnicity, religion and morality, the wells of democracy are poisoned.

There are students of African politics who suggest that the political and economic problems of the continent derive largely, if not entirely, from fixed ethnic and social, primitive cultures, and uncivilized patterns of conflict that defy modern understanding or remedy. Among Africanists these concepts have been derided as reflecting what Richards calls a "New Barbarism" theory of development that virtually ignores the roles played by politics and economic underdevelopment.[21] Although students of Islam have not, to my knowledge, used this terminology, there is a close parallel to this debate with a number of scholars and journalists continuing to insist that the democratic deficiency of the Muslim world (together with other pathologies) is largely if not entirely attributable to a similarly "barbaric" culture. Our argument has essentially been that although Islam is in some ways a special case, there is nothing particularly Islamic that accounts for whatever democratic deficits exist. These differences, moreover, are better explained through more mundane country-by-country forces of economics, history and politics, and—in particular—in the ways in which these factors are interrelated.

Islam, gender, violence and human rights

The case studies and data presented in this book indicate quite clearly that the deficit of democracy often attributed to Muslim-majority countries essentially disappears when subjected to comparative analysis. Whether a country is formally democratic, however, is not to say that it embraces a full range of democratic values associated under the general heading of "liberal democracy." From a Western European and US perspective in particular, the world's ostensibly "democratic" Islamic countries are likely to be particularly deficient at least three key dimensions: women's rights, human rights more generally and attitudes toward violence. In addition—as we will argue in a concluding section—there is a strong division of perceived opinions and practices on issues involving secularism and the role of religion in society.

Gender equality, in a broad sense, is strongly related to economic development. The UNDP's Gender Inequality Index measures statistical indicators of social and political equality such as literacy and membership in parliament by gender. It also includes measures that are strongly related to economic development, such as maternal death rates and participation in the work force. By

this measure, ironically, Muslim-majority countries as a whole have an average inequality index that is not very far behind that of other countries.[22] This does not mean, however, that gender equality is the norm in the Islamic world. Because the oil-rich MENA countries can deliver high levels of healthcare, education and social services to their populations, male and female, they probably appear more egalitarian than they should. Government policies that single out women, or that support patriarchal social relations are, indeed, on prominent display particularly in the more authoritarian countries of the Middle East.

To European and American eyes, there is perhaps nothing more symbolic of Muslim attitudes toward women than the veil (or hijab as it is known in many parts of the world). To many authors of personal histories, journalistic accounts and scholarly works it is symbolic of the kind of gender inequality said to be inherent in Islam. While many Muslim women regard the veil as a means of liberating themselves from a focus on the human body and a physical manifestation of the right to privacy, most Westerners regard it is a symbol of silence or submission: tangible evidence of gender bias in the Islamic world. There is no doubt that in many countries, including Indonesia and Turkey, "women have been voluntarily putting on the hijab in growing numbers throughout the Muslim world"; frequently with the argument "that with the hypersexuality of Western culture, hijab places the emphasis on a girl or woman's personhood, rather than her sexuality."[23] Or, it is suggested, the veil is a symbol of religious identity that is proudly worn in the same way as a cross, bindi or yarmulke; or simply as a matter of social convention like a necktie:

> As with the necktie, the headscarf might not be one's choice on a hot day if physical comfort were one's sole criterion for dressing; and, as with necktie, only one sex feels obliged to wear it. But, as with the necktie, it would be a mistake to assume that wearers feel like victims of sexual discrimination. Most may simply regard it as a normal part of dressing for appearance in public.[24]

Sentiments such as these have played a major role in characterizing the veil issue not as one of female oppression, but as a question of civil liberties, of the right to choose veiling. This was certainly the case in Turkey. It is quite the opposite in countries like Saudi Arabia where veiling is absolutely compulsory. Rather than providing a shell of privacy, the veil seems more a badge of inferiority, particularly when viewed in the context of other laws that segregate the sexes and discriminate against women. Mandatory veiling often goes hand-in-hand with policies limiting access to education and certain occupations, or, in extreme cases, forbidding women to drive cars or to appear in public without male company. While these restrictions are found only in a handful of authoritarian Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan under the Taliban, Fish makes the statistical case that there is broader

evidence of discrimination against women. Digging beyond the overall numbers in the United Nation's reports on gender equality, he shows that the percentage of Muslims in the population is negatively correlated with income equality, with female parliamentary membership or occupation of high-ranking government positions, with literacy, and even with life expectancy. Public opinion polls also show a strong correlation between the percentage of Muslims in the population and the tendency to agree with statements supporting "traditional" gender roles.[25] In the centuries since the death of the Prophet, virtually all of the religious scholars have been male, and are usually educated in the patriarchal societies of the Middle East, where they have generally restricted the role of women in the mosque and in public life. The irony of this is that seventh-century Islam conferred rights on women, such as property ownership, which have only recently been accorded to them in the Christian world. Many of the leading feminists in the Muslim world, not surprisingly, ground their arguments more directly in the Koran than in the teachings of these religious scholars. And there are numerous actual cases in which this approach has worked. In 2006, for example, Pakistan's Federal Shariat Court ruled against a law discriminating against women marrying foreign nationals. The law, the court ruled, was discriminatory, unconstitutional, "against international commitments of Pakistan and, most importantly, is repugnant to the Holy Quran and Sunnah."[26]

Male voices in support of gender equality—and they are strong and numerous—as we have seen in the case of Indonesia, are now frequently heard. And, in an interesting twist, there have been more female heads of state in Muslim-majority countries than in the rest of the world. Progress is being made toward "a new paradigm that reestablishes the connection between culture, religion, and human/women's rights discourse and activism."[27] Other religions, it can also be argued, are fundamentally paternalistic; and the Islamic world today is essentially at least as progressive on issues of gender equality as were virtually all nations a century ago. In the final analysis, however, "Muslims have an especially acute problem with gender-based inequality."[28] Democratization has proven a partial cure especially in allowing women's groups effectively to organize; however, it has also facilitated the use of sexist policy proposals as religiously based leverage issues, particularly at the local level.

Laws discriminating against women are often paralleled by other restrictions on human rights. Muslim-majority countries average 5 points on a scale of 1 to 7 on Freedom House's civil liberties index, without a single Islamic country receiving a "fully free" score of 1, and only one (Senegal) rated at 2 points. Restrictions on the press and other forms of expression are probably no more common in the Muslim world than elsewhere, but civil rights in many Islamic countries suffer from a tendency to endorse the hierarchical structures of early Muslim jurisprudence in which free persons were ranked above slaves, men above women and Muslims above non-Muslims. Similarly to other world religions, few Muslims still condone slavery; but in addition to

a bias against women, many Muslim countries exhibit biases not just against non-Muslims but against all who refuse to accept the dominant orthodoxy. Even in more democratic Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, forces of nationalism and religious orthodoxy have tended to trump the rights of religious minorities.

Indonesia and Senegal are among a growing number of Muslim-majority countries that have enshrined most aspects of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) into their constitutions, and Turkey has won EU acceptance of most of its human rights criteria. The new Afghan and Iraqi constitutions, adopted under strong pressure from US advisors, are also strongly protective of human rights. Clearly, the tide of world opinion is on the side, in the abstract at least, of the UDHR protections. Even the more authoritarian Muslim countries, instead of overtly opposing these criteria, have felt it important to propose a Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights rather than simply to ignore the issue. But although the rhetoric of this declaration parallels that of its secular counterpart, its actual protections are far less substantial. Its "qualifications on rights," moreover, "have been deliberately left so vague and open-ended that they allow states vast discretion in circumscribing or nullifying rights."[29] Recent democratization movements in countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Afghanistan have brought to the fore tensions between these competing versions of "true" Islamic policies. While there are, as in all major faiths, strong arguments on these issues, the actual records of Muslim majority countries with regard to human rights vary far less according to piety than to politics. In a broad sense, as Ann Elizabeth Mayer suggests, the more repressive policies:

> should not be ascribed to peculiar features of Islam or Islam's supposed inherent incompatibility with human rights. Instead, they should be seen as part of a broader phenomenon of attempts by elites—the beneficiaries of undemocratic and hierarchical systems—to use religion as and culture as devices to legitimatize their opposition to international human rights law or to weaken it.[30]

Simply put, the more authoritarian the regime the more repressive its policies. This basic fact, however, is not wholly reassuring in the wake of experiences with democracy in a number of countries where laws restricting freedom have proven popular with the electorate. And, as we saw in the case of Indonesia's pornography bill, it is not necessarily the Islamic parties that use anti-civil libertarian appeals in the name of religion to restrict rights. More profoundly, the Iranian Revolution, forged in an improbable coalition of liberal reformers, leftists and Islamic militants united in opposition to the shah, was essentially hijacked by the militants. Instead of dismantling the strong state and repressive apparatus of the Pahlavi era, it extended and redefined it:

> vesting even greater powers in the state to subdue social forces as a pre-requisite to for the realization of its public policy agenda. The Islamic

> Republic, as was also the case with the early Pahlavi state, became directly concerned with the people's dress, music, personal relations, and cultural outlook. It regulated clothing and individual conduct in public, restricted women's and minority rights, imposed controls on the news and entertainment media, changed education curricula and introduced ideological indoctrination, and even sought to Islamize intellectual activities.[31]

The specter of Iran continues to haunt the Muslim world. It was often argued that what happened in Iran was precisely what would happen in the wake of the Arab Spring and what is happening now in Turkey. While this possibility can by no means be dismissed, the Iranian case is probably unique. Not only did the shah's repressive policies play into Islamist hands, a badly divided opposition simply could not unite effectively to oppose the elevation of the ayatollah. More importantly, "it is not possible to understand the trajectory of the Islamic Republic's development without understanding how the Iran–Iraq war affected political priorities, attitudes, and power struggles in Iran."[32] By allowing conservative forces to seize the flags of nationalism, it shifted the lines of debate from issues of democratization to state-building and development that both divided and overwhelmed the liberals. The strength of democratic ideals in the country is attested to by the regime's continuing observance of quasi-democratic procedures; but its essential theocratic authoritarianism is unique.

There is nothing in the Koran as violent as parts of the Old Testament, as when Moses—not satisfied with killing all the Midianite men and burning their villages—issued the command: "Now kill all the boys. And kill every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept with a man" (Numbers 31:17–18). Nor do the Abrahamic religions have a monopoly on invocations of violence. Despite its pacific image, Buddhism has been at the root of ethnic cleansing efforts and acts of mass violence, particularly against Muslims in Sri Lanka and Burma, and Hindus in Bhutan. More than any other religion, however, Islam has been depicted as unusually prone to acts of and justifications for violence. Images of demonstrators shouting "Death to [name the villain du jour]" seem almost always to involve Muslims, and when groups like Islamic State give anyone who is not a Sunni Muslim the option of conversion or death it reinforces the image (in the West at least) of a particularly violent faith. Fish presents comparative data on two kinds of reliably reported indicators: individual homicide rates and incidents of large-scale political violence. Murder rates, he finds, are considerably lower in Muslim countries than Christian ones; and, surprisingly, incidences of large-scale political violence have killed roughly the same percentage of the populations in both.[33]

Acts of terrorism, however, are another story. Fish shows that "Islamists have been responsible for the bulk of global terrorism over the past fifteen years."[34] Historically, a wide diversity of groups—from the United States' Ku

Klux Klan to Peru's Shining Path and Spain's Basque militants—have used acts of terrorism to arouse feelings of fear and wear down their opponents. Menachem Begim, winner of the 1979 Nobel Peace Prize, authorized the bombing of the King David Hotel in 1946 that killed nearly 100 people, most of them civilians. Both Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland committed acts of terrorism in a tradition of religious violence stretching back more than a century. Even Buddhists, the least violent of the world's religious followers, have been linked to acts of violence in Burma that have killed hundreds of Muslims and displaced more than 100,000 ethnic Rohingya.[35] In recent years, however, acts of terrorism have been increasingly associated with Islam. Defining terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents," the United States government agency charged with tracking terrorist activities counted over 10,000 such acts in 2011, occurring in seventy countries and resulting in 12,500 deaths.[36] With almost two-thirds of the incidents and three-quarters of the deaths occurring in just three countries—Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan—those whom the report calls "Sunni extremists" were responsible for nearly nine out of every ten such acts.

Mark Juergensmeyer argues that with few exceptions, such as the Shining Path and the Basques, "religion has supplied not only the ideology but also the motivation for and the organizational structure for the perpetrators."[37] At the same time religion "serves to contain some of humanity's most destructive impulses," raising "the question of the extent of a direct link between religion and terrorism."[38] Indeed it is generally the case that religion has historically been more a tool than a driver of terrorism. Karen Armstrong's tracing of the history of religion and violence very sensitively blends these seemingly contradictory positions by suggesting that acts of violence committed in the name of religion are most likely to occur when religious attitudes are most firmly conflated with ethnic, political and other identities.[39] Ethnic, class and political conflicts are intensified when overlaid—whether sociologically or strategically—with religion, and are particularly likely to turn violent during periods of rapid social change.

With the notable exception of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, most of the victims of Islamic terrorism in this century have been other Muslims. Although many of these acts of terrorism are fundamentally more the product of long-simmering ethnic rather than strictly religious conflicts, the perpetrators of Islamic terrorism are unusual in the extent to which they wrap the robes of religion around their acts. The Koran, as we have noted, is arguably less violent than some other religious texts; but while most Jews and Christians have given decreasing attention to glorifying violence, many Islamists have moved in the other direction. "None of the explanations found in the literature," as Fish concludes, "is entirely satisfactory."[40] In large part it would seem to reflect a peculiar and (one would hope) temporary confluence of forces in which globalization and new technologies of communication and mass murder have become readily

Table 7.2 State-religion regimes and democratization in Muslim-majority countries

Freedom House scores for secular countries		*Freedom House scores for countries with established religions*		*Freedom House scores for Islamic countries*	
Albania	6	Algeria	11	Afghanistan	12
Azerbaijan	12	Bangladesh	7	Bahrain	12
Burkina Faso	8	Comoros	7	Brunei	11
Chad	13	Djibouti	11	Iran	12
The Gambia	12	Egypt	11	Maldives	8
Guinea	10	Iraq	11	Mauritania	11
Indonesia	6	Jordan	11	Oman	11
Kazakhstan	11	Kuwait	10	Pakistan	9
Kosovo	9	Libya	9	Saudi Arabia	14
Kyrgyzstan	10	Malaysia	8	Sudan	14
Lebanon	9	Morocco	9	Yemen	12
Mali	9	Qatar	11		
Niger	7	Somalia	14		
Senegal	4	Tunisia	6		
Sierra Leone	6	United Arab Emirates	12		
Syria	14				
Tajikistan	12				
Turkey	7				
Turkmenistan	14				
Uzbekistan	14				
Average	9.65		9.87		11.4

Sources: Ahmet T. Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Appendix C; and Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2013: The Democratic Leadership Gap," *Journal of Democracy* 25 (April 2014), 82–83.

available just as the grievances of radical Islamists are reaching a post-colonial peak. The willingness of oil-rich authoritarian governments to fund further radical and violent fundamentalist movements is an added factor in parts of the world where strong, highly sectarian religious forces have been able to offer martyrdom in heaven as a reward for acts of terrorism on earth. Certainly, too, the terrorist acts of Palestinians in Israel and the often violent responses of the Israelis have served as both models and motives for others. In a broader sense, however, terrorism is only one aspect of a larger picture of political violence which renders it almost trivial. The massive disruption to

the lives of an overwhelming number of victims of political violenec was at the hands, not of terrorists, but of armies, police and state executioners. In almost every significant conflict between terrorists and troops, moreover, it is the latter who inflict the most casualties (yet who tend to occupy the higher moral ground). Despite attempts by religious activists to "reclaim the traditional right of religious authorities to say when violence is moral and when it is not," the "monopoly over legitimate violence" remains largely in the hands of the modern nation-state.[41]

Islam and the state

Overall, Muslim-majority countries exhibit a wide range of official state policies toward religion. In consolidating their government of Turkey, Kemal Atatürk and his reformist allies made an assertive brand of secularism the foundation of the state. Religions, said one of their leaders on the adoption of the 1937 constitutional provision on secularism, "should stay in individual's consciences and temples without intervening in material life and worldly affairs. We are not letting them intervene and we will not let them intervene."[42] At the other extreme is Saudi Arabia where:

> sharia is the constitution of the state, the sole formal source of political legitimacy, and the law of the land or common law. It is avowed as the solitary source of binding norms for the civil and private spheres, shaping and justifying social, communal, and family mores as well as individual morality. And, most fundamentally, sharia is the central conception of the religion to which every Saudi citizen formally belongs, laying down the intricate rules of ritual practices, among them the monumental pilgrimage to the holy places which the kingdom directly administers.[43]

Although neither Dahl nor Tilly, nor any of the major students of democracy cited in Chapter 2 pay particular attention to the question of religion and the state, there was a parallel consensus among Western students of Islam that both democracy and modernization are closely associated with—if not dependent upon—a political system far closer to the secular or Turkish end of this scale than toward the Saudi model. It was also rather generally assumed that Turkey was the exception in the Islamic world and that, as Lewis put it, "the distinction between church and state, so deeply rooted in Christendom, did not exist in Islam."[44] Between the Turkish and Saudi extremes, however, there is in fact a panoply of state–mosque relations that richly illustrate the possible balances and tricky boundary problems faced throughout the world. Of the forty-six Muslim majorities examined by Kuru in 2008, eleven were religious in the Saudi vein, fifteen had established churches and twenty were secular.[45] There is, as can be seen Table 7.2, a slight tendency for the more secular of these regimes to score higher on the Freedom Houses scales

of political rights and civil liberties. The twenty secular regimes averaged scores of 9.6 points in 2013, compared with 9.9 for fifteen with established religions and 11.4 in the eleven exclusively Islamic countries. These differences are probably explained in part by the likelihood that the Freedom House figures themselves—particularly on the civil liberties scale—reflect a measure of secularization: countries with state religions are almost by definition likely to have lower Freedom House scores than those that do not. On balance then the effects of formal state policies toward religion in Muslim majority countries have at best a marginal relationship to democracy and do not seem to be "based on the so-called exceptionalism or political essence of Islam."[46]

Fox's earlier data, from 1990 and 2002, presents a more complex set of indicators measuring both the official level of government involvement in religion and a variety of other ways in which governments can regulate and control religious practices. Government involvement was indeed far higher in the Muslim countries of the Middle East than anywhere else in the world, and restrictions on other faiths are extremely high in a number of Islamic countries: in both Saudi Arabia and the Maldives, for example, all other religions are illegal.[47] The line between church and state is particularly vague in authoritarian regimes, and almost all Muslim-majority countries have at least some laws favoring some sects or religions and restricting others; however—and this is the point many analysts have missed—so do most other countries. As Fox's data set shows, "in 2002, 117 (66.8 percent) of the 175 states supported some religions more than others, and 131 (74.9 percent) engaged in some *religious discrimination* against minorities."[48] The more one focuses on specific cases, the clearer it becomes that there are "multiple secularisms" in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, and in those of all major religious faiths.[49] Timothy Byrnes's study of Catholicism in post-communist Europe, for example, shows that despite the avowedly secular nature of most Eastern European governments, the church wields considerable political influence both indirectly through individual communicants and organizationally at the state and international level.[50]

The more one looks at actual state relations with religious organizations, in fact, the murkier the picture becomes. Turkey, technically, is a secular state, very much the opposite of Saudi Arabia. In actual practice, however, the wall that defends religion *from* the state in Turkey is all but nonexistent. Every practicing Muslim under the age of eighty has uttered the same prayers approved by the state, listened to the same weekly sermons written by the state and learned the same version of Islam approved by the state for use in the schools. Long before the AKP came on to the scene, Turkey's "secular" governments defined what it is to be a Muslim in Turkey. That it is a much more tolerant form of Islam, much less rigidly enforced than that of the Saudis, does not change the fact that it is, in a very practical sense, a state religion.

With the exception of the United States, religion has been in decline in most of the world's more economically advanced countries. The record is

mixed in the rest of the world, however, thus increasing the perceived religiosity gap. Some observers have even gone so far as to suggest the need "to recognize the European process of secularization for what it truly was, namely a particular Christian and post-Christian historical process, and not, as Europeans like to think, a general or universal process of human or social development."[51] Implicitly at least, most studies of democratization have accepted some form of secularism as part of the package of values and rules essential to democracy. While some democratic theorists, as we noted in Chapter 2, have been willing to concede a role for organized religion in providing general moral guidelines, the more common assumption is that the rational political actor in a democracy arrives at his or her preferences free of "outside" (i.e., religious) control. For most students of political science, it was simply assumed that "wherever the modernization process has had an impact, it has contributed to secularization, both social and political,"[52] and that these combined forces of modernization and secularization were necessary if not sufficient preconditions for democratization. Western scholars, journalists and politicians have only recently been able to bring the religious variable into the dialogue of democratization. The discussion here of the relationships between Islam and democracy is thus only part of a wider, emerging dialogue on the more general issues of the role of religion in politics. What is increasingly recognized in this relatively new debate is that the interface between religion and the state—even in many of the supposedly secular states of Europe—is far more extensive than the democratization literature had assumed.

Much of the debate concerning religion and democracy, moreover, and particularly with regard to Islam, has been profoundly distorted by a reversal of the causal connections. It is not so much that undemocratic religious forces have fostered the development of authoritarian regimes, as that these regimes have nurtured and sustained retrograde religions. Through state control of mosques and schools, restrictions are placed on other religions, yes, but most importantly on the kind of Islam celebrated and taught. It is not Muslims acting in religious capacities who enforce interpretations of sharia law that limit human rights, discriminate against women, impose barbaric penalties for crimes, and war on other sects, rather it is state officials enforcing on the citizenry their own interpretations of Islamic law. The laws labeled as sharia in Saudi Arabia are neither made nor enforced by the ulama (though they undoubtedly have some influence). Women who drive in Saudi Arabia are not warned that they will go to hell, but that they will go to jail. Shiite and any versions of sharia other than the particular forms favored by the ruling family are prohibited not as matters of religious preference but as questions of law. While not as rigid or extreme as the Saudis in their control of what kind of sharia law will prevail, most Islamic countries have centralized structures of service delivery and law enforcement that have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, binding authority over what organizations are allowed to operate, and control over their territorial borders. In many of the most repressive

regimes, these laws and institutions enforce versions of Islamic law that are not even those of the majority of the people.

Secularism and democracy

There are a number of ways in which the connections between secularism and democracy are fairly direct, and this is especially visible in countries that have state-run religions. The wall of separation, often depicted as protecting the state from being unduly influenced by religion, actually has the more important function—as strikingly illustrated through its absence in Saudi Arabia—of preventing the state from enforcing its own ideological and power-driven interpretation of religious doctrines. Democratic theory on the whole is highly protective of the right to organize and express opinions that are both secular and profane, though certain exceptions are tolerated, particularly with regard to organizations that themselves do not respect democratic values. Laws such as those in the German constitution that prohibit neo-Nazi parties, and similar rulings that ban parties linked to communism, have historically been passed in a number of countries (including the United States). More recently, a number of religious organizations, defined as "terroristic" have been harassed and proscribed in a number of democracies. And at the furthest extreme are countries like China that ban all religions and Saudi Arabia that bans all but one.

Stepan suggests that the issue is not secularization per se, but what he calls the "twin tolerations," that is:

> the minimal degree of toleration that democracy needs to receive or induce from religion and the minimal degree of toleration that religion (and civil society, more generally) needs to receive or induce from the state for the polity to be democratic. Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them authoritatively to mandate public policy ... or effectively to deny critical freedoms to any citizen. The minimal degree of toleration that religion needs to receive from democracy ... is not only the complete right to worship but the freedom of religious individuals and groups to advance their values in civil society.[53]

This suggests that if secularism is not essential to democracy, there must be at least some liminal point of freedom of the state from control by any one religion on the one hand, and of religions in general to be free of state control on the other.

"Secular" Turkey has long controlled religious practices, and the growing power of the AKP has in turn made it increasingly possible for one religion to control the state. Yet Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian tendencies aside, there are sound grounds to expect Turkey's marginal democratization to survive and even expand. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas suggests

that what makes this point attainable is the ability to distinguish substantive questions about what is right and wrong from procedural questions about how these values can best be achieved. So long as we can agree on the latter, keeping the possibilities of dialogue open, a divided society can at least achieve a utilitarian compromise that makes democracy possible. In theory, this certainly works, and history confirms the efficacy of this solution in many cases. Where it doesn't work very well is where one faith is so dominant and/or so rigid in its doctrines that compromise is deemed neither necessary nor desirable. It took the Europeans more than 100 years between the Protestant Reformation and the Treaty of Westphalia to reach such accommodations. The United States, by the time of its independence, was too pluralistic not to reach a pragmatic consensus; but today, as throughout most of its history, that consensus is not without challenge.

Fox uses two scales, one assessing the extent of government involvement in religion, the other measuring the absence of state support for or regulation of it. Kuru similarly distinguishes what he calls "active" and "passive" models of secularism and state policy. In both studies and in much of the contemporary literature, secularism and state religion are seen not as dichotomous variables but as changing continua of Stepan's twin tolerations. At one extreme of the Muslim world is the Saudi model in which the separation of religion and state is nonexistent. Not only are religions other than Islam illegal, but the state both finances and dictates a very conservative version of Wahhabism with blasphemy punishable by death, and sharp restrictions placed on other interpretations of Islam. Although the Kingdom has increasingly eschewed some of the more brutal interpretations of sharia law, its criminal and civil codes are frequently criticized for discriminating against women and religious minorities, "torture in prisons; intimidation by the religious police; the execution of cruel and unusual punishments, such as beheading, stoning, hanging, amputation, and lashing; and increasing frequency of the use of the death sentence."[54]

Although Saudi Arabia is clearly the outlier, Brunei, the Maldives, Sudan and Turkmenistan are similar in restricting religious minorities and closely blending state and religious laws. As in Saudi Arabia, human rights violations are frequent and often severe; women and religious minorities are discriminated against; and civil liberties few and far between. Only Islam may be taught in the schools. But state power is less blended with religion than imposed, and sharia law is enforced more sporadically and, as a rule, less stringently than in Saudi Arabia. The state's penetration of Islam in these countries is more purely political. Many of their violations of human rights, as Köngden puts it with regard to Sudan, "have no relation to sharia. They must, rather, be attributed to the regime's efforts to stay in power at all costs. Islam, in this context, only serves as one instrument among many others, to attain this goal."[55] There are seven other Muslim-majority countries in which Islam is the state religion. The current situation in Afghanistan is too much in flux to venture even a broad generalization, and there are few clear patterns in

the other six. Some proclaim sharia the law of the land, others more vaguely refer to it as the source of inspiration for all laws, and in all of them it tends in practice to be mixed with local customs and the commercial, criminal and—less frequently—civil codes that are legacies from the respective colonial heritages.

Virtually all of the more secular Muslim countries have faced demands for greater state involvement in religion, and they have sometimes responded. To revert to Habermas's distinction between substantive and procedural acts based on religion, and to Kuru's "active" and "passive" models of secularism, most of these acts have been both passive and substantive. Turkey's easing of prohibitions on veiling are passive in the sense that they don't *require* anything. Ironically, in terms of the Habermas distinction the decision was pro-democracy in the sense that it permitted a previously excluded group of women to participate in parliament, in higher education and in the civil service. Indonesia's pornography law was substantively active, probably discriminatory and certainly offensive to civil libertarians. But it did not substantially affect the political balance of power, that is, the procedural aspect of democracy in Habermas's terms. Whether Muslim-majority states are more likely to play active roles in injecting religious variables into democratic polities is, as we have argued, not as clear as many Westerners seem to believe; but the questions raised by the policy choices made in the world's incipient Muslim democracies have brought the issues of secularism and democracy back into the academic and political arenas.

Muslim democracy

Promoting secularism within Muslim societies is a difficult endeavor, if only because many Muslims see it as a Western concept brought to the Muslim world with colonialism and reinforced by Western support for secular authoritarian regimes. In actual fact, however, most Islamic countries are not alone in mixing religion and politics. Government involvement in religion, as Fox's data clearly show, "remains ubiquitous throughout the world."[56] Between 1990 and 2002, the years included in Fox's survey, involvement increased, though in complex manners of surge and decline. His separation of religion and state index, moreover, found that only about 10 percent of the world's countries were not significantly involved in religion.[57]

In every country, in democracies in particular, the wall between church and state is anything but static: religion flows around whatever barriers are created, seeps through them and sometimes flows over them in a rush. Few religions have ever fully eschewed politics, but many if not most have made an accommodation similar to Stepan's twin tolerations: you leave us alone, we will stick to our business (even if that business sometimes involves political issues). Where Islam is perhaps different is in its general and apparently growing willingness to accept a closer blending of religion and politics in actual governing, and in containing within the community a large, visible and vociferous minority objecting to most such accommodations. "It appears," as

Fox writes with regard to first point, "that in the twenty-first century, states with Muslim majorities, for the most part, seem unable to remain neutral with regard to religion."[58] Yet the fact is that some of these states are considerably more neutral than others. Indeed what has continually confounded our ability fairly to evaluate the relationship between Islam and democracy is an inability or unwillingness to hear Islam's many voices. Echoing a commonly heard perspective, Abdelwahab Meddeb argues that "if Islam is to be cured of its current affliction, it must get to that post-Islamic, postreligious place where Christianity and Judaism have managed to survive."[59] Meddeb himself finds—particularly in the older texts—a far more flexible kind of Islamic thinking; but his opening presumption that Islam as a whole is mired in the past (not to mention the parallel assumption that all Christians and Jews have moved to a contrary "postreligious place") is found all too commonly on the Internet, in the press and even in scholarly writings. This dividing of the world into two camps—one modern, liberal, democratic and enlightened, the other superstitious, rigid, violent and authoritarian—is not only a parody of reality but, in a strange sense, an affirmation of the worldview of the most backward and dangerous Islamists.

There are Muslims, perhaps more numerous than fundamentalist Christians, Jews or Hindus, who continue to call for a closer meshing of religion and politics, even for an Islamic state. These groups, generally labelled as "Islamists," have received the most attention when they combine their calls for an Islamist state with acts of terrorism, war and violence. The most radical of them, such as the recently prominent ISIS, favored the revival of their version of a caliphate, whereby the world's Muslims should live under one Islamic state ruled by sharia law. The very idea of such a caliphate is at best, in Basim Tibi's felicitous phrase, an "invented tradition." In most mainstream Islamic thinking, sharia is not a fixed set of codified laws. It comprises only the clear rules of the Koran and the explanations of them found in the words (*sunnah*) of the Prophet. Over the centuries in which sharia law has been interpreted and applied, scholarly ulama have enunciated numerous legal principles, many of which have developed something like the kind of divine authority that allowed them erroneously to be regarded as part of or equivalent to the sharia. Thus the laws applied by the sharia courts in, say, Aceh, Indonesia—while derived from the same Koranic core of those in, say, Saudi Arabia—are very different in actual content. The idea of a post-Prophet caliphate which combines sacred and secular authority with the power to enforce its own interpretation of divine law has no historic precedent. But the idea that the state can and should have the ability and power to enforce laws based on religious doctrine is neither invented nor confined to Islam. While the more radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have received more coverage in the press, the more important force in the long run is probably that segment of the Islamic public that eschews violence and favors democracy, *and would also like to see a closer blending of religion and politics.*

In many Muslim-majority countries, moreover, the more democratic the nation becomes the more such blending is likely to occur. Liberalization of political life increases the space for religious actors to press for a more robust and assertive role for religion in public affairs. While I think it is clear from the data and analyses presented in this book that Muslim democracy is not an oxymoron, and that the Muslim-majority countries are moving toward democracy at roughly the same pace, and with many of the same prospects and problems of countries at similar stages of post-colonial freedom and economic development, Muslim democracy may prove to be a separate case. By arguing that secularism and the separation of church and state are not part of the core definition of democracy but that the "twin tolerations" are, Stepan has created an opening in the theoretical relationship between religion and democracy. It is an opening that Muslim democrats use to counter the accusation by conservatives that their ideas lack cultural authenticity because they are effectively promoting an anti-Muslim political doctrine (i.e., secular democracy). This change in the political lexicon helps to steer the debate away from emotionally charged terms such as "secularism" and towards more important debates about the necessary boundaries of freedom for elected governments from religious groups, and for religious groups from government—boundaries that a democratic political system requires. The issue "today is how, where, and by whom the proper boundaries between the religious and the secular ought to be drawn. There are in this respect multiple competing secularisms, as there are multiple and diverse forms of religious fundamentalist resistance to those secularisms."[60]

"Islamic political theory and historical experience," as Hayes says, "offers little guidance for appropriate institutional development. This is evident throughout the Muslim world today as several countries struggle to balance political architecture with the demands of Islam."[61] Although it has, ostensibly, experienced four peaceful, electoral transitions few would contend that any of these contests in Iran meet the criteria of fair and free. Minus the veto power and control over nominations exercised by the ayatollah and the Guardian Council, however, something between the Iranian model and Western, secular democracy may be emerging in the Islamic world: the development of "illiberal" electoral democracies that blend mosque and state in ways that violate important freedoms yet leave the practice of popular government largely intact. Such a blending is not new, indeed it is in many ways a throwback to the nineteenth century when countries could be considered "democracies" even as they refused women and racial or ethnic minorities the right to vote, restricted civil liberties, banned some religious practices and showed clear preferences for majority religious groups. The favoring of one religious group over another, patterns of electoral and political discrimination that cross the line from what Habermas called the "substantive" into the "procedural" realm, thus eroding popular sovereignty, is a possible result; but what is emerging with growing clarity in the Muslim world is the outline of a new challenge to the long-tacit link between secularism and democracy. In

both theory and practice, Indonesian Islamic intellectuals and politicians are developing what Hashemi calls an "indigenization of secularism … that has embraced political pluralism, human rights, and the rules of democratic governance."[62]

The dilemma of how to identify the limits of religious authority will arise with increasing frequency in the emergence and consolidation of democracy in countries with strong religions. "In short, the practical or theoretical tensions between Muslim societies and assertive secularism are not based on the so-called exceptionalism or political essence of Islam. Assertive secularism is very likely to be incompatible with any religion that has public claims."[63]

Muslim democracies, as they emerge, may not meet the standards of modern liberal democratic theory. And they may or may not qualify as true democracies at all. But the struggles of countries like Indonesia and Turkey to blend aspirations for democracy with strong religious beliefs will continue to display new ways of reinstating religion as a central societal influence and political player. There is, of course, nothing new about this process; it goes back to Westphalia and before. But what is perhaps most interesting about the question of Muslim democracy is the raising of the question itself, thus forcing political scientists in particular to bring the religious variable back into play.

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"This is a ground-breaking comparative study of the Muslim world's struggle for democracy that transcends the simple cliches and polemics of an oft-asserted 'incompatibility' between the two. The book applies democratization theories to highlight events, factors and solutions explaining 'crucial' cases of Muslim democracy –Turkey and Indonesia– but also broader trends in the nexus between Islam, modernization, and democracy in the Muslim world. Written in an accessible language, the book will provide a valuable guide for students and researchers working in the areas of comparative democratization, Islamic politics, and twilights of democracy, secularism, religion and politics, and human rights in Muslim societies."
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"Sometimes it seems like we have shifted seamlessly from ignoring religion's role in politics to overstating it when it comes to explaining the relative dearth of democracy in Muslim-majority societies. In his challenging and provocative new book, Schneier persuasively insists on the re-emphasis of political factors in accounting for the complex relationship between Islam and democracy across the globe."
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Edward Schneier is professor emeritus of political science at the City College of the City University of New York, USA.

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